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Abstract  
This research endeavors to critically study the state-building inter-
vention in Afghanistan since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 
late 2001. By analyzing field interviews collected from six large Af-
ghan provinces, this dissertation, in particular, explores an alterna-
tive state governmental design at the central level, and examines the 
role of elected provincial councils for decentralization at the sub-
national level in Afghanistan.  
Since the Bonn conference in 2001, the Afghan ethnopolitical elites 
are divided between the Pashtuns for a heavy centralized presidential 
state system, and the non-Pashtuns (mainly Tajik, Hazara, and Uz-
bek) for semi-presidential parliamentarism, among them some advo-
cates for parliamentary federalism. While the 2004 Afghan constitu-
tion adopted a heavy unitary centralized state system. In practice, it 
continued an ethnopolitical elite power-sharing government agreed 
upon at the December 2001 Bonn conference. The findings of this 
study reveal that implementing a non-ethnic-party and merit-based 
democratically elected unitary government as envisioned in the 2004 
Afghan constitution, would neither be accepted by the various ethnic 
groups and parties nor would it be backed by the regional and inter-
national partner countries. A complete federal option also fails to 
have majority Afghan support, nor is it suitable for a geographically 
and socio-politically complex, and economically weak Afghanistan. 
The National Unity Government (NUG) model in place since 2014 
– a somewhat semi-presidential system – has not been successful, 
and the lack of a strong political party system also weakens the ar-
guments for adopting semi-presidentialism. If peace, social justice, 
political stability, good governance, economic development, and na-
tional integration is the optimum goal for system change, Afghans 
need to adopt a unitary ethnic grand-coalition at the center, (a presi-
dent with three vice-presidents with no constitutional pre-specifica-
tion of ethnic status for these executive posts) and a moderate decen-
tralized administration at the sub-national level.   
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This dissertation also finds that the Afghan elected Provincial 
Councils (PC) in place since 2005 are constitutionally week and in 
some instances dominated by warlords and drug mafias. 
Nevertheless, they have proved significant to local governance in 
rural Afghanistan, improving political awareness, the mobilization 
and participation of women, government legitimacy, democracy, and 
economic development. If the Afghan government ever managed to 
make peace with the Taliban, curbed warlordism and corruption, 
then for implementing decentralization, the Afghan PCs are the most 
feasible democratic institution to build on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
AISS       Afghansitan Institute for Stratigic Stidudies  
AREU     Afghanistan Research Eveluation Unit  
CDC        Community Development Council  
CEO        Chief Executive Officer  
CIA         Central Intelligence Agency 
CLJ          Counstitutional Loya Jirga  
DC           District Council  
DDR        Disarmament Demobilization and Reintigeration  
IDLG       Independent Directorate of Local Governance  
ISAF        International Security Assistant Force  
ISI           Inter-services Intelligence  
MP          Member of Parliament  
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organizationa 
NUG       National Unity Government   
OECD    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PC           Provincial Council  
PDC        Provincial Development Council 
SNTV     Single Non-transferable Vote  
USSR      United of Sovit Socilist Rebpublic  
UN          United Nation  
US           United States  
VC          Village Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Glossary  
 
Fiqh                          Islamic Jurisprudence 
Khan/Malik/Big      Traditional community leader  
Jihad                        Holy War   
Jirga/Shura              Consultative Council 
Islamic-Ummah        Islamic-Community   
Meshrano-Jirga       The Upper House of the Afghan Parliament 
Mujahedeen             Holy Warriors or Freedom Fighters  
Pashtunwali             The Pashtun ethnic code of conduct  
Sharia                       The Islamic Law 
Sharwal                    Mayor  
Shura-e-Mili            The National Assembly of Afghanistan  
Wali                         Provincial Governor   
Wolesi Jirga             The Lower House of the Afghan Parliament 
Woluswal                District Governor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Table of Contents 
ERKLÄRUNG................................................................................ 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................. 3 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... 5 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................. 7 
GLOSSARY.................................................................................... 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................. 9 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION .............................................. 13 
1.1 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS, QUESTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE: .... 18 
1.2 METHODOLOGY ..................................................................... 23 
1.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: ..................................... 29 
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ............................................ 37 
CHAPTER 2: PART-I, STATE-BUILDING CONCEPTS AND 
DEFINITIONS ............................................................................. 42 
2.1 STATE-BUILDING AND ITS RELEVANT CONCEPTS ................. 42 
2.2 WHAT IS THE STATE? ............................................................ 48 
PART II: STATE-BUILDING THEORIES .............................. 52 
2.3 CLASSICAL AND DIALECTICAL MODERNIZATION THEORIES: 52 
2.4 THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND THE STATE-
BUILDING STRATEGY ................................................................... 60 
2.5  ‘NEW’- INSTITUTIONALISM THEORY AND THE POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH ......................................................... 62 
2.6 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION THEORY AND STATEBUILDING
 .................................................................................................... 71 
PART-III: A FEW ESSENTIAL STATE-BUILDING 
COMPONENTS ........................................................................... 76 
2.7 STATE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS 
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES ................................................ 76 
2.8 CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES ........ 86 
2.9 FEDERALISM .......................................................................... 92 
2.10 DECENTRALIZATION ............................................................ 97 
2.10.1 Administrative decentralization ................................. 101 
2.10.1.1 Deconcentration .................................................. 101 
2.10.1.2 Delegation ........................................................... 102 
2.10.1.3 Devolution........................................................... 102 
2.10.1.4 Privatization ........................................................ 102 
2.10.2 Political decentralization .......................................... 103 
2.10.3 Fiscal decentralization .............................................. 104 
CHAPTER 3: .............................................................................. 107 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE STATE-BUILDING 
IN MODERN-DAY AFGHANISTAN ..................................... 107 
3.1 STATE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN .............. 107 
10 
 
3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF AN ETHNO-CONFEDERATION 
AFGHANISTAN (1747-1880) ...................................................... 113 
3.3 STATE MODERNIZATION ATTEMPTS (1880-1963) ............... 115 
3.4 THE FIRST AFGHAN ‘DEMOCRACY’ (1964-1953) ................ 120 
3.5 THE FORMATION OF FIRST AFGHAN POLITICAL PARTIES .... 122 
3.6 THE RADICAL SHIFT FROM MONARCHY TO REPUBLICANISM, 
AND THE FAILED ATTEMPT OF COMMUNISM ............................. 125 
3.7 ISLAM AND THE STATE IN AFGHANISTAN: FROM ‘TRADITIONAL 
FUNDAMENTALISM’ TO ‘POLITICAL ISLAM’, AND TO 
FUNDAMENTAL EXTREMISM ...................................................... 127 
3.8 THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL 
ISLAM ........................................................................................ 135 
3.9 THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF TALIBAN (1994-2001) ............... 137 
CHAPTER 4: A CRITICAL ANALYSES OF THE U.S.  
POST-TALIBAN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ... 143 
4.1 THE U.S. POST-TALIBAN NATION AND STATE BUILDING 
INTERVENTION: ......................................................................... 143 
4.2 THE BONN AGREEMENT AND ITS UNFIXABLE FLAWS ......... 146 
4.2.1 Ignoring Peace-Making in Afghanistan: A Prerequisite 
for Nation and State-Building............................................... 150 
4.2.2 The Re-Emergence of Taliban: A Major Obstacle to 
Peace-and State-Building Process ....................................... 154 
4.2.3 Conflicting Regional Interests in Afghanistan ............. 159 
4.2.4 The Installation of Ethnopoltical Elites and Warlords 
into State-men: ...................................................................... 162 
4.2.4.1 The Case of Balkh: The Kingdom of ‘Ustad’ Atta 
Mohammad Noor .............................................................. 164 
4.2.4.2 The Case of Bamyan: The De-facto Capital and 
Power-base of Hazara Elites ............................................. 169 
4.2.4.3 The Case of Herat: The Fiefdom of Ismail Khan . 173 
4.2.4.4 The Case of Nangrahar: Divided between Pashtun 
and Pashayie Ethnic Warlords .......................................... 175 
4.2.4.5 The Case of Kandahar: Divided between Tribal 
Warlords and Elites ........................................................... 178 
CHAPTER 5: .............................................................................. 182 
STATE GOVERNMENTAL DESIGN AND THE AFGHAN 
DISCOURSE .............................................................................. 182 
5.1 THE 2004 AFGHAN CONSTITUTION: AN UNRESOLVED 
CONTROVERSIAL DOCUMENT .................................................... 182 
5.1.1 The Rights of Women:.................................................. 185 
5.1.2 The Role of Islam:........................................................ 187 
5.1.3 The Electoral System: .................................................. 188 
5.1.4 Ethnic Identity vs. National Identity: ........................... 189 
5.2 THE AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL VS. PARLIAMENTARY STATE 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN DISCOURSE ......................................... 192 
5.3 THE AFGHAN PERCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY ........................ 204 
5.4 THE AFGHAN PERCEPTION OF STATE GOVERNMENTAL FORM
 .................................................................................................. 208 
11 
 
5.4.1 The Proponents of Presidential Centralization ........... 211 
5.4.2 The Advocates for a Sort of Parliamentary 
Decentralization: .................................................................. 215 
CHAPTER 6: THE AFGHAN ELECTED PROVINCIAL 
COUNCILS AND THEIR ROLE IN SUB-NATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE ......................................................................... 219 
6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 219 
6.2. PART-I: SUB-NATIONAL FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS .................................................... 220 
6.2.1 Provincial Governor & Administration: ..................... 223 
6.2.2 District Government: ................................................... 226 
6.2.3 Informal Governance of Jirgas and Shuras ................. 227 
PART II: SUB-NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
IN AFGHANISTAN................................................................... 232 
6.3 THE AFGHAN ELECTED PROVINCIAL COUNCILS .................. 232 
6.3.1 The Oversight Authority of the Afghan PCs ................ 237 
6.3.2 Conflict Resolution Role .............................................. 243 
6.3.3 De-Facto Service Delivery: (The Catalytic Role at Local 
Bureaucracy) ........................................................................ 246 
6.3.4 The Bridge between the People and Government:  
Building on State Legitimacy ................................................ 248 
6.3.5 The Increasing Role of Afghan Female PC 
Representatives ..................................................................... 250 
6.3.6 The Changing Face of Local Power: The Power of the 
Gun Leaves its Place to the Power of the Vote..................... 257 
6.3.7 Lack of Enough Financial Means to the PC Led to 
Corruption ............................................................................ 260 
6.3.8 The Elected Provincial Councils and the Power-Sharing 
Battle between Traditional and Newly Emerging Elites. ..... 263 
6.3.8.1 The Case of Balkh ................................................. 265 
6.3.8.2 The Case of Bamyan ............................................. 267 
6.3.8.3 The Case of Herat ................................................. 268 
6.3.8.4 The case of Nangrahar: ......................................... 269 
6.3.8.5 The Case of Kandahar ........................................... 271 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
A FUTURE RESEARCH .......................................................... 272 
7.1 FEW POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE AFGHAN UNITARY 
CENTRALISM ............................................................................. 272 
7.1.2 Federalism for Afghanistan ......................................... 273 
7.1.2 Semi-Presidentialism ................................................... 275 
7.1.3 Unitary Decentralization ............................................. 277 
7.2 THE AFGHAN SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ........................................... 278 
7.2.1 The Afghan PC, a Potential Institution for a Moderate 
and Gradual Devolution? ..................................................... 282 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH PROSPECTS: .......................................... 286 
ANNEX 1: EXPERT INTERVIEW’S QUESTIONAIRE ..... 287 
12 
 
ANNEX 2: THE DARI VERSION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
DECREE ON PC OVERISGT POWER ................................. 289 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................... 290 
ANNEX 3: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TWO 
PASHTU AND    DARI TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEWS 
(PAGE NR 1-20) ......................................................................... 329 
ANNEX 4: TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWS IN 
PASHTU AND DARI LANGUAGES (PAGE NR 21-232) .... 329 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION  
The September 11th terrorist attack was a human tragedy for the peo-
ple of the United States, whereas the United States’ subsequent mil-
itary intervention that led to the toppling of the Taliban Emirate cre-
ated a window of opportunity for lasting peace, democratization and 
economic development for the people of Afghanistan. In November 
2001, while the U.S. was still conducting its military operations (Op-
eration Enduring Freedom) in the Afghan soil, the UN Security 
Council issued resolution ‘1378’, convening an international confer-
ence in Bonn Germany aimed at forming a new government between 
the warring factions in Afghanistan (United Nations Security Coun-
cil, 2001, p. 2). 
The December 5, 2001, Bonn agreement – also known as the Bonn 
Accord – produced a series of sequencing state-building steps in-
cluding a six-month interim government, the emergency Loya Jirga 
(grand council) for the formation of a two-year transitional govern-
ment, and the constitutional Loya Jirga for establishing a new Af-
ghan constitution for a permanent government (Rubin B. R., 2004).  
Nevertheless, the Bonn peace and state-building opportunity was 
damaged right from the beginning by hasty and reckless policy de-
cisions of the U.S., Afghan, and U.N. key stakeholders between 
2001-2004. The Taliban – one of the key conflict groups – were not 
only excluded from the talks, but were also mercilessly killed or tor-
tured at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. The Taliban’s almost 
defeated enemy, the ex-Mujahedeen warlords – were brought back 
to state power overnight. This undoubtedly led to the rebirth of the 
Taliban insurgency in the following years, more violent than ever 
before. Empowering the warlords and bringing them into the gov-
ernment led to a corrupt and weak government establishment in Ka-
bul. In the following years, this caused civilians in many rural areas 
of the country to turn to the Taliban for maintaining justice and se-
curity.   
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The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan could be justified based on 
what Eric A. Heinze (2009 ) would call ‘self-defense’ or Andrea 
Kathryn Talentino (2005)  ‘global ‘security’. Nevertheless, it should 
be equally criticized for its subsequent ill-advised peace- and state-
building policies in the Afghan complex sociopolitical context. Berit 
Beliesemann de Guevara (2012), notes that the international state-
builders’ attempt to export modern ‘liberal peace’, democracy, 
‘internationalization and depoliticization’ policy and practices to 
non-western societies aim at building states and (good) governance, 
yet ignore quite different historical and social dynamics and 
processes. According to Beliesemann de Guevara (2012) since state-
building is a complex interaction between local, national and 
international actors, the institutionalization of power as a legitimate 
rule/actor requires the utilization of ‘strategies and tactics’ the 
application of which often produces diverse ‘reactions’ including 
‘resistance, cooperation and manipulation’ (Bliesemann de Guevara, 
2012).  
In the Afghan context, while the warlords collaborated with the U.S. 
and the international community for their own political and financial 
interests, the Taliban resisted for their own survival. The U.S. in 
euphory of winning the Afghan war quite easily those days did not 
bother to take fundamental steps for restoring sustainable peace and 
government order. 
Among the fatal peace and state-building flaws, one was the imple-
mentation of a contradictory state institutional design in the 2004 
Afghan constitution. According to Rubin and others, the Afghans 
were divided based on the ethnopolitical identity of Pashtuns versus 
non-Pashtun (this includes mainly the chief groups Tajiks, Hazara, 
and Uzbek), in which the former insisted on a unitary centralized 
state system, whereas the other opted for a parliamentary decentral-
ization, some among them even demanding federalism (Rubin B. R., 
2004),  (Maley, 2013) & (Malejacaq, 2016). It was the intervention-
ists – the U.S. and its NATO allies – which pushed its various indig-
enous yet rival cooperatives – the Northern Alliances warlords and 
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the Zahir Shah diaspora group –  to align on some state governmental 
modality. Eventually, a heavy unitary centralized system was agreed 
in the 2004 constitution, whereas in practice an ethnolinguistic 
power-sharing government of mainly non-Pashtuns warlords and the 
diaspora Pashtuns headed by Hamid Karzai continued until late 
2014.  
To ensure his winning, Karzai –  an ethnic Pashtun – had chosen 
both of his vice-presidents from among the most influential Tajik 
and Hazara warlords during the 2004 and 2009 presidential elec-
tions. To secure the consent of his Uzbek ethnic ally, General Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, Karzai had to award him the post of Afghan Na-
tional Army (ANA) chief of staff. Moreover, Karzai had to share 
cabinet positions with both of his vice presidents and General Dos-
tum. Likewise, to maintain his government’s sub-national power, 
leading warlord commanders of all major ethnic groups were pro-
moted to governorships and other high-ranking government posi-
tions.  
Meanwhile, the heated divide over a state governmental modality 
never ended even after the approval of the 2004 constitution. As soon 
Karzai purged some of the non-Pashtun ethnopolitical elites from 
government positions, they went on building political alliances and 
demanding change from a unitary centralized system to parliamen-
tary federalism. The establishment of Etelaf-Mili or Afghanistan Na-
tional Front by some of the former Northern Alliances warlords dur-
ing 2010 and 2012, for example, was widely supported by the anti-
unitary centralization advocates in the country. The U.S. Republican 
congressmen headed by Dana Rohrabacher were also backing the 
initiative (Ruttig, 2012). 
The formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) in Septem-
ber 2014 officially recognized that a unitary centralized state system 
was no longer acceptable for the majority of the non-Pashtun politi-
cal elites. Following a long-disputed presidential election, Abdullah 
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Abdullah, the losing candidate refused to accept the final results of 
the second-round elections. Alleging widespread fraud, Abdullah 
and his supporters warned of violence and the formation of a parallel 
government if the election commission were to announce his oppo-
nent, Ashraf Ghani, the winner (Wörmer N., 2014). Hence, the U.S. 
and the UN intervened to sort out a political settlement that resulted 
in the formation of the NUG. In apparent contradiction to the Afghan 
constitution, the NUG agreement created a Chief Executive position 
equivalent to a prime minister post for the losing candidate Abdallah 
along with fifty percent of the cabinet seats. The agreement also 
stated that within two years of the NUG, the Loya Jirga (Grand As-
sembly) would be convened to amend the state constitution to 
change the present presidential to a semi-presidential system.  
No doubt, the NUG agreement facilitated a peaceful handover of 
power. Nevertheless, it clearly undermined the young Afghan de-
mocracy among the ordinary citizens, who besides all security chal-
lenges went to the polling centers, hoping to elect their next presi-
dent. Furthermore, some critical articles agreed in the NUG docu-
ment remained unimplemented, including the inauguration of the 
Loya Jirga for amending the constitution. While the next presidential 
elections are scheduled for early 2019, the fate of the NUG agree-
ment in general and the Chief Executive post in particular, remained 
unclear. 
Thus, taking the above stated institutional design puzzle and the eth-
nopolitical divide over the issue into consideration, this dissertation 
partly attempts to find reasonable answers to the questions on state 
institutional design in Afghanistan in the long run.  
The elected Afghan provincial councils and their increasing role at 
the subnational administration is another major theme; this disserta-
tion deals with. Adopting a heavy centralized administrative struc-
ture in an ethno-politically divided society like Afghanistan causes 
political instability. The increasing role of the elected provincial 
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councils and the influential warlords at the sub-national governance 
have repeatedly challenged the central government authorities.  The 
heavily centralized administration adopted in the 2004 Afghan con-
stitution gave executive authority only to sectoral ministries and in-
dependent directorates in the capital Kabul. In theory, the Afghan 
province, designated as the ‘local administrative unit' sub-nationally 
in the constitution (2004, Article One Hundred Thirty-Six), holds no 
real political, administrative and fiscal autonomy of its own.  In prac-
tice, however, depending on which warlord has influence in the 
province, the local councils may have a larger role.     
For the first time in the Afghan history, the 2005 fully elected pro-
vincial councils (PC) increasingly changed the local versus central 
political dynamics. Though constitutionally weak, and still heavily 
influenced by major local warlords, nevertheless the PC’s fully dem-
ocratic nature created a vibrant political transformation locally. Its 
political representation role at the province level created deep polit-
ical awareness among the local citizens. Their limited oversight au-
thority not only challenged the local government administrations for 
accountability but also repeatedly alerted the central government for 
reviewing its sub-national policies.    
The PC’s role and functions are very much significant to the Afghan 
sub-national administration. No matter which (centralized or decen-
tralized) administrative system the Afghan government might adopt 
in the future, the present democratic provincial councils would prove 
more effective in local governance if equipped with real power and 
precise mechanisms of its implementation. Supplemented with qual-
itative field research this dissertation has studied the Afghan PCs 
painstakingly in a separate chapter.     
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1.1 Research Hypothesis, Questions and Significance: 
Of course, the constitution is a document that can be amended. The 
constitution shall be respected. Its implementation is essential and 
requires a strong determination by the nation. However, the consti-
tution is not the Quran. If five or ten years down the line we find that 
stability improves, proper political parties emerge, and we judge 
that a parliamentary system can function better, then a Loya Jirga 
can at a time of our choosing be convened to adopt a different system 
of government.   (Hamid Karzai January 4, 2004) 
The above statement is part of the closing speech by Hamid Karzai 
–  by a then interim president of Afghanistan –  to the participants of 
Constitutional Loya Jirga  (CLJ) in January 2004.  At the CLJ meet-
ing, Karzai acknowledged that the bulk of his non-Pashtun – mainly 
Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbek – countrymen were unhappy with the 
adoption of a heavily centralized presidential system. To calm down 
the non-Pashtun opponents of Presidentialism, Karzai assured the 
possibility of adopting a parliamentary system through amending the 
constitution in the near future.  
The well-known scholar on Afghanistan, Barnet R. Rubin –  who 
was also actively involved at the Bonn state-building process for Af-
ghanistan –  highlights from his notes from the CLJ that “nearly all 
Pushtun delegates, joined by some members from other ethnic 
groups, came out for a presidential system. A bloc of non-Pushtun 
delegates, however, strongly supported a parliamentary system. Both 
sides made cases that mixed genuine public considerations with eth-
nopolitical ambitions” (Rubin B. R., Crafting a Constitution for Af-
ghanistan, 2004, p. 12). Although the 2004 constitution adopted a 
heavy unitary centralized state system, the government formed a de-
facto ethnopolitical elite coalition, sharing power with various local 
power-holders. While Karzai, a Pashtun became the president, the 
two vice-presidents and other vital ministerial posts were given to 
the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek Northern Alliances parties. At the sub-
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national government level, the provincial and district governor posi-
tions were also handed over to those local warlords who already con-
trolled the areas.  
Historically too, Afghanistan has always remained a unitary central-
ized state in theory, while, in practice, the central government rulers 
had to either conquer or compromise with the local ethno-tribal 
elites.  
Following the fraudulent and disputed presidential elections in Sep-
tember 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State’s John Kerry mediated a 
power-sharing arrangement, known as the National Unity Govern-
ment (NUG), between the second-round two leading candidates, 
Ashraf Ghani, and Abdullah Abdullah.  The NUG agreement for-
mally recognized the ethnopolitical power-sharing government 
through a unique style of semi-Presidentialism arrangements by cre-
ating a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) post – somewhat similar to a 
prime minister position –  for Abdullah Abdullah. The agreement 
also called on “convening of a Loya Jirga to amend the (2004) con-
stitution and considering the proposal to create a post of an executive 
prime minister” within two years of its deal (The ‘government of 
national unity’ deal (full text), 2014). While the NUG government is 
soon to enter its final year of the five-year period, the constitutional 
Loya Jirga has not been taken place so far. Furthermore, the deal also 
insisted on the ‘equal’ distribution of ‘senior officials’ of the gov-
ernment at national and local levels (The ‘government of national 
unity’ deal (full text), 2014).   
Although the prerequisites ‘stability and the emergence of proper 
political parties’ noted by Karzai in 2004 are not yet in place, the 
NUG arrangements revived the ethnopolitical divide over the state, 
which stemmed from the Bonn state-building discourse in 2001. If it 
ever happens that the Afghan political elites reach to a consensus on 
amending the constitution, the question on which alternative state 
governmental form would suit better the Afghan context would be a 
matter of discourse. Hence, the outcome of this research would not 
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only add to the academic discourse of the post-conflict and ethnopo-
litical fragmented democracies but also serve as a policy proposal 
for the case of Afghanistan.   
As discussed in detail below, the state-institutional design is a sig-
nificant component of the state-building process. According to 
Stefan Wollf: 
The underlying assumption of the state-building literature, in 
other words, is that peace can be facilitated through an insti-
tutional bargain that establishes macro-level structures 
through which micro-level rewards are provided to elites 
(and their supporters), giving them incentives to resolve their 
differences by democratic political, non-violent means. 
(Wollf, 2011, p. 1779) 
Wollf’s observation leads us to one of the critical hypotheses of this 
dissertation. I argue that ignoring peace-making – as one the most 
significant precondition for state-building –at the 2001 Bonn confer-
ence, resulted in the return of the Taliban insurgency and prolonga-
tion of the Afghan conflict. Based on the state-building intervention-
ist theory, chapter three of this thesis briefly analyses the cause and 
consequences of the U.S. intervention and its peace and state-build-
ing failure in Afghanistan. The first hypothesis is tested in chapter 
four.   
The second hypothesis of this dissertation is that the Afghan ethno-
political elites are divide over the state-institutional design – in 
which the Pashtuns resist for a unitary centralization, whereas the 
non-Pashtuns advocate for a parliamentary decentralization. By 
providing extensive incentives to the anti-Taliban coalition of the 
Northern Alliances at the ground and the Bonn processes, also led to 
the lack of a genuine bargain over the state institutional design in the 
Afghan context. The second hypothesis is tested in chapter four and 
five.  
Besides testing the above-stated hypophyses, the present research 
studies state-building in Afghanistan mainly from the perspective of 
state-institutional design (unitary centralization vs. parliamentary 
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decentralization) at the national level. Based on the field research, it 
also attempts to find the role of the 2005 elected provincial councils 
at the sub-national administration for a possible decentralization. 
Following are some of the critical questions which this dissertation 
aims to undertake for the discussion.  
1.    How far are the Afghan ethnopolitical elites divided over state-
institutional design? 
2.    Taking the ethnopolitical divisions of the Afghan elites and the 
present security, sociopolitical, and economic conditions of the 
country into consideration, is the current presidential system appro-
priate or is there a need for an alternative model? 
3.    The Afghan democratic provincial councils (PCs) are complet-
ing their third successive term in March 2019. What role do they play 
at the sub-national administrations? What has been improved in their 
role, authority, and performance since their establishment in Septem-
ber 2005? 
4.    Taking the elected PCs as a prerequisite for local democracy, 
good governance, and decentralization, is Afghanistan ready to 
transform into a decentralized government administration? If yes, 
which kind of decentralization fits into the Afghan context?  
The first question attempts to test the hypothesis, by finding how far 
the Afghan political elites are divided over state-institutional design.  
It follows the post-Bonn constitutional discourse over the state-gov-
ernmental design in which Pashtun political elites opted for a presi-
dential centralization and the non-Pashtun for parliamentary decen-
tralization, few of whom demanded Federalism. I argue that the U.S. 
as the key architect of the Bonn processes, through its threat and in-
centive policy made the non-Pashtun Afghan elites to compromise 
over present unitary centralized system in Afghanistan.  
Based on the theoretical foundation for existing classical democra-
cies around the world including Juan J. Linz’s (1990) Parliamentar-
ism, Donald L. Horowitz’s (1990) Presidentialism, Maurice Duver-
ger’s (1980) semi-Presidentialism, and Lijphart`s (1977 & 
2002/2003) consociational democracy, the second question seeks to 
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find out which system would fit best the Afghan context. The first 
two questions are mainly concerned with state-building and its insti-
tutional design at the national government level.  
Any alternative proposal to the present presidential centralization 
brings the sub-national government institutions into the discussion, 
which leads us to our third and fourth questions. The third question 
aims to study the elected provincial councils’ role, functions, and 
capacity, since its first-time establishment in September 2005. 
Strong local democratic institutions are considered as the prerequi-
site for decentralization in the academic literature. Hence, taking the 
present status and capacity of the PCs, question four test the applica-
bility for a possible decentralization model in the Afghan context.  
Although the author briefly evaluated the historical context as soci-
opolitical background knowledge for its reader, the Bonn process in 
2001 until the establishment of the NUG government in 2014 is con-
sidered as the main timeframe for this dissertation.    
The focus of this study is primarily on Afghan state central institu-
tional design and is also democratic provincial councils-centric. The 
author is aware that the sub-national state and its actors are not the 
only players involved in contemporary state-building and its reform 
agenda. Nevertheless, owing to the time and scope of this research 
project, the focus is on the elected provincial councils and their role 
and impact on a broader state-building reform project in Afghani-
stan.   
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1.2 Methodology 
The qualitative research methodology makes the foundation of this 
dissertation. The data used in this study comprised both secondary 
academic sources and materials, as well as the author's own field re-
search in Afghanistan. The secondary source materials used in this 
study includes a wide range of academic books, journals, research 
publications and papers, survey materials, the Afghan government, 
and international donor organization's policy papers, and finally in-
vestigative reports and articles from credentialed Afghan and inter-
national media outlets. 
The primary desk-based research is done in author's home university 
library – the University of Erfurt, Thuringia federal state of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. Due to family reasons, on June 2015, the 
author moved to Frankfurt am Main – Hessen federal state of Federal 
Republic of Germany – where he was based in the library of Goethe 
University. Both Erfurt and Goethe University libraries have exten-
sive access to a wide range of academic source materials and facili-
ties (including access to online databases of other academic institu-
tions) on the field. However, there has been limited access to Af-
ghanistan specific source materials, particularly access to materials 
published and available only in local Afghan languages of Pashtu 
and Dari. 
Fortunately, this problem has been overcome largely by author's 
multiple visits to Afghanistan including two months field research, 
where the library of Kabul University has been used for this purpose. 
Though a majority of the secondary source materials used in this 
study are in the English language, however, sources in Pashtu, Dari, 
and German languages are also used as needed. While Pashtu and 
Dari are the author's mother tongues, he has comprehensive com-
mand of the German language due to his living, studying and work-
ing in Germany for  eight years. 
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In addition to secondary data, field research makes the significant 
part of this dissertation. Due to inferior security conditions across 
Afghanistan, the field research was considered mainly in one phase 
that lasted from 10th March until 24th April 2016. However, one 
spontaneous interview was conducted in September 2017, in Kabul 
– a trip made primarily for personal purposes by the author.   
From the 34 Afghan provinces six large provinces including Kabul, 
Kandahar, Balkh, Bamyan, Herat, and Nangarhar were chosen for 
conducting the field research. The key reasons behind the selection 
of the above provinces for field research comprise the de-facto eth-
nolinguistic power-politics of the warlords and their influence on na-
tional and sub-national government institutions including the elected 
provincial councils. While the capital Kabul is the largest populated 
city for all major ethnic groups in Afghanistan and the home for na-
tional politics, the remaining five provinces have their significance 
in respect to being the home and power-base for major ethnolinguis-
tic groups and political parties in sub-national politics. For example, 
Kandahar remained the capital for Pashtun tribal, ethnic groups and 
the birthplace for influential Pashtun political leaders and move-
ments including the Taliban, ex-President Hamid Karzai and his 
family, and general Raziq– to point out just a few of the historical 
figures and movements of the last two-decades. Nangrahar is another 
Pashtun dominant province in eastern Afghanistan, and also the de-
facto power-base for the Tajik dominant Northern Alliances warlord 
group including the Pashtun Qadir family ( Abdul Qadir and his son 
Zahir Qadir) and the Pashaie ethnic Ali family (Hazrat Ali and his 
son Ahmad Ali) – again to mention just a few prominent figures. 
Herat is a dominant Tajik province and is identified with the promi-
nent Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society) party leader and warlord Is-
mail Khan. Balkh, though a multi-ethnic province, nevertheless re-
mains the battle-ground for power between the dominant Tajik Ja-
miat-e-Islami party of Atta Mohammad Noor and the Uzbek Junbish 
(Movement) party of Abdul Rashid Dostum. Finally, Bamyan is 
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known as the capital of the Hazara ethnic group, de-facto ruled by 
the Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami (Islamic Unity Movement) party of Ka-
rim Khalili. 
The conducted field research is primarily based on qualitative expert 
and elite interviews. The Afghan elected Provincial Council (PC) 
members make the main target group for interviewing in this re-
search. The PC members could be primarily considered as elites, due 
to their functional power and position but also experts due to their 
specific knowledge in the field. According to Beate Littig (2009), 
there is no fundamental difference between the elite and expert in-
terviews from the methodological point of view and research ap-
proach. The only difference between elite and experts' interviews lies 
behind the ‘differing social and political sciences research traditions 
and interests'   (p. 98). A clear understanding of the elite and expert 
interviews and their overlapping commonalities could be extracted 
from the Littig`s  (2009) following lines: 
It concludes with a sociology of knowledge-based appeal that 
the (professional) functional elite – given their positions of 
power – be considered as a specific group of experts. From a 
methodological perspective and as a result of their specific 
interpretive knowledge ("know why") and procedural 
knowledge ("know-how"), experts (and thus also the elite) 
are of relevance to social and political sciences research. 
Consequently, interviews with the elite aimed at generating 
explicit, tacit, professional or occupational knowledge 
should be seen as expert interview.  (pp. 98-99) 
Moreover, as it revealed in our test-interview with the IDLG person-
nel1, the majority of the PC members possess double roles; (1) the 
formal elected representation positions at the PC, and (2) the infor-
                                                          
1, the IDLG is the primary liaison office between the Afghan PCs and the central 
government. Besides other responsibilities, the IDLG provides regular capacity 
building courses for the PC members across the country. 
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mal local community elite role, including tribal elder, Jihadi com-
mander, religious scholar (e.g. Mullah), spiritual elite (e.g. Sufi Pir), 
civil society activist or member of a political party. In addition to the 
above-listed elites, interviews are also conducted with other experts 
including government employees, members of informal community 
councils, civil society actors and Taliban shadow-government mem-
bers. 
The exploratory research approach is considered for developing in-
terview questions. Bernt Reiter (2013) exclusively describe the ex-
ploratory research approach in the following paragraph:  
We can spend hours debating what "democracy," or "citizen-
ship" really is. However, this discussion is beside the point. 
What exploratory research focuses on is to what reality a 
word like "democracy" refers to. What does democracy mean 
in Colombia today? What does it mean to a poor campesino, 
a black Chocoano, or an indigenous tribe member from Vau-
pés? We need to dissect, to analyze by pulling apart, words 
from the reality they refer to and, as exploratory social scien-
tists, we should focus on the reality, not the words. This 
means, in most cases, that we need to look for indicators that 
tell us something about the reality represented by a word.  (p. 
6) 
To summarize Reiter, exploratory research is concerned with the 
world ‘reality' of concepts and approaches that depend on different 
contextual conditions. This approach is significant to the present 
study, as it dwells not only into the post-2001 state building inter-
vention in Afghanistan from the international standard principles 
perspective but also from the Afghan elite and contextual perspec-
tive. It is attempting to draw an Afghan solution to the problem and 
thereby, the Afghan perspective is considered significant for finding 
answers to the questions. In other words, it is critical to know what 
and how the Afghan elite perceive the state-building concepts and 
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mechanisms including democracy, state-institutional design at the 
central (unitary centralization and the debate around possible alter-
natives) and local (democratic provincial councils and its role in de-
centralization) levels. As Littig (2009) also notes that in exploratory 
expert interviews “members of the elite serve as sources of infor-
mation on specific areas of knowledge that would otherwise be in-
accessible” (p. 101). Thus, considering the explorative research ap-
proach, field interviews were designed in a semi-structured and 
open-ended questionnaire format. According to Nigel King and 
Christine Horrocks  (2010), semi-structured interviews provide par-
ticipants the opportunity to present their understandings of the con-
cepts and phenomena through sharing individual experiences (p. 16).   
In total, the author conducted thirty-nine semi-structured interviews 
in six large provinces, respectively ten in Kabul, eight in Herat, three 
in Kandahar, six in Jalalabad, six in Balkh and six in Bamyan prov-
ince. From out of a total forty-two interviews, thirty-two were con-
ducted with PC members and the reaming ten with government offi-
cials, tribal elders, members of community development councils 
(CDCs), civil society activists and Taliban shadow-governments 
leading officials. 
Based on their prior request2 the author conducted a group discussion 
interview with Kandahar PC members, while the remaining thirty-
one interviews were in individual or one-to-one session manner. The 
group discussion with Kandahar PC members comprised seven rep-
resentatives from whom three were female, and the remaining four 
were male participants. Moreover, based on interviewees' prior re-
quest, five interviews, (three with Taliban officials in Herat and Ka-
bul, and two with civil society activists in Kandahar and Balkh) are 
conducted in an off-the-record manner, the remaining interviews are 
                                                          
2, before conducting the field research, the author considered individual inter-
views for his field research. However, in Kandahar province, PC members after 
consulting with their chairman proposed only group interview with the author. 
Consequently, seven PC members (three female and four male) agreed to par-
ticipate in a group discussion of nearly half an hour. 
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all recorded. In addition, to snow-ball technique, the author used his 
contact networks3   
The length of interviews varies from person to person, encompassing 
around five to forty minutes each. With total fifteen open-ended 
questions, the author designed the semi-structured questionnaire in 
three main sections; the demographic section; the local governance 
section; and Central Governance section4. Taking the sensitivity of 
the issue into consideration, the author prepared the questionnaire 
not only in both Afghan national languages of Pashto and Dari but 
also conducted as wished by the interviewee either in Pashtu or 
Dari5. From out of 42 interviews, 20 interviews were conducted in 
Dari language and remaining in Pashtu.  
Moreover, due to limited (25% reserved quota based on the Afghan 
electoral law) participation of Afghan women in the PC, attempts 
were made to interview as many females as possible. From out of 
thirty-two interviews with PC representatives, the author managed 
to interview nine female PCs respectively three in Kandahar, two in 
Kabul, and the remaining four (one in each) in Balkh, Bamyan, Herat 
and Nangarhar provinces. 
The recorded interviews are transcribed together with the help of na-
tive Afghans who had fluent commend on both national languages 
of Pashto and Dari. The author analyzed the transcribed text through 
content analyses method. The inaccessibility to computer-based cod-
ing software for both Pashtu and Dari languages led the author to 
work with the data manually. The direct quotes woven in the study 
are translated from Pashtu and Dari into the English language by the 
author himself. Efforts have been made to deliver the exact massage 
                                                          
3 for reaching out to the informants across six chosen provinces. The author is 
of Afghan origin, who lived most of his life in Afghanistan. From January 2008 
until March 2011 the author worked as a legislative program officer for the 
United State Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Afghan par-
liament in Kabul. 
4 Annex 1 is the English copy of the questionnaire specified for the PC members.    
5. The author is native Pashtun from Kabul and has fluent command on Dari lan-
guage too. 
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while translating. The author’s previous experiences as official 
translator for Pashtun and Dari to English and vice versa with inter-
national organizations was an asset in this regard.        
Besides interviews, the author also applied observation and partici-
pation method in this study. The author collected notes during his 
attendance at several provincial council's members' sessions and 
meetings with the constituencies during the field research. The col-
lected notes are paraphrased, and quoted word for word and are high-
lighted via footnotes in this dissertation.  
1.3 An Overview of the Literature: 
State-building is amongst the blurred and multifaced term in 
academic literature, as well as in its policy approach. It encompasses 
a wide range of interdisciplinary meanings, applications and 
outcomes, including building peace, security, legitimacy, 
institutions, democracy, good governance and economic 
development in the following literature: (Huntington, 1968 &1991), 
(Martinussen, 1997), (Battera, 2003), (Caplan, 2004), (Fukuyama, 
2004), (Fukuyama, 2004 & 2005), (Brinkerhoff, 2005), (von 
Bogdandy, Häußler, Hanschmann, & Utz, 2005), (Scott, 2007), 
(Grindle, 2007), (Wesley, 2008), (Grävingholt, Gänzle, & Ziaja, 
2009), (Chandler, 2010),  (Wollf, 2011), (Van de Walle & Scott, 
2011), (Marquette & Beswick, 2011) (Maley, 2013), (Podder, 2014), 
(M. Gisselquist, 2014) & (Grotenhuis, 2016). Different perceptions 
among scholars of state-building and its relevant concepts are 
elaborated under another title in chapter two. 
With respect to state-building in Afghanistan, numerous literatures 
(Rubin B. R., 2002; 2004; 2006; 2013 & 2016), (Maley, 2004; 2013 
& 2018), (Nixon, 2008), (Lister S. , 2007), (Brahimi, 2007), 
(Schetter & Mielke, 2008), (Berman, 2010), (Edwards, 2010), 
(Ganapathiraju & Miske, 2012), (Podder, 2014), (Young Greven, 
2014), (Monten, 2014), (Keane, 2016) and (Edward, 2017) have 
made significant contributions from various perspectives including 
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that of security, peace-making, nation and state-formation, 
reconstruction, donor engagements etc.  
Several academic works have studied Afghanistan, from third-party 
state-building – also known as the international or humanitarian in-
tervention – perspective, among them (Rubin B. R., 2006). (Schetter 
& Mielke, 2008), (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008),  (Münch, 2013), (Edward, 
2017). For Heinze  and others, the rationale for international inter-
vention is the act of interference by a state, an organization of a 
group of states (e.g. in the case Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO), 
or an international organization (United Nations) in another state - 
with or without using force - aiming at ending ‘violent' oppression 
and atrocities or other human rights violations committed by a ruling 
government regime on its own people  (Heinze, 2009 ) & (Trim & 
Simms, 2011). However, as Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo (2008) 
also note, the US-led international intervention in Afghanistan was 
primarily driven by ‘self-security’ ‘with no clear strategies for long-
term stabilization, state-building or development’ (2008, p. 641).  
The Taliban Emirate’s refusal to surrender Usama bin Laden – leader 
of the Al-Qaida organization and the suspect of the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks – led to the US-led NATO military invasion in Afghanistan. 
The U.N. sponsored the Bonn haste process, aiming at the stabiliza-
tion and a political settlement in Afghanistan following the US-mil-
itary invasion in late 2001. Thus, it is also at this juncture that the 
academic literature critically reviews the Bonn arrangements and its 
following state-building process.  
For instance, in his paper, Peace Building and State-Building in Af-
ghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security? Barnett R. 
Rubin (2006),  analyses post-Taliban state-building intervention 
based on the ‘combined’ ‘mobilization’ of three key statehood ele-
ments of ‘coercion, capital and legitimacy’ (pp. 176-178). According 
to Rubin (2006), historically, foreign aid (state capital) was the key 
to the mobilization of the Afghan rulers for building political coer-
cion (military) and legitimacy to form states. However, the end of 
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the Cold War in the early 90s and the global war on terror in 2001 
changed the terms of conditions for state-building in general, and for 
Afghanistan in particular  (p. 178).  
Rubin (2006) notes that the dominating role of the U.S. obstructed 
the UN coordinating position in all the state-building operations in 
Afghanistan. Empowering warlords through military and financial 
assistance, excluding the Taliban – as one of the main parties to the 
conflict – from the Bonn talks, and the failure to co-ordinate foreign 
aid are listed by Rubin (2006, pp. 180-183), Maley (2013) and Ah-
mad Rashid (2008/2009 & 2010) as the significant factors blocking 
the way towards Afghan state sustainability. Although Rubin ob-
serves that the UN involvement, the international consensus on the 
intervention, and the application of liberal democracy were some of 
the relatively positives outcomes of the Bonn process, and conducive 
to local legitimacy (2006, pp. 183-184). Nevertheless, I argue that 
some major flaws in the Bonn process (listed by Rubin and others 
above) resulted in the rebirth of insurgency, political deadlocks, cor-
ruption and the lack of rule of law in the following years. This not 
only gradually reduced the state legitimacy locally, but also weak-
ened the consensus supporting the US-led intervention in Afghani-
stan regionally and internationally. 
While the international intervention is highlighted as counterproduc-
tive for local governance, in the first place by Chandler  (2010), the 
lack of contextual knowledge and ‘what constitutes’ local ‘legiti-
macy’ is noted as the ‘major problem’ of the ‘imposed state-building 
projects’ by Edwards (2010, p. 16). According to Edwards (2010), 
the US-led international state-building strategies stem from the 
Western statehood modality that is incompatible to a ‘hybrid politi-
cal order' and ‘fragile' social context like Afghanistan  (p. 16).  
Nevertheless, citing Ullmann-Margalit (1977),  Maley (2013) be-
lieves that “On occasion it may be a good idea to attempt a break 
from ‘traditional’ ways of doing things that privilege the power of 
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some aspirants over others by entrenching norms of partiality” (pp. 
256-257). Maley (2013) continues that besides ‘local history’ and 
‘culture’ the Afghan state-building enterprise is ‘subject’ to ‘inter-
nationally accepted’ ‘norms’ including ‘human rights and the laws 
of armed conflict,' as well as ‘democratic governance' (p. 257).  
A separates chapter in this dissertation critically analyzes the Bonn 
process and its outcomes in the following years.  
The present research is mainly concerned with state-building in Af-
ghanistan from the perspective of state-institutional design (presi-
dential vs. parliamentary) at the national level and the role of 2005 
elected provincial councils at the sub-national administrative struc-
ture for a possible decentralization. Therefore, the author briefly re-
viewed some of the relevant literature. 
Scholars on Afghanistan agrees that Afghan political elites are eth-
nically divided on state-institutional design, in which the Pashtuns 
opt for presidential centralization, whereas the non-Pashtuns (mainly 
Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbeks) for a sort of parliamentary decentraliza-
tion, and among them some even wish for federalism (Malikyar & 
Rubin, 2002), (Goodson L. , 2003), (Rubin B. R., 2004) & (Rubin & 
Gagnon, 2016). This discourse is equally divided between academic 
scholars too.   
The pragmatic rationale for adopting a robust presidential centrali-
zation in 2004 – aiming at demobilizing various warlord groups and 
maintaining Afghan national integration –  has been acknowledged 
by several scholars including  (Smith J. P., 2001), (Goodson L. , 
2003), (Rubin B. R., 2004), (Berman, 2010), (Nuruzzaman, 2010) 
and (Smith O. M., 2018) and strongly supported by some others 
(Zakhilwal, 2001, ph. 16), (Berman, 2010, pp. 7-9) & (Khalilzad, 
2016, p. 195).  
Following field research in 2002, Malikyar and Rubin (2002) pro-
posed the Afghan constitution drafting commission for   “a state 
structure (for Afghanistan) that is unitary enough to unite the country 
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and decentralized enough to permit real participation to a popula-
tion” (p. 46). In another place, Rubin and others concretely promote 
a presidential system with the devolution of power to sub-national 
government structures (Rubin B. R., 2013),  (Ghai, 2003),  (Selassie, 
2003), (Ganapathiraju & Miske, 2012).   
Nonetheless, taking the ethnolinguistic fragmented nature of the Af-
ghan context into consideration, some academic discourse heavily 
weighs on parliamentary federalism among them (Shahrani, 2001; 
2014), (Cameron, 2001), (Tremblay, 2002), (Goodson L. , 2003) 
(Carroll & Anderson, 2009) and (Torabi, 2012). Whereas others pro-
pose some sort of semi-Presidentialism with a decentralized admin-
istrative structure (Maley, 2003 & 2013) & (Ahmadi, Mohammadi, 
& Erfani, 2016, p. 82). In one place, Maley (2013)  notes that the 
application of a strong Presidential system as ‘the most serious single 
weakness' in the 2004 Afghan constitution, which led to ‘manipula-
tive neopatrimonialism’ of executive power and ‘burgeoning corrup-
tion’ in the following years (2013, pp. 259-266). 
In August 2016, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) 
published its field research results in a paper ‘Afghanistan`s 
Constitution and the Society in Transition’ in which besides other 
significant constitutional controversial issues, it attempts to reveal 
Afghans’ preferences for state institutional design at national and 
local level. The study is conducted through surveying 800 people 
and interviewing around 34 elites in ten Afghan provinces including 
Bamyan, Badakhshan, Balkh, Ghazni, Ghor, Kandahar, Kabul, 
Kunduz, Nangarhar, and Herat (Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & Erfani, pp. 
12-13).  The quantitative polls of the AISS report that the majority 
(49%) of the respondents agree with the current presidential system, 
whereas 29% favor parliamentary and 22% a semi-presidential 
system (p. 59). Whereas, the qualitative interview results show that 
half (17 out of 34) of the experts are for a parliamentary system 
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(Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & Erfani, 2016, p. 75).6 (Ahmadi, 
Mohammadi, & Erfani, 2016, p. 75) Similarly, according to this 
study, 39.8% of the respondents opted for the present heavy 
centralization, whereas 40.9% preferred decentralization in which 
"provinces should be given the decision- making power and local 
officials should be elected by the people" (p. 67). The remaining 
19.4% demand federalism with a division of power between the 
center and periphery (Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & Erfani, 2016, p. 67). 
Nevertheless ‘one-third’ of the respondents perceive the ‘non-
implementation of the constitution” as the main issue rather the 
present state-institutional design (Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & Erfani, 
2016, p. 44 & 52).   
Although the AISS study is the first field research that assesses the 
Afghan perception on the implementation of the Afghan constitution 
post-2004, it has serious technical, methodical and ethical 
shortcomings. While the authors ignore the ethnopolitical divide 
(Pashtun vs. the non-Pashtun) over the matter, they intentionally 
attempt to project the results of the study in favor of parliamentary 
(30%) system by merely ignoring that 49% of the polls are in favors 
of a presidential system. Likewise, from among its qualitative 
interviews, only 17 (out of 34) experts (almost all of whom are non-
Pashtuns) are quoted for the parliamentary system while the 
remaining (17 experts) are overlooked. 
Furthermore, the lack of awareness among the ordinary Afghans 
regarding the political system and the sub-national administrative 
structure, which may impede the accuracy of a quantitative survey is 
one of the critical issues disregarded in this study. 
The selection of provinces is also not ethnically proportional. While 
the Pashtun makes the majority (40-50%) ethnic group (Schetter, 
                                                          
6 The researcher misinterpreted 17 out 34 as the majority which is incorrect.  34 
mines 17 is equal to 17. That means only half of the respondents were against 
Presidentialism. 
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Stammesstrukturen und ethnische Gruppen, 2009, p. 24)7, only two 
(Kandahar and Nangarhar) out of ten selected provinces are chosen 
for the survey. Similarly, the study is conducted only in Dari 
language and mainly quotes prominent opposition of the present 
government and critical of the Pashtun dominance. For instance, it 
quotes Ahmad Wali Massoud – an ethnic Tajik, brother of the late 
leading Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and 
now head of the Massoud foundation; Hafiz Mansoor – ethnic Tajik, 
a prominent member of the Northern Alliances and very famous for 
his anti-Pashtun stance. Likewise, Sima Samar and Habiba Sarabi – 
ethnic Hazara; and finally, Mohammad Shahir Rafeeq Shaheer and 
Fauzia Koofi, are among the outspoken Tajik parliamentarians 
against Pashtun domination in the present government. The non-
Pashtun political elites understand that a centralized presidential 
system would favor the Pashtun dominance. Therefore, they are 
more inclined to opt for an alternative model.    
It is also worth mentioning here, that AISS invited chief executive 
Abdullah Abdullah as the honorary guest at the inauguration 
ceremony of this particular study results.  Abdullah, who brought up 
the constitution amendments and changing the presidential system 
to semi-Presidentialism in his NUG political deal in 2014. In his 
speech, Abdullah appreciated the initiative of the AISS and claimed 
that his demand for a change in the political system is backed by 
academic research (Office of the Chief Executive , 2016). It is also 
worth mentioning here that all three authors in this study belong to 
the non-Pashtun (Tajik and Hazara) ethnic group. The AISS’s biased 
approach brings the results and credibility of its study in question.  
Hence, the author has learned significant lessons from the above-
listed short-comings for the present study. 
                                                          
7 Though there is no up to date data that fixes the present statistics on ethnic 
groups. However, there is also no data that shows that Pashtuns are not the 
majority group.   
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Another major subject covered by the present study is the Afghan 
elected provincial councils (PCs) and their role in an alternative de-
centralized state structure. Unfortunately, except for Sarah Lister and 
Hamish Nixon’s two research papers (Lister & Nixon, 2006 pp.6-9 
& Nixon, 2008 pp.19-23) which partly introduces the 2005 elected 
PCs, there is hardly any analytical study in the literature. In their 
research paper ‘Center-periphery Relations in the Afghan State: 
Current Practices, Future Prospects’ Malikyar & Rubin (2002) pro-
poses the power over sub-national ‘allocations’ to the provincial and 
district councils (2002, pp. 45-46). However, the proposal came be-
fore the creation of Afghan PCs in 2002. Thereby, the present study 
attempts to fill this knowledge gap with field research results. 
The Afghan informal governance structures (Jirag/Shura), the war-
lords' power, and the patronage-based system are among the high-
lighting themes in several of the sub-national governance literature 
including (Malikyar & Rubin, 2002), (Lister S. , 2007), (Lamb & 
Shawn, 2012), (Münch, 2013), (Schetter, 2014) and (Malejacaq, 
2016) to mention but a few. Few relevant points discussed by Sarah 
Lister (2007) and Conrad Schtetter (2014) are reviewed here. Lister 
analyses the Afghan local government institutions from the Chester-
man’s (2004) theory of a state in which ‘political power’ has been 
‘manifested and exercised’ ‘in progressively depersonalized, formal-
ized and rationalized’ manner (2007, p. 3). Lister believes that fol-
lowing the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, the co-option of 
local warlords into the state structures, resulted in parallel power in-
stitutions to the Afghan state  (p. 16). Lister suggests that:   
Disarmament, the reform of the police, and the judicial sec-
tor, and close attention to the quality of senior appointments 
are all measures that would have contributed to shifting ‘the 
rules of the game’ in Afghanistan from informal patronage 
based systems, and towards a more depersonalised, formal-
ised and rationalised exercise of power through the state. (p. 
16)  
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While Lister disparages the U.S. and its Afghan partners for not ap-
plying the liberal state-building strategies, surprisingly enough 
Schetter (2014)  is exactly criticizing for the opposite. According to 
Schetter (2014):  
The approach taken by the interventionists also revealed the 
strong limitations of the 
 political vocabulary and imagination. Political dynamics 
that could not be squeezed into these bequeathed categories 
or did not follow the ‘rational logic' of the modern nation 
state were often labelled as illegitimate (e.g., warlords, infor-
mal institutions) or even chaotic and anarchic.  (p. 9)       
Schetter notes that the lack of in-depth knowledge of the ‘local real-
ities’ and non-contextualization of the modern state-building strate-
gies led to counterproductive outcomes in Afghanistan. Pointing to 
what was earlier emphasized by Lister (2007), Schetter believes that 
while the international community aimed at changing the local ‘rules 
of the game’ in Afghanistan, not knowing that “quite often” “its own 
actions became determined by the local ‘rules of the game’” (p. 10). 
The remilitarization of the local warlords – in the form of para-mili-
tary forces –  and the creation of several parallel development coun-
cils are underlined as the severe drawbacks by Schetter  (2014). Tak-
ing into consideration the significantly different analyses of Lister 
and Schetter on the sub-national political dynamics, the present 
study also updates on the similar issues in general and the PCs in 
particular in a separate chapter.   
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis  
Chapter one of this thesis follows the standard academic procedure 
of opening the discussion with an introduction, the rationale, re-
search questions, literature review, and methodology. This chapter 
provides the reader with a first glance at what the thesis is about, 
how it is conducted, why it is significant and finally what its rele-
vance is to the academic and practical field. This thesis is intended 
not only for the academic researchers of this field but also to the 
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policy makers and readers interested in the subject of Afghanistan. 
Therefore, efforts have been made to use basic language terminol-
ogy. 
Chapter two of the thesis is divided into three main sections. Section 
one defines the blurred term of state-building and its relevant con-
cepts including its historical evolution and overlapping relations 
with peace and nation-building. This section also briefly discusses 
state from the Western or Weberian and the Third World statehood 
perspective. Section one attempts to provide a foundation for the 
mega theories and approaches discussed in the following sections. 
Section two of chapter two dwells on state-building relevant theo-
ries, approaches, and strategies. This section begins with reviewing 
first the classical and dialectical or clientelistic modernization theo-
ries that provide the base for the nation and state-building ap-
proaches. Though both theories are outdated among the social scien-
tists, ironically, in practice, they still have a dominant influence over 
many policy approaches. The post-9/11 U.S. and its western allies' 
nation and state-building approach in Afghanistan could be a perfect 
example for this claim, discussed in chapter four.  Classical modern-
ization theories are followed by political modernization, interna-
tional intervention, and new-institutionalism theories, each provid-
ing fundamental backgrounds and perspectives on state-building 
strategies and approaches. Section three of the chapter is allocated 
for some state-building components including state-intuitional de-
sign at the central and local level that are relevant to the case study 
of Afghanistan. This section reviews the key democratic state gov-
ernmental models including Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, and 
Semi-Presidentialism. Taking the post-conflict and social segmental 
conditions into account, it also brings into discussion the consocia-
tional democracy of Arend Lijpart and federalism. Section three of 
chapter two concludes with the decentralization approach on the ba-
sis of which the case of sub-national governance in Afghanistan is 
analyzed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter three is a brief historical overview of the Afghan state, so-
ciety and political transformation from its foundation as a tribal fed-
eration in the mid-18th century until the Taliban Islamic Emirate at 
the beginning of 21st century. The reader will find that Islam, tribal-
ism, and ethnicity, are the critical influential phenomena/tools in 
shaping the Afghan state and society relations, gaining political 
power and resistance against modernization and external invasions. 
Islam as the dominant faith and ideology has evolved along various 
versions including mysticism, traditionalism, the political Islam of 
Mujahideen and the recent traditional extremism in Afghanistan. 
Short-lived experiments with democracy and communism are also 
briefly discussed in this chapter. Due to its geopolitical location, 
state-building in Afghanistan has been heavily subject to great-pow-
ers’ regional interests, and a battleground and buffer zone throughout 
its nearly 300 years of modern history. The overall aim of chapter 
three is to provide its reader with a sharp sociopolitical contextual 
picture of modern-day Afghanistan.  
Chapter four analyzes the U.S. post-9/11 military and subsequent 
state-building intervention in Afghanistan. The interventionist 
theory and state-building approaches are contextualized in the post-
Taliban Afghanistan. It attempts to highlight the U.S., the U.N., and 
the Afghan players' roles regarding the institutional achievements 
and drawbacks of the 2001 Bonn agreement. Freeing Afghans from 
the oppressive authoritarian regime of the Taliban and the formation 
of a constitution that not only secures women and minority rights but 
for the first time in its history introduced Afghanistan to a fully 
democratic system are among the great achievements discussed in 
this chapter. Whereas ignoring peace-making before state-building 
is one of the key flaws of the whole intervention. Empowering 
Afghan warlords and mafia groups, endemic corruption, the de-facto 
formation of an ethnolinguistic based government despite de-jure 
support for a strong unitary centralized state system, and the 
underestimation of the regional powers' (Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and 
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India) interests by the U.S., its western allies, and the U.N. are 
highlighted as key failures of the state-building process in 
Afghanistan. Chapter four concludes with case studies of prominent 
warlords around six researched provinces. The case studies serve to 
inform the reader about the power-struggle and -cooption between 
formal (elected PC members) and informal state actors in the Afghan 
sub-national politics.  The overall aim of this chapter is to prepare its 
reader with the security and sociopolitical context of the country 
during the past decade. This background knowledge is imperative 
for discussing the central questions of the dissertation in the 
following chapters.  
Chapter five addresses one of the central questions of this thesis, 
namely state institutional design at the central/national level. It 
begins with an analysis of the 2004 Afghan constitution with regard 
to its controversial topics including the role of Islam, the right of 
women, the electoral system and ethnic identity. It then turns to the 
state-institutional design discourse during and in the aftermath of the 
Bonn process. Adding the field research findings of this dissertation, 
it then brings forward the Afghan perception of key terms and 
concepts, including democracy, presidential, parliamentary, and 
federal systems, as well as centralization and decentralization. It 
tests the hypotheses of the Afghan ethnopolitical divide over state-
institutional design through field interviews with elites, as well as 
supported by second-hand data. This thesis hypothesizes that Afghan 
political elites are divided along ethnolinguistic lines, in which 
Pashtuns propagate the existing presidential centralization, whereas 
non-Pashtun (Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek) advocate for a sort of 
parliamentary decentralization.  
Chapter six focuses on the Afghan sub-national governance and state 
administrative structures. To provide the reader with a full picture, it 
begins by introducing the entire Afghan formal and informal sub-
national administration structure, including provincial and district 
administrations, and the informal governance mechanism of Jirgas 
and Shuras. Based on the field interviews, it then explicitly 
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introduces the Afghan elected provincial councils (PCs), its role and 
responsibility at the sub-national governance sector.  
Chapter seven is a joint conclusion for chapter five and six. Looking 
at possible future scenarios for Afghanistan, it proposes alternative 
government models at the national and sub-national level.   
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CHAPTER 2: Part-I, State-Building Concepts 
and Definitions 
 
2.1 State-Building and Its Relevant Concepts  
State-building is a multidisciplinary theme, borrowing its theories 
and concepts from broad social sciences` subjects including; 
anthropology, political science, security studies, conflict 
management, comparative politics, economic development, and 
international relations – to mention but a few (Scott, 2007),  (Wollf, 
2011), & (Marquette & Beswick, State Building, Security and 
Development: state building as a new development paradigm?, 
2011). The state as a ‘human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory’ by Max Weber (1946), and the thesis of ‘war made states’ 
by Charles Tilly (1975) serve as the foundation for debates on the 
nature and formulation of state-building. However, the 
contemporary state-building discussion can also be traced in several 
theories among them modernization, political development, 
intervention, institutionalization, and new-institutionalization, 
which are discussed briefly in the following sections. This varied 
inter-disciplinary approach to the state-building topic adds to the 
complexity, diversity, and ambiguity of both its concepts and 
practices. It certainly leads to an exciting yet blurred discussion in 
the literature.    
The implicit rationale of state-building, according to Francis 
Fukuyama, goes something like this. When a state is so weak or 
fragile that its institutions fail to deliver the expected services (for 
example security, health, education, construction and the rule of law) 
to its citizens, then it needs to be reformed or built from scratch  
(Fukuyama, 2004). Conceptually, the term "failed states" was first 
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used in the early 1990s  to list countries which were prone to social, 
economic, and institutional instability and to fragmentation due to 
poverty, sectarian wars and civil conflicts (Nay, 2012). Another very 
broad notion, "fragile states," refers to the categories of state 
institutions which lack legitimacy, authority, and capacity, and as a 
result are unable to provide basic public services and governance to 
its citizens  (OECD, 2010). Nevertheless, Olivier Nay (2012) notes 
that ‘fragile state' is relatively new, blurry, and controversial concept 
in the literature, government policy papers, and donor evaluation 
reports  (p. 2), entailing a long list of ‘notions' including weak, 
failing, failed, collapsed, post-conflicted, divided, and other crises 
contexts.  
For Fukuyama (2004) state-building is concerned with a state's 
‘institutional building' or with improving its ‘capacity' and 
functionality. Public administration, political institutional design 
(e.g., parliamentary, presidential, centralization, decentralization), 
legitimacy or democratic participation, good governance, and 
cultural values with respect to the formal and informal social 
structure of a particular country are the significant components in a 
state-building strategy, notes Fukuyama  (2004). For the Max Plank 
2005 publication, state-building "means the establishment, re-
establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given 
territory capable of delivering public goods"  (von Bogdandy, 
Häußler, Hanschmann, & Utz, 2005). According to Maley William 
(2013) state-building ‘refers to attempts to create' ‘key political and 
administrative structures' within ‘territorial units' of a state or to ‘re-
create them when they have either broken down or been severely 
disruptive.' Derick W. Brinkerhoff sees state-building more as 
reforming and strengthening governance or as he called it 
"rebuilding governance" with regard to ‘legitimacy, security, and 
effectiveness' in post-conflict and failed contexts both through 
national actors and international interventions (2005). In another 
place, for Brinkerhoff (2005) state-building in a post-conflict context 
means, providing security through Disarmament, Demobilization, 
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and Reintegration (DDR), promoting inclusion and participation of 
citizens in the political process, providing public services and 
economic opportunities, and implementing the rule of law and good 
governance. Taking the DDR and security conditions into 
consideration, Brinkerhoff (2005) sees state-building as identical 
with peace-building (2005).  
Nevertheless, there are contradictory and blurred viewpoints 
concerning whether peace-building and state-building are 
converging concepts.  In his statement "An Agenda for Peace" the 
1992 United Nation’s Secretary General Boutros-Ghali defines post-
conflict peace-building as “action to identify and support structures 
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict” ( 1992, Chapter II, Article 21). OECD writes 
that "peacebuilding is about ending or preventing violent conflict 
and supporting sustainable peace, while state-building is about 
establishing capable, accountable, responsive and legitimate states" 
(OECD, 2010, p. 21). However, in an interesting analytical paper, by 
the German Institute for Development, state-building and peace-
building are noted as ‘congruent' concepts which ‘ultimately address 
a common purpose from different perspectives and ‘generate 
compatible or complementary approaches of engagement' 
(Grävingholt, Gänzle, & Ziaja, 2009, p. 10). Nevertheless, if peace-
building and state-building are congruent approaches and target the 
same goals, the peace-making process is considered a prerequisite 
by the United Nations. As Boutros-Ghali (1992) writes; “Between 
the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the peace lies the 
responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful 
means” (Chapter IV, Article 34).  
Likewise, Brinkerhoff (2005) believes that conflict and post-conflict 
are “relative terms” used interchangeably in peace-building studies. 
He notes that post-conflict does not only refer to the situation of 
ended violence in a defined terrain, but it could be stopped in some 
parts and still ongoing in others (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Therefore, 
state-building initiatives are not dependent on an absolute ceasefire 
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and peace (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq). However, minimal security is a 
precondition for state-building in a post-conflict-conflict context, 
according to Wolf  (2011). Wollf notes that democracy and lasting 
peace are the ultimate goals of a state-building project, yet minimal 
security is a precondition in post-conflict societies (2011). 
Furthermore, the term ‘state-building' is not identical with ‘nation-
building' in the literature. According to the Max Plank 2005 
publication, "Nation-building is the most common form of a process 
of collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing public 
power within a given territory” (von Bogdandy, Häußler, 
Hanschmann, & Utz, 2005, p. 586). Moreover, unlike peace-building 
(e.g. usually United Nations) and state-building (third-party 
intervention) nation-building is an "essentially indigenous process 
which often not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on 
existing traditions, institutions, and customs, redefining them as 
national characteristics in order to support the nation's claim to 
sovereignty and uniqueness"  (von Bogdandy, Häußler, 
Hanschmann, & Utz, 2005, p. 586). Hence, nation-building is the 
outcome of both peace-building and state-building processes in the 
long run.  
Moreover, state-building initiatives have been driven by diverse 
factors and motives through the course of modern history. 
Fukuyama’s (2004 & 2005) well-known book, “State-Building: 
Governance and World Order in the 21st Century” classifies 
‘modern' (democratic) state-buildings into three main phases. 
According to Fukuyama, the first phase of the so-called ‘modern' 
state-building agenda began in Europe after the World War II, and 
in Asia (e.g., India) and Africa with the end of colonialization. 
However, it gained momentum during the second phase with the 
collapse of the communism in 1989, at which time countries in the 
developing world, including Latin America, embraced neo-
liberalism by introducing the free market economy and minimizing 
state functions. Because many of these states lacked the capacity and 
authority to enforce laws and regulate the market, this led to 
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increased fragility and in some cases to failure.  (Fukuyama, 2004 & 
2005) & (Marquette & Beswick, State Building, Security and 
Development: state building as a new development paradigm?, 
2011). Fukuyama`s (2004 & 2005) thesis of "the missing dimensions 
of the stateness" differentiates between the "scope" of the state which 
encompasses a large list of functions or services (e.g., security, 
health, education, infrastructure and so on) provided for its citizens, 
and the ‘strength' or ‘capacity' (e.g., institutional capability to 
enforce law and order) through which a state  ‘executes' its public 
policy objectives transparently and with accountability. 
Nevertheless, his analysis of state-building is from the economic 
development perspective. (Fukuyama, 2004 & 2005, pp. 18-20).   
The third, most recent phase of the state-building mission run by 
international intervention ostensibly aims not only at curving violent 
conflicts and civil wars (e.g. Bosnia, -Herzegovina, East Timor, 
Sierra Leone, Afghanistan), international terrorism (e.g. 
Afghanistan), or dictatorial regimes (Iraq), but also at bringing 
western democracy and economic development to these third world 
countries (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007). David Chandler (2010) 
notes that the international state-building went beyond its primary 
“humanitarian and security reasons” of peacebuilding by 
“developing and exporting frameworks of good governance”  (p. 1). 
Based on Chandler (2010) though, the intention of the international 
state-building is that of bringing social, economic and political 
stability and development, however problematic the way these 
policies and strategies are formed and implemented may be. Lack of 
contextual understanding and difficulties in coordination are the two 
main problems identified by Chandler  (2010) in international state-
building policy design and implementation.  
The state-building intervention of the developed world, particularly 
OECD countries, in developing countries tends to be western liberal 
democracy-centric both in policy design and in practice, and is often 
criticized in the literature for this reason. Some scholars and pundits 
compare it with the 19th century`s European colonization of injecting 
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western linear bureaucratic norms and values in developing 
countries` hybrid social and political settings. Nevertheless, the 
difference is that contemporary interventions are temporary and are 
carried out in a development assistance format (Marquette & 
Beswick, State Building, Security and Development: state building 
as a new development paradigm?, 2011) & (Skendaj, 2014). 
However, Albrecht & Wiuff Moe (2014) note that western and 
nonwestern state discourse is by no means about advocating hybrid 
political orders over stable democracies, but is intended to deepen 
our understanding of the complexity of the contexts, which is key to 
the success of the state-building approach.  
It can be seen that the term state-building and its policy approach 
encompasses a wide variety of interdisciplinary concepts and 
perceptions aiming at bringing security, peace, institutionalization, 
democratization, legitimacy, good governance and economic 
development.  
The conceptual and literature-based practical controversies about 
state fragility and state formation require us to acknowledge that 
there can be no ‘one size fits all' state-building policy or approach. 
However, it is essential to study various cases and their approaches, 
and identify the missing factors causing state fragility or other 
instability circumstances and then act accordingly. 
Taking the above definitions, overlapping concepts and discourse 
into consideration. We need to distinguish between state-building as 
the formation of institutions (democratic, functioning and 
accountable) through various available institutional designs or forms 
of government (parliamentary vs. presidential and centralization vs 
decentralization) and also as a governance process (elections, the 
rule of law, good governance and economic development) both at 
national and local level. Both could be causes and consequences of 
a state sliding into fragility, failed and collapse circumstances. That 
means that a state with none or ill-functioning political systems and 
institutions could lead to poor service delivery, corruption, economic 
stagnation, and, conversely, poor service delivery, corruption and 
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stagnation could lead to a deterioration of political systems and 
institutions. Furthermore, formal and informal state institutions are 
the prime concern of state-building literature. 
In post-Taliban Afghanistan too, we witnessed the design and 
implementation of state-building strategies not only to bring an end 
to the decades-long conflicts and build a better future for the nation’s 
citizens, but also to prevent the hijacking of Afghan soil by 
international terrorists as a safe-haven from which to threaten global 
security.  
The present stuttering democracy of the Afghan state is the outcome 
of the Bonn state-building process, which is built on the loss of 
hundred-thousands of human lives (these includes Afghan and 
international civilians and soldiers), and billions of US dollars in aid. 
If we wish to preserve these costly state-building achievements and 
enter into a stabilization period, the Afghan government must 
undertake an overall review and reform of its state-building agenda 
at both the national and local levels. This dissertation attempts to 
contribute to this global cause.    
 
2.2 What is the State? 
Max Weber`s (1946) definition of the state as ‘a human community 
that (successfully) claim[s] the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory' is one of the most cited 
definitions in political science literature. Simeon Mitropolitski  
analyzes Weber's definition into contemporary political science 
disciplines.  According to Mitropolitski (2011) the concepts; 
monopoly, legitimacy, and force, are ‘three main' features, and 
human community and territory are two sub or ‘secondary' features 
through which political science could well understand the state. He 
interprets the concept of ‘monopoly' as political power, of 
‘legitimacy' as ‘the type of cultural acceptance' (e.g. Islamic, 
authoritarian or democracy) of a regime, and of ‘physical force' as 
‘the main technique of governance' (e.g. centralized vs decentralized 
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political systems) in a society  (Mitropolitski, 2011). Among 
contemporary political science scholars, however, Bob Jessop 
(1990) is very reluctant to settle on a specific definition of the state 
and specifically disagrees with Weber’s definition. According to 
Jessop (1990), the state is a ‘form-determined social relation' rather 
than an ‘abstract and formal object' which varies, in real-world 
politics, from one state to another. Jessop  (1990) asserts that  
the core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble 
of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted 
function is to define and enforce collectively binding 
decisions on the members of a society in the name of their 
common interest or general will. (p. 341) 
In other words, it is a ‘macro-political organization' with ‘social 
bases,' projects, and big national goals  (Jessop, 1990). According to 
Jessop, most state-centric theories agree that the ‘state' is "just one 
institutional ensemble among others (e.g., civil society, media, 
market, interest groups, and so on.) within a social formation", yet it 
is seen as responsible for providing ‘cohesion' to all other institutions 
and for fixing their problems.  (Jessop, 2015). Jessop (1990) asserts 
that in order to understand the nature of the state, it is important to 
understand the “complex forms of articulations among the state 
institutions and between the state and non-state institutions” (p. 340). 
In another place, he states, that ‘structural power and capacities' of a 
state can be understood in its particular "strategic-relational" context  
(Jessop, 2015, p. 18). John Martinussen (1997) defined the state from 
a socialist point of view as an “independent institution that functions 
in accordance with the decision of rational decision makers” (pp. 
220-221). Whereas, the economic theory dethrones the state as an 
independent institution and makes it dependent on the ‘interests of 
international capital'  (Martinussen, 1997). However, Martinussen 
(1997) cautions that most of the theories on state are derived from 
the western developed or industrialized context which could be 
misleading for the Third World countries’ context. Thus, for him too, 
the state is one institution among many, nevertheless in the Third 
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World context with the following four main characteristics. (1) It is 
‘a product of conflicting interests and power struggles'; (2) ‘a 
manifestation of structures' which holds certain powers and 
functions, and determines the roles, relations and behaviors of state 
and non-state institutions and individuals; (3) ‘an arena' or a political 
sphere where different social forces interact and compete for their 
interests, and (4) ‘an actor’ which through its autonomous power and 
capacities influences processes and events in a society (Martinussen, 
1997). Parts of the above-listed dimensions of a state will be 
contextualized in this dissertation's case study in the coming 
chapters, for which it was necessary to understand what a state is. 
It is also essential to draw on what differentiates western from non-
western statehood. Western or Weberian-type states refer to all 
"stable liberal democracies based on an industrialized market 
economy" namely OECD countries (Boege et al., 2009, p. 18). The 
main concept under the Weberian state model is the "clear distinction 
between public and private spheres" in which its people accept the 
state as the only "legitimate" and the "highest authority" having the 
"monopoly" of power "over a territory and population." In return, it 
provides public services to its citizens including security, health, 
education, law and order, and economic opportunities (OECD, 2010) 
& (Marquette & Beswick, State Building, Security and 
Development: state building as a new development paradigm?, 
2011) On the other hand, hybrid or non-western states are 
characterized with more than one “legitimate actor” or source of 
power in a defined territory in which `the state` shares both the 
legitimacy and authority with other informal actors (e.g. clan or 
tribal elders, community and religious figures and representatives of 
village councils, strongmen and warlords, etc.).  In this case, the state 
is engaged with citizens partly through other than formal 
mechanisms including religious, customary and traditional laws and 
codes of conducts (Boege et al., 2009). Patronage networks and 
personal relations are the prime sources of attaining political 
representation and economic opportunities in hybrid political orders 
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(OECD, 2010). According to Boege and others (2009), the 
"mainstream" practices and literature on state-building are mostly 
that of the western perspective, which is why it is unsuccessful in 
many cases. For a hybrid, social and political society a hybrid 
political order (mixture or a compromise of a modern state and 
traditional local structures) could prove more effective than a 
western cooked exported model (Clement, Boege, Brown, Foley, & 
Nolan, 2007). Boege and his colleagues also recommend a state-
building approach which speaks to the ground realities and 
conditions, namely integrating and engaging informal/local actors in 
formal state structures, giving them a sense of ownership through 
transferring roles and responsibilities (2009). ‘Ownership’ is a new 
buzzword in donor development policies that means letting local 
actors set priorities and agendas.  While this makes sense 
conceptually,  in practice, if these "local actors" are none-democratic 
(e.g., self-imposed strongmen and elites, warlords and drug-mafia ), 
then local ownership does more harm than good.  For example, 
warlords, drug-traffickers, and strongmen who hold official 
positions in Afghanistan's government, particularly in peripheries, 
further eroded and complicated the situation for state legitimacy and 
stability (for more, see the chapter on warlords in Afghanistan). 
Beoge at al. (2009) also notes that there is to be a distinction between 
local-spoilers; warlords and drug-traffickers who only seek their 
personal interests, and local-cooperators; e. g. clan-chiefs, tribal 
elders and informal council representatives who are motivated, not 
only by personal and group incentives, but also by legitimacy 
concerns, when it comes to building a state in a hybrid manner. 
One concept crucial to understanding the state and its formation is 
legitimacy, which is as necessary for maintaining the authority of 
local power brokers as it is for the state.8 OECD defines legitimacy 
as the acceptance of ‘a political order,' an ‘institution,’ or an ‘actor' 
                                                          
8 over their patrons. For more, please refer to the section informal governance 
in Afghanistan. 
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by a group of people as a legitimate form of rule, without questioning 
its correctness of ‘how' and ‘why' (2010, p. 15).  Legitimacy is not a 
directly measurable concept. The classic understanding of state 
legitimacy could be listed under functions and concepts including 
nationalism, religious identity, public service delivery, economic 
performance and development, democratic participation and 
accountability  (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007). However, both 
Fukuyama (2004 & 2005) and Brinkerhoff (2005) notes that, since 
the end of the cold war, democracy and good governance are 
accepted prime standards through which states’ legitimacy could be 
universally measured. However, it is significant to note that field 
experience shows that developing, war-torn, and some Muslim 
countries have a different measurement of legitimacy and 
democracy9. As March and Oslen (2008) write "Legitimacy depends 
not only on showing that actions accomplish appropriate objective, 
but also that actors behave in accordance with legitimate procedures 
ingrained in a culture" (p. 8).   
Theories that support state-building and its relevant concepts and 
agendas are reviewed in the following chapter. 
 
Part II: State-Building Theories 
2.3 Classical and Dialectical Modernization Theories: 
Nigel King and Christine Horrocks correctly note that when we let 
“theory guide us in research; it can sometime help define the 
problem, offer insight and show us possible solutions” (2010, p. 10). 
The theories discussed in this section are introduced with the 
intention of following the above-quoted rationale. As discussed 
                                                          
9 The field research in this study finds that the concept of democracy in Afghan-
istan is seen as compatible with Islamic values by some, but unIslamic by oth-
ers. Whatever seems opposed to the Muslim perception of Islamic values and 
laws (for example, liberal democracy) is perceived as illegitimate as per Islamic 
principles. It is not only social perception but is also stressed in the Afghan con-
stitution. Article three of the Afghan constitution notes "No law shall contra-
vene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan." 
(The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, p. 7) 
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above, state-building is concerned with the problem of forming ‘new' 
or strengthening and reforming existing institutions. The attempt in 
the following pages is to review theories which support similar 
concepts and process. In the meantime, efforts are made to look for 
theories that are more Third World-centric and to contextualize and 
analyze the problem through a case study of state-building in 
Afghanistan.  Since this study is intended to study state-building at 
the national – in the form of a suitable political regime or 
government system – and at the local level – decentralization, aiming 
at political stability which is significant for sustainable peace and 
development.  Therefore, to provide a source for empirical 
argumentation, a mixture of theories and schools of thought are 
reviewed comparatively. However, the objective is not only to find 
a firm theoretical background, which is a challenging job for this 
case study, but also to testify to the validity of these theories, leaving 
an analytical footprint for future researchers and students of political 
science and development studies. 
The state-building agenda applied in war-torn and post-conflict 
countries, as well as the so-called Third World failed states, relies 
strongly on the early 1950s classical modernization,  on 1980s new-
institutionalization, and on the post-cold war humanitarian interven-
tionist theories of the 1990s. This will be reviewed here briefly. Ac-
cording to Törnquist  (1999) the contemporary new institutionaliza-
tion theories “are not based on grand substantive theories … rather 
they are broad analytical frameworks that permit us to borrow valu-
able insights and hypotheses from earlier schools” (p. 86). He adds 
that many of the 20th-century democracies are studied based on re-
vised modernization and similar categories of theories  (Törnquist, 
1999).  Therefore, a review of the modernization theories is also an 
attempt to get valuable insights and concepts which are relevant to 
creating a theoretical framework for the empirical research of this 
dissertation. 
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To begin with, Samuel P. Huntington (1971) notes that the pioneers 
of modernization theory, Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, and Frank 
Sutton embraced a change in political sciences through their ‘theory 
of action.' According to Huntigton (1971), these pioneers, divided 
the post-World War II Europe as ‘modern industrialized society' and 
the rest of the developing world as ‘agricultural society' that laid the 
foundation for the classical modernization theory. In the meantime, 
Joseph R. Gusfield  (1967) writes that the bases of the modernization 
theory rest on Max-Weber's economic theory of rational and tradi-
tional behavior. Olle Törnquist (1999) also cities that followers of 
the Max Weber school of thought “distinguished traditional from 
modern, or development-promoting attitudes and values” (1999, p. 
45). According to Huntington (1971) and Törnquist (1999) in mod-
ernization theory – which is primarily economic and social develop-
ment-driven – a ‘modern man’ was seen as development-oriented, 
‘independent’, able to plan, ‘efficient’, flexible to change, and hav-
ing the ability to control change,  while a ‘traditional man’ was ‘pas-
sive’,  ‘conservative’, unable to plan, and lacking the ambition to 
change or control the change.  John Martinussen (1997) also asserts 
that the central point of modernization theory lays on the differenti-
ation between the modern and the traditional, and that modernization 
theory has to do with "how the traditional values, attitudes, practices, 
and social structures break down and are replaced with more modern 
ones"  (p. 56). The modernist also believed that the Western societies 
(Northern America and Western Europe) and their institutions were 
modern and progressive, and that Third World societies were tradi-
tional and backward (Martinussen, 1997) & (Törnquist, 1999). Ac-
cording to Martinussen (1997) and Törnquist (1999), the moderni-
zation theory came into existence as a result of the ‘positive assess-
ment' of the history of Western colonization and imperialism in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. For the western modernist scholars, col-
onization was not the cause of backwardness but a positive impact 
on the colonies due to the replacement of the old and traditional 
structures with new and modern ones  (Martinussen, 1997) & 
55 
 
(Törnquist, 1999). Modernism theorists also recommended that, if 
the developing countries of the Third World wanted to catch up with 
the progressiveness of the industrialized societies, they be required 
to build economic and other ties with the Western nations.  This 
would make it possible for them to learn and simply copy and paste 
the developed institutions and structures of the West into their coun-
tries  (Martinussen, 1997). In the meantime, the anti-colonization up-
rising coupled with the Marxist-communist ideology contended that 
the Western imperialistic approach to modernization was itself the 
cause for the ‘backwardness' of the Third World countries  
(Törnquist, 1999). However, both blocks assumed traditionalism to 
be the main cause of the underdevelopment and were obsessed to 
push the developing countries of the Third World into modernity, 
each defining that modernity based on their own socio-political ide-
ologies, namely Western imperialism and capitalism versus Soviet 
Marxist-socialism (Törnquist, 1999). According to Törnquist 
(1999), the political modernization or development theory arose as a 
consequence of social, cultural and economic modernity and change, 
which meant a transformation to a more complex and advanced gov-
ernment apparatus, including democratic elections, political parties, 
interest-groups, parliament, specialized administrative bureaucra-
cies, mass media and so on  (pp. 47-48). Before long, however, mod-
ernization theory came under strong criticism due to its North-West-
centric approach with a lack of ‘empirical justification,' and as being 
“much too optimistic and characterized by wishful thinking"   
(Törnquist, 1999, p. 54) & (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 167-168).  Sev-
eral revisions have attempted to overcome the shortcomings of the 
classical modernization approach, introducing a variety of new con-
cepts and theories.  
In the1960s Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, through 
empirically studying some non-Western countries, brought 
significant perceptional change to modernization studies in general 
and to the study of political development in particular. Reducing the 
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modernization theory to an approach, Almond (1960) stated that 
both Western developed and non-western developing or 
underdeveloped societies have political structures, perform similar 
functions, are multifunctional, and are culturally mixed. In another 
place, he writes that all political systems have a dualistic nature of 
formal and informal structures and cultures  (Almond, 1960). 
Almond (1960) concludes that “the universe of political system is 
less tractable to simple contrasts (between modern or traditional) that 
we have supposed (p. 25). He furtherly adds “we need dualistic 
models rather than monistic ones, and developmental as well as 
equilibrium models, if we are to understand differences precisely and 
grapple effectively with the process of political change” (Almond, 
1960, p. 25)    
Another revised version of the classical modernization theory, ac-
cording to Martinussen (1997) is the ‘dialectical modernization the-
ory’ which is mainly based on social change theory rather political 
development, and is nevertheless very significant for ‘affecting 
state-building, the form of regime and political change’ (p. 172). In-
troduced by Joseph R.  Gusfield, the dialectical or clientelism theory 
is based on a study of India’s traditional, diverse religious, caste-
based society. Gusfield (1967) brings forward the notion that tradi-
tional values and structures are not ‘necessarily in conflict’ but rather 
in many cases make the foundation for ‘supporting modernizing 
frameworks’ (p. 352). He notes that traditions are not ‘static,' but 
they evolve during the course of historical events (Gusfield, 1967). 
According to Gusfield, tradition was exposed development and 
change even before the Western dual characterization (new and 
modern versus old and traditional) of development and their pro-
posed change in developing counties  (1967). Two other pioneer 
scholars Lioydl I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph enriched 
the dialectical modernization theory based on empirical research of 
political development in Indian concerning its caste system. Both 
Rudolphs  (1967) assert that modernization scholars not only ‘under-
estimated the potentialities’ of the tradition for development but they 
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also misunderstood modernity by ‘excluding’ valuable structures 
and symbols which could play a vital role for social and political 
change in a society – pointing to the Mahatma Gandhi`s freedom 
movement formed based on the existing social and religious infor-
mal institutions.  
In another place, Gusfield  (1967)  also notes that “the role of 
traditional values in the form of segmental loyalties and principles 
of legitimate authority are of great importance in understanding the 
possibilities for the occurrence of unified and stable politics at the 
national level” (p. 357). This understanding is highly relevant to the 
sociopolitical context of  Afghanistan and speaks powerfully to the 
present impasse in the country. The political legitimacy and stability 
in Afghanistan is often challenged by its patronage clans and tribal 
structures in scattered rural areas and their divided loyalties. The 
decades of war and internal conflict which intensified the 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation of Afghan society even farther 
complicated the political atmosphere for stability at the national and 
local level. In the meantime, the US post 9/11 military intervention 
and its subsequent imported state-building agendas have been 
wrestling with the so-called primitive traditional and tribal settings 
for more than one and half decades. This will be discussed in much 
detail in the empirical part in coming chapters.   
 
Supporting Gusfield theory, Martinussen (1997) asserts that it is the 
developing countries ‘traditional and tradition bound institutions and 
practices' which form the bases for the ‘modernization and 
development processes.' This can be done most effectively by 
empirically studying the social, political and cultural structures, and 
‘in particular networks including patron-client relations, ethnicity 
and religion' within developing countries independently rather than 
in comparison to western world values of development.  In other 
words, modernization in non-western societies should happen based 
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on their own social, religious, ethical and tribal characteristics, and 
sociopolitical cultural potentials.   
Gusfield (1967) adds that stressing the significance of tradition does 
not mean that it should oppose new values and reformed institutions. 
According to Gusfield  (1967), Mahatma Gandhi's successes ‘in 
social reform and political union' also rest on his use of tradition and 
its potential force in mobilizing the Indian society. The 
decentralization of governance in India, for example, is based on the 
already existed traditional village democracy of Panchayati Raj10 
(Gusfield, 1967). Initially, in the 1920`s, Gandhi aimed to tackle 
poverty and foster his independent movement by reviving these local 
self-governing assemblies (Ananth, 2014). Later in 1993 the 
Panchayati Raj were embedded in the Indian constitution with more 
power and authority as a decentralization reforming strategy known 
as “The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act” (Ananth, 2014).     
The Indian local self-governance reform brought forward by 
Gusfield has a parallel in the Afghan sociopolitical culture. The 
incorporation of the Panchayati Raj or traditional village assemblies 
into the formal Indian government format is comparable to the newly 
elected provincial councils and expected district and village 
councils, which existed informally before modern day Afghanistan 
as the village councils, or Jirga/Shuras. The hypothesis of this 
dissertation is that if the local informal Jirgas/Shuras are integrated 
into the formal government format, of course with more defined 
mechanisms, power and responsibility, and required financial 
resources, they will serve as the foundation for citizen participation, 
security, democracy, development, and eventually political stability 
at the national level. This is discussed in more detail in the following 
empirical chapters too. Gusfield  (1967),  Rudolph and Rudolph 
(1967) agrees that the use of traditional structures and institutions 
can smooth the course of development while the marginalization of 
                                                          
10 Panchayats or village assemblies are local self-governing intuitions in India 
which are embedded in the formal political system of local governance. For 
more, please read http://jespnet.com/journals/Vol_1_No_1_June_2014/1.pdf 
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those institutions would result in a lack of indigenous backing of 
political systems (1967, p. 362). Gusfield concludes that “…the past 
(traditional structures) serves as support, especially in the sphere of 
values and political legitimation, to the present and the future. We 
need a perspective toward change which does not deny the specific 
and contextual character of events” (p. 362).   
According to Martinussen  (1997) through studying the 
sociopolitical culture of the developing countries, the classical 
political modernization and development theorists were concerned 
mainly with four questions: (1) ‘state-building': ‘creating 
bureaucratic or other structures' that can ‘ensure the required support 
needed for' political stability; (2) nation-building: "creating a 
political community and promoting the citizens` transfer of loyalty 
from smaller groups, like tribes and local communities, to the larger 
political systems"; (3) democracy building: active citizen 
participation in ‘political life',  and (4) Trust-building: by equal 
distribution of goods and services for the well-being of citizens on 
the one hand, and gaining political support of the ‘government in 
office' on the other  (1997, p. 171).   
Martinussen (1997) asserts that there is an "increasing 
understanding" among state-building scholars and policymakers 
that:  
(a)That western institutions and the state-building strategies 
pursued by the industrialized countries cannot simply be 
transplanted to the developing countries; (b) that the 
developing countries are so different that different strategies 
must be applied; and (c) that the public administration must 
accept ‘the people’ as partners in the developing process – 
not just as clients or a passive target group of intended 
beneficiaries (p. 175).  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting here, that the central critique of the 
dialectical or clientelism theory rests on the corruption and 
inequality outcomes which result from the client-patron relationship 
in developing countries. Törnquist (1999) writes that the “patron-
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client relations are based on mutual personal exchange of goods or 
services between unequal actors” (p. 57). ‘In a wider political 
context' this leads to an unhealthy or corrupt relationship between 
political elites and ‘businessman and large land-owners’ – in which 
the latter receives business relevant ‘treatment’ in return for financial 
and political (vote) support (Törnquist, 1999). The patron-client 
political culture noted in developing countries by Törnquist is not 
much different from that of the lobbying of the large industrial 
companies and corporations in developed countries. Nevertheless, 
the patron-client culture leads to social and political instability when 
politicians instrumentalize cultural, religious, and ethnolinguistic 
cleavages. This is the basis for another major hypothesis of this 
research.  The warlords and tribal elites utilize the ethnolinguistic 
(Pashtun vs. non-Pashtun) and some case religious (Shira vs. Sunni) 
differences in order to gain political support in Afghanistan. This is 
also discussed in the empirical and historical analyses in five large 
provinces in Afghanistan. 
 
2.4 The Political Development Theory and the State-
building Strategy  
Contemporary state-building strategies borrow their theoretical 
backgrounds predominantly from Samuel P. Huntington`s late 1960s 
political institutionalization or political development theory 
(Martinussen, 1997).  According to Martinussen (1997)  
Huntington’s theory of political institutional shares ‘several of its 
basic assumptions with the classical modernization theory' which 
rests on building government institutions and their capacity that are 
significant to ‘order' and to economic development in Third World 
countries. The essence of Huntington`s  (1971) theory is concerned 
about the ‘balance of' relationship between ‘political participation 
and political institutionalization.'  Huntington  (1968) writes 
“urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the 
traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, 
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new possibilities of satisfaction” (p. 53). This ‘social mobilization' 
creates an ‘aspiration' for economic development and opportunities 
in a newly modernizing society and if the these ‘wants' are not 
fulfilled; it leads to ‘social frustration.' According to Huntington  
(1968), the ‘traditional structures' in developing countries are less 
likely to ‘encourage' economic mobilization ‘rather than political.' 
Therefore social frustration turns into a political drive in the form of 
political participation and demands for more actions by the political 
apparatus. If the government lacks the political institutions and the 
capacity through which individuals can practice their political will 
in a more civilized way, uprisings and political instability will result  
(Huntington, 1968). Therefore, before any attempt toward promoting 
people participation and economic development, there is a need to 
build strong government institutions including, public 
administration, law, and order and military institutions that aim to 
curve corruption and any possible revolt    (Huntington, 1968).  
Martinussen (1997) notes, that although Huntington’s theory didn’t 
win popularity among the political science scholars due to his 
‘conception of the military as a monolithic actor with considerable 
capacity for coordination and promotion of economic development’, 
he was ‘one of the first exponents of the many later theories and 
strategies concerning reaching-down state-building’ (pp. 174-175).  
However Martinussen  (1997) adds that while there is no doubt that 
a state`s institutional capacity is significant for maintaining political 
stability and eventually economic development, nevertheless “a 
development-promoting state-building strategy could still never be 
based exclusively on these components” (p. 175). Martinussen 
concludes that the ‘repressive' or ‘top-down' state-building approach 
in some of the developing countries led the political scientists to 
introduce ‘decentralization and popular participation' theories and 
strategies which ensure a ‘genuine' relationship between state and 
the people for political stability and economic development  
(Martinussen, 1997). For the sake of a possible policy solution in the 
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context of Afghanistan, decentralization is discussed in the 
following section of this dissertation. 
 
2.5  ‘New’- Institutionalism theory and the Political In-
stitutional Approach 
In the earlier section, we discussed that political modernization and 
development theories are based on rational choice and individual 
behavior theories. The contemporary ‘new-institutionalization 
theory' brings in institutions as the game changer in the political 
science studies. As B. Guy Peter  (2005) writes: "the success of these 
two (behaviouralism and the rational choice) disciplinary 
revolutions is the backdrop for which the ‘new institutionalism' came 
into existence"  (p. 16).The ‘new'-institutionalization theory 
introduced by James G. March and John P. Oslen in the late 1980s 
is a shift of focus from individual to institutions which according to 
Peters  (2000) are ‘arrangements of rules and incentives’ and are 
independent variables influencing individuals` attitudes and choices. 
March and Oslen (1989) defined institution as a set of ‘rules,’ 
‘routines’ and forms that are constructed along the historical 
experiences in a society and ‘persist beyond the historical moments 
and conditions’ which influence individual behaviors and vice versa  
(pp. 167-168).  According to Sven Steinmo institutions are ‘formal 
and informal rules’ which constitute the bases for political behavior 
(2001). He adds, formal institutions are embedded in constitutional 
forms and the informal in cultural norms, and with their ( both formal 
and informal) absence ‘there could be no organized politics’ 
(Steinmo, 2001).  
The ‘new-institutionalism’ theory is also dispersed into various sub-
category approaches among political science and sociology scholars.  
In his book Institutional Theory in Political Science, Peters (2005) 
lists them under six significant approaches, including rational 
choice, empirical, historical, sociological, institutions of interest 
representation, and international institutionalism. Edwin Amenta 
63 
 
and Kelly M. Ramsey reduced them to three categories: historical, 
sociological and political institutionalism  (2010). Peter A. Hall and 
Rosemary C.R. Tylor (1996) also divided them into three main 
approaches, namely historical, rational choice, and sociological 
institutionalism. 
However, the pioneers of the normative institutionalization approach 
March and Oslen (2008) notes that institutionalism, “connotes a 
general approach to the study of political institutions, (which are) a 
set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations 
between institutional characteristics and political agency, 
performance, and change” (p. 2). In another place, Peters  (2008) 
also writes “Although there are several approaches to 
institutionalism, they all focus on the central role of structures in 
shaping politics and also in shaping individual behavior”  (p. 48).  
Since institutionalism in a broader sense is concerned with rules, 
routines, structures and processes in an institution in a society, with 
their impact on individuals and vice versa, and with the notion that 
they are all in constant change, therefore, it is appropriate to choose 
this theoretical approach for analyzing the state-building project in 
Afghanistan at both the local and national level. The author is 
primarily relying on the normative or political institutionalization 
theory of March and Oslen as a theoretical framework for this 
research. Based on this, the author will review the formal and 
informal institutions, and their controversial relations and social and 
political impacts on national and local level governance. However, 
to project a precise picture of the matter and for the purpose of 
analysis, some necessary concepts and terms are borrowed from 
other approaches too. For example, the study of how warlords and 
tribal elites emerged as influential political leaders in the Afghan 
government context (in Chapter V) requires a historical review, for 
which one needs the historical institutionalism framework and 
approach. 
Fortunately, institutional approaches are all relevant to and 
dependent on each other. Amenta and Ramsey  (2010) note that 
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“political institutionalism has become more historical and focused 
on historical processes, and focuses theoretical attention on the 
interaction of actors at a medium-systemic, interorganizational, or 
meso-level” (p. 27). 
Moreover, in respect to whether institutions could have formal and 
informal format and be in national and local levels, Peters (2005) 
says “… in political science…everything from formal structure like 
a parliament to very amorphous entities like social class, with other 
components of the sociopolitical universe …(are) also being 
described as institutions” (p. 29). Theda Skocpol (2010) also writes 
“institutions may be formal organization or informal networks” (p. 
105). In another place, Peters  (2008) writes it is the ‘continuous 
interaction' of ‘a range of institutions, actors and ideas' that ‘provide' 
the foundation for governance in a society. If institutions encompass 
both formal government and informal traditional structures and 
norms, then institutionalism can be used as a theoretical framework 
for this empirical research. The problem statements and research 
questions of this dissertation explore the state formal political 
(particularly provincial councils) and the traditional informal 
(warlord networks and tribal councils) institutions, their routines, 
orders, roles, inter-interaction and the changes which occur as result 
of impacts on each other. This approach will help us to know how 
politics work and what the causing factors and consequences are that 
lead to instability or stability in the Afghan sociopolitical context. 
However, before going into detail March and Oslen  (2008) highlight 
a very relevant point which speaks to the issue this thesis is 
concerned with:   
Another core assumption (in new institutionalism) is that the 
translation of structures into political action and action into 
institutional continuity and change, are generated by 
comprehensible and routine processes. A challenge for (the) 
student of institutions is to explain how such processes are 
stabilized or destabilized, and which factors sustain or 
interrupt ongoing processes (p. 3).  
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This research analyzes political institutions (both formal and 
informal) and their processes and consequences for the sake of stable 
and democratic state institutional design at the central and 
subnational levels in the Afghan context. It will be a challenge to 
propose a concrete prescription as March and Oslen cautioned 
above. Nevertheless, the attempt is to learn about these institutions, 
their structures and processes, and possibly find improved 
alternatives for both political scientists and policymakers. 
Now that institutions and what they constitute have been clearly 
defined, the next questions would be where do they come from or 
how do they form? The answers to these questions are important for 
the informal institutions and structures discussed in the Afghan 
sociopolitical context in later chapters. Peters (2005) writes that ‘the 
rules and norms that are argued to shape institutions’ crystalizes 
from collective behaviors of individuals viewed as appropriate in 
society. He adds that once ‘some common norms' in the form of 
‘reciprocity, honesty and cooperation' are practiced in a society, they 
turn into routines ‘in proto-institutional settings' which create 
meaning, values and the motivation for membership (p. 33). In 
Peters’ words “an institution is created when a formal structure has 
meaning for the members, and when those members begin to believe 
that the structure is something more than a means to an end” (2005, 
p. 33). According to Peters (2005), it is this ‘logic of appropriateness' 
that moves people to participate and get membership in an 
institution, including in a political one. In another place, he notes that 
political parties and networks come into existence as a result of 
‘political dynamics' in a state, which he called this ‘institutions of 
interest representation'   (2005).   
Regarding what institutions produce, what role they play in shaping 
and changing the political behaviors of political actors, March, and 
Oslen  (2008) writes: 
Within an institutional perspective, a core assumption is that 
institutions create elements of order and predictability. They 
fashion, enable and constrain political actors as they act 
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within a logic of appropriate action. Institutions are carriers 
of identities and roles and they are makers of a polity’s 
character, history, and vision. They provide bonds that tie 
citizens together in spite of the many things that divide 
them.” (p. 3).  
Alternatively, in another place they note: 
“institutions are imagined to organize the polity and to have 
an ordering effect on how authority and power is constituted, 
exercised, legitimated, controlled and redistributed. They 
affect how political actors are enabled or constrained and the 
governing capacities of a political system. Institutions 
simplify political life by ensuring that some things are taken 
as given. Institutions provide codes of appropriate behavior, 
affective ties, and a belief in a legitimate order. Rules and 
practices specify what is normal, what must be expected, 
what can be relied upon, and what makes sense in the 
community; that is, what a normal, reasonable, and 
responsible (yet fallible) citizen, elected representative, 
administrator, or judge, can be expected to do in various 
situations (p. 6).     
To contextualize the characteristics mentioned above, dynamics and 
consequences of institutions, the empirical questions, and 
hypotheses of this dissertation are briefly brought into the 
discussion, here. Do the Afghan elected provincial councils (PCs) as 
quite new political institutions (though weak, however, embedded in 
the constitution) constitute, exercise, legitimate, control and 
redistribute authority and power? What impact had these new 
institutions (PCs) on the political behavior of the Afghan tribal and 
warlord political elites? Moreover, how much have these new 
institutions (PCs) made and changed the ‘political character' and 
‘vision' of these political actors so far. In other words, has the 
formation of PCs in the Afghan sub-national political context been 
able to ‘provide codes of appropriate behavior, affective ties, and a 
belief in a legitimate order'? According to the findings of this 
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research study, a majority of the provincial council representatives 
are sponsored by, or themselves are warlords, drug mafia and 
powerful tribal elites who not only run and shape local politics, but 
also influence national agendas through violent and illegal means. 
These local power brokers are used to doing politics in a more 
traditional patron-client manner in which rules are established by an 
informal code of conduct rather than by a constitution and its 
embedded laws. If these formal institutions (PCs) haven’t built this 
capacity and ‘vision' yet, is there any tendency for building it in the 
future or is it opposite? 
Moreover, what impact did the new constitutionally defined formal 
institutions (PCs) have over the old traditional informal institutions 
(namely Shuras/Jirgas)? The answers to the above questions would 
lead us to one part of our main subject namely, the potential of the 
sub-national institution in a stable and democratic institutional 
design. In other words, this thesis will highlight whether the PCs are 
institutions capable of taking the load and responsibility for a 
possible decentralization of Afghan state institutions.       
 
Another significant matter, which March and Oslen are concerned 
about is the ‘order' and ‘change' in political institutions. To put it 
differently, what orders do institutions produce? And whether, and 
when, institutions change from one form to another. In this respect 
March and Oslen  (1989) describe: 
“Although they (Institutions) provide important elements of 
order in the changing scene of politics, political institutions 
themselves also change. The processes of change include the 
mundane, incremental transformations of everyday life as 
well as the rarer metamorphoses at breaking points of history 
– when a society’s values and institutions are challenged or 
shattered. These are situations where citizens are more likely 
to become aware of the values, concepts, beliefs and 
institutions by which they live. Typically, in such situations 
the political institutions and the ways in which they organize 
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the relations between citizens, elected representatives, 
bureaucrats and experts, and organized interests are 
reexamined, and possibly modified, transformed, or 
replaced.  
In general, changes are produced through some kind of 
encounter between the rules (or action based on them) and an 
environment, partly consisting of other rules. The dramatic 
version is war or civil war which may replace one definition 
of appropriateness with another. The less dramatic version is 
an ongoing tension among alternative institutional rules – 
and an ongoing debate or struggle over the matching of 
institutional principles and actual situations and spheres of 
activities.” (March & Olsen, The Organization of Basis of 
Politics , 1989, pp. 166-167) 
March and Oslen’s description speaks very well to the conditions of 
both informal and formal political institutions in Afghanistan. From 
the establishment of modern-day Afghanistan until contemporary 
political developments, the informal social institutions and networks 
(e.g., tribal councils and patronage networks) often played a game-
changing role in overthrowing one regime and bringing another in 
power. The more than three and half decades of war and conflict 
brought considerable changes in its format, norms, and values. For 
example, the 1920s modernization, the 1970s communism and the 
1990s radical Islamization years including civil war and ethnic 
conflicts shaped and reshaped the norms, values, and structures of 
these institutions. One of the recent developments is that the 
establishment of new democratic institutions, the provincial councils 
(PCs), in sub-national governments is replacing the traditional 
councils. If the bulk of the population still wishes for a traditional 
Islamic-Sharia system, a majority of the younger population believe 
in democracy and people's participation.  As deliberately explained 
in Chapter five (state-institutional design at the central level), 
Afghans (as voters and candidates for political positions) are aware 
of their vote value and believe that they could influence local politics 
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by merely electing someone who is more responsive to their 
demands. Therefore, the informal patronage and elite institutions and 
actors according to the hypothesis of this research are moving toward 
more formal settings and institutions. 
Furthermore, Amenta and Ramsey (2010) state that its ‘medium-
systemic, interorganizational, or meso-level' approach to political 
institutionalism is mainly macro state-centric. Concerning how 
national political institutions and systems influence local politics, 
Amenta and Ramsey  (2010) write:    
The main theoretical framework (of political 
institutionalism) is that macro-level political institutions 
shape politics and political actors, who act under constrains 
that may influence their impact on state and policies, 
refashioning political institutions in the process, and so on (p. 
29).    
In another place, Amenta (2005) notes that questions surrounding 
the state and its formation, structures and processes makes the core 
of the political institutionalism. Peters (2008) writes that, through 
‘new institutionalism’, political science scholars build new 
comparative analysis and approaches over the differences between 
the parliamentary versus presidential and between federal versus 
unitary states. According to him, political stability in presidential 
institutions is one of the main subject matters some political 
scientists are concerned with, in less developing political contexts 
(2008). In differing between ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism in 
another place, Peters (2005) says: 
…the old institutionalism argued that presidential systems 
are significantly different from parliamentary systems, based 
upon the formal structures and rules. The ‘new 
institutionalism goes further and undertakes trying to 
determine if these assumed differences do indeed exist, and 
if so in what ways those two alternative ways of organizing 
political life differ, and what difference this makes for 
performance of the systems (p. 2).   
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This point opens another significant discussion which constitutes the 
second part of this research, namely the discussion over which 
government system (parliamentary or semi-presidential, 
decentralized, or unitary centralized) better accommodates the 
sociopolitical needs of the Afghan context. The Afghan centralized 
unitary constitution restricts all power and authority to the central 
line ministries, leaving subnational democratic institutions with 
advisory and conflict resolution roles. The central government which 
is a de-facto power-coalition of all major ethnic minorities is often 
divided and in conflict, each group (faction? element?) perusing their 
own regional and ethnolinguistic interests. The major ethnic groups 
are divided between the Pashtuns, the proponents of the currently 
installed unitary centralized state system and the Tajik, Hazara, and 
Uzbek who advocate a change to a decentralized parliamentary one, 
and some even prefer federalism. Therefore, the new institutionalism 
theory, particularly political institutionalism, supports the key 
questions in this thesis. It empirically studies the constitutional 
parliamentary versus Presidentialism discourse in the Afghan 
national politics on the one hand and the decentralization process 
through elected provincial councils and its implication in formal and 
informal governance institutions on the other. In the informal 
governance format, warlords and tribal elites directly influence and 
shape the local and national government politics. 
In order to know why the current political system (unitary 
centralized) is not suitable (to follow the line of argument of its 
opponents) or very much suitable (to follow the line of argument of 
its proponents) we need to review these both classical government 
systems of Parliamentarism vs Presidentialism, as well other 
alternative systems including semi-presidential and consociational 
democracy.  
Furthermore, decentralization is reviewed as a possible strategy for 
prevailing democracy, good governance, sustainable development 
and political stability in Afghanistan.    
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2.6 Humanitarian Intervention Theory and Statebuild-
ing  
Ostensibly, the contemporary OECD state-building policies and 
projects are either part of the preventive or extended mission of the 
primarily humanitarian intervention, halting weak, failing, or post-
conflict states sliding into human catastrophes. The spectrum of such 
intervention contains military and nonmilitary policy packages, 
including the provision of humanitarian assistance, security, ‘rule of 
law,' ‘good governance,' democracy, and institutionalization of the 
government apparatus  (Veit & Klaus, 2012). Richard Caplan called 
this ‘third-party' state-building which is different both in authority 
and legitimacy from that of ‘indigenous state-building' (Caplan, 
2004, p. 53).  In both policy and practice, part of these state-building 
and humanitarian interventions is still highly inspired by the invalid 
classical modernization and political development theories – 
discussed in detail above.  
Humanitarian intervention is defined as the act of interference by a 
state, organization of a group of states ( e.g., NATO) or an 
international organization (United Nations) in another state - with or 
without using force - aiming at ending ‘violent’ oppression and 
atrocities or other human rights violations committed by a ruling 
government regime on its own people (Heinze, 2009 ) & (Trim & 
Simms, 2011). Eric A. Heinze (2009 ) notes that humanitarian 
intervention takes its justification from the moral reasoning of the 
cosmopolitan theory. According to Heinze (2009 ), "a cosmopolitan 
morality suggests that state is rightfully the subject of external moral 
scrutiny for how it treats its citizens"  (p. 16). In other words, since 
cosmopolitanism considers ‘human well-being' and ‘individual 
autonomy' ‘as the highest moral good,' therefore, where human 
suffering occurs by a state on its people, international intervention is 
morally permissible (Heinze, 2009 ). Whereas, according to the 
statism theory, states ‘have a legal and moral claim against outside 
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interference’ and are ‘free’ to ‘create their own political community’ 
the way that is appropriate for them (Heinze, 2009 , pp. 16-17).   
The statists are against any intervention in a sovereign state's affairs, 
unless, and only if, a state government commits ‘widespread 
massacre or enslavement of their own people' (Heinze, 2009 ). It is 
worth noting here that Henze's humanitarian intervention 
perspective is primarily military intervention. According to Joseph 
Boyle  (2006) based on the traditional just war theory military 
intervention or intervention with force is ‘morally a kind of warfare.'   
Nevertheless, there is a distinction between humanitarian 
action/assistance, and intervention, in which the former requires the 
willingness and ‘cooperation' of the installed government and the 
latter is carried out with force  (Trim & Simms, 2011). Similarly, any 
military intervention is not considered humanitarian intervention, 
even if it is invited by ‘a party claiming de jure or de facto authority 
in that state'   (Trim & Simms, 2011, p. 5). Thus, military 
intervention is legal only under the condition of ‘self-defense' and 
‘prior authorization' of ‘the United Nations (UN) Security Council’, 
based on Heinze (2009 ). Brendan Simms and D.J.B Trim  (2011) 
note that despite being ‘perfectly licit within the international law,' 
nevertheless, due to its ‘controversial' drawbacks on ‘international 
relations,' humanitarian intervention with military force is seen as 
the very last option. Another primary justification or legitimization 
for intervention – besides human rights violations - is the right to 
self-defense and security. However, as Andrea Kathryn Talentino 
notes, the concept of security has not remained in its traditional form 
of a military threat, but in contemporary world politics encompasses 
a larger area of concern of states, including: economics, health, 
migration, drug trade, terrorism, gender, and environmental issues  
(Talentino, 2005). In this regard Howard Adelman also writes:  
In the global nation-states system, there is a compact among 
the states that each (state) has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
land and peoples within their respective territories. States 
assume responsibility for the security and well-being of their 
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own people. But a state only exists as a fully developed state 
if there is sufficient control and power exercised over the 
body politic, and if the polity is capable of surviving on its 
own. As a body politic, there has to be both centralized 
coercive control and economy in place that will ensure 
survival.  (2002, pp. 3-4)    
It can be asserted from Adelman (2002)   and Talentino (Talentino, 
2005) that where a state  fails to ensure the security and well-being 
of its own citizens – and where that may affect the security and 
stability of another state – intervention by the other state/s is 
permissible. In other words, international security and stability are 
dependent on the ability of individual states to provide security, 
economic opportunity, and law and order. Thus, it is at this juncture 
where the powerful states go beyond their primarily humanitarian 
intervention of providing security and aid to state-building 
engagement.  The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United 
States after the 9/11 attack and its following state-building 
engagement could be a perfect example of such kind.   
Although the intention and objectives of such interventions might be 
humanitarian and reformative, its operational policies and strategies 
might often result in disruptive rather than constructive outcomes. It 
is at this juncture, where the humanitarian intervention with or 
without military force is controversial among the scholars.  Heinze 
(2009 ) also believes that any humanitarian intervention is subject to 
moral, legal and political justification questions. Another major 
point in the interventionist literature is the increasing responsibility 
taken by the strong western states for failing or failed states.   
 As David Chandler writes:   
International state-building is no longer something that just 
happens after the event – western military intervention for 
humanitarian or security reasons (Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq) or post-conflict peacebuilding (Bosnia and East Timor) 
– but is increasingly seen as a vital package of policy 
measures designed to prevent states from sliding into 
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economic and political collapse. A set of international policy 
prescriptions, the frameworks of good governance are seen 
as a ‘silver bullet' capable of assisting states in coping with 
the problems of our complex globalized world: facilitating 
sustainable development, social peace and the development 
of democracy and the rule of law.  (2010, p. 1)     
Chandler’s statements bring us a step nearer to the present debate of 
what an international state-building intervention is and how it 
happens.  
Berit Beliesemann de Guevara writes “…any powerful group 
struggling to institutionalise its power as a legitimate form of state 
rule can be framed as an agent of state-building” (2012, p. 5). That 
means the international community state-building intervention is a 
top-down, self-styled and ready-made strategy applied to third world 
countries. Whereas, state-formation is the product of historical 
conflicting interactions and processes among different groups within 
a society  (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). Beliesemann de Guevara 
(2012) analyzes state-building discourse from ‘the international 
state-builders’ and ‘the local recipients’ perspectives.  According to 
him, international state-builders attempt to export modern ‘liberal 
peace’, democracy, ‘internationalisation and depoliticisation’ policy 
and practices to non-western societies aiming at building states and 
(good) governance, yet ignoring historical contexts, and social 
dynamics and processes quite different from that of western societies 
(Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). The local recipients (powerful 
political elites) in their account often question the legitimacy of such 
intervention and continue to struggle for their social and political 
survival, in some cases with revolt (e.g., warlords and the re-
insurgency in the case of Afghanistan), which doom any reforming 
efforts to failure. Besides, since statehood is a complex interaction 
between local, national and international actors and processes, the 
institutionalization of power as a legitimate rule/actor therefore 
requires the utilization of ‘strategies and tactics'  (Bliesemann de 
Guevara, 2012). The application of these strategies and tactics 
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results in conflicting interests between various groups in a society, 
which leads to diverse ‘reactions’ including ‘resistance, cooperation 
and manipulation’ (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012).    
Moreover, the internationalized conditions for state-building made 
many post-conflict states dependent on their international partners  
for finances, security, the rule of law and legitimacy (Chandler, 
2004) & (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). The primary state-society 
relation – provision of services and the monopoly of force by the 
state and in return collecting taxes and earning legitimacy from its 
population – is distorted and replaced by ‘clientelistic networks 
sustained’ by political and economic ‘rents’ (Bliesemann de 
Guevara, 2012). For example, the flow of financial and military aid 
by the US and NATO forces to warlords and tribal elites created 
powerful para-state actors in Afghanistan. By providing economic 
and political rents to its local subordinates and tribal networks, these 
once unpopular power-brokers not only gained local loyalty but also 
managed to occupy key government decision-making positions - 
soon misused for farther personal gains. The government office 
farther facilitated access to illicit income opportunities including the 
drug-trade and widespread corruption. Meanwhile these 
powerbrokers became so strong and influential that any attempt at 
reform that might cause  their income sources to dry-up would lead 
to political instability and even to the threat of collapse of the 
political regime. This is in no small extent happening at the current 
Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah national unity government. In 
contrast to ex-president Hamid Karzai, president Ghani stopped 
paying powerful Mujahideen commanders, which resulted in their 
withdrawing support from the regime and even planning plots to 
remove Ghani, which were disclosed and reported to the US 
embassy. 
In addition to direct state military interventions, the United Nations 
(UN) and the OECD countries' national development organizations 
are among the key players of soft-skill state-building strategies and 
policies in developing in general, and in post-conflict countries in 
76 
 
particular. Here too, the independent academia has a viewpoint quite 
critical of the parties implementing these projects. For instance, 
Chandler (2010) believes that the international ‘fictional policy 
narrative’ of ‘universalizing’ western liberal democracy and market 
economics is ignoring ‘the needs and interests of those subject to 
intervention’ which not only disrupts the state-formation processes 
but also undermines the reform objectives of the interventionists.  
Florian P. Kühn (2012) affirms the international state-builders for 
their ‘contradictory logic' of disturbing the natural social and 
political interactions and processes by injecting western ‘ideal' state 
models in non-western societies.       
In the case of Afghanistan, a majority of the aid is directly spent by 
the individual donor institutions based on their own institutional 
mandates and conditions. Therefore, it often not only fails to help the 
state-building process but also undermines the minimum state 
institutions. Lack of cooperation and coordination among these 
international players in applying contradictory, self-styled reform 
strategies and projects are another major dilemma ahead of state 
institutionalization for intervened countries. The creation of several 
duplicated local development councils at the village, district and 
provincial levels in Afghanistan for instance impaired the existence 
of the elected provincial and traditional village councils. 
 
Part-III: A Few Essential State-Building Com-
ponents 
 
2.7 State Institutional Design: Presidential versus Par-
liamentary Democracies 
State-building in the 21st century is not about whether democracies 
are preferred over autocracies, but about which type of democracies 
fit better in a particular social and political context. In other words, 
democracy is the primary parameter for the state-building agenda. 
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Therefore, after ceasefires and the end of conflicts, both 
policymakers and political scientists search for a state model 
(parliamentary or presidential, unitary or decentralized) that will best 
accommodate political stability, legitimacy, and good governance in 
a particular social context. However, before discussing which type 
of democracies best suits post-conflict and divided societies, we 
need to take a brief glance at the concept of democracy itself.  
In Joseph A. Schumpeter`s (1943/2003) words - an influential 
economist and political scientist of the 20th century- democracy is an 
“… institutional arrangement for arriving at political decision which 
realises the common good by making the people itself decide issues 
through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to 
carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1943/2003, p. 250). A more explicit 
definition of democracy is provided by Robert A. Dahl  (1999). 
According to Dahl, democracy constitutes two dimensions; (1) the 
provision of ‘enforceable set of rights and opportunities', by a 
political institution and (2) the ‘actual participation in political life' 
by its citizens  (pp. 12-13).  Dahl (1999) asserts that for a democracy 
to be implemented fundamentally, its political institution  "must" 
deliver its citizens the rights and opportunities ‘by law and practice'; 
to choose their representatives through participating in free and fair 
elections, ‘freedom of expression', freedom of media, civil society 
organization and inquiry of government policies, among others  (p. 
13). 
The development of contemporary world democracies has gone 
through many historical ups and downs.  According Samuel P. 
Huntington (1991) ‘the first wave of democratization' lasted between 
1820s and 1926 in which 29 states (e.g., West-Europe and North 
America) were transformed into democracies, nevertheless the 
number declined to 12 with coming of Mussolini in power in 1922, 
and ‘the second of wave' began after the end of World War II in 
which around 36 countries adopted democracies  (p. 12). 
Nevertheless, a small (6 countries) reversed from democracy 
between 1960-1975  (p. 12). Huntington notes that the collapse of 
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communism in 1989 marked the ‘third wave of democratization’ in 
the world (1991). The shift from authoritarian regimes to 
democracies in the third wave of democratization was fundamentally 
extensive: by the beginning of the twenty-first century the number 
of world democracies increased to 75%, including states in Asia, 
Latin America, Central Europe and Africa (Mair, 2008) & (Brooker, 
2008 ). Some literature categorized the present era as the ‘fourth 
wave of democratization' initiated by the outbreak of the ‘Arab-
Spring’ in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen in 2010, and 2011 in Syria  
(Howard & Hussain, 2013) & (Abushouk, 2016).    
Although, the debate over the two principle alternative government 
models (parliamentary and presidential) existed before the 
emergence of the modern democracy (Lijphart, 1992). The ‘third 
wave of democratization' played a vital role in widening the horizon 
of political scientists and ‘constitutional builders' regarding 
democratic institutions and available choices both in theory and in 
practice, according to Mair  (2008). According to Douglas V. Verney 
(1959/1992), the British monarchy was the first to be challenged and 
transformed a limited monarchy. The system that resulted was a 
parliament, entailing the roles of ‘both government and assembly', 
whereas in the United States the monarch was replaced by an elected 
president/governor and the ‘assembly remained' as a separate 
legislative body (Congress), which formed the first presidential 
system in the 18th century. (Verney D. V., 1959/1992). It is not 
surprising that the Asian and African countries inherited the 
parliamentary model of democracies from its colonial power Great 
Britain, and Latin America countries, the presidential model from 
the United States (Horowitz D. L., 1990) & (Lijphart, 1992). There 
is no consensus on ‘an exact definition' for presidential and 
parliamentary systems in the literature, however, according to Arend 
Lijphart  (1992) and others, the executive-legislature power 
relationship is one of the prime distinctions between the two. In a 
parliamentary system, the executive power is shared with 
legislatures in a collegial manner, while in a presidential model, it is 
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unipersonal, namely with the head of the government or president 
(Verney D. V., 1959/1992), (Carey, 2005) & (Müller, 2008). In other 
words, in a parliamentary system, besides its legislative function, the 
parliament chooses and controls the government through electing the 
executive (prime minister or chancellor and cabinet), while in the 
presidential system, the executive (the president) is directly elected 
by popular vote and is independent of the legislative power. The 
president chooses his own cabinet, requiring vote of confirmation 
(e.g. in the U.S.) or confidence (e.g. in Afghanistan) of his choices 
by the legislative (Canas, 2004) This is the principle characteristic 
distinguishing these two models of governments. Some of the 
significant differences are illustrated in the table below (Table 1). 
Table 1 Comparison of presidential, parliamentary and semi-
presidential governments   
Institutional 
characteristi
cs   
Presidential   Parliamenta
ry   
Semi-
Presidential  
Head of the 
government  
President  Prime 
minister or 
chancellor, 
etc.    
Prime minister 
or chancellor, 
etc. 
Head of the 
state 
Identical with 
the head of 
the 
government 
Monarch or 
President 
(non-
executive and 
usually has a 
ceremonial 
role) 
President 
(usually has 
arbitrary power)  
Choosing the 
head of the 
government 
 
Via popular 
vote, directly 
or via 
electoral 
college for a 
Via 
parliament 
(e.g., 
Germany, 
Spain) or 
Appointed by 
the president or 
nominated by 
the president and 
elected by the 
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constitutional
ly fixed term 
appointed by 
the head of 
the states with 
an obligatory 
vote of 
confidence 
(e.g., UK, 
Netherland) 
parliament (e.g., 
Portugal) 
Choosing the 
head of the 
state 
-  Monarchy is 
inherited, and 
the president 
is elected by 
the 
parliament, 
particular 
electoral 
college or 
popular vote 
President is 
directly or quasi-
directly elected  
executive-
legislative 
relations    
Separated, 
executive 
with one-
person 
(president) 
Shared in a 
collegial 
manner 
(Prime 
minister & 
parliament) 
Balanced 
through mutual 
interaction 
between all three 
bodies: 
president, 
parliament and 
the 
government/pri
me minister 
Cabinet 
appointment 
and its role  
By the 
president 
(usually with 
the consent of 
the 
By the 
parliament 
with a high 
degree of 
collegiality in 
By the president 
(usually with the 
consent of the 
legislature) 
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legislature) 
and has an 
advisory role 
decision 
making 
collegiality in 
decision making 
Political 
accountabilit
y to the 
legislature 
President is 
not 
accountable 
to the 
legislature 
(usually the 
cabinet is) 
Prime 
minister and 
ministers are 
accountable 
to the 
parliament 
and can be 
dismissed 
from the 
office with 
the vote of no-
confidence  
President is not 
accountable to 
the legislature, 
but the cabinet is 
Source: assembled by the author from various sources see, please 
note11.  
Lijphart (1992) points out three significant features: (1) ‘executive 
stability', (2) ‘greater democracy' (3) and ‘limited government' as the 
                                                          
11 the above Table is constructed based on the general features of these three major 
government models by the author. The information in this table is collected from 
various sources, including (1) from the book “Parliamentary Versus Presidential 
Government” part one “Introduction”, page, 1-30 by Arend Lijphart and 
“Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government”, page, 31-47 by 
Douglas V. Verney, 1992, Oxford University Press Inc., New York. (2) 
“Comparative Politics” Chapter 8 “Governments and bureaucracies” page 193 
by Wolfgang C. Müller, 2008, Oxford University Press. Oxford. (3) “The Semi-
Presidential System”, journal article by Vitalino Canas, 2004, Max Planck-
Institute für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecgt, pages 95-124. (4) 
“Non-Executive Presidencies in Parliamentary Democracies” page 7, by 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014 
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positive characteristics of Presidentialism, that are counted at the 
same time as the negative features for Parliamentarism. In other 
words, the advantage of Presidentialism is in its stable executive 
power in which the president is elected for a fixed term and cannot 
be dismissed by the legislature. Unlike the prime minister or 
chancellor who is subject to the vote of confidence of the parliament. 
Since the president is elected through a direct popular vote, it is more 
democratic, versus the prime minister, who is elected indirectly by 
the members of the legislature. The executive power is separated 
between the president and the legislative house; therefore it is limited 
and competitive. Whereas in a parliamentary system there is a fusion 
of executive-legislative power in one body namely parliament and 
that makes the government uncontrolled (Schlesinger JR, 
1982/1992), (Linz, 1990) & (Lijphart, 1992). 
Meanwhile, the opposite of these features is counted as the 
advantages for Parliamentarism and vice versa. To put it more 
explicit, the first two major disadvantage of the Presidentialism are 
(1) its conflict of interest between executive and legislature over 
national policies, (2) the ‘temporal rigidity' or the fixed term of the 
president – in the case of the death of the president or of the president 
going against national interests – leads to a political deadlock. While 
the fusion of powers results in cooperation and forming coalitions, 
and the flexibility of the executive term results in the smoothness of 
the government politics in Parliamentarism  (Linz, 1990) & 
(Lijphart, 1992).  The third problematic - common in presidential 
regime - in Juan J. Linz (1990) words is that the ‘winner-take-all' 
rule which brings ‘democratic politics to a zero-sum game' could be 
particularly harmful in divided and plural societies. Although the 
majority of contemporary world governments fit somehow into 
either of the models (Parliamentarism or Presidentialism), there are 
many variations of the principles including, semi-Presidentialism 
(e.g., in France and Austria), directorial government (e.g., 
Switzerland), and directly elected prime minister (in Israel)  (Müller, 
2008). Semi-Presidentialism is also known as the hybrid or 
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‘intermediate' of parliamentary and presidential government systems 
and is derived from the French political regime in 1970  (Duverger, 
1980). The emergence of semi-presidential is the result of the short-
comings of both pure classical government systems 
(Parliamentarism and Presidentialism) in some political contexts 
discussed earlier above (Lijphart, 1992) & (Canas, 2004). In other 
words, by bringing in an elected president in the power paradigm, 
semi-Presidentialism tries to compensate some of the deficits of 
Parliamentarism (less democratic) and Presidentialism (political 
deadlock).  Vitalino Canas (2004) defines semi-Presidentialism as a 
political system in which ‘the dynamic’ of power or ‘relations’ is 
‘balanced’ between ‘three political bodies’ namely, ‘a Government’ 
or prime minister, ‘a Parliament’ and ‘Head of the State’ or president 
elected based on universal suffrage (p. 95). Canas notes (2004) that 
the balance can be achieved through attaining a mutual political 
legitimacy to all three bodies, and a "mutual legitimacy" is achieved 
through the election of the president, the prime minister and 
parliament via ‘more or less12' popular votes, nevertheless, mutual 
legitimacy is not ‘sufficient' if it is not followed by ‘equivalent' 
power and collaborative interactions. According to Canas, unlike the 
parliamentary and presidential government, the distribution of 
powers in a semi-presidential system is subject to a constraint for all 
three major bodies. In his words: "the principle of balance, a 
principle that is the backbone of the semi-presidential system, 
determines that none of the bodies may acquire essential and 
permanent influence over either of the others (Canas, 2004, p. 102)”  
Nonetheless, Lijphart (1992) claims, that the disadvantage of the 
semi-presidential system is its combination of ‘two forms’ which ‘do 
not operate simultaneously but in phases’ (p. 21). That means, when 
the semi-presidential system is in its parliamentary phase, it is not as 
                                                          
12. According to the Vitalino Canas (2004), since the prime minister is elected by 
parliamentary majority vote, and the members of the parliament are elected by 
popular vote, the election of the prime minister is seen as equivalently demo-
cratic. However, because it is still not as democratic as direct elections, the ex-
pression ‘more or less' is appropriate to use. 
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efficient as in pure Parliamentarism for forming coalitions.  
However, when it is in its presidential phase, its government lacks 
‘more democracy' because of the absence of a popular vote for the 
prime minister, and it can become a ‘hyper-presidential' through 
which the president could dominate all power as it happened in 
France between 1962-1974 and 1981-1986 (Lijphart, 
1992/1999/2004). However, Lijphart believes that semi-
Presidentialism has convincing potential as an alternative model, 
particularly for contexts where the presidential system has lost its 
popularity, and where a radical move to pure Parliamentarism is 
challenging due to the historical longevity of Presidentialism in a 
society (Lijphart, 1992/1999/2004).  
In general, however, there is no clear consensus among the scholars 
and constitution makers in respect to which type of democracy 
(parliamentary or presidential) is superior to the other. Linz - (1990) 
an advocate for Parliamentarism – tags the ‘winner-take-all’ rule as 
an instability factor for Presidentialism and argues that the 
institutional flexibility of the parliamentary system facilitates the 
efforts of different parties (particularly minorities in divided 
societies) to form political coalitions, which leads to greater stability 
and its superiority over presidential governments. According to him, 
apart from the US Presidentialism, and France and Finland`s mixed 
or semi-Presidentialism, the majority of the world’s ‘stable 
democracies’ are parliamentary (Linz, 1990). Fred W. Riggs (1992) 
goes even farther, disapproving of Presidentialism as an alternative 
system to Parliamentarism, and claiming that the ‘longevity' of the 
United States government is not a good basis for measuring the 
‘superiority' of the presidential system. Riggs's notes that almost all 
presidential systems in the third world countries including Korea, 
South Vietnam, Liberia, Philippines and many countries in Latin 
American have experienced frequent ‘disruptions' usually through 
military coups or sometimes through the dissolution of congress by 
the president, in contrast to the proved relative stability of ‘two-
thirds' of parliamentary and semi-presidential systems in third world 
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countries (Riggs, 1992). However, Donald L. Horowitz (1990) – a 
proponent of Presidentialism – brings back the ‘winner-take-all’ 
rule: a plurality electoral system in which the majority wins all and 
the minority loses, as a contra-argument to Linz. He describes its use 
in parliamentary elections in which it also shut-out minority parties 
from the parliament, resulting in disruption to ethnically divided 
societies. Horowitz (1990) says that it is the majoritarian or popular 
electoral system which causes the ‘winner take all' rule in a 
presidential system, that could be replaced with a different electoral 
system for ‘divided societies’. 
Horowitz (1990)  notes that for instance the ‘plurality plus 
distribution’ electoral system in Nigeria was intentionally chosen to 
‘shut out ethnic extremists and elect a moderate centrist president’ 
(Horowitz D. L., 1990, pp. 75-76)He also adds that the focus of study 
and critiques of Linz are based on presidential systems in Latin 
America, and if Linz had studied the failures of parliamentary 
democracies in Asia and Africa, his conclusion would have been 
different (Horowitz D. L., 1990). 
Meanwhile, Seymour Martin Lipset  (1992) does not believe in 
either Horowitz`s (1990) or Linz`s (1990) arguments that 
‘constitutional variations' in both alternative models could be the 
deciding factors for achieving stable democracies. He emphasizes 
‘economic and cultural factors' as essential prerequisites for 
establishing sustainable democracies, particularly in third world 
countries  (Lipset, 1992). According to Lipset (1992), although 
recent development shows different results in Non-Protestant 
nations in southern Europe and Latin America, historical evidence 
shows that democracies in rich Protestant nations were more 
sustainable than in poor Catholic ones. He adds that the reason why 
many Muslim countries still have authoritarian and monarchy 
regimes and not democracies, are the non-separation of religion from 
politics  (Lipset, 1992).  In another place, Linz  (1990) also concludes 
that it is not only the institutional choice which brings success and 
stability to democracies but social-political culture and leadership 
86 
 
play a significant role in supporting both parliamentary and 
presidential democracies in many nations.   
 
 
2.8 Consociational Democracy in Divided Societies 
After the world war II, besides the continued rivalry between the 
capitalist democracy and authoritarian communist regimes, social 
and segmental cleavages were the main challenges for political 
stability in western Europe (Schendelen, 1985). The Netherlands, for 
example, was divided among various religious and class groups, in 
which the religious parties were not only antagonistic toward non-
religious parties (socialist and liberal), but also fragmented among 
their own various sects (mainly the Catholic versus Calvinist),  In 
addition, the class stratum was alienated between lower, middle and 
higher layers  (Schendelen, 1985). Nonetheless, despite these severe 
social and segmental cleavages, the Dutch people managed to form 
an ‘effective' and ‘stable' democracy in the country (Lijphart, 1968). 
Arend Lijphart studied the sociopolitical climate of his home country 
– in his book "The politics of accommodation: pluralism and 
democracy in the Netherland" – and developed the consensus or 
consociational democracy theory in the late 1960s (Schendelen, 
1985) & (Binningsbo, 2013).   
In general, Lijphart`s (1977 & 2002/2003) consociational democracy 
theory rests on two major features: (1) ‘sharing of executive power’ 
or establishing a ‘grand coalition’ government at the national level 
and (2) granting ‘group autonomy’ at the local (p. 3).  Lijphart 
(1999/2004) describes these two features as below:   
Power sharing denotes the participation of representatives of 
all significant communal groups in political decisions 
making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy 
means that these groups have authority to run their own 
internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and 
culture (p. 97).  
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The grand coalition and self-governance theory is complemented by 
two additional features namely (1) mutual veto and (2) proportional 
representation. The former is a political power through which a 
minority segment or party could block a decision of the majority of 
the grand ollation that goes against their ‘vital interest' and the latter 
grants a share of civil and political participation in the whole 
government to all segmental groups  (Lijphart, 1977).  Lijphart 
(1977) believes that in a segmentally divided society, the desire for 
‘statesmanship’ and the fear from ‘mutual destruction’ are the major 
political motives for political elites entering into a coalition and 
forming ‘intersegmental elite cooperation’ with their opponents.     
The significance of the consociational theory is in its creation of 
conflict regulation capacity in societies with deep segmental 
cleavages. According to Harry Eckstein (1966) segmental cleavages 
are those racial, ethnic, language, religion, tribal and regional 
dissimilarities in a society, which are followed by political 
competition and conflict.  In its extreme form, one distinctive group 
or party seeks ‘autonomy’ or ‘dominance’ over the other, (p. 34). For 
Donald L Horowitz  (2003) a divided society is a society “in which 
ethnic-group identities have a high degree of salience, exceeding that 
accorded to alternative identities – including supra-ethnic, territorial, 
ideological, and class-based alternatives – and in which levels of 
antipathy between ethnic groups are high” (p. 26).  Due to its power-
sharing feature at the center and self-governance at the peripheries, 
the consociational democracy is very often cited as a conflict 
regulation approach in post-conflict and divided societies.  Lijphart 
claims that consociational democracy is not only an option but "the 
only feasible solution" for multi-ethnic societies, which suffered or 
are still suffering from conflict and civil war    (2003, p. 2).  In 
comparing political systems, B. Guy Peter  (2008) also believes that 
consociational democracy is a ‘form of conflict resolution 
mechanism’ in societies with segmental cleavages. Stefan Wollf 
(2011) called consociational democracy as an appealing ‘post-
conflict state-building’ strategy.  
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Furthermore, during the rise of ‘new-institutionalism’ in the 1980s – 
when democracy was ‘the only game in town’ – institutions were the 
independent variables whose impact on society was being studied by 
political scientists, according to Peter Mair (2008). It was also the 
time in which the traditional alternative government models 
(parliamentary and presidential) were farther developed, and in 
which democracy emerged as a ‘rich’ political system with several 
conceptual and institutional classifications’ (Mair, 2008).  Also, 
democracy was analyzed based on various attractive parameters 
including; ‘legitimacy', ‘performance', ‘effectiveness' and 
efficiencies (Mair, 2008). Arend Lijphart greatly contributed to this 
account by comparing the majoritarian versus consociational 
democracies, which is cited as the "most comprehensive and well 
developed whole (government) system" study by Mair  (2008). In 
his book ‘Patterns of Democracy, Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries’ Arend Lijphart (1999, 2012) 
distinguishes the majoritarian models of democracies from 
consensus in ten institutional characteristics. According to Lijphart 
(1999, 2012)  in majoritarian democracies:  
(1) Executive power is    
controlled by ‘single-party 
majority cabinets’;  
(2) Legislative power is 
dominated by executive 
power;  
(3) There are (usually) two 
parties;  
(4) Electoral systems are 
‘majoritarian and 
disproportional;  
(5) Interest groups are 
pluralist and competitive;  
(6) Institutionally 
governments are ‘unitary and 
centralized; 
(7) Legislative power is 
concentrated in unicameral 
house;  
(8) Constitution is flexible;  
(9) Judicial review is done 
by legislature; and  
(10) ‘Central banks are 
dependent on executive’ (pp. 
3-4).  
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Whereas, in consociational 
democracies:  
 (1) executive power is 
composed of ‘broad multi-
party coalitions; 
(2) the executive-legislative 
power relations are balanced;  
(3) party system is multiple;  
(4) the electoral system is the 
proportional representation; 
 (5) interest groups negotiate, 
are compromising and 
‘corporatist’ 
 (6) institutionally 
governments are federal and 
decentralized; 
 (7) the legislative house is 
bicameral, ‘equally strong but 
differently 'formed';  
(8) constitutions are not 
flexible and could only be 
amended by ‘extraordinary’ 
majority vote;  
(9) judicial review is done by 
supreme or  
constitutional court; and 
 (10) central banks are 
independent of executive 
power (Lijphart, 1999, 2012, 
pp. 3-4)
 
In another place, Lijphart briefs majoritarian democracies as 
‘exclusive, competitive and adversarial' and consociational as 
‘inclusive, bargaining and compromises'  (1999, 2012). According 
to Lijphart (1977), the executive power-sharing aspect of consensus 
democracy could be adopted in both traditional government models; 
in parliamentary through ‘grand coalition cabinet' and in a 
presidential system via ‘grand coalition of a president and other top 
officeholders'  (p. 25). Besides preferring parliamentary democracy 
over presidential and semi-presidential systems for various reasons 
discussed deliberatively in the earlier section, Lijphart (1999/2004) 
strongly advocates for federalism and decentralization due to its 
support for his segmental autonomy feature. In his ten differentiating 
features listed above, the federal and decentralized government are 
identified with consociational democracy, while centralized and 
unitary state systems are categorized under the majoritarian type of 
government (Lijphart, 1999, 2012, pp. 3-4).   
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Moreover, according to him, in the real world politics, there is hardly 
an absolute majoritarian or consensus democracy. However the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand could be called ‘relatively pure 
majoritarian democracies', whereas Switzerland and Belgium 
consociational  (Lijphart, 1999, 2012). In his study of thirty-six 
countries` democracies around the world (between 1945- 2010), 
Lijphart (1999, 2012) concludes that the performance of 
consociations in regards to ‘more democratic’ and effective 
governance is much better than majoritarian, and he recommends 
consociational democracy as more suitable for ‘culturally and 
ethnically deep divided societies’ (pp. 295-296). Due to its ‘power-
sharing’ aspect at the national and ‘self-governance’ at the local level 
which could settle conflict and bring stability, the consensus 
democracy is widely practiced, particularly in several third world 
post-conflict and divided societies including in Burundi, Bosnia, 
Lebanon, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zimbabwe  (Sisk, 
1995), (Wollf, 2011) & (Binningsbo, 2013).  
However, for Lijphart, the success of consociational democracy is 
very much dependent on ‘favorable conditions’ in place. According 
to Lijphart (1977) the balance of power through and among multiple 
segments, multiparty system, small population size, cross-cutting 
cleavages, overreaching loyalties (for example nationalism), and 
territorial segmental isolation are the favorable factors and 
conditions which are conducive to consociational democracy in 
general and to federalism in particular. 
Consociational democracy approach is very relevant to the case 
study of this dissertation. Although a constitutionally centralized 
unitary system, the de-facto post 9/11 Afghanistan state is based on 
an ethnolinguistic coalition in the capital with extended influence of 
each primarily ethnolinguistic party in the sub-national units. 
Parliamentary federalism is often proposed by most non-Pashtun 
minorities, while the predominantly Pashtun majority insists on 
strong centralism, fearing to lose its inherited dominance in the 
government.  The newly established elected provincial councils have 
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opened another social and political discourse for decentralization, 
discussed more fully in another chapter. 
It should be noted that there is a list of critiques on Lijphart's 
consociational theory. For example, Donald L. Horowitz   (2003) 
believes that the incentives and motives through which the Lijphart’s 
consociational approach brings conflicting parties into coalitions are 
not realistic. Horowitz (2003) argues that “why should majority-
group leaders” who have “the ability to gain all of political power in 
a majoritarian democracy, be so abnegating as to give some of it 
away to minority group leaders?” (p. 7). Furthermore, there are 
competing political elites and parties within ethnic groups.  If one 
elite party enters into a grand-coalition, which usually requires some 
kind of compromise, the opponent elites "make an issue of the 
compromise, referring to it as a sell-out", according to Horowitz  
(2003, p. 8). Other major critiques of the consociational approach are 
that the grand-coalition is undemocratic due to its lack of strong 
opposition which is a condition for democracy, and that it is 
unpractical because once the coalition is formed, there is still usually 
no consensus on certain decisions which might lead to political 
deadlocks (Lijphart, 2003) & (Horowitz D. L., 2003). Lijphart 
(2003) tried to respond to the above-listed critiques made by the 
opponent of his theory in several places13.  
The Horowitz’s critiques on consociational democracy are relevant 
to the case of Afghanistan. The political elites and parties in both 
main Pashtun and Non-Pashtun minorities who are left out of the 
coalition blame the government for not representing their ethnic 
group and claim the compromise was made for the personal gain of 
the ethnic representatives in the coalition. This sometimes pressures 
and challenges the main coalition partners, when faced with ethnic-
based decisions, to try to win more power and positions for their 
                                                          
13 For more, please find in Journal article "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democ-
racy” Arend Lijphart, 2003, Oxford Scholarship Online, page 1-22 and book “De-
mocracy in Plural Societies” Arend Lijphart, 1977, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London 
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groups in order to neutralize the critiques of their sub-elites. This has 
often led to political deadlock. For instance, although the Afghan 
unity government is in its third year now, most of the critical 
ministerial seats are still empty because no agreement could be 
reached in the coalition for the appointments. In another case, the 
distribution of electronic identity cards for the Afghan nationals was 
a project ready for implementation even at the time of ex-president 
Hamid Karzai, but still has not been implemented, as both sides (the 
Pashtun and the non-Pashtun minorities) have their reservations 
(read more in chapter five).    
 Since the Bonn agreement, the Afghan political elites are divided 
between Pashtuns for presidential centralization and non-Pashtuns 
for parliamentary decentralization, with some non-Pashtuns 
advocating federalism. Therefore, it is a matter of relevance to 
review both federalism and decentralization in the following section.  
  
2.9 Federalism  
Globalization and its socioeconomic consequences challenged the 
authorities of centralized nation-states as groups and political parties 
intensified pressure for approving their segmental identities and 
ensuring their regional interests, according to Ronald Watts (2001) 
and Harihar Bhattacharyya (2010). Federalism has served as a 
‘reconciling technique’ for the ‘contradictory trends’ of 
‘intergeneration and disintegration’ caused by globalization, “by 
establishing a shared government for specified common purposes, 
while allowing autonomous action by regional units of government 
on matters relating to particularly regional interests”, based on Watts 
(2001, p. 9).  
The term ‘federal’ originally derived from the Latin word of foedus, 
- ‘means covenant or compact’- initially used in the Christian 
theological context referring to the human-God partnership 
relationship (Elazar, 1976/2011).  Since the French Revolution and 
the rise of theories of mass democracy, the term Federal is used to 
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refer to a political partnership between government and people 
through power-sharing based on ‘real' justice and cooperation 
(Elazar, 1976/2011). In 1787, the American constitutional makers 
used the word ‘federalism' in this way for the first time to denote the 
United States government system  (Verney D. V., 1995/2011). 
Although used interchangeably in some literature, there is a 
conceptual distinction between ‘federalism', and ‘federal political 
systems'  (Watts, 2001) & (Verney D. V., 1995/2011). According to 
Watts (2001) “federalism is a normative term” and “refers to the 
advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-
rule and regional self-rule” (p. 24). The term ‘federal political 
systems' applies to broad categories of non-unitary political systems, 
mainly including federation, confederation, federacy, decentralized 
union, associated states, condominium and league, all entailing at 
least two main elements of shared-rule and self-rule (Watts, 2001). 
It is worth noting here, that in this dissertation I am concerned only 
with a federation model of the federal political system, which is used 
interchangeably with federalism. 
Lijphart (1977) brings federalism under the consociational approach, 
calling it a particular form of consociational democracy. 
‘Overrepresentation' at the national and ‘segmental autonomy' at the 
local level are the two key features which make consociation theory 
identical with federalism, based on Lijphart (1977). Additionally, 
Lijphart (1977) and others argue that while constitutional democracy 
has been applied in various forms of federalism in several post-
conflict contexts around the world, some have formed stable and 
successful democracies, while others failed depending on their 
approach to segmental or territorial conflict settlement (Norris, 
2008) & (Wollf, 2011). Norris (2008) considers federalism an 
‘important strategy' for societies which are fragmented along the 
language, religious, racial and tribal lines because under a federal 
arrangement; each group is granted the autonomy to preserve its own 
distinctive identity. Wollf  (2011) also enlists federalism under 
consociational theory and defines it as “a constitutionally entrenched 
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structure in which the entire territory of a given state is divided into 
separate political units, all of which enjoy certain exclusive, 
legislative and judicial powers independent of the central 
government” (p. 1785).  
However, there is a slight difference among some of the scholars 
regarding whether federalism is similar to consociation democracy. 
Malcom M. Feeley & Edward Rubin (2008) distinguish between 
consociation and federalism: 
Federalism may fulfill some of the same functions as 
consociation and might even count as a consociational 
approach, but many consociational strategies do not count as 
federalism, because they do not possess federalism's defining 
characteristics; that is, they do not establish geographically 
defined subunits with definitive autonomy rights against the 
central government  (p. 29).  
 
For Feeley & Rubin (2008) there is a geographically ‘separate 
government’ which has ‘semiautonomous authority’ in federal 
arrangements, whereas in consociation the idea is to protect minority 
groups by granting them a role in the center and subcultural 
autonomy at the local. Similarly, Daniel J. Elazar (1976/2011) 
defines federalism as “a form of political organization which unites 
separate polities within an overreaching political system so that all 
maintain their fundamental political integrity” (p. 82). Pointing to 
the American federal system, Elazar (1976/2011) notes that the 
federal, state or local entities are each structurally separate and 
autonomous polities which each obtain their authority directly from 
the people. Herman Bakvis (2011) also differentiates federalism 
with consociation, considering the Canadian government model as 
federalism (in which the federal units are territorially separated 
between English and French-speaking groups) while regarding the 
Netherlands as consociational (in which the government was formed 
based on religious and class cleavages in non-territorial bases).   
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Nevertheless, Lijphart (1977) notes that federalism could be applied 
in both plural and non-plural societies, with territorial and non-
territorial bases. However, it would be ‘especially attractive' if 
segmental cleavages coincide with territorial ones, which he calls  
‘federal society'. He adds that when populations are segmentally 
deeply intermingled, the autonomy aspect of the federal 
arrangements is applied based on non-territorial or ‘personality 
principle'  (Lijphart, 1977). The personality principle grants 
autonomy to groups or communities based on their distinctive 
ethnolinguistic, religious and other ideological subculture identities 
(Lijphart, 1977).   
Some of the successful examples of non-territorial federal systems 
around the world are Belgium, Switzerland, The Netherlands (until 
1967), India, South Africa, Lebanon (until 1975), Malaysia (until 
1969) (Lijphart, 1977 & 2002/2003) & (Erk, 2003). Nevertheless, 
taking the conceptual differentiation between federalism and 
consociational democracy among some scholars into account, one 
should consider Lijphart’s  (1977)  favorable conditions for 
federalism. Based on Lijphart’s (1977) favorable conditions: in a 
deeply fragmented society, a federal arrangement is more 
‘conducive’ if its political party systems are based on segmental 
cleavages and if it has more than two political parties, "because if 
one segment has a clear majority its leader may attempt to dominate 
rather than cooperate with the rival minority” (p. 55 & 61).  
Moreover, federal governments are more stable if its segmental 
cleavages are stable, crosscutting, have overreaching loyalties (for 
example nationalism), and separated territorially  (Lijphart, 1977).  
As noted above, consociational theory in general and federalism, in 
particular, are criticized due to possible secession and partition 
consequences in divided societies. Some of the general 
consociational approach-centric critiques are mentioned above. Eric 
A. Nordlinger  (1972) also cited by Lijphart  (1977, p. 44) himself, 
accuses federalism of secession and civil war. Nordlinger  (1972) 
states that “federalism may actually contribute to a conflict’s 
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exacerbation” rather than conflict regulation (p. 31). According to 
Nordlinger (1972) minority groups in one state with territorial roots 
from another, usually suffer from the dominant group due to 
impossible segmental state boundaries in some federal 
arrangements, which strengthen ethnic cleavages and as a result 
increase the conflict. In addition, once federalism provides the 
segmental group with ‘partial autonomy', they become powerful 
enough to contest for more and more autonomy.  If the central 
government refuses their demands, it leads eventually to succession. 
However, Lijphart tries to defend Nordlinger's argument by 
justifying it with one of the four features of the consociational theory 
namely ‘Mutual Veto', through which a segment could blackball 
another segment if it goes against the national interests or interests 
of the other groups  (1977). 
Furthermore, Lijphart (1977) believes that secession should not be 
considered as an "undesirable result of the tensions in a plural society 
under all circumstances." Instead secession can be seen as an 
alternative solution when both centralization and decentralization 
fail to prevent conflict and civil war. He acknowledges the costly 
and unfavorable consequences of succession, which may cause 
resettlements of the minority groups in new or partition states. 
However, he favors this burden over the ‘human suffering', that 
usually occurs under one state solution  (Lijphart, 1977).    
One can conclude from the above discussion, that federal political 
systems, constitutionally provide the opportunity for all segmental 
minority groups to run their parallel autonomous governments sub-
nationally, while forming a joint central government nationally. 
Although this seems attractive theoretically, the real-life case is more 
challenging and competing, because it is not a win-win scenario for 
some minority groups. 
In the Afghan context, the Pashtun elites hold on to some of the 
above-stated contra-arguments for federal government brought by 
Nordlinger. The eruption of a bloody civil war between mainly 
ethnolinguistic (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek) and religious sects 
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(Shia vs. Sunni), in which each group tried to reach to power, ended 
up with a more fragmented society. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
Pashtun minority group resists federalsim ostensibly for the sake of 
national unity, claiming a federal government would lead to 
secession, while on the other hand, the non-Pashtun minorities 
advocate for federalism, citing the historical suppression of 
minorities by the dominant Pashtuns. Another major problem arises 
after the implementation of a federal system. Since all regions/states 
or provinces are not equally gifted with geographical, natural, and 
industrial resources, there is always conflict between rich and poor 
regions affecting the national unity.  
These arguments are deliberatively discussed in chapter five and 
seven. However, in the following section, decentralization is 
reviewed as one of the compromising strategy for Afghanistan. 
 
2.10 Decentralization  
The field interviews for this research shows that the majority of 
Afghans perceive the Federal system a dangerous government model 
for the national integration of the country. Therefore, the term 
federal turned out to be a political Taboo. Moreover, among many 
Afghan political elites, the decentralization concept is perceived 
interchangeably with Federalism.      Referring to the same problem, 
Daniel J. Elazar differentiates these terminologies very clearly as he 
contextualized it as the American federal system. Elazar  
(1976/2011) notes that the power in the American federal system is 
distributed vertically among the autonomous federal, state and local 
entities in a matrix shape, that is very much different from 
decentralization, in which the power is transferred horizontally from 
central to local government levels. According to Elazar (1976/2011),  
it is a centralized government which has the authority to decentralize 
or centralize the power whenever it wishes to do so, whereas, in a 
‘non-centralization'/federal form, the power cannot be centralized, 
unless one violates the constitution. Freeley and Rubin also 
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distinguish decentralization from federalism, in which the former is 
the central government's ‘managerial strategy' of its sub-national 
tiers, whereas, in the latter, sub-national tiers have ‘definitive rights 
against the center'  (2008). Nevertheless, taking the diverse forms of 
political systems into account, decentralization could be applied as a 
governance reforming strategy in unitary, federal (for example 
where the states tiers are very large and divided into several sub-
tiers), or mixed models (Norris, 2008). Since this thesis is concerned 
with decentralization in the context of Afghanistan, which has a 
strong centralized unitary political system, therefore, the focus is on 
decentralization in unitary systems. 
Initially, decentralization was applied in American business 
enterprises in the early 1950s, for improved efficiency and better 
management in its hierarchal organizational structures  (Elazar, 
1976/2011).  About two decades later, it was introduced by Richard 
Nixon as a ‘new-federalism’ – a reforming strategy - to counter over-
centralization in the United States’ government system (Elazar, 
1976/2011). Since the 1980s, both developing countries – in which 
a strong centralization was once the norm and desire - and developed 
nations gradually moved toward decentralized government 
structures (Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983) & (Schneider, 
2003). According to the 2005 World Bank report, in the last two and 
half decades 75 developing countries across Asia, Africa, Latin 
America, and Eastern Europe shifted to decentralization through 
introducing fiscal, administrative, and political structures and 
authorities to its sub-national tiers (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & 
Shah, 2005). Sub-nationally, the central government-appointed 
officials were replaced with directly or indirectly elected governors, 
independent public service institutions (education, health, and 
infrastructure) were established, and responsibility for self-planning, 
budgeting, spending, and revenues collection were transferred to 
local governments  (Grindle, 2007). After a decade of experience, in 
the 1990s, it has been revealed that the process of decentralization 
improved governance, democracy, and economic development in 
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some countries, while in others, the results were disappointing  
(Grindle, 2007). This has led to a more constructive academic 
discourse, followed by several empirically based research and 
studies, as well as the development of various assessment 
frameworks through which decentralization outcomes are measured. 
However, even today the contemporary decentralization literature 
accepts that though theoretically decentralization may promise better 
service delivery, good governance, local democracy, and economic 
development, in practice the results are limited and vary from 
country to country  (Schneider, 2003), (Grindle, 2007) & (White, 
2011).   
Decentralization is a strategy which a central government employs 
for the horizontal transfer of structures, powers, resources, and 
responsibilities to its sub-national institutions. Aaron Schneider  
(2003) defines decentralization as “the transfer of power and 
resources away from the central government” (p. 33). Tulia G. 
Falleti (2005)  describes decentralization as “a process of state 
reform composed of a set of public policies that transfer 
responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels 
of government in the context of a specific type of state” (p. 328). 
Although, it was accomplished through the actions of central 
government leaders who loosened up the pyramid of power 
horizontally, in many cases they were prodded into doing so by the 
continuous pressure of the civil society, domestic political and 
international financial (for example the World Bank) institutions 
who pushed for decentralization (Grindle, 2007). In addition, 
administrative congestion under centralized government, 
inefficiency, and lagging economic growth and development 
provided critical motives in developing countries for shifting to a 
downward governance process   (Schneider, 2003). Decentralization 
- also known as the bottom-up or local governance strategy - 
received widespread support from international and mulita-national 
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financial and economic development organizations14 (e.g., World 
Bank and OECD) for its compatibility not only with the alleviation 
of poverty but also with economic growth and development.    
Better service delivery, democracy, good governance, and economic 
growth and development are the key incentives attached to 
decentralization strategy cited in the literature.  Merliee S. Grindle, 
in her well-known research, "Going Local", reviews decentralization 
as the driving force for ‘improved governance and democracy' which 
provides ‘local conditions of (people's) well-being'   (2007, p. 10). 
Noriss (2008) argues that ‘decentralized governance’ results in 
effective and accountable government and public policy, and ‘the 
representation and accommodation of territorially’ segmental 
fragmentation (p. 3). After reviewing around 33 scholarly papers on 
decentralization (between 1958 and 2011), Stacey White (2011) 
concludes that decentralization is about bringing government closer 
to the people. According to White (2011) ‘the implicit rationale' of 
decentralization is that, the closer the government is to its people, the 
better it serves the people, and in addition, the more the people get 
out of the government, the higher their willingness to accept its 
authority. That means, the legitimacy and stability of a government 
strongly depend on how much services it provides to its people 
locally. Furthermore, since the local governments are closer to 
people, they are in a better to position to identify local needs. If they 
have enough resources and authority in hand, they may target these 
needs more efficiently than the central government. As cited above, 
these are conceptual promises of the decentralization strategy, which 
may or may not meet the ground realities. 
Decentralization is divided along various forms and degrees in the 
literature. Based on theories of fiscal federalism, public 
administration, and political sciences, Schneider (2003) considers 
                                                          
14 See for example the World Bank Report 2006, edited by Anwar Shah here: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/LocalGovernanceinDe-
veloping.pdf or OECD report 2005 here: http://www.oecd.org/leed-forum/pub-
lications/Local%20Governance%20and%20the%20Drivers%20of%20Growth.pdf  
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decentralization along three critical dimensions including fiscal, 
political, and administrative decentralization. The amount of 
autonomy given by the central government to local levels is the 
deciding factor for measuring the functionality of decentralization in 
all three dimensions, though Schneider (2003) underlines it in 
administrative decentralization only.  
2.10.1 Administrative decentralization is concerned with the 
public administration sub-nationally. According to Schneider 
(2003), contemporary theories of modern bureaucracy measure the 
functionality of sub-national administration along the fundamental 
parameters of efficiency, effectiveness, and ‘rational'. That means, 
result-based management is the key concern, once central 
governments decide to extend service delivery units downward. As 
mentioned earlier, Schneider  (2003) believes that it is the amount of 
‘autonomy' by which the degree of administrative decentralization is 
measured. Some literature separately divides decentralization along 
deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization. 
However, Schneider   (2003)  uses this categorization under 
administrative decentralization only.  
2.10.1.1 Deconcentration is the lowest degree of decentralization, 
in which the central government deploys only some service delivery 
and managerial responsibility to sub-national units through line 
ministries (Martinussen, 1997). In some literature, it is even not 
considered as ‘true' decentralization, since the central government 
runs these sub-national offices, which have no authority or autonomy 
of their own  (White, 2011). According to Martinussen (1997), in 
‘pure' deconcentration, there is neither a ‘discrete entities' as local 
government nor a ‘mechanism' ‘for mandatory horizontal 
coordination and integration' (pp. 210-211). De-jure, Afghanistan is 
a perfect example of deconcentration. The provincial and district 
governments are not more than just political representation offices 
for the president, with administrations providing only some public 
services of the central line ministries. 
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2.10.1.2 Delegation is the second lowest degree of decentralization. 
It happens when the central government delivers decision-making 
authority on specific public functions and utilities to sub-national 
governments  (White, 2011). In delegation, both public and Semi-
public enterprises offer sector-based services including energy, 
water, health, communication, and transportation sub-nationally  
(Martinussen, 1997). In this instance, the sub-national governments 
are still accountable to the central government, however, not entirely 
controlled  (White, 2011).  
2.10.1.3 Devolution also known as the ‘pure' or ‘extensive form' of 
decentralization, provides sub-national governments with 
administrative, decision-making, financial authority, and power  
(White, 2011). In devolution, the sub-national government functions 
as ‘quasi-autonomous' units, thus giving them a relatively free hand, 
although the original political power and legitimacy of devolved 
regions still rest with the central government  (Martinussen, 1997). 
In other words, a true devolution encompasses all three main 
dimensions of decentralization –  political, administrative, and fiscal. 
Great Britain is a relatively excellent and recent example of 
devolution in the literature. 
2.10.1.4 Privatization occurs when the central government 
contracts specific service delivery projects or programs to private 
profit, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)  
(Martinussen, 1997).     
Boex and Yilmaz  (2010) argue that for an effective decentralized 
administration, at least four central departments are needed. These 
include: (1) ‘regularity powers' and physical or space planning; (2) 
finance and procurement; (3) human resources HR and (4) public 
service delivery  (2010). Since local officials are closer to its people 
than the central government, therefore, they are in a better position 
to identify local needs and conditions and plan and regulate 
accordingly. Likewise, though most of the national programs (e.g., 
health, schooling, and environment) and projects (e.g., 
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infrastructure) are determined at the central government, flexibility 
in its implementation by local administration might prevent 
inefficiency  (Boex & Yilmaz, 2010).       
2.10.2 Political decentralization is concerned with people’s 
participation and representation in policy articulation sub-nationally 
(Schneider, 2003). In other words, political decentralization allows 
people to elect their provincial, district and village level councils, 
governors and city mayors through free and fair elections. It helps 
citizens not only to control public services actively, but also to hold 
local politicians accountable for their decision-making  (Norris, 
2008). Both civil society institutions and political parties play a 
significant representation role in articulating and bargaining for 
people’s interests with government bureaucracies (Schneider, 2003).  
To stay in office and make a higher career, local politicians too, 
compete to win hearts and minds, and votes of local people by opting 
for public interest projects and programs. 
Furthermore, Jamie Boex and Serdar Yilmaz (2010) identify four 
main ‘components' for political decentralization sub-nationally: (1) 
the political structure; (2) electoral system; (3) party systems and 
finally (4) accountability mechanisms.  The political structure of 
decentralization deals with how the institutional arrangements 
function within the legislative (e.g., whether the local councils run 
the governments departments or only provide oversight to the 
appointed officials), the executive (e.g., whether the mayor is elected 
by the council or directly by popular vote), and the judicial (courts) 
powers  (Boex & Yilmaz, 2010). The electoral system both allows 
the citizens to choose their representative, and accordingly 
encourages the candidates to reach out to their voters. Locally, 
proportional representation (PR) and single-member constituencies 
(or the first-past-the-post) are the two popular electoral systems 
through which the voters directly chose their favorite candidate,  in 
which the former is rated as a minority and women-friendly system 
and the latter is known for its transparency,  (Boex & Yilmaz, 2010).  
104 
 
Another major component that adds to the attractiveness of political 
decentralization is the nature of political party systems. Based on 
Boex and Yilmaz's extended assessments, both party-based and non-
party-based elections have their advantages and disadvantages. 
Nevertheless, it is the intensity of political contestation between 
political parties and individuals which can promote local constituent 
interests rather than the interests of the local elites and their national 
political parties  (2010). Grindle (2007) also notes that higher levels 
of political competition lead to better governance, whereas the 
contrary relies ‘on traditional methods of mobilizing support' 
favoring ‘clientelism' and elite interests. 
Last but not least, the legitimacy and acceptability of the whole 
political decentralization rely on accountability mechanisms. Boex 
and Yilmaz (2010) are concerned with the citizens' based 
accountability measurements through which the local 
representatives and policymakers are expected to provide 
information on public programs and projects to their constituents. In 
the case study of Afghanistan, political decentralization is limited 
only to popular representation in provincial and district councils, 
where the representatives have only poor oversight authority with no 
apparent accountability mechanisms, nor any legal checks and 
balances.          
2.10.3 Fiscal decentralization happens when the central 
government transfers revenue and expenditure authority to its sub-
national jurisdictions. In such circumstances, the provincial and 
district governments not only allocate their budgets and spending but 
are directly responsible for collecting revenues through local 
taxation, leasing, and contracting public assets and resources. 
Through its regulatory policies and financial instruments, the central 
government plays the distributing role in balancing the economy as 
a whole in fiscal decentralization  (Schneider, 2003).  Since local 
governments are not equally bestowed with natural and industrial 
resources, central governments usually interfere through the use of 
105 
 
national funds, loans or intergovernmental fiscal transfers to uplift 
the poorer localities.   
According to Boex and Yilmaz (2010), the effectiveness of both 
administrative and political decentralization lies within fiscal 
decentralization. Because, it is the fiscal power through which local 
politicians respond to the demands of their constituencies and justify 
their authority over local populations  (Boex & Yilmaz, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the allocation of revenue, expenditure, inter-
governmental transfers, and loans are challenging assignments 
which require not only professional competence but also 
transparency and accountability from the officials involved in local 
government administrations, based on Boex and Yilmaz  (2010). 
Therefore, Grindle (2007) is correct in her assumption as she says: 
“from the perspective of local officials and agencies, 
decentralization means not only a complex of new responsibilities 
but also a series of different relationships with other levels of 
government that have to be managed simultaneously” (p. 6). 
Adequate knowledge and capacity at the local level is the 
precondition before adopting any form of decentralization, 
particularly in a country with a long history of centralization. 
Furthermore, although decentralization is primarily attributed with 
local democracy, transparency, efficiency and its potential for 
decreasing segmental cleavages and conflict, its opponents criticize 
it precisely for not providing these reforms and for even farther 
worsening and destabilizing local governance. Niamh Gaynor  
(2014) notes that several empirical studies have shown that 
decentralization caused corruption, inequality, and increased 
conflict in post-conflict and developing countries. According to 
Gaynor  (2014), ignoring the ‘state formation history’, informal and 
formal governance structures and political norms of a particular 
country context leads to the failure of decentralization. It is in this 
context where elites capture local power and state institutions 
through patron-client relations, and where it leads to corruption, 
inequality, and increased conflict (Grindle, 2007) & (Gaynor, 2014).      
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Taking the above review into account, the newly half-political 
decentralization process in Afghanistan encompasses one of the two 
central concerns of this dissertation. Although only endowed with a 
conflict resolution function, the newly elected provincial councils 
have shifted the dynamic of local politics in Afghanistan.  Those 
warlords and elites who once ruled by the power of gun had to 
provide free meals and services at their own expense during the 
election campaigns in order to win the hearts, minds, and votes of 
their local citizens. The local representation and minimum oversight 
authority not only challenged the line ministries’ service delivery 
units, but also put pressure on the central government authorities 
through mobilizing and organizing a mass demonstration for local 
reforms. Besides these significant outcomes, however, there are also 
grave challenges ahead of these new democratic institutions. As 
stated earlier, at this point the administrative decentralization is in a 
mere deconstruction degree. It has been now almost a decade since 
the establishment of the provincial councils in Afghanistan, but 
representatives in some areas lack the political and professional 
capacity needed to perform their duties and achieve what has been 
expected locally. In many areas, provincial councils and 
governments are occupied and run in a patronage manner by major 
illegal power-brokers, including warlords, drug-traffickers and tribal 
elites. These factors make the central government hesitant to transfer 
more power and responsibility to the already democratically elected 
provincial councils. These and other relevant facts and stories of sub-
national government are illustrated based on the empirical study 
done in major large provinces of Afghanistan. The chapter on 
provincial councils in Afghanistan is mainly devoted to this 
discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
A Historical Overview of the State-Building in 
Modern-Day Afghanistan 
 
3.1 State, Society, and Politics in Afghanistan  
The Afghan state first came into existence in the form of the Max 
Weber’s (1946) definition – “a human community that (successfully) 
claim(s) the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical forces with 
a given territory” – as an ethno-tribal federation in the mid-18th 
century.  From its creation in 1747 until today, Afghanistan has 
experienced various state governmental models including: absolute 
monarchies (between 1747-1922 without constitution, and between 
1923-1962 with constitution), parliamentary monarchy with partly 
democratic elections (1963-1972), republicanism (1973-1977), 
communist socialist republic (1977-1992), Islamic government 
(1992-1996), Islamic Emirate (1996-2001) and the current 
presidential democracy (2001-present), all based on the principle of 
centralization of power and authority.  
Throughout its modern history, the Afghan state has shared both 
legitimacy and authority with its Pashtun tribal and non-tribal ethnic 
minorities, particularly in sub-national governments in rural areas. 
The Erwin Orywal (ed) 1986 study identifies around fifty-five ethnic 
groups within the modern-day Afghan territory (Orywal, 1986). In 
chapter one, article four of the 2004 Afghan constitution only 
fourteen ethnic groups are named: “The nation of Afghanistan shall 
be comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, 
Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, 
Brahwui and other tribes.” (The Constitution of Afghanistan 
(English Translation), 2004). An accurate update of ethnic statistics 
is not available today, but in some academic accounts from before 
the Afghan civil war, four ethnic groups were highlighted as the 
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major ones, with Pashtuns estimated to make up between 40-50% of 
the population, Tajiks 20-35%, Hazara 7-20%, and Uzbek 8-15% 
(Schetter, Stammesstrukturen und ethnische Gruppen, 2009, p. 24) 
(Glatzer, 1998). During the Afghan civil war, these four major ethnic 
groups fought against each other to gain military and political 
support, with some building alliances with others. By building an 
ethno-political collation government in late 2001, the Bonn 
international conference officially recognized these four ethnic 
groups as the major ethnic minorities in Afghan politics.  
In addition to ethnic differences, the Afghans can be divided 
linguistically, mainly between Pashtu and Dari speakers. Pashtu is 
the language of the Pashtun ethnic group, whereas Dari originally 
belongs to Tajik ethnic groups, but is also spoken by Hazara (with a 
slight different dialect of Hazaragi). The Uzbek, Turkish, Pashaye, 
Baluchi, and some other local languages are spoken in their areas of 
influence. However, depending on whether these minority groups  
reside alongside a majority of Pashtun or Tajik ethnic groups, the 
official or second language becames either Dari or Pashtu. For 
instance, in the South and Eastern Afghanistan, where the majority 
of Pashtun live, the official communication language for Baloch, 
Pashaye, Nuristani or Hazara is Pashtu. Whereas the Hazara, Uzbek, 
Turkmen, Pashaye and other minorities in the north and central 
Afghanistan adopted Dari as their official communication language. 
Since this dissertation is partly concerned with the political divide of 
the Pashtun ethnic and speaking groups vs. the non-Pashtun ethnic 
and speaking groups, this thesis uses the phrase Pashtu vs. non-
Pashtun for simplifying the matter. The non-Pashtun means here, 
mainly the Dari language-speaking major ethnic groups of Tajiks, 
Hazara, Uzbek and Turkmen.   
The social construct or family-tree of each Pashtun family can be 
traced back in a network of a sub-clan, clan, sub-tribe, and the tribe. 
But the non-Pashtuns' social identity is limited to its family, 
community, village, or occupation. However, due to centuries of co-
existence (except for a few instances of ethnic cleansing), each 
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Afghan belongs to a Qaum – a primary identity which could be a 
family, a clan, a tribe, village, or an occupation (Roy, 1986). Each 
Qaum has its own somewhat structured or unstructured consensus 
system, run by a group of noble elders Spingeri (in Pashtu)/Mo-sapid 
(in Dari) meaning white-beard or elderly men, headed by a chief 
(Khan or Malik) – usually in a better socio-economic condition than 
the rest of his Qaum. The Khan or Malik is the prime legitimate, 
though non-state, actor who is responsible for settling internal family 
and property matters through informal governance mechanisms 
including religious and customary laws, and codes (Pashtunwali), 
but also protecting and ensuring local interests against other Qaums 
or the state. Through personal and patronage networks, the state 
interlocutors and bureaucrats get into contact with the Khans and 
Maliks for maintaining state-society politics at provincial, district 
and village levels.  
Nevertheless, the Afghan social construction and its interaction with 
the state is comparably different and relatively more advanced in the 
cities (usually large cities of Kabul, Herat, Masar-e-Sharif, 
Jalalabad) and provincial towns (provincial capitals) than in rural 
areas. Although urban populations reside in neighborhoods 
according to their ethnicity, tribe, or Qaum, (for example, in Kabul 
city, the eastern Afshar town is primarily inhabited by Hazaras, the 
northern zone of Khirkhan, Sare-e-Kotal is primarily Tajik of the 
Northern region, the Qala-e-Zaman Khan, Bagrami in south and 
western part of are Pashtuns), they are nevertheless mingled by inter-
ethnic marriages, occupations, and business dealings with each 
other.   
There are several internal and external socio-economic and political 
factors, which explain why Afghanistan has never managed to keep 
a steady pace toward state institutionalization and modernization 
despite its 270 year long history of existence. The socio-economic 
and ideological differences between the centers and the peripheries 
are common even in most developed countries in the world. 
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However, in Afghanistan, this gap has led to constant conflicts 
throughout its history  (Roy, 1986).   
Olivier Roy (1986) notes:  
…there are really two Afghanistan: first there is the town 
(shahr), the place of innovation (bid`at); this is the natural 
environment of the civil servant, the teacher, the soldier and 
the communist, all “intellectuals” and “bare-head” (sar-
luchak), held to be unbelievers and arrogant; and secondly 
the province (atraf), the home of religion, tradition (sunnah) 
and values which stand the test. 
To a considerable extent, Roy's 1980s observation still fits present-
day Afghanistan. The predominantly peasant livelihood and lack of 
access to education in the provinces has badly divided the Afghan 
rural communities from the cities, where inhabitants enjoy basic 
urban facilities including health, schools, and jobs in public and 
private sectors. In their early years, children (predominantly boys) in 
these scattered remote communities learn to read the Quran in Arabic 
and learn the basics of Fiqh, or the Islamic jurisprudence, taught by 
local Mullahs/Imams either at traditional Madrasas (religious 
schools) or at the village Mosque. Due to insecurity and poor social 
and economic conditions, only a few children manage to move to 
towns for schools or jobs.  The rest follow their family occupation in 
their local villages, be it farming or other hand-skill professions. 
According to 2017 Human Rights report, "3.5 million children are 
out of school, and 85 percent of them are girls" (Human Rights 
Watch , 2017, p. 4). It certainly divided the Afghan society between 
the moderns and liberals who reside in the city and towns and the 
religious conservatives living in the countryside. Also, the long 
history of foreign invasions and internal uprisings caused deep 
divisions as a majority of these populations periodically became 
seasonal militiamen who fought either for or against the state.    
 
Historians and authors on Afghanistan, OlivierRoy (1986), Angelo 
Rasanayagam, (2003) & Amin Saikal (2004) note that the Afghan 
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state has relied upon ‘tribalism’, Islam and Afghan nationalism as 
the key state legitimacy tools, rather than on governance and public 
service delivery, for maintaining state authority on tribal and non-
tribal ethnic communities. For instance, Afghans were mobilized 
under the same legitimacy concepts of Islam and Afghan nationalism 
to defeat foreign interventions (Saikal, 2004).  As Angelo 
Rasanayagam also notes,  it is the Islamic ‘traditional’ 
fundamentalist nature of the Afghan society that not only fought 
against foreign ‘non-Muslim’ occupations (the British and the 
Soviets), but also resisted internal modernization attempts 
throughout history (Rasanayagam, 2003).  
Men belonging to various tribal and non-tribal ethnic minorities of 
Qaums make up the Afghan military.  Therefore, they were first loyal 
to their local communities' chiefs, then to the central government. In 
return, the Qaum chief, in the role of Khan, Malik, or local 
commander secured the interest of his community and militiamen 
with the government  (Rasanayagam, 2003).  This culture of patron 
and client has been continued even in post 9/11 Afghanistan, where 
ethnic warlords and tribal elites conditioned their support on the state 
appointing their favorite men in key government posts.    
When a Qaum, or networks of several close Quams, felt threatened 
by central state politics, they revolted against the state, utilizing its 
own militiamen  (Roy, 1986). Time and again, the Afghan state ruler 
(Amanullah Khan 1919-29) or regime (the communists 1977-1989) 
attempted to penetrate these tribal and non-tribal micro-communities 
and to integrate them into state institutions. Not only did they fail to 
do so, but the effort cost them bitterly, with the collapse of their own 
governments. Historians and scholars: Roy  (1986) Ghubar, Meer 
Ghulam Mohammad (1989/2012),  Rasanayagam (2003) & Saikal 
(2004) note these reforming and modernization attempts were hasty 
and, in some parts, in strong opposition to the very socio-cultural 
beliefs of the Afghan society, which is why modernization backfired 
against those regimes at the very early stages of its development. The 
Afghans did support those modernization and state reforming 
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agendas that respected and secured Islam and the Afghan cultural 
principles  (e.g., during the Amir Abdul-Rahman khan era between 
1880-1901) (Roy, 1986).      
Similarly, because it is land-locked and has a predominantly 
agricultural economy, the country is constantly dependent on foreign 
aid, and consequently has unequal relationships with neighboring 
and regional powers. Afghanistan’s geopolitical location also 
trapped the country as a buffer zone between the great empires of the 
time, namely British-India and Russia in the 19th century, and the 
Soviets and the United States during the cold war in the 20th century. 
The country’s buffer zone role eventually led to direct military 
interventions by the British (1880-1919), the Soviets (1979-89) and 
the United States (2001-until present). Besides the imperialistic 
motivations behind these episodes, the intervening powers also 
aimed not only to change the traditional Afghan state institutions into 
a modern western bureaucracy, but also to penetrate the indigenous 
social-culture structures and beliefs (Pashtunwali and Islam) by 
imposing their imported ideologies (e.g. communism and western 
liberal democracy.  These efforts, however, faced bitter resistance 
from Afghanistan’s rural communities and were ultimately defeated.  
Following the U.S. military invasion in late 2001, a number of 
international aid organizations and some private investment 
companies (including telecommunications) arrived in the country, 
with the effect of tremendously changing Afghan perceptions in both 
urban and rural areas. The broadcasting of tens of private Radio and 
TV stations not only provided the younger generation job 
opportunities, but also linked them with the outside world. The 
access of Mobile telephones and internet even in remote areas of the 
country connected Afghans to other parts of the country and beyond, 
to the rest of the world. Today, the social media outlets of Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter are used not only by educated professionals, 
but also by those who are not educated. The insecurity and 
uncertainty caused by prolonged years of conflict have made 
Afghans among the most politicized in the region and probably in 
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the world. Facebook groups and pages are widely used even in the 
most remote areas of the country for sharing news and commenting 
on issues, and also for election campaigns and against corrupt 
government officials.  
Politically, once again, the Afghan society is divided between three 
main groups: the liberal democrats (supporting the US invasion and 
the Afghan government and opposing the Taliban ideology), the 
Afghan nationalists (who are mostly moderate Muslims opposing the 
U.S. invasion, but supporting the Afghan government and willing to 
include the Taliban) and the traditional Islamists, (opposing the US 
invasion and directly or indirectly supporting the Taliban 
movement).  
   
To have a better picture, in the following, we briefly review state-
building attempts from Afghanistan’s emergence in 1747 until the 
pre-9/11 Taliban Emirates in late 2001. Islam, which as the religion 
of the Afghan state and society throughout history, has played a 
fundamental legitimacy role is reviewed in a separate chapter. The 
post-Taliban state-building project is also discussed in a separate 
chapter. 
 
3.2 The Emergence of an Ethno-Confederation Af-
ghanistan (1747-1880) 
Modern-Day Afghanistan came into existence after the 
disintegration of the Persian King Nadir Afshar's empire in the mid-
18th century. In the aftermath of a nine days long, contested grand 
assembly –  known as the Loya Jirga (LJ) –   which marked a 
historical milestone for the foundation of an independent multi-
ethnic and tribal confederation, choose Ahmad Khan – an Abdali 
Pashtun tribesman–  as its king or Shah in Kandahar, by then the 
capital of Afghanistan  (Ghubar, 1989/2012). It is this historical 
legitimacy that, time and again, has led the Afghans to call upon the 
Loya Jirga, which requires the representation of both Pashtun 
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numerous tribal and non-Pashtun ethnic groups across the country, 
for an all-inclusive consensus on a national matter. The 2002 
Emergency LJ during the interim government of President Hamid 
Karzai and the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) for drafting the 
post-Taliban constitution are recent examples. 
The founding father of modern-day Afghanistan is Ahmad Khan 
Durrani (1747 -1772), who successfully managed to establish the 
basis for a strong centralized state through imposing taxes and tariffs 
on local chiefs and landlords. With regard to sub-national matters, 
Khan installed his loyal provincial Hakims or governors to ensure 
security, judicial and financial issues  (Ghubar, 1989/2012). His 
success rested on the considerable experience and knowledge of 
Afghan tribal and non-tribal rivalry politics which he had gained 
during his service as a significant army general in the Persian Empire 
responsible for the Afghan and Uzbek battalion  (Ghubar, 
1989/2012). Now, as the Shah (king), Ahmad Khan used both state 
incentives and force to obtain the submission of numerous tribal and 
ethnic communities to his central authority (Ghubar, 1989/2012). To 
legitimize his central state power, the king had to pick up the 
manpower for his army from among various tribal and ethnic groups 
and to share the bounties earned from the wars and from territorial 
extension the Indian subcontinent (Ghubar, 1989/2012).  
 At heart a warrior, Ahmad Shah spent most of his time and focus on 
expanding his empire – to encompass a territory reaching from the 
Amu (Oxus) river in the north to the Arabian sea in the south and 
from Indian Panjab in the east to Khorasan of Iran in the west  
(Rasanayagam, 2003). Because he kept his state authority limited to 
his personal leadership skills rather than institutionalizing it into a 
state system with a robust government mechanism  (Saikal, 2004), 
Ahmad Shah’s death in 1772 left a power vacuum. His empire 
shrank, and the state went  into a long period of domestic turmoil, 
local uprisings, and foreign interventions  (Saikal, 2004).  Ahmad 
Shah's successor was his favorite son Timor, whose efforts remained 
limited to the distribution of the sub-national governments’ power 
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among his 36 sons  (Saikal, 2004). Following Timor Shah's death, 
rivalries over the throne arose among his dozen descendants, and the 
geopolitical competition between the great empires of British-India 
and Tsarist-Russia (a contest that became known as "The Great 
Game") trapped Afghanistan as a buffer-state, plunging the country 
into political chaos and the ultimate British intervention in the early 
19th century (Saikal, 2004).  
3.3 State Modernization Attempts (1880-1963)  
In the aftermath of the second Afghan-Anglo war (1879-1880), it 
was Abdul Rahman Khan or the ‘Iron Amir’ –  a descendant of the 
Ghalzai tribe of the Muhammadzai clan – who initiated the basis for 
a modern state by introducing ‘universally applied administrative 
and judiciary’  regulations and institutions in Afghanistan (Saikal, 
2004). However, as Roy (1986) notes, Abdul Rahman Khan’s at-
tempt was only to “rationalize the institutions of the state to make 
them more efficient, without thereby affecting traditional society” 
(p. 15).  The Amir’s strategy aimed at building a strong military 
power, for which purpose he used all other state sectors' resources, 
including placing the economy and manufacturing at the disposal of 
the military (Roy, 1986). Islam was declared the religion of the state. 
Sharia law was enforced in the legal courts and religious leaders or 
Ulama were integrated into his government institutions – policies 
through which the Amir easily legitimized his power not only within 
the diverse Pashtun tribes but also with other ethnic minorities 
(Saikal, 2004). It was his Afghan context-based strategy, to which 
he owed his popular support, and which guaranteed the survival of 
his regime for the following two decades (Roy, 1986) & (Saikal, 
2004). However, Abdul Rahman Khan's national integration policy 
was widely criticized due to his discrimination and use of violence 
against non-Pashtun ethnic minorities, including the forced conver-
sion of Nuristanis to Islam and the brutal suppression of the Hazara's 
uprising. According to historian Mir Mohammad Ghulam Ghubar  
(1989/2012), although the Amir had an aggressive policy toward all 
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local revolts, including Pashtun landlords in the southern Kandahar 
and Tajiks in eastern Herat who rose up against government tax en-
forcement policy, his stance towards Hazara minority was discrimi-
natory and ruthless  (pp. 663-671).  
When Amir15 (or Shah) Abdul Rahman Khan died in 1901, his son 
Habibullah Khan became the new Amir. According to historian 
Amin Saikal, the rule of Habibullah Khan marked a significant shift 
from the internal family power struggles of the royal family to the 
beginning of a national revolution against the British invasion and 
the establishment of the basis for constitutional modernization and 
state-building reformation in Afghanistan  (2004).  However, just 
before achieving his dream of independence, the Amir Habibullah 
was mysteriously assassinated in a plot and left the throne to his son 
and successor Amanullah Khan (Rasanayagam, 2003).  Amanullah 
Khan not only achieved Afghan independence in 1919 through 
declaring Jihad (Holy War) against the British invasion (which led 
to the third Afghan-Anglo war), but also kicked off his father's plans 
for state and society modernization in a radical form  (Ghubar, 
1989/2012). Shah Amanullah's modernization strategy was different 
from that of his grandfather's Abdul Rahman.  He not only aimed at 
reforming the state institutions into a western style bureaucracy, but 
also intended a radical change in the social, political and economic 
structures   (Saikal, 2004).  In 1923 he issued the first Afghan 
constitution, an absolute monarchy with the structure in place for 
participatory national and sub-national institutions, including a 
national advisory assembly (Shura-e-Melli) at the central level and 
provincial and district councils at the sub-national level 
(Constitution of Afghanistan , 1923). The national assembly and 
sub-national councils had a consultative and legislative role. Their 
representation was half democratically elected, and half appointed 
                                                          
15 The title Amir which literally means leader in Arabic was taken from the Is-
lamic culture of the Prophet Mohammad. For legitimacy reasons the Afghan 
King or Shah titled himself the Amir or leader of the faithful.   
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by the central government (Constitution of Afghanistan , 1923).  
Inspired by the western or Weberian state bureaucracy, King 
Amanullah also formed a ‘well-structured’ ministerial cabinet, 
including a prime minister at the national level and assigned 
governors and bureaucrats at the provincial and local levels (Saikal, 
2004). Through socio-economic infrastructure and development 
programs and projects, the King attempted to congregate 
Afghanistan’s scattered ‘micro-societies' into a sovereign ‘nation-
state'  (Saikal, 2004). His modernization reform was partly inspired 
by Turkey’s revolutionary leader Kamal Ataturk, who had close ties 
with the king, but as a believing Muslim, Amanullah aimed at 
integrating the socio-religious Afghan society into western 
institutional modernization (Saikal, 2004). While Islam and its main 
principles remained as the defining principle for the state-society 
relations, the new constitution, known as the ‘basic code’, and its 
subsequent laws distinguished itself from the outdated and 
traditionally-Islamized rules and norms  and established relatively 
secular ones (Saikal, 2004). Establishing schools for both girls and 
boys with a secular educational curriculum, sending female and male 
adults for higher education abroad, and calling for equal social rights 
for women were among the new initiatives, highly sensitive in the 
traditionally male-dominated Afghan society (Saikal, 2004).  
At the sub-national level, the King also took bold reforming 
measures against the tribal chiefs and khans who in the past enjoyed 
local autonomy and were conditionally submissive to the central 
government orders (Ghubar, 1989/2012). By abandoning all free 
privileges and gifts to tribal elites and local chiefs, the new King 
attempted to integrate them into the sub-national government 
bureaucracy with new roles and responsibilities, along with new 
checks and balances. He also took a strict stance against religious 
leaders or Ulama. Curbing their areas of influence, the King 
introduced judicial courts with a relatively loose Sharia law mingled 
with western secular codes (Ghubar, 1989/2012). Thus, it is not 
surprising that his reforming agenda had little buy-in among the 
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tribal and religious elites who crystalized social unrest and stirred 
mass-uprisings against the King across the country, particularly 
among the underdeveloped rural population. 
According to some historians, King Amanullah made some grave 
mistakes in his domestic and foreign policies, that brought a halt to 
his reforming agenda and ultimately resulted in his overthrow from 
the power. The visionary King failed to acknowledge the social 
fabric of Afghan society – a complex weave of tribal norms and 
traditional Islamic values  (Ghubar, 1989/2012), (Rasanayagam, 
2003) and (Saikal, 2004). His speedy and radical modernization 
policies proved antagonistic toward local values and customs. For 
instance, upon his return from Europe – where he was impressed by 
the development of the industrial world –  the king banned women 
from wearing veils in public and ordered government officials to 
wear western uniforms, a bold symbolic move which spread rumors 
around the country that the king had turned away from Islam and 
become Kafir or infidel (Ghubar, 1989/2012).  
Likewise, the extension of close diplomatic and developmental ties 
with the major western European and regional countries such as 
Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and notably Russia, 
distressed the British empire  (Saikal, 2004). These new 
developments plus the defeat of the British by Afghans in the third 
Anglo-Afghan war motivated the British Empire to help destabilize 
Amanullah's power from within  (Saikal, 2004).  
Consequently, in January 1929, a Tajik militiaman named 
Habibullah Bache-e-Saqau, backed by local religious elites from 
north of Kabul, ousted King Amanullah from power and announced 
himself as the new Amir (Ghubar, 1989/2012). Amanullah escaped 
with his family to Kandahar and from there to a permanent exile to 
Italy (Saikal, 2004). With this, the modernization chance which 
could have changed Afghanistan's destiny forever came to an end.  
The sociopolitical backfire from which Amanullah suffered, 
discouraged his successors in the following years, which is why the 
social gap between the state and society continued at a similar, slow 
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pace in the following decades as well. In consequence, the Afghan 
rural population not only remained deprived of socio-economic 
infrastructure and developments but also continuously remained 
subject to outdated traditional rules (a mixture of traditional 
Pashtunwali and medieval age interpretations of Islamic laws). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the Islamic radicalization of the 20th 
and 21st centuries had a better market in the Afghan soil than in that 
of its birthplace, Saudi-Arabia.     
General Nader – a former Defense Minister and diplomat during the 
reign of Amanullah – returned from self-imposed exile from France, 
seized power, and publicly hanged Bache-e-Saqau in Kabul 
(Ghubar, 1989/2012). (It is worth mentioning here that Habibullah 
Bache-e-Saqau, with almost nine months of limited power in Kabul, 
was the first non-Pashtun head of the state in Afghan history.  He 
was followed by another Tajik president – Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami party of Mujahidin – during the civil 
war in the early 1990s.)  
In 1929 again the Loya Jirga played its institutional role by crowning 
General Nader as the new King.  Nader’s family tree goes back to 
the Mohamadzai branch of Barakzai Pashtun (Rasanayagam, 2003). 
To avoid a similar fate as his Pashtun predecessor, Amanullah, the 
new King not only slowed down the modernization programs, but 
also reversed them to a certain degree, notably with respect to 
policies towards tribal and religious elites and their consensus in 
government affairs  (Saikal, 2004). In 1931 Nader Shah issued a new 
constitution, creating a constitutional monarchy with a two-house 
parliament, and the separation of powers with a weight on Sharia law 
in the judiciary branch (Saikal, 2004). He also appointed tribal and 
religious leaders to crucial government positions, aiming to win 
legitimacy to his dynasty. The King also managed to build a neutral 
and friendly foreign policy towards both great powers – Russia and 
Britain, and with other regional and European countries. It was in 
Nader's reign that the United States of America officially recognized 
Afghanistan, however with no diplomatic ties, as it did not want to 
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upset the British Empire by interfering in its zone of influence.  
Though Nader Shah succeeded in maintaining a broad political 
balance both at home and abroad, his antagonistic and ‘eliminating' 
policy against some political elites eventually resulted in his 
assassination  (Rasanayagam, 2003).  
 
3.4 The First Afghan ‘Democracy’ (1964-1953) 
In 1933, following the death of Nader Shah his 19-year-old son 
Mohammad Zahir ascended to the throne  (Saikal, 2004).  However, 
the de-facto power was seized by Nader's brother, Mohammad 
Hashim, who was Prime Minister under Nader and remained in that 
position under Zahir.  Hashim controlled both domestic and foreign 
politics and treated Zahir Shah merely as a ceremonial figurehead 
until Hashim retired in 1946 (Saikal, 2004). During this period, 
Prime Minister Hashim took advantage of the opportunity to 
empower two of his other nephews, Mohammad Daoud and 
Mohammad Naim, who both played significant roles in Afghan 
politics in following decades. Daoud who was also King Zahir's 
cousin and brother-in-law is known as the second most ambitious 
modernization leader in Afghan history after King Amanullah. A 
convinced Pashtun nationalist, Daoud not only made efforts to 
reform and modernize state institutions, but also tirelessly fought for 
the claim of Pashtunistan and the Durand Line16 (Saikal, 2004) – the 
disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.   
                                                          
16. The Durand Line was demarcated by the British Empire in 1893 as the buffer 
zone and border between British-India and independent Afghanistan.  The Line 
also divided tribal Pashtuns. With the end of British colonialization in Indian 
continent and the creation of two independent states, Pakistan and India, in 1947, 
the disputed Durand Line, by then marked off the North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP), and the five Pashtun tribal Agencies were integrated into the newly 
Muslim established Pakistan. Afghan governments have never accepted this line 
as an international border with its neighboring Pakistan, but have called either 
for this region’s reintegration into Afghanistan or for its establishment as an in-
dependent Pashtun state. The dispute over the Durand Line remains unresolved 
to this day. Although not discussed in the public agendas of both states, it re-
mains one of the critical background factors in contemporary security and politi-
cal tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.    
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In his capacity as Defense Minister and later as Prime Minister 
(between 1953-63), Daoud Khan repeatedly threatened Pakistan in 
defense of his fellow Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line. 
His Belligerence towards Pakistan  caused economic stagnation for 
Afghanistan when the border –  a key trading route, which most of 
the Afghan economy relies on to this day – was closed.  The Afghan 
government’s dependence on the trading route with Pakistan and the 
King’s concerns for the stability of his reign, led to increasing 
tensions between the Prime Minister and the King, which finally led 
Daoud to resign from Prime ministership. By that time, this 
charismatic, modernizing, and nationalist leader had already built up 
unprecedented popularity among the Afghans, particularly among 
the ethnic Pashtuns, who made up the backbone of the Afghan army  
(Saikal, 2004). His popularity later facilitated Daud’s return to 
power. 
Daoud’s exit from political scene signified King Zahir’s awakening 
from political passivity. Seizing de-facto power of his kingdom in 
his own hands, King Zahir assigned a committee of highly qualified 
experts to lay down the foundation for a new democratic constitution 
for Afghanistan (Rasanayagam, 2003). After a deliberative 
discussion and genuine scrutiny of the prepared draft by the 
members of the Loya Jirga, the new Afghan constitution was 
endorsed on October 1st, 1964 (Rasanayagam, 2003). In comparison 
to previous constitutions, the 1964 constitution is known as 
Afghanistan’s first democratic and inclusive document. In part one, 
article one, the word Afghan (which historically referred only to 
Pashtuns) was applied to all individuals living and holding 
citizenship in Afghanistan (Rasanayagam, 2003). In theory, the new 
constitution also ensured the fundamental rights of all individuals 
and the equality of Afghan citizens before the law with no gender, 
race, ethnic or religious discrimination. Alhough the new 
constitution declared Islam as the religion of the state, the courts 
would apply Sharia law only when there was no state law on the 
matter in place (Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964, article 102). 
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Freedom of religion for non-Muslims – in this case the Hindu and 
Sikh minorities, who predominantly reside in Kabul and earthen 
Nangarhar provinces – was also assured by the new constitution, 
however with limitation ‘determined by laws for public decency and 
public peace' (Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964, article 2).  
The 1964 constitution also endorsed a bicameral parliament or Shura 
in which members of the lower house or Wolesi Jirga were 
exclusively elected representatives from across the Afghan 
provinces. Members of the upper house or Meshrano Jirga were 
composed as follows: one third from the provinces, one-third 
provincial councils and the remaining one-third appointed by the 
King, ‘from amongst well-informed and experienced persons' 
(Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964, article 45). (Rasanayagam, 
2003) The prime minister, who was appointed by the King, had to 
introduce the cabinet ministers to the Wolesi Jirga for a vote of 
confidence, after approval by the King. According to the new 
constitution, the Royal family had no right to hold government 
positions (Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964).   
Based on the principle of centralization, the 1964 constitution 
defined the province as the unit for sub-national administration, in 
line with major public service delivery ministries of the central 
government. Elected provincial and municipality councils had an 
advisory role to the centrally appointed sub-national governments 
only (Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964).   
 
3.5 The Formation of First Afghan Political Parties 
In theory, for the first time in history, the right to freedom of 
expression, a free press, and the formation political parties was also 
established in the 1964 constitution. However, a separate law on the 
press was passed  in 1965, in which the press was subordinated to 
the higher authority of ‘Islam and constitutional monarchy' 
(Rasanayagam, 2003).   
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Though unofficial and limited only to intellectual circles, the first 
Afghan political movements had come into existence in the early 
1950s, including the Wikh-Zalmayan (awaked youth), primarily a 
nationalist movement led by Daoud Khan; the Watan (Motherland), 
anti-monarchy liberal leftists; and Nida-e-Khalq  (the voice of 
people), leftist Tajik intellectuals (Saikal, 2004). Despite no 
provision of subsequent law on the status of the political parties, the 
1964 constitution opened the door for an official formation of these 
political parties and encouraged both Islamists and Marxist-
socialists to form alliances along their already existing movements  
(Rasanayagam, 2003). The People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) or Hezb-e-Demokratik-e-Khalq – a convinced 
Marxist-socialist movement backed by the USSR –  officially 
formed in 1965 and soon split along personal lines into two separate 
parties: The Parchami (the Banner) branch of PDPA led by Karmal, 
and the Khalqi (the People) branch of PDPA led by Taraki and Amin 
in 1967 (Rasanayagam, 2003).  Although PDPA contained some 
significant non-Pashtun ethnic minorities, friction during its early 
period led to the birth to two other major ethno-based parties in 1966, 
including a Tajik-based Sitam-e-Mili or the national oppression 
party, aimed at anti-Pashtun domination, and ‘a pro-Beijing’ Maoist 
party initiated by Dr. Mahmoodis aiming at (mobilizing the Hazara 
ethnic group for equal social rights in the Afghan society 
(Rasanayagam, 2003).  
In response to these new developments, in 1965, the Islamists also 
established their first political party of Jamiat-e-Islami or ‘Islamic 
Society’ under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad Nyazi, later 
Burhanuddin Rabbani – both Cairo-based Al-Azhar Islamic 
University graduates (Roy, 1986) & (Rasanayagam, 2003). The 
Egyptian Al-Ekhwanul Muslimin or the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Hassan Al-Bana was the ideological source for the Afghan Jamit-e-
Islami party (Roy, 1986).  
Angelo Rasanayagam asserts that the Afghan Jamiat-e-Islami party 
was not rooted in the so-called ‘traditional Afghan religious 
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establishment' or ‘Ulama', but was pioneered mainly by Kabul 
University professors and students who were partly educated in 
state-sponsored programs abroad, including in Egypt and the Indian 
subcontinent  (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 50). Headed by Sibghatullah 
Mujadidi, the traditional Ulama formed their political party in 1970.  
Mujaddidi was affiliated with the Naqshbandiyya writ of the Sufi 
brotherhood  (Roy, 1986, p. 47).  
Although initially unpopular and limited only to the capital Kabul 
and few other major towns, it was PDPA, backed by the USSR, that 
took control of Afghan politics in the late 1970s and ruled in a 
manner antagonistic to the Islamists movements, which ultimately 
led to an uprising and then the Russian invasion.  
However, following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, not 
only the traditional Ulama and the Intellectuals Islamists build 
alliances, but also fundamentalist Wahhabis from Saudi-Arabia and 
other Muslim countries reached out to fight for the same cause 
against Godless communism (Roy, 1986, p. 47). As mentioned 
earlier, on principle, the movement was established to oppose not 
only the communist regime but to align the Afghan society under 
one umbrella of the Islamic Ummah (Muslim community in the 
whole world). However, it did not take long before the Jamiat-e-
Islami members, including Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Abdul Rabrasul Syaf 
formed their own individual Sunni-sect Islamic movements along 
ethnolinguistic lines (Griffin, 2001). According to William Maley 
(1998), the flow of arms and financial assistance from the United 
States and Saudi Arabia motivated prominent leaders to compete for 
a larger piece of the pie, which subsequently caused the birth of 
dozens ethnolinguistic parties in the ground.  Inspired and backed by 
the Iranian Islamic Revolution of Khomeini, the Hazaras ethnic 
minority also formed several political parties based on Shia-Islamic 
ideology including Al-Nasr "victory" and Sepah-e-Pasdaran 
"Revolutionary Guard Corps" in Iran and the Hazarajat region of 
Afghanistan in 1979 (Amstutz, 1986, pp. 116-118). In 1989, when 
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the Soviets were forced to withdraw, the Khomeini regime in Iran 
urged all Hazara parties to consolidate under one armed and political 
movement of Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami “Islamic Unity Party” led by 
Ali Mazari (Griffin, 2001, p. 23) & (Razaiat & Pearson, 2002). 
 
3.6 The Radical Shift from Monarchy to Republican-
ism, and the Failed Attempt of Communism 
Zahir Shah’s democracy and state-building reform experiment was 
in its first phase of implementation in July 1973 when his own cousin 
and brother-in-law Dauod ousted him from power (Saikal, 2004). 
Dauod Khan declared republicanism and put an end to the Afghan 
monarchy.  Historians have noted that the Parchami fraction of 
PDPA unofficially facilitated the coup for Dauod. Since PDPA was 
a Soviet-funded party, it is clear that the Russians were behind the 
masterplan  (Rasanayagam, 2003) & (Saikal, 2004). In return for 
their support, Daoud appointed Parcham members to high-level 
government posts including positions as cabinet ministers in the 
early days of power. However, when his relations turned sour with 
the Soviets, he gradually purged Parchamis from power. According 
to Saikal  (2004), Dauod was not ideologically a communist, but a 
‘nationalist reformist' who only used the PDPA for seizing power. In 
the days following his revolt, he initiated ‘17-strong' commissions 
of executive power which in return elected Dauod as president, 
chancellor, foreign minister, and defense minister of the new Afghan 
Republic  (Saikal, 2004).  After seizing full political power, Dauod 
quickly kicked off his reform agenda, declaring Zahir's regime 
‘despotic' and ‘anarchy,’ suspending the constitution and the 
parliament, and regulating state affairs through presidential decrees  
(Saikal, 2004). Based on the principle of centralization, Dauod 
aimed to extend the state bureaucracy and public services beyond the 
urban cities to the far-reaching rural areas of the country. He planned 
a modernization strategy for over 25 years, including a ‘Seven Year 
Development Plan' which contained major infrastructure and mining 
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projects for the country  (Saikal, 2004). Historians note that Dauod 
was genuinely committed to institutional reform and aimed for a 
progressive and modern Afghanistan.  However, his lack of 
tolerance toward his political opposition, both at home and abroad, 
caused him and his regime a short life  (Rasanayagam, 2003) & 
(Saikal, 2004). He oppressed or killed anyone who threatened his 
establishment. He sided with the PDPA in curbing Islamists at home 
through political repression and target killings  (Saikal, 2004). 
Dauod re-raised the cause of Pashtunistan for ‘self-determination', 
and provided the Baluch separatists training comps inside 
Afghanistan, which made Pakistan respond by providing safe haven 
to the leading Afghan members of Jamiat-e-Islami (Griffin, 2001) & 
(Rasanayagam, 2003). His heavy financial dependence on Soviets 
led them to demand that he establisah a pro-communist regime, 
sharing power with PDPA. (Rasanayagam, 2003). Frustrated, Dauod 
officially stressed his friendship with the Kremlin, but not only 
purged PDPA members and sympathizers from government 
positions, but also extended his hand for assistance from an anti-
Russian block - Iran, the Gulf countries, and the United States  
(Saikal, 2004). This reckless move in the heat of cold war convinced 
the Soviets to remove Dauod and install their long time invested 
party – The PDPA  (Saikal, 2004). The Russian backed communist 
PDPA revolution was followed by continuous inner-circle coups and 
assassinations and eventually by the Soviets’ direct intervention in 
1979 (Saikal, 2004).  
The toppling of the Dauod regime in 1977 could be marked for 
Afghanistan not only as the halting point for a social-economic and 
state institutionalization and modernization reform, but also a radical 
reverse from the late 20th century to medieval times. Although the 
communist regime's state and society reform agenda had little 
difference from that of Dauod Khan, its ideological approach and 
implementation were in direct conflict with the social fabric of a 
predominantly traditional Islamic society. The core of PDPA's 
reform scheme encompassed: spreading literacy, improving 
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agriculture through land reform, and strengthening state institutions, 
but less for the sake of the Afghan people than for the cause of 
Marxist ideology (Roy, 1986).  Hence, once again the regime was 
not welcomed but promptly faced resistance from all classes of the 
Afghan society, including the Muslim clergy, university teachers and 
students, and even ordinary landlords. The PDPA replied with brutal 
oppression and mass murder, causing more local resistance, and 
ultimately national armed revolt  (Ibrahimi N. , 2009). According to 
the 1991 Human Rights Watch report, the ruthless Afghan 
communist regime and the subsequent Soviet invasion cost over a 
million Afghan civilians' lives, with five million others forced to 
migrate into the neighboring Pakistan and Iran (Human Rights 
Watch, 1991).   
 
3.7 Islam and the State in Afghanistan: from ‘tradi-
tional fundamentalism’ to ‘political Islam’, and to fun-
damental extremism  
Throughout Afghanistan's modern history, Islam, mingled with local 
tribal and traditional customs, remained the dominant religion, 
culture and ideology in the country. The Umayyad and Abbasid 
caliphates brought the religion of Islam to the area of today’s 
Afghanistan between the late 7th and in the early 8th century (Gibb, 
1923). However, local traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Zoroastrian, remained the main practices of the region until the 
late 9th century (Azad, 2017, pp. 44-47). It was the ‘Ghaznavid 
conquest of the eleventh century' in that transformed the today's 
Afghanistan and its surrounding geography ‘into the dar-Islam (the 
realm of Islam)'  (Azad, 2017, p. 47).  Today it is hard to access 
accurate statistics, but according to Roy's 1986 publication, in 
addition to only 'a few thousand Hindus and Sikhs', 80% of the 
Afghan population followed the Sunni sect of Hanafi jurisprudence 
and the rest  the Shia sect Jaffari jurisprudence  (p. 30). By the late 
20th-century, decades-long conflict and forced-migration had 
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certainly brought large variations to the given statistics by Roy. In 
comparison to neighboring Pakistan, or to Iraq’s bloody religious 
sectarian conflicts, the Afghan Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived 
in relative peace with each other until the present. The only 
exception  was during the Sunni orthodox Taliban regime, which not 
only discriminated against the Shai-Hazara minority, but also forced 
a large number of Hindus and Sikhs to leave the country (Rashid A. 
, 1998) & (Silinsky, 2011). Likewise, Afghanistan was historically 
also home for a considerable number of Jews, who mostly resided in 
the capital Kabul and the western city of Herat. By the late 20th 
century most Jews had migrated either to Israel or the United States, 
and by the early 21st century, none remained in Afghanistan 
(Silinsky, 2011, p. 672).  
In Afghanistan, Islam is mixed with the local cultural norms, 
particularly with the tribal code of Pashtunwali, and in some 
instances, Islam comes second to local customs when dealing with 
matters concerning daily life. For example, the Badal custom 
Badalis still practiced mainly in rural areas of the country, especially 
in the Pashtun population. The word Badal in Pashtu language 
means revenge, or in exchange. It is a conflict resolution method, 
often applied in a murder case. To end a conflict between two 
families or clans, an unmarried female relation of the murderer is 
married to a male relation of the victim. Sharia law strongly prohibits 
this act, yet it is a locally accepted norm.   
According to Arezou Azad  (2017) ‘the medieval Afghan society' 
has not adapted itself to the Arab ‘finished product' of Islam, but 
rather the Islamic religion has had to integrate locally, a 
circumstance that has resulted in ‘the multiple version of Islam in 
Afghanistan'  (p. 55). The various mystic sects of Sufism, the 
traditional fundamentalism of the Sharia law of Ulama, the reformist 
political Islamism of Mujahidin (Roy, 1986), and the traditional 
fundamental extremism of Taliban are the versions of Islam, through 
which the Afghans rulers (Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1880, Amir 
Habibullah Bach-e-Saqau 1929, Mujahideen in 1992, Taliban in 
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1996) gained political legitimacy for building the state. Moreover, 
Islam was the driving force behind bitter efforts to oust foreign 
invaders from the Afghan soil (three Afghan-Anglo wars during the 
mid-19th and early 20th century, the Soviets between 1979-1989, and 
the post-2001 Taliban insurgency continuing to the present). 
Likewise, any state modernization attempts that presumably 
contradicted or disrespected local cultural and religious norms met 
with bitter resistance that resulted in overthrowing Afghan rulers 
(Amanullah Khan1923) and regimes (Communists PDPA 1977-
1991).      
According to Roy (1986), historically the Islamic religion has 
evolved from traditional fundamentalism in the 18th and 19th century, 
to the political Islam of Jihadism in the mid-20th century, to what he 
also called the popular religions in the Afghan political context (p. 
31).  Maley (1998) states that the emergence of the Taliban in the 
late 20th century was the rebirth of the traditional fundamentalism of 
the Afghan Ulama. For the sake of clarification of the subject and 
drawing its specific distinctions and origins, others describe Taliban 
as traditional extremists. Although all three forms share the Islamic 
fundamentals of the Quran (the Muslim holy book) and Hadith 
(tradition of the Prophet Mohammad), there are different 
understandings and interpretations of the religious texts and sources. 
The distinction made by Oliver Roy  (1986) between the different 
religious ‘forms’ including “the legal orthodoxy of the Ulama17, the 
mysticism of the Sufis, and the political Islam of the Islamists” in 
the late 20th century in the Afghan context is a matter of importance 
in this regard (p. 30). Since the traditional Afghan Ulama approve of 
Sufism (Islamic mysticism) and some of them are simultaneously 
both Sufi (a follower of the mysticism) and Alim (a scholar in Islamic 
law), Sufism is listed as traditionalist, whereas the fundamental Arab 
                                                          
17 Ulama is the plural form of ‘Alim' literally means a scholar, and in this Islamic 
context, refers to someone who studied the Islamic law or Fiq.  For more please 
see "Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan" (p.10), Roy, Olivier, 1986, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
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Wahhabism  (1986, pp. 38-39), and the traditional extremists 
disapproved of mysticism in Islam. For example, the Taliban strictly 
prohibited the Sufi from practicing their rituals in public, which 
caused the Afghan Ghailani family of Qadiriyya and the Mujaddidi 
of Naqshbandiyya to go into exile in Peshawar, Pakistan. 
The traditional Afghan Ulama are predominantly followers of the 
Deobandi school of Islam, who until the mid-19th   century, regularly 
traveled to the Indian-subcontinent to obtain their Islamic education 
in Deoband Madrasa18, with some of those in northern Afghanistan 
attendimg the ‘Diwan Begi' Madrasa in Bukhara  (Roy, 1986). 
Following the partition of India and the creation of an independent 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947, Peshawar – the capital of the 
north-west frontier province and the home for various chains of 
Madrassas including the Deobandi school of Islam – became the 
center for Islamic education for the Afghan Ulama (Roy, 1986, p. 
47).  
The Deoband Madrasa or ‘Dar-al-Ulum’ is an Islamic religious 
‘seminary’ named after the township of Deoband near Delhi, India, 
which was founded by Mawlana Qasim Nanuatwi in 1866 (Miftahi, 
2012).The creation of Deoband aimed at consolidating the 
fundamental teaching of Islam through the strict interpretation of the 
holy book (Quran) and the sayings and tradition (Hadith) of Prophet 
Mohammad for the sake of Muslim Umma (community) fate in 
British-Indian (Metcalf, 1982). About the teaching curriculum at 
Deoband Madrassa Roy (1986, p. 57) writes: 
 comprised 106 books having to do with theology (according 
to Ashari doctrine), the commentary on the Quran, the 
Hanafite fiqh, and the hadith, and also included Arabic and 
Persian grammar, literature, Greek and Arabic philosophy, 
astronomy and medieval geometry, the branch of medicine 
known as Greek (Yunani) and logic. 
                                                          
18 Madrassa literally means a school or educational institution in Arabic and 
Farsi, however, in the Afghan context, it connotes primarily a religious school. 
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 Upon the completion of their studies at Deoband, the Afghan Ulama 
were to open their local ‘private’ Madrassas throughout the country, 
particularly in the rural regions of Afghanistan (Roy, 1986). Hence, 
it provided both the legalistic and mystic religious elites a significant 
legitimacy and influence on their communities, and in some 
instances, a role superior even to that of the tribal elders in matters 
concerning state and society  (Roy, 1986). Although the Afghan 
Ulama did not form their political parties until in the 1960s, they 
have long played an active legitimacy role in the Afghan politics. 
For example, Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901) urged the Afghan 
Ulama to preach Jihad against the British infidels and proclaimed 
himself Amir (commander or leader in the religious context)  
(Rasanayagam, 2003, pp. 11-12). Likewise, the overthrow of King 
Amanullah by Habibullah Bach-e-Saqau in 1929 was directly 
supported by the traditional Afghan Ulama (both the legalistic and 
mystics) in accord with their tribal alliances  (Roy, 1986) & (Saikal, 
2004). When Bach-e-Saqau took over Kabul, "he was crowned king 
with the title of Habibullah' (friend or beloved of God) by the pir19 
of Taqao20” (Roy, 1986, p. 66),  and in return, he exclusively placed 
his nine months (17th January-13th October 1929) limited kingdom 
and treasury at the service of religious elites (Saikal, 2004). 
However, King Nadir (1929-1933) on the one hand, hanged Bach-e-
Saqau for his revolt against the state, and on the other hand integrated 
the Ulama into his judicial system, a punish and reward policy 
through which Nadir not only controlled the religious elites, but also 
gradually decreased their area of influence in his state politics  (Roy, 
1986, p. 47) & (Saikal, 2004).  
The penetration of communist ideology into the thought of trained 
intellectuals in the Afghan sociopolitical context caused the birth of 
political Islam of the Islamist variety in the mid-20th century in 
Afghanistan (Roy, 1986) at a time when many young Afghan 
                                                          
19 Pir is a religious leader in the Sufi tradition of Islam.   
20 or Tagab, a district of northern Kapisa province in Afghanistan. 
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graduates were returning home from foreign universities, among 
them the leading Al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, Egypt. Dr. 
Gholam Mohammad Niyazi was among those returnees and, upon 
his arrival, became dean of the theology faculty of Kabul University  
(Roy, 1986) & (Saikal, 2004). The Islamic theology faculty 
establishe at Kabul University in 1951 by the Afghan government 
had direct links with the Al-Azhar, University of Cairo.  It aimed not 
only to institutionalize Islamic studies along with secular education, 
but also to draw a line between the traditional clergy of Madrassa 
and the reformist and moderate Islamists  (Roy, 1986). The 
reformists had attracted students from other scientific studies, 
including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud, 
students at the Polytechnic engineering university in Kabul who 
went on to build resistance movements against the Soviets in the 
1980s  (Roy, 1986).  According to Roy, the Islamic reformists, 
Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Hezb-e-Islami of 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, were critical of the traditional clergy or 
Ulama  (Roy, 1986, p. 69), who felt obliged to serve only Din 
(religion) and to follow a Muslim ‘Hakim' or ‘Amir' (ruler or leader), 
in contrast to the Islamist belief in ruling the state by reforming and 
politicizing the Islam religion.  
The origin of the political Islam ideology of the Afghan Islamists, 
later Mujahiddin, according to Roy  (1986), has come primarily from 
the ‘Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ in Cairo, but also from the teaching 
of Indian-subcontinent based Sayyid Abul Ala, Maududi (p. 68). 
Maududi's ideology starkly confronted nationalism, capitalism, and 
socialism and sought a Pan-Islamism, but he also distanced his 
teachings from traditional Islam by redefining the relation of faith to 
state and society (Nasr, 1994, p. 8).  According to Seyyed Vali Reza 
Nasr (1994), it was the ‘revivalist' Maududi, who in 1941 formed the 
first Islamic political party of Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society) or JI 
in India, and who viewed politics as an inseparable part of the 
Muslim faith. For Maududi the fate of Islamic religion was 
dependent upon politics. He was for the establishment of an Islamic 
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caliphate, but more in the form of a modern state, compatible with 
western-style democracy and denouncing social classes and 
violence. Similarly, he criticized the ‘latitudinarian tendencies of 
Sufism' by emphasizing necessary reformations. The Pan-Islamism 
doctrine of Maududi was against the Indian partition, but when 
Pakistan was established, Maududi moved his JI party from the 
Pathankot of India to the Pakistani city of Lahore, and from there his 
ideas spread to other major cities of the country including Peshawar  
(Nasr, 1994, p. 12).  
In the 1980s, the Maududi Jamiat-e-Islami actively helped to 
mobilize the Afghan Mujahideen with arms and funds, and enrolled 
their children at madrasas in Peshawar and Baluchistan  (Nasr, 
1994).  
Through their modern Islamist ideology and guerrilla warfare, the 
Afghan (Mujahideen) not only drove out the Russian super power 
and overthrew their communist regime, but also marginalized the 
traditional Ulama from the central political scene. For example, the 
main political parties who fought over power in Kabul were the 
Islamists Rabbani-Masud, Hekmatyar, Mazari, and Syaf. However, 
according to Roy  (The Failure of Political Islam , 1994), the Afghan 
Islamists failed to establish a functioning state based on Islamic 
ideology. Pointing to the post-Soviet fractured Mujahedeen 
government, Roy  (1994)   writes: “Thus the politicization of 
traditional society in Afghanistan both by war and by Islamism has 
produced only one form of relatively modern politico-military 
organization: the Masud System”, which was “not an effective 
political model” (p. 166).  
It was this political failure and the subsequent barbaric warlordism 
which facilitated the rebirth of traditional fundamentalism, yet this 
time in its extremist form. Although the exact root of the Taliban’s 
fundamental extremism remains unclear, according to Maley (1998), 
‘the social and doctorial roots’ of the Taliban are mainly derived 
from the traditional Ulama of Deoband, with its leadership 
comprised of the madrassa teachers and its soldiers drawn from the 
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students (1998, pp. 14-15). Furthermore, according to Maley (1998),  
Rashid  (1999), and Saikal (2004) the movement's ideological thread 
goes back to the Pakistani-based Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (the 
Islamic Society of Ulama) of Maulana Fazul-ul Rahman (JUI-F), 
from which the Taliban received substantial political and technical 
support during its time in power between 1994-2001. The Jamiat-e-
Ulama-e-Islam is one the of largest mainstream Islamic political 
parties in Pakistan which follow the Deoband strict traditional school 
of thought (Amin, 2014, p. 127), and has distinguished itself 
considerably from that of Maududi's moderate JI (which supported 
the Mujahideen resistance in the 1980s (Nasr, 1994). The JUI-F 
leadership and members are predominantly graduates of the 
traditional madrassas, and the party receives its political support 
from the lower social class, while the JI leadership structure is 
composed of university intellectuals and is mainly backed by the 
middle-class Pakistanis (Amin, 2014, p. 127). Moreover, although 
both parties follow the Hanafi jurisprudence, unlike the JI of 
Maududi, the JUI-F has a strict stance vis-à-vis the Shia Muslims 
and the role of women in the society (Rashid A. , 1998). During their 
regime between 1996 and late 2001, the Taliban strictly applied JUI-
F ideology in Kabul. 
Although the Taliban’s origin is often linked to the traditional Ulama 
of Deoband, they departed from that tradition in the implementation 
of their extreme Sharia system. The Taliban opted for the full 
implementation of the medieval Islam and sharia system, 
disqualifying the political Islam of the Mujahideen, and discarding 
Sufism and the Shia sect of Islam, while the traditional Afghan 
Ulama of the 18th and 19th and mid-20th century not only bestowed 
legitimacy on the Afghan rulers and regimes but also were both 
Ulama and Sufis, who respected the local traditions and the minority 
cults of the Afghan society. Likewise, the consolidation of the 
Taliban with the Wahhabi Usama bin Laden's Al-Qaida 
organization, in 1996  (Saikal, 2004) is another sign of the Taliban’s 
departure from its traditionalist origins.  
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Thus, the Taliban version of Islam is a significant shift from 
traditional fundamentalism to fundamental extremism. Moreover, 
the conclusion can also be drawn, that due to the relatively identical 
socio-religious patterns of the region, throughout Afghanistan’s 
modern history, all forms of Islamic ideologies (the traditionalists, 
Islamists, and extremists) have made their way to Afghanistan from 
the Indian subcontinent, particularly from today's Pakistan. 
Furthermore, although these ideologies substantially affected the 
Afghan socio-political culture and structures, due to the ethnic, 
religious, and cultural heterogeneity of Afghan society, none of the 
Islamic ideologies have managed to build an entirely legitimate 
political order in Afghanistan. Since the Afghan Islamists of the 
1979-1996 period and the Taliban extremists of 1994-2001 have 
actively fought to establish their version of Islam state in 
Afghanistan, it is essential to have a brief review of their regimes in 
the following pages. 
 
3.8 The Afghan Resistance and the Failure of Political 
Islam 
The Afghans who took refuge from the brutality of the communist 
regime in neighboring Pakistan and Iran were soon mobilized by the 
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to launch a Jihad 
“holy-war” based on Islamic ideology against the Russian invasion 
and their Marxism-Leninism ideology in 1979 (Roy, 1995, p. 79). 
Certainly, Islamic parties (discussed in the earlier section) came in 
the forefront, taking the leadership of the Afghan Mujahideen "holy 
warriors or freedom fighters". The CIA and Saudis assigned 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to recruit, train and supply 
Afghan Sunni fighters on the ground (Saikal, 2004). The Islamic 
regime of Khomeini in Iran - as the major neighbor to the west of 
Afghanistan – funded the Shia Afghans to fight the Russian red army 
and its 'puppet' regime on the front line (Saikal, 2004).  
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When the Soviets troops withdrew in 1989, the subsequent Geneva 
Accord21 (GA), based on the Afghan Interim  Government (AIG), 
failed to align all resistance parties in an all-inclusive and broad-
based political settlement in Kabul (Saikal, 2004, pp. 200-208). The 
Soviet-backed Dr. Najibullah government collapsed in April 1992, 
and the Mujahideen declared Afghanistan an ‘Islamic State" for the 
first time in its history (Rasanayagam, 2003).  The Mujahideen 
government appointed Sebghatullah Mujadidi for two months, who 
was followed by Burhanuddin Rabbani head of the Jamiat-e-Islami 
party  (Saikal, 2004). Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the Hezb-e-
Islami party never agreed to the new power establishment, in which 
his chief rival commander Ahmad Shah Massoud was appointed as 
defense minister  (Rasanayagam, 2003). As a result, Hekmatyar 
stormed Kabul with rockets, killing thousands of Afghan civilians  
(Saikal, 2004). The failure of the Geneva Accord led to a disastrous 
civil war between several fractured Mujahedeen parties throughout 
the country. Although having limited territory (few northern 
provinces) under his control, Rabbani remained the official president 
of Afghanistan with the UN  until the fall of the Taliban regime 
(Saikal, 2004).  
The political immaturity of the Mujahideen leaders and their 
ethnolinguistic and Sunni-Shia sectarian divide, made them easy 
pawns for the external secret service intelligence of Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iran, who dragged Afghanistan to a bloody civil war. 
The Mazari led Wahdat forces seized power in the central Hazarajat 
region. It also controlled the Hazara populated zone of western 
Kabul city which led to street to street clashes with the Saudi-
sponsored Ittihad-e-Islami “Islamic Union” party`s armed forces of 
Abul-Rassoul Sayyaf.  
Since 1992, the Mujahedeen "warlord militias" on their part 
committed worse kinds of human crimes, including murder, rape, 
                                                          
21 A UN-led peace settlement between the Pakistan government and the PDPA 
regime which facilitated Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. See more 
(Saikal, 2004, pp. 200-201)     
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abduction, forced labor, looting, and destroying Kabul city to ruin22 
by their street fights and blind rockets (Human Rights Watch , 2005). 
Afghanistan changed to a base of small fiefdoms controlled by local 
warlords, loyal to their own ethnolinguistic parties, who in return 
gave them financial and military support. It did not take too long 
before the chaos of this period paved the way for the rise of yet 
another medieval movement under the banner of Islam – the Taliban 
regime. 
 
3.9 The Islamic Emirate of Taliban (1994-2001)  
The Soviet withdrawal left no valid excuse for the US to stay in the 
region, so the fate of crucial Sunni Islamic parties of Mujahideen 
was handed over to the US’s major allies: Pakistan and the Saudis  
(Saikal, 2004). Pakistan preferred Hezb-e-Islami (the Islamic Party) 
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – a predominantly Pashtun ethnic party – 
and provided it with financial and military support to take control of 
the Rabbani-Massoud government in Kabul (Rasanayagam, 2003). 
With the passage of time, the Hezb-e-Islami party led by Hekmatyar 
showed incompetence in achieving Pakistani goals, so the Taliban 
became the right alternative for Pakistan to invest in (Saikal, 2004). 
In the meantime, the Rabbani-Massoud government was heavily 
dependent on India, Iran, and Russian military and financial 
assistance  (Griffin, 2001).   
In 1994, a small group of Madrasa (religious schools) students or 
"Taliban", mobilized by their instructors – who were ex-Mujahedeen 
who had fought against the Soviets in the 80s and had continued their 
education in Madrassas when the war ended –  rebelled against the 
atrocities and ‘lawlessness' of the local warlords in the southern 
Kandahar province (Rashid A. , 1999). In another account, according 
to Saikal (2004), the Taliban were trained and sent by the Interior 
Ministry of Pakistan to provide security for their cargo transport via 
                                                          
22. It is worth noting here, that the author migrated to neighboring Pakistan as 
an eight-year-old child, not because of the Russian invasion, but to escape the 
street fights of the Mujahideen parties in Kabul city in 1992. 
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the Chaman-Spinboldak border to Central Asia – a test-mission in 
which the Taliban succeeded. After that the Taliban were mobilized 
to topple the predominant Tajik government in Kabul. Although 
there remains no doubt that the Pakistani military plus ISI supported 
the Taliban, when and how this support began and whether or not 
the Taliban were a self-emerging group from the first is unclear. 
Certainly, there were some major ex-Mujahedeen fighters among the 
Taliban who, after the withdrawal of Soviets, laid down their arms 
and either returned to normal life or continued Islamic education in 
Pakistani Madrassas  (Rashid A. , 2000). For example, Mullah 
Mohammad Omar, leader of the movement, and later Amir-ul-
Mumeneen, “leader of the faithful” of the Islamic Emirate, who was 
an ex-Mujahedeen commander of Hezb-e-Islami (led by Maulavi 
Mohammad Yunis Khalis), and also other major Taliban 
commanders who later were promoted to high-ranking Emirate’s 
posts, had previously served with various anti-Soviet movements 
(Rashid A. , 2000).  At first, the Taliban assured an end to the 
brutality of warlordism and vowed that peace and security would 
prevail in Afghanistan  (Rashid A. , 1999) & (Rashid A. , 2000). The 
new movement thus soon won the hearts and minds of the Pashtun-
dominated population in the southwestern Afghanistan who had 
suffered years of conflict and brutality  (Goodson L. P., 2011). Under 
a famous slogan: The End of Evil and Corruption "Shar-aw-Fesad" 
23 – referring to the warlords of ex-Mujahedeen – the Taliban 
                                                          
23 It is worth mentioning, that on the eve of 26 September 1996, the author 
himself was in Qarabagh, a district in the north of Kabul province, where the 
Northern Alliance forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud left Kabul city towards the 
north of Afghanistan. Massoud's caravan which included all possible military 
personnel and civilian vehicles that were overloaded with ex-mujahedeen and 
their families who feared they would have no future if they stayed behind. Late 
in the afternoon of the following day the Taliban forces marched toward north 
Kabul in a long convoy of pick up cars, tanks, and other heavy military vehicles. 
The author, 12 years old at the time, came out on the street, along with other 
kids and elders, to greet the Taliban’s arrival and show a gesture of welcome. 
However, there were mixed feelings of hope and fear, and uncertainty as a 
whole. The people only heard stories of Taliban heroism from BBC Radio in the 
past two years, and yet here they were arriving at their villages. The first thing 
the Taliban did was to denounce warlordism and disarm all militiamen. Those 
who surrendered themselves were given their arms back to rule and fight 
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managed to sweep up district after district and province after 
province until 1996 when they reached the doorsteps of Kabul with 
their heavy equipped forces (Rashid A. , 2000). It is worth noting 
that the Taliban did bring security and an end to the warlords' lawless 
cruelty in all the region under their control. Nevertheless the 
conditions that they later imposed on the ordinary citizens were 
suffocating and inhuman. On September 27, 1996, they captured 
Kabul and swiftly moved towards the north  (Rashid A. , 1999). By 
the mid-1998, the Taliban controlled almost 90% of the Afghan soil, 
squeezing the Northern Alliance’s militias to a limited territory in 
the north (Rashid A. , 1999) & (Goodson L. P., 2011). By 1997 the 
Taliban regime was officially recognized as ‘the legitimate Afghan 
government' by Pakistan, and soon thereafter by Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates  (Saikal, 2004).   
It was after the capture of Kabul city that the Taliban removed its 
savior mask, declaring Afghanistan as an Islamic Emirate, enforcing 
their version of  ‘Islamic Sharia law' – a unique style of violence 
based on an ultra-conservative and literal interpretation of the Quran. 
The Emirate signed a Sharia police department named ‘Amr-e-
Belmaruf wa-Nah-e-Anel-Munkar' literally, “the order to do good 
and refrain from bad or illegal" in all corners of the country. The 
Islamic Emirate banned women from social life, including going to 
school and working in government or the private sector. Men were 
ordered to grow long beards. Photography, films, and music were 
strongly prohibited, and those who violated the rules were publicly 
punished. The Sharia police conducted self-style street courts, in 
which men and women were whipped , beaten and shot for alleged 
disobedience of Sharia law24. Between 1998 and 2001, Taliban 
forces met with violent resistance mainly from the Shia minority in 
Hazarajat areas particularly in Bamyan and from Uzbek warlords in 
                                                          
alongside them. As the days went by they started to implement sharia law, 
lashing,  beating, and cutting off hands and fingers, and another horror spread 
through the town and streets of Kabul. 
24. The author lived under the Taliban regime in the year 1998 in Kabul city. 
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Mazar-e-Sharif, where alone 3000 Taliban prisoners were 
‘summarily executed' by general Malik of the Junbish Mili party of 
General Dostum (Human Rights Watch, 2001).  The Taliban replied 
with even harsher retaliation, massacring thousands of Hazara and 
Uzbek forces including civilians both in Mazar-e-Sharif and Bamyan 
provinces (Human Rights Watch, 2001). Between 1996 and 2001, 
both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance’s forces committed 
horrific massacres and human rights abuses in the north, particularly 
in Mazar-e-Sharif (Fatima, 2014, pp. 41-42). According to the 
Human Rights Watch report, nearly 2,000 civilians, mostly Hazara 
and Uzbek ethnic were brutally killed by the Taliban in 1998 when 
they recaptured Mazar-e-Sharif for the second time (Human Rights 
Watch, 1998).  In retaliation, around 3,000 Taliban prisoners were 
suffocated and shot dead in shipping containers by General 
Dostum`s militias in a 2001 US-backed operation which is also 
known as the killing of Dasht-e-Laili25 – according to Jamie Doran’s 
documentary “Afghan Massacre: Convoy of Death” (2003).  These 
massacres and war crimes tremendously added to the ethnic hostility 
of Pashtuns vis-a-vis Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek in the north and the 
rest of the country. They also fueled the recruitment of Pashtun 
sympathizers for the resurgence of the Taliban offensive in later 
years in the south and east, as well as in northern Afghanistan.  
Likewise, the poppy cultivation and trade became widespread 
around the country (Saikal, 2004) – which not only offered the local 
farmers a better livelihood, but also became a vital source of 
government income through the imposition of taxes and tolls on 
farmers and traders  (Rashid A. , 2000)& (Rubin B. R., 2002). At the 
request of the international community during their last year of 
power, the Taliban banned the cultivation and trade of opium in the 
areas remaining under their control (Rubin B. R., 2002). In 2004, the 
international community supported the Afghan government with 
                                                          
25 A desert in Jawazjan province in northern Afghanistan. It is the capital of She-
berghan and counts as the power-base for General Abdul Rashid Dostum. 
141 
 
funds amounting to 25.5 Million US dollars to ban the harvest of 
poppy on over 1.5 million Afghan farmers in Helmand, Kandahar, 
Nangarhar and Badakhshan provinces (United Nations , 2004 ). 
Shortly after their fall in late 2002, the re-emerging Taliban 
insurgency not only allowed but supported the poppy cultivation in 
the areas of their control, which motivated local farmers and traders 
to supported the reemergence of the Taliban after US invasion.  
The Taliban movement is nothing but the legacy of the joint venture 
of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan on the war against 
the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in the 1980s  (Rashid A. , 2000), 
(Griffin, 2001) & (Saikal, 2004). The core of Taliban ideology 
contains two fundamental principles:  a never-ending ‘Jihad’ against 
the infidels, and the implementation of the divine law or Sharia in 
Muslim territories. This notion attracted thousands of Muslim 
students and warriors from all around the world to fight the Godless 
communist regime and its Soviet backers in Afghanistan. Among 
them,  of Saudi origin, was Usama Bin Landen of Al-Qaida (Rashid 
A. , 2000) & (Saikal, 2004).  The Soviets withdrew, but while 
Pakistan had a strategic stake in the area (threatening India in the 
border with Kashmir and using that conflict as a proxy to gain a pro-
Pakistan regime in Kabul), it continued to breed new multi-national 
Jihadists including Afghans, Pakistanis, Arabs and Chechens in its 
Madrasas and training comps (Rashid A. , 2000). When the Taliban 
movement gathered momentum, with fighters pouring into 
Afghanistan from the Pakistani Madrassas and training camps, 
Pakistan publicly supported the new Islamic Emirate and lobbied for 
it around the world (Saikal, 2004).  Pakistan was the key architect 
behind the Taliban project in Afghanistan, and Saikal (2004)  called 
it the ‘creepy invasion of Pakistan'. Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (the 
Islamic Society of Ulama) of Maulana Fazul-ul Rahman (JUI-F), 
which provided fighters, training, and political support to the Taliban  
(Maley, 1998) &   (Rashid A. , 1999), was the main political ally of 
Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s regime between 1993-
1996 (Rashid A. , 1999). When the US attacked the Taliban regime 
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in late 2001, it was the JUI-F, that with the support and cooperation 
of the ISI, provided a safe haven for the Taliban fighters in the Quetta 
and Peshawar cities of Pakistan (Rashid A. , 2008/2009).  According 
to historian Saikal (2004), when Usama bin Laden entered 
Afghanistan through Pakistan in1996 seeking a safe haven for his 
Al-Qaida fighters, he pledged in return to support the Taliban regime 
financially in its fight against ex-Mujahedeen. By September 2001 
the Taliban Emirate had ruled in Kabul for five years when the 9/11 
attack launched by Usma bin Laden radically changed the Taliban 
regime’s fate.  It suffered a disastrous collapse within just a few 
weeks.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
Chapter 4: A Critical Analyses of the U.S.  
Post-Taliban Intervention in Afghanistan 
 
4.1 The U.S. post-Taliban Nation and State Building In-
tervention: 
It would be unfair to deny that the U.S.-led military intervention and 
the subsequent nation-and state-building mission not only ended the 
Taliban authoritarian and oppressive regime, but also introduced 
Afghanistan to a democratic government for the first time in its 
history. They also brought a constitution that guarantees an elected 
government through free and fair election; equal rights and 
opportunities for all citizens including women; freedom of 
expression and civil society. Yet it is equally fair and significant to 
highlight the U.S. intervention's flaws and, in some instances 
unfixable ones (to which I will return in short), and to note that an 
alternative approach could have brought Afghanistan into much 
better shape than today and also saved a hundred-thousand human 
lives and billions of U.S. dollars’ worth of resources. 
The United States post-9/11 military intervention in Afghanistan 
could be primarily justified by reason of  ‘self-defense’ and 
‘security’ conditions, according to Adelman (2002), Talentino 
(2005) and  Heinze (2009 ). The Taliban Emirate’s refusal to hand 
over the 9/11 suspect Usama bin Laden – leader of the Al-Qaida 
extremist organization –  led the U.S. to embark on the war on terror 
(on Al-Qaida and on the Taliban for providing it sanctuary) and 
eventually to the invasion of Afghanistan. Another rational for the 
U.S. invasion, according to Heinze  (2009 ), calls on the 
cosmopolitan theory’s moral reasoning, which justifies international 
intervention with military force where a state or regime inflicts 
human suffering on its own people (p. 16). That argument had been 
made even prior to the 9/11 incident, and the Taliban regime was 
already under scrutiny by international forces with an eye to possible 
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intervention because of its violent and oppressive rule and human 
rights violations on its own people, including the ban on women’s 
education.  
Furthermore, according to Talentino  (2005), the contemporary 
concept of ‘security' in international politics encompasses a large list 
of issues including health, migration, gender, environment, and 
terrorism. Adelman (2002) & Talentino (2005) argue that the failure 
of a state in ensuring the basic needs of its own citizens –  including 
security, health, education, economic opportunities, and the rule of 
law –  eventually jeopardizes the security and well-being of citizens 
of another state. Thus, it is at this juncture that the ‘self-defense' 
military intervention reason extends to the wider ‘security' concept 
and justifies state-building engagements in failing and failed states, 
or in ‘no state’ circumstances – as was the case in Afghanistan after 
the Taliban was ousted. The state-building intervention was in dire 
need in Afghanistan even prior to 9/11.      
When the Bush administration declared its war against terror (Al-
Qaida organization) and its sanctuaries (Taliban regime), no 
intention and plan was in place for a subsequent nation- and state-
building mission in Afghanistan (Rashid A. , 2008/2009). The Bonn 
process was aimed to fill the power  (Rashid A. , 2008/2009)created 
by the Taliban removal. 
Additionally, it is important to note that, before the U.S. invasion, 
Afghanistan did not have a functioning state as was the case in Iraq, 
Japan and Germany (Monten, 2014, pp. 185-186).  Due to decades-
long war and conflict (discussed in the earlier section), the state-
machinery was so severely damaged that it was barely able to deliver 
even basic services (e.g., security, water, shelter, health, education, 
and the rule of law) to its people. One-quarter of the Afghan 
population had migrated (Rashid A. , 2008/2009), the rest were in 
captivity either to the strict Sharia law of the Taliban Emirate or to 
the savage brutality of the Northern Alliance warlords. Since the 
arrival of the warlords in 1990s, the Afghan informal governance 
structures, which had proved successful in resolving community 
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conflicts, and had often played a mediating role between the state 
and society in the past, were also disrupted. As the well-known 
scholar on Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin, noted in an article in 2002, 
"over the past two decades Afghanistan has been ruled, in whole or 
in part, at times badly and at times atrociously, but it has not been 
governed" (2002, p. 153). Likewise, the illicit economy – comprised 
of poppy cultivation, drug-trade, and the illegal export and import of 
other goods – primarily benefited the conflict parties and mafia 
groups  (Rubin B. R., 2002).  In short, Afghanistan matched all the 
tags of a ‘fragile state' listed by Olivier Nay   (2012, p. 2) as weak, 
failing, failed, collapsed and divided, and was in dire need of the 
establishment of a sustainable peace and the creation of new state 
security, political, administrative and economic institutions.  
The focus of this discussion is not whether the U.S. military inter-
vention in Afghanistan was morally justifiable or not. Rather it de-
scribes the basis of the arguments for the subsequent nation- and 
state-building engagement of the international community in gen-
eral, and of the United Nations and the U.S in particular. In other 
words, state-building by an external interventionist and its local le-
gitimacy are the main themes of this discourse. As Marina Ottaway 
(2002) notes, the challenging task for third party state-builders is not 
the creation of states but the creation of local legitimacy. Chesterman 
et al.  (2004)  write:  
States cannot be made to work from the outside. International 
assistance may be necessary, but it is never sufficient to es-
tablish institutions that are legitimate and sustainable. This is 
not an excuse for inaction, if only to minimize the humani-
tarian consequences of a state’s incapacity to care for its vul-
nerable population. Beyond that, however, international ac-
tion should be seen first and foremost as facilitating local pro-
cesses, providing resources and creating the space for local 
actors to start a conversation that will define and consolidate 
their polity by mediating their vision of a good life into re-
sponsive, robust, and resilient institutions.  (pii) 
146 
 
If third-party intervention is legitimate for the sake of international 
security, then it is rational to subject the interventionist/s to scrutiny 
of the outcomes of their state-building mission. Heinze (2009 ) also 
believes that any intervention is subject to moral, legal and political 
questions. The current chapter will critically analyze the U.S. post-
9/11 military invasion and its subsequent nation- and state-building 
intervention that shaped the Bonn agreement and the ongoing state 
apparatus in Afghanistan.   
 
4.2 The Bonn Agreement and Its Unfixable Flaws   
In late November 2001, while the U.S. and its local ally –  the Afghan 
Northern Alliances –  forces were still hunting Al-Qaida and Taliban 
forces in Afghanistan, the United Nations Security Council issued 
resolution ‘1378', convening a conference in Bonn, Germany, to 
establish a ‘transitional administration leading to the formation of a 
new government' in Afghanistan (United Nations Security Council , 
2001, p. 2). 
In Afghanistan, from 1994 until the invasion of the U.S. in late 2001, 
the Taliban and the Northern Alliances  warlords were the main 
conflict parties, whose armed forces fought each other on the front-
lines. Once hostile to each other, the Northern Alliances– an ethnic 
collation of  Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami "Islamic Society" party under 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Panjshiri26 Shura-e-Nezar party 
"supervisory council of the north" under Ahmad Shah Massoud, the 
Hazara Wahdat-Islami "Islamic Unity" party led by Abdul Ali 
Mazari and the Jumbish-e- Mili of General Dostum – was formed 
after the capture of Kabul by the predominantly Pashtun movement 
of the Taliban in September 1996 (Collins, 2011, p. 38). 
                                                          
26 Panjshir is a Tajik speaking province in north-central Afghanistan. It is the 
birthplace of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the late leader of the Shura-e-Nezar party 
or the supervisory council of the North.  Since the leadership of the Shura-e-
Nezar mainly comprised individuals from Panjshir province, therefore it is popu-
larly referred to as the ‘Panjshiri' party. 
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The initial outcome of the December 5th, 2001 Bonn agreement – 
also known as the Bonn Accord –  was the formation of a six-months 
transitional government, also known as the Interim Authority of 
Afghanistan (Rubin B. R., 2004). The Interim Authority of 
Afghanistan was supplemented by a supreme court and a 
commission for facilitating the inauguration of an Emergency Loya 
Jirga, or grand council, that would lay the foundation for a future 
complete and ‘permanent' government's ‘structure and key 
personnel' (Rubin B. R., 2004).  
 The Bonn agreement was followed by some state-building 
(institution building) efforts which were principally a nation-
building attempt –  imposed on the warring factions, who hardly 
represented the Afghan broader population. The Interim Authority 
of Afghanistan was an ethnopolitical power-sharing deal between 
two parties, the NA warlords and the exiled ex-king Zahir (Rubin B. 
R., 2004). Thus, the key government positions were also divided 
based on ethnolinguistic political leaders of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara 
and Uzbek. 
It was the miscalculated state and nation-building policies and 
strategies of the Bonn Accord that led to the longest ongoing U.S. 
war, the extended Afghan conflict and government instability, and 
widespread corruption in Afghanistan.  Let's bring Berit 
Beliesemann de Guevara's (2012) perspective on ‘international state-
builders’ (in this case the U.S.) and the ‘local recipients’ (Afghan 
conflict parties) into  consideration here (p. 5). According to 
Beliesemann de Guevara (2012), while imposing western style state-
building policy and practices – these includes; liberal peace, 
democracy, governance, internationalization and depoliticisation –  
the international state-builders often ignores the local historical 
context and sociopolitical dynamics of a country that are very critical 
to the questions of legitimacy and the political stability of a state.  In 
Afghanistan, the fundamental flaws began with the November 14th, 
2001 United Nation's Security Councils' nation- and state-building 
arrangements  (United Nations Security Council , 2001). By 
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excluding one of the critical conflict parties, namely the Taliban, 
from the negotiations, the Bonn agreement failed to conduct peace-
making arrangements. It also failed to ensure a fair representation of 
the largest ethnic group of Pashtuns in the new government 
architecture. As  Rubin  (2004),  author on Afghanistan and 
diplomacy at the Bonn talks, confesses "despite this attempt 
(bringing exiled Pashtuns) at ethnic inclusiveness, the group 
assembled in Bonn did not represent the people of Afghanistan, 
either directly or indirectly" (p. 7). Thus, it not only significantly 
undermined the Bonn process, but it paved the ground for the revival 
of the Taliban as an insurgency group and the consequent 
destabilization of the country in the following years.  The cause and 
consequences of the failure of the Bonn peace-making are discussed 
in detail under a separate title in this chapter. 
The Afghan population – who were exhausted from decades of war 
and forced migration – hoped that maybe this time the United States 
would save their future by bringing a sustainable government. 
However, the US along with its UN organizers primarily focused on 
how to fill the power gap left by the Taliban regime. There was fear 
that the Northern Alliances inner factions would re-enter the conflict 
for power as had happened during the early 1990s, when the 
Mujaheddin committed horrific human crimes in the Kabul. There 
was no grantee that history would not repeat itself  (Rubin B. R., 
2004), and although Kabul remained safe, shortly after the fall of the 
Taliban regime, Balkh province experienced several clashes over the 
Mazar-e-Sharif city between the Jamiat-e-Islami militia of 
commander Atta Mohammad Noor and the Jumbish-e-Islami of 
General Abdul Rashid Dostum. This danger led the UN to send its 
first peacekeeping mission of International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in January 2002, and by May the same year UN forces 
comprised around 4500 soldiers from nearly 19 nations (Lansford, 
2012, pp. 56-57).   
The U.N., as the facilitator of the Bonn process, also failed to play 
its significant role, due to the overall control of the United States 
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over the Bonn process. Chaired by the UN special representative for 
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, the key architects and controllers of 
the Bonn process were U.S. special envoys James Dobbins and 
Zalmay Khalilzad, who aimed to reach some quick and reasonable 
consensuses between the Afghan warlords and Zahir Shah’s team 
through a policy of reward and threat   (Khalilzad, 2016, pp. 119-
127).  
Moreover, the Bush invasion of Iraq in 2003 considerably reduced 
the amount of  U.S. attention and resources available to the barely 
began state-building mission in Afghanistan (Rubin B. R., 2002), 
(Rashid A. , 2010) & (Maley, 2013). Following the Bonn agreement, 
Afghans awaited some vital infrastructure projects and programs 
from the newly US-backed government which could have created 
millions of jobs to the war-torn population while restoring 
agriculture and building industrial sectors. It was a lost chance, 
through which the US could have helped the Afghan government 
gain public support and legitimacy after decades of long war and 
devastation.  However, instead, to cut short their burden of 
responsibility, the Americans supported the Northern Alliances 
warlords – who still maintained their militiamen in the regional 
power-bases – with the U.S. pouring financial and military resources 
their way, ostensibly to help them fight the remnants of  Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban (Forsberg, 2009). While the ISAF mission was 
limited only to the capital Kabul, the rest of the country remained 
contested among various warlord militia (Rashid A. , 2010). To 
sustain their income, the various warlords' groups turned to the drug-
trade and opened  other illicit businesses in the areas of their 
influence  (Rashid A. , 2010) & (Jackson A. , Politics and 
governance in Afghanistan: the case of Kandahar, 2015). In a very 
short period they became wealthy and influential enough to threaten 
the American-installed government in Kabul. According to Rashid  
(2010), in later years, the Americans accepted that substituting 
warlords for the Taliban was a fatal mistake. The de-facto control of 
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the warlords in five major provinces is empirically assessed in the 
following section. 
There is no doubt that the U.S. government faced enormous public 
pressure to respond to the 9/11 perpetrators promptly and 
accordingly. However, the lack of a policy after  ‘the war on terror' 
in Afghanistan not only dragged the U.S. into its history's longest 
war, causing the loss of hundreds of thousands of human lives and 
billions of US dollars, but it also made circumstances even bloodier 
and more complicated for the Afghans than they had been in the first 
place. 
Moreover, in 200l there was a regional and international census on 
the US intervention in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as the U.S. 
showed its intention for longer mission then just removing the 
Taliban, it significantly alerted the regional powers for their own 
interests particularly Russia and Iran.  
The exclusion of the Taliban from the peace talks, the empowerment 
of warlords and mafia groups, the de-facto formation of an 
ethnopolitical power-sharing government, and the underestimation 
of the interests of the regional powers (Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and 
India) are some of the critical failures of the U.S. led nation- and 
state-building mission in Afghanistan, discussed separately in the 
following.   
 
 
4.2.1 Ignoring Peace-Making in Afghanistan: A Prerequisite 
for Nation and State-Building  
In an analytical paper, the German Institute for Development 
“Deutsche Institute for Entwicklungspolitik (d.i.e)” describes state-
building and peace-building in a post-conflict context as ‘congruent’ 
concepts, targeting a common goal of building and strengthening 
state institutions that leads to preventing conflict (Grävingholt, 
Gänzle, & Ziaja, 2009). So, if state-building is compatible with 
peace-building, then there must be a prior step which facilitates the 
successful execution of the two. In his statement "An Agenda for 
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Peace," the 1992 United Nation's Secretary-General, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali –– called this step ‘peace-making' which aims at 
bringing “hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means” (Chapter 
IV, Article 34). Thus, according to Nicole Ball (1996,2001,2003), 
peace-making requires “formal cessation of hostilities” between 
conflicting parties through ‘negotiations'  (p. 722). (For more on this 
discussion, please review chapter Two, Part One) 
At the Bonn conference in 2001,  the U.N.  instead of making peace 
between the main hostile parties – namely Taliban militias and the 
NA warlords  -  directly engaged in nation-and state-building in 
Afghanistan. The Afghan delegates invited to the Bonn negotiations 
comprised four factions: the predominantly non-Pashtun (Tajik, 
Hazara, and Uzbek) coalition of Northern Alliances' warlords, the 
exile Pashtun elites under former King Zahir27(native Pashtun, 
however, who couldn't speak Pashtu), the Peshawar based diaspora 
elites, led by Pir Ghailani (Non-native Pashtun) and the Cypress28 
group headed by Humayon Jarir (Panjshiri Tajik)  (Shahran, 2010). 
The Taliban were not only entirely excluded from the talks, but the 
U.S. administration detained those who showed interest in Bagram 
and Guantanamo prisons (Rubin B., 2018, para.7). While Karzai – a 
member of former King Zahir’s group who lived in exile –  was 
chosen as the chairman of the interim government, the NA warlords 
–  the main armed opposition to the Taliban –  seized the majority of 
the key cabinet seats    (Rubin B. R., 2002) (Rashid A. , 2010) 
(Shahran, 2010) & (Maley, 2013). As a result, the UN agreement in 
Bonn settled a political deal for the formation new government 
between anti-Taliban factions. Thus, peace-making, a fundamental 
                                                          
27 Zahir Shah was the Afghan monarch between (1933-1953), who lived in exile 
in Rome after the1953 coup d'état by his cousin Daoud Khan. Despite the de-
plorable socioeconomic conditions, Afghans enjoyed relative peace during King 
Zahir's regime. Therefore, Zahir holds legitimate credits among many Afghans, 
who recall his monarchy as the ‘golden era' in the country.  (Amin Saikal, 2004, 
Modern Afghanistan; a history of struggle and survival) 
28 The group was named after the island ‘Cypress’ because its participants were 
mainly the Shia minority of Hazara and Pashtuns, supported by Iran (Timor 
Shahran, An Analysis of Peacemaking in Afghanistan, 2010).  
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prerequisite for peace-building and nation-building was 
intentionally sabotaged.  
Scholars and diplomats who participated in or wrote about the Bonn 
conference have noted various reasons for the exclusion of the 
Taliban from the peace talks. Barnet Rubin – a well-known experts 
on the subject and advisor to the UN special representative for 
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, in the Bonn talks – writes that “the 
international community has defined one side of the ongoing war in 
Afghanistan – the alliance of Al-Qaida and the Taliban – as an 
outlaw formation that must be defeated” (2002, p. 155). Likewise, 
William Maley (2013) – another well-known author on Afghanistan 
– believes that the assassination of the Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader 
of the Shura-e-Nezar or Supervisory Council of the North, by Al-
Qaida suicide bombers just before the US-led invasion of 
Afghanistan made it difficult to accept the condition of including the 
Taliban at the Bonn talks on the Northern Alliances. Likewise, 
Zalmay Khalilzad – special representative of the U.S. in the Bonn 
process and later U.S. ambassador to Kabul – believes that the 
Taliban were ‘determined’ to fight, and as he writes, “I was skeptical 
that the international community could have lured the Taliban to the 
table at Bonn (2016, p. 121).”   
However, it was just recently ‘revealed' that the George W. Bush 
administration purposely excluded the Taliban from the peace talks, 
and that those who ‘tried to participate' were ‘imprisoned at 
Guantanamo or Bagram' (Rubin B. , 2018, p. para.7) & (Coll, 2018). 
Moreover, the Northern Alliances warlords were armed and financed 
by the United States to go after the remnants of Al-Qaida and Taliban 
fighters (Rashid A. , 2010). Thus, though the UN played a facilitative 
role, nevertheless the Bonn process was overwhelmingly controlled 
by the U.S., which favored the military alliances of the Northern 
warlords. In other words, the U.S. overthrew the Taliban regime and 
installed the Northern Alliances warlords’ government in Kabul. The 
Bonn conference was a legitimizing effort by the U.S. for its 
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intervention and establishment of the new government in 
Afghanistan.  
However, a legitimate government in Afghanistan required an 
ethnically broad-based representation, and the Bonn conference 
failed to accomplish this. Instead, political power was distributed 
between the predominantly non-Pashtun warlords Mujahedeen and 
a few exile Pashtun elites who had little Afghan ground support   
(Rubin B. R., 2004). Because of his political base in exile, even 
Karzai – a native Popalzai Pashtun tribesman of eastern Kandahar – 
had little foothold among the largest Pashtun ethnic group in 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, he was an affiliate of the Northern 
Alliances leading party of Jamiat-e-Islami of the late president 
Rabbani in early 1990s, and joined the anti-Taliban campaign during 
2000/2001 (Rashid A. , 2008/2009). It was the U.S. special forces 
that brought Karzai to eastern Afghanistan in late 2001 to cut a deal 
with the Taliban for the surrender of Kandahar  (Rashid A. , 2010) 
& (Khalilzad, 2016). It can be concluded that after Hezb-e-Islami 
(Islamic movement of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) who also boycotted 
the Bonn talks and declared Jihad against the U.S. invasion, hiding 
first in Iran and then in Peshawar, Pakistan (Rashid A. , 2008/2009, 
pp. 244-245),  the Taliban remained the only dominant group 
representing the largest ethnic group of Pashtun inside Afghanistan. 
It is worth mentioning here, that brutal atrocities committed by the 
Taliban in the following years significantly affected their image and 
legitimacy among majority Pashtuns.  
Finally, the U.S.’s initial enemy was the Al-Qaida network, not the 
Taliban regime. It was the refusal of handing over Usama Bin-Laden 
which made the Taliban enemy of the U.S. and led to the war on 
terror and its safe heavens. The war succeeded in dismantling both 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban at the end of 2001 and throughout 2002, 
but The U.S.’s treatment of the Taliban as Al-Qaida terrorists even 
after the toppling of their regime was a significant mistake. If the 
U.S. was concerned about the human rights abuses, then the NA 
warlords were not lagging behind the Taliban. Had the U.S. included 
154 
 
the Taliban in the Bonn process in the first place, the Afghan conflict 
would have had an end in 2001. 
 
4.2.2 The Re-Emergence of Taliban: A Major Obstacle to 
Peace-and State-Building Process  
Multiple factors fueled the re-emergence of the Taliban insurgency 
in Afghanistan. Among them, the humiliating ouster of the Taliban 
from the power and their exclusion from the Bonn talks (discussed 
in detail above), the empowering of the long-fought enemy – the 
Northern Alliances warlords, the installment of a weak and corrupt 
state, and the underestimation of the regional power's interests were 
the determining ones. The Taliban were mercilessly bombed by the 
U.S. air forces, killing hundreds-thousands of them, and thousands 
more arrested and brought to the Guantanamo Bay – the United 
States military detention camp in Cuba   (Rashid A. , 2010). 
Likewise, the US armed and financed the Northern Alliances 
warlords – the frontline enemy of the Taliban in the North –  and 
they brutally hit the Taliban on the ground (Rashid A. , 2008/2009) 
& (Khalilzad, 2016).  When the Taliban regime collapsed, many of 
its fighters surrendered to the Uzbek militias of General Dostum of 
the Northern Alliances and were mercilessly massacred and buried 
in the Dasht-e-Laili desert in Jawazjan province (Rashid A. , 
2008/2009). Irish filmmaker Jamie Doran (2003) collected the video 
footages of the atrocities in a documentary film named “Afghan 
Massacre: Convoy of Death”29 in which around 3,000 Taliban 
prisoners were suffocated and shot dead in shipping containers by 
General Dostum`s militiamen in 2001. Dostum was on the CIA 
payroll and was accompanied by American soldiers, when the brutal 
human rights volitions occurred (Raisen, 2009).  
 
                                                          
29 The film can be watched in the following link: https://www.democra-
cynow.org/2003/5/26/afghan_massacre_the_convoy_of_death 
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According to Rashid (2008/2009) the Taliban commanders foresaw 
their massacre by the Northern Alliances and repeatedly requested 
to be allowed to surrender to the US troops, the UN and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  However, neither 
the Americans nor the international organizations responded to their 
appeal, but instead watched as the massacre happened. In the 
following years, when insurgency mounted, the Taliban responded 
to their humiliating ouster, with the worst human crimes ever, 
including beheadings and suicide bombings on the Afghan and 
International military, on aid workers, and on civilians. In an off-the-
record interview with the author, a Taliban commander, partially 
justified their crimes as a response to what had happened to them 
when the U.S,, the UN, and the international community did nothing 
to stop the massacre during the collapse of their regime30.  
Based on the Bonn agreement, the new government was assigned to 
establish the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC) to oversee war crimes and human rights violations, and act 
accordingly (Rubin B. R., 2002). However, except for periodic 
reports, the AIHRC failed to bring even a single war criminal to 
justice. In late 2001, when the Uzbek and Tajik militia of Northern 
Alliances warlords entered the Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif cities 
abandoned  by the Taliban – they accused the  minority ethnic 
Pashtuns there of being Taliban and committed horrific human 
crimes, including ‘summary exactions’, torture, looting, and rape of 
                                                          
30 The author interviewed Taliban commanders and the shadow-governor of 
the Herat province in March 2016. In September 2017 the author interviewed 
several Taliban prisoners released from Poli-Charkhi detention camp in Kabul. 
The Taliban justifies their civilian attacks something like this. "The west is in a 
war against Muslims and Islam, and the Taliban are the only true movement 
who are standing against them through holy Jihad". The Afghan government is 
"a US puppet" regime like the communist regime had been a Soviet puppet be-
tween 1978-1991. Therefore, "those who work for them are traitors, and the 
punishment for traitors is worse than for infidels and invaders". When they 
were asked if the Taliban were also getting support from Pakistan, who is an 
ally in the war against the Taliban and who gave military bases to the US forces, 
they denied any support from the Pakistan government. "It is with the support 
of Allah, the Almighty, that we get financial and military support from individual 
Muslims from all around the world including Pakistan". Besides, "Pakistan is a 
Muslim country, and there is no border between the Muslim Ummah".       
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women (Human Rights Watch, 2001).  Instead of being brought to 
justice, the Northern Alliances warlords enjoyed key leadership 
positions in the Afghan government, supplemented by the U.S. 
financial, military and political support. Through patronage 
relations, the new government administration was occupied by ill-
educated corrupt and in some cases illiterate officials. As the 
government administration machine started to run, some Afghans 
already missed the Taliban's law enforcement even though it had 
been cruel and chaotic. The return of the warlords to power and the 
widespread corruption in government administration immensely 
disappointed the majority of the Afghan public. 
Moreover, the collateral damage from U.S. and NATO combat 
forces significantly helped the Taliban win back local Afghan 
support in the early days of the occupation. Often local civilians were 
detained and mistreated by the  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
in suspicion of Taliban or Al-Qaida affiliation. A 2004 Human 
Rights Watch reports notes "it appears that faulty and inadequate 
intelligence has resulted in targeting civilians who had taken no a 
part in the hostilities, in unnecessary civilian deaths and inquiry 
during arrest operations, and in the needless destruction of civilian 
homes and property" ( 2004, p. 11). Steve Coll (2018) writes that 
C.I.A. paid “impoverished locals for information” who for “financial 
incentives” invented “tantalizing false stories or settled vendettas by 
labeling a business or tribal rival as Al Qaeda (2018, para. 14)”. 
These accused detainees were then badly tortured, as the 2004 
Human Rights Watch reports: 
Afghans detained at Bagram airbase in 2002 have described 
being held in detention for weeks, continuously shackled, 
intentionally kept awake for extended periods of time, and 
forced to kneel or stand in painful positions for extended 
periods. Some say they were kicked and beaten when 
arrested, or later as part of efforts to keep them awake. Some 
say they were doused with freezing water in the winter. 
Similar allegations have been made about treatment in 2002 
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and 2003 at the U.S. military bases in Kandahar and in U.S. 
detention facilities in the eastern cities of Jalalabad and 
Asadabad. (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 4) 
Moreover, the U.S. forces’ night raids and air-strikes aimed at 
capturing and killing the Al-Qaida and Taliban leaders also resulted 
in massive civilian causalities. The 2008 Human Rights Watch 
reports documented 424 civilian deaths caused by U.S. and NATO 
air and land attacks between 2006 and 2008 (p. 13). According to 
this report, 47 civilians were killed in an airstrike on a wedding party 
in eastern Nangarhar province in July 2008. These numbers 
significantly increased in the following years.  House-searches by 
heavy equipped male US soldiers in a traditional Afghan society, 
particularly in southern Pashtun communities where the female 
family member is perceived as the Nang or Namus (pride) of family 
and clan, and where even her appearance in the presence of male 
stranger is forbidden, resulted in anti-American and pro-Taliban 
sentiments among the local population31.  
Furthermore, the U.S. administration's refusal to negotiate an 
‘amnesty' forced the Taliban to seek refuge with their old friend 
Pakistan (Rubin B., 2018, para.7). According to Ahmad Rashid 
(2008/2009), the Pakistani army and intelligence service ISI 
evacuated a large number of leading Taliban commanders from the 
Kunduz and Kandahar provinces to safe-heavens in Pakistan. Thus 
Pakistan remained the only brother in time of need for the Taliban, 
and in return they also vowed loyalty to Pakistan in the following 
years. For Pakistan – who played the role of both friend and foe in 
the U.S. war on terror – the Taliban remained a strategic proxy 
against their lifetime enemy, India (Rashid A. , 2010). Moreover, the 
U.S.’s extended war in Afghanistan also meant extended financial 
and military support to Pakistan – as a non-NATO major ally. 
                                                          
31. An ex-Taliban and sympathizer told the author in the off-the-record inter-
view "The Americans are mercilessly bombing our villages, disgracing and rap-
ing our women and children in their night rides, whereas the United Nations 
and Human Rights Watch watch it all. The United Nations and Human Rights is 
only a drama against the Muslim and Mujahideen." 
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By mid-2002, soon after resettling in Pakistan, Taliban leaders began 
to reorganize their remnant fighters to start yet another Jihad (holy 
war) against the U.S occupation and the ‘puppet’ Afghan 
government (Rashid A. , 2008/2009, pp. 242-243). The Pakistani 
Islamic political parties generously helped the Afghan Taliban in 
fund-raising and recruiting new fighters32. In ‘spring 2003' the 
Taliban launched their first assault by assassinating an international 
aid worker in Kandahar, and by mid-2004 killing dozens of Afghan 
and foreign military and aid personnel, and seizing areas in Zabul 
and Helmand provinces  (Rashid A. , 2008/2009, pp. 245-253). By 
early 2009, Taliban's guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, and 
kidnappings destabilized ‘over 60 percent’ of the Afghan territory 
(Masadykov, Giustozzi, & Michael Page, 2010, p. 3). Nearly one 
year after the ISAF mission termination and the withdrawal of the 
U.S. combat forces, on September 28, 2015, the Taliban managed to 
seize the northern Kunduz province capital and kept control of it for 
about two weeks (Landinfo, 2017, p. 6). It was their first major 
success since their removal from power in 2001. The field research 
of the present also revealed that during the past couple of years, the 
Taliban established their parallel government structures that include 
the appointment of shadow provincial and district governors and the 
sharia courts. Except for in a few provinces, (Bamyan and Daikundi) 
the Taliban controls the majority of the villages and in some areas 
also the district affairs in rural areas, and the Afghan government 
controls city centers –  (Off-the-record-Interview35Kabul, 2017). 
Notwithstanding their limited personal and military equipment, the 
Taliban’s success lies in their ideological war of fighting ‘the 
occupation’, the ‘infidels’ and ‘defending Islam’.  (Off-the-record-
                                                          
32. At that time, the Author was living in Peshawar city of Pakistan and wit-
nessed the Pakistani Islamic parties and movements including, the Jamit-e-
Ulama Islam (JUI), Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Taiba campaign for 
Afghan Taliban through collecting charities in Masques but also recruiting vol-
unteer fighters to fight against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. They have installed 
charity tents in Friday prayers at Masques and call on local people to contribute 
with whatever they can to support the holy cause of Jihad in Afghanistan.        
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Interview36Herat, 2016) & (Off-the-record-Interview37Herat, 
2016). For their part, the Afghan government and its international 
partners propagate the Afghan war as a war against international 
terror.  Nevertheless, the international troops’ presence in 
Afghanistan significantly undermined the ideological aspect of the 
war among the poor-educated Afghan army. The widespread 
corruption in the Afghan army is another vital factor of the losing 
land and personal to the Taliban.  
 
4.2.3 Conflicting Regional Interests in Afghanistan  
Taking the self-security rationale of the foreign intervention into 
consideration, Afghanistan was home for proxy wars and interests 
between regional countries even prior to the U.S. intervention and 
still is today. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Pakistan relied on 
the Pashtun warrior Gulbodin Hekmatyar of Hezb-e-Islami to 
represent its interests until the Taliban replaced him in 1994. 
Hekmatyar, and after him, the Taliban, became a force in support of 
an Afghan government that would accommodate Pakistan's bests 
interests.  Pakistani vital interests include reduced Afghan 
interactions with neighboring India, or if possible, even a move 
towards hostile relations with India, and official recognition of the 
Durned line33 – a historically disputed border between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. Meanwhile, India, Russia, Iran, and Turkey backed the 
Northern Alliances Mujahedeen for its proxy war in Afghanistan 
                                                          
33 The Durand Line was drawn as a buffer zone and border between the British-
India and independent Afghanistan by the British Empire in 1893 which divided 
tribal Pashtuns along the line. With the end of British colonialization of the In-
dian continent and the creation of two independent states, Pakistan and India in 
1947, the disputed Durand Line, by then the North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and the unruled  five tribal Agencies were integrated into the newly es-
tablished Muslim Pakistan. The Afghan governments have never accepted this 
line as an international border with its neighboring Pakistan and argued for ei-
ther its reintegration into Afghanistan or its establishment as an independent 
Pashtun state. The dispute over the Durand Line remained unresolved even until 
today. Though not discussed in the public agendas of both states, however, it is 
one of the critical background factors in contemporary security and political ten-
sions between the two states.    
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(Saikal, 2004). Before its inter-party alliances in 1996, support for 
the NA was divided among the regional countries around 
Afghanistan. India and Russia favored the Jamiat-e-Islami of 
Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Shura-e-Nezar of Ahmad Shah 
Massoud for its anti-Taliban struggle.  Russia feared the Taliban as 
a potential supporter of the central Asian Islamic movements and 
Chechen separatists. For India, the backing of the Taliban by 
Pakistan was a major concern. Iran supported and still supports the 
Hazara ethnic parties because of their common Shia-sect ideology – 
and in response to Saud-Arabia’s backing of Sunni-sect groups, 
whether Mujahideen or the Taliban. Turkey's support of the Uzbek 
party led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum is primarily based on 
their shared Turkic ethnicity  (Rashid A. , 2010).  
Despite being a close economic alley to Pakistan, China remained 
impartial until the collapse of the Taliban regime. Following the 
installment of the new Afghan government, China not only 
supported the Afghan government but hugely invested in its mining 
sector. China's interests in Afghanistan appear to be purely 
economic. 
With all these conflicting interests in place, the post 9/11 ‘war on 
terror' campaign left the regional powers including Pakistan and 
Saudi-Arabia – who nurtured the Taliban Emirate – with no other 
option (at least for the time being and because of existing 
circumstances) but to agree to the terms of conditions, namely the 
U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan. At the Bonn 
negotiations, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and India strongly backed the 
Northern Alliances' desire to exempt the Taliban from the Bonn 
talks, whereas Pakistan was opposed to any non-Pashtun led 
government in Kabul  (Bird & Marshall, 2011, pp. 96-97).  
Because the Pakistani establishment was concerned that the NA-led 
government in Kabul would give great leverage to its border enemy 
India, it pressured the United States to bring in more Pashtuns, which 
resulted in introducing Karzai as the head of the interim government  
(Rashid A. , 2010). During late 1990s Karzai’s main base had been 
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in Pakistan (Rashid A. , 2008/2009, p. 16). Pakistan's concerns later 
met reality when, during the regimes of both president Hamid Karzai 
and Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan enjoyed close relations with India. 
The Trump administration's August 2017 South-Asia strategy not 
only replaced Pakistan with India as a close U.S. ally against Islamic 
extremism – including the Pakistani Taliban, who target India's 
interests in Kashmir – but also isolated Pakistan internationally and 
in the region. The Trump Administration also publicly accused 
Pakistan of harboring the Taliban who target U.S. interests in 
Afghanistan (Garamone, 2017).    
Likewise, although Russia and Iran had shown no objection to the 
U.S. role in Afghanistan in the early years, the longer the U.S. and 
its western allies engagement extended, the worried became Russia 
and Iran. In an analytical article to the BBC Pashtu, Umar Zakhilwal 
– Afghan ambassador and president Ghani's special envoy to 
Pakistan – writes: 
In 2001/2002 there was a regional consensus on the U.S. led 
international military intervention in Afghanistan. The 
toppling of the Taliban regime and its replacement with a 
civilized elected government was nearly a regional demand. 
However, as the time passed, this consensus became weak. 
In mentioned years, regional countries (Pakistan, India, Iran, 
Saudi-Arabia, China, Turkey, Russia, and the central Asian 
countries) had a similar stand with the U.S. and its western 
allies regarding Afghanistan. It might be that some of these 
nations had no other choice, but a majority of them due to 
various reasons declared Taliban as a common enemy. For 
example, besides very critical relations between the U.S. and 
Iran, however, on toppling the Taliban they shared common 
ground. Likewise, besides conflicting interests in 
Afghanistan and the region, Iran and Saudi-Arabia 
demonstrated common interests on the issue in Afghanistan. 
In 2016/2017,  the consensus and common interests have not 
existed anymore.  (Zakhilwal U., 2017, para.10-14)  
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Zakhilwal does provide detailed reasons for the lack of consensus on 
the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. However, to follow the line of 
argument of the self-security and interests, it becomes clear that 
neither Russia nor Iran is happy with a permanent U.S. military 
presence in Afghanistan. In an off-the-record interview to the 
Author, the Taliban shadow governor in Herat province shared that, 
following the U.S. pressure on Pakistan, both Iran and Russia are 
supporting Taliban in their ‘Jihad against the U.S. led western 
invasion' (Off-the-record-Interview36Herat, 2016).  
While it is true that Afghanistan is segmentally divided, until there 
is consensus on a government that accommodates the varying 
interests of the regional and international actors, any peace and 
stability effort would be doomed to failure. 
 
4.2.4 The Installation of Ethnopoltical Elites and Warlords 
into State-men:  
One of the significant flaws committed by the U.S. and its 
international Allies at the Bonn Conference was the systemic support 
and installation of the Warlord Mujahideen into the Afghan 
government. Empowering the warlords went against the very idea of 
a centralized state system, sliding Afghanistan into endemic 
corruption, political instability, and eventually a lack of local 
legitimacy. 
The Afghan warlords were first formed in the shape of Mujahideen 
“holy warriors or freedom fighters” in the Pakistani refugee camps 
by the CIA, based on Islamic ideology to launch Jihad “holy-war” 
against the Russian invasion and their Marxism-Leninism ideology 
in 1979 (Roy, 1995, p. 79).  In 1989 when the Soviets troops 
withdrew, the dozen Mujahedeen groups were already divided along 
the ethnolinguistic and Sunni-Shia sectarian lines. 
The failure of the Mujahideen government in 1992 led to a 
devastating civil war in which the Mujahideen (holy worriers) turned 
into ethnic warlords, committing horrific human crimes on other 
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fellow ethnic citizens. The arrival of the Taliban in 1994 not only 
intensified the ethnic tension by discriminating the non-Pashtun 
minorities but also enslaved the whole Afghan population by 
implementing their medieval Sharia system. By 2000 Taliban 
managed to control a majority of the territory of Afghanistan, 
squeezing the Northern Alliance warlords to a minimal region in the 
north. 
Following the 9/11 attacks, it was the U.S. ‘war on terror’ that 
brought the Warlord Mujahedeen back into the forefront of the 
Afghan politics. The U.S. rearmed and financed the Northern 
Alliances warlords aiming at going after Taliban and Al-Qaida 
leftovers (Rashid A. , 2008/2009) & (Coll, 2018).  
At the Bonn talks, the U.S. also favored its NA ally warlords, 
because of their significant role in hunting Taliban and Al-Qaida 
fighters, and because they already controlled territories (Rashid A. , 
2008/2009).  While Hamid Karzai was appointed as the chairman of 
the interim and transitional administrations, the critical political 
positions remained with the Northern Alliances' men (Rubin B. R., 
2004, p. 9). For instance, the defense minister Mohammad Qasim 
Fahim, the interior minister Yunes Qanuni, the foreign minister 
Abdullah Abdullah were all ‘Panjshiri’ warlords (Goodson L. , 2003, 
p. 87).  
The 2004 constitution defined Afghanistan as a heavy centralized 
presidential system, however, in practice the power-sharing or 
collation government model adopted in Bonn 2001 was pursued in 
the following years. At the central level, the government power was 
divided between warlords and Hamid Karzai in the 2004 and 2009 
elected governments. For example, Ahmad Zai Massoud – brother 
of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Shura-e-Nezar or 
Supervisory Council of the North –  was made the first-vice-
president of Hamid Karzai while Mohammad Karim Khalili –  leader 
of the Hazara ethnic Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami (Islamic Unity) party –  
the second.  To win the consent of his powerful ally, the Defense 
Ministry was already promised to Mohammad Qasim Fahim by the 
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leader of the United Front who was promoted by Karzai to a 
symbolic Marshal rank.  The same ethno-power-sharing method was 
followed at the 2009 and 2014 elections as well. 
Likewise, local commanders affiliated with the central line warlord 
ministers were equally promoted to governors or other high 
government positions. The U.S. government systematically credited 
these local warlords with money and arms to fight against the 
remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida. The U.S. government 
paychecks and arms and the Afghan government positions (e.g., the 
governor and police chief) were used by these individuals to increase 
their local socioeconomic and political influence over the central 
authority. To secure their income, these warlords commenced illicit 
businesses including the trade of drugs and embezzlement. 
Consequently, once little known local chiefs became prominent 
political and military powers, challenging the stability of the central 
government authority  (Rashid A. , 2010) & (Jackson A. , Politics 
and governance in Afghanistan: the case of Kandahar, 2015). 
According to Rashid (2010), the Americans accepted in later years 
that substituting the Taliban with warlords was a fatal mistake. Due 
to their excessive influence over the local power-politics, local 
Afghans and international journalists identify some of the major 
provinces and regions with influential warlords, for example, Balkh 
with Atta Mohammad Noor, Herat with Ismail Khan, Kandahar with 
General Raziq, etc. 
In the following, the author also reviews the de-facto power-politics 
of the five provinces visited individually, including Balkh, Bamyan, 
Herat, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. 
 
4.2.4.1 The Case of Balkh: The Kingdom of ‘Ustad’ Atta Mo-
hammad Noor 
Balkh, with its evolving historical background, is one of the oldest 
cities in the north, dating back centuries before the existence of 
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modern-day Afghanistan.  Its Hairatan34 port adds to the strategic 
geopolitical and economic significance of Balkh as one of two 
gateways in the north - connecting Afghanistan with central Asian 
countries through Uzbekistan.  The capital Mazar-e-Sharif, or ‘the 
holy shrine’, is named after its iconic Blue-Mosque, which legend 
claims to be the tomb of Hazrat-e-Ali, the fourth caliph, and cousin 
of prophet Mohammad in Islam. Mazar-e-Sharif, hosting the 
country`s major ethnic groups of Tajiks, Uzbek, Turkmen, Hazara, 
and Pashtun, counts amongst the most diverse cities in Afghanistan. 
Although ethnic cleansing and hostility among different groups were 
planted during Amir Abdul-Rahman Khan's reign, between 1880-
1901, in which the ethnic Pashtun King cruelly discriminated and 
suppressed the Hazara minority and those who stood against his rule  
(Ghubar, 1989/2012), ethnic tensions were revived during the post-
Soviet civil war and also during the Taliban regime (See also 
Bamyan case). 
During the civil-war, Balkh was controlled by General Abdul Rashid 
Dostum, a prominent Uzbek warlord, and leader of Jumbish-e-Milli 
"National Movement" party.  Dostum was an army general during 
the communist regime in the 1980s who later build his own militia 
and fought against different Mujahedeen fractions and the Taliban in 
the north. In 1996 the predominantly Pashtun Taliban group took 
control of Kabul and marched steadily toward the north. Once hostile 
to each other, the Tajik based Jamiat-e-Islami "Islamic Society" 
party under Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Shura-e-Nezar party 
"supervisory council of the north" of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the 
Hazara ethnic Wahdat-Islami "Islamic Unity" party led by Abdul Ali 
Mazari, and the Jumbish-e- Mili of General Dostum formed a 
coalition against the Taliban in the north - called the Northern 
Alliance  (Collins, 2011, p. 38).  Between 1996 and 2001, both the 
Taliban and the Northern Alliances forces committed horrific 
                                                          
34 Hairatan is located in Kaldar district of Balkh province which is one of the 
strategic ports which connect Afghanistan to central Asian countries. 
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massacres and human rights abuses in the north, particularly in 
Mazar-e-Sharif (Fatima, 2014, pp. 41-42). According to a Human 
Rights Watch report, nearly 2,000 civilians, mostly Hazara and 
Uzbek ethnic were brutally killed by the Taliban in 1998 when they 
recaptured Mazar-e-Sharif for the second time (Human Rights 
Watch, 1998).  In retaliation, around 3,000 Taliban prisoners were 
suffocated and shot dead in shipping containers by General 
Dostum`s militias in a 2001 US-backed operation, which is also 
known as the killing of Dasht-e-Laili,35.  These massacres and war 
crimes tremendously added to the ethnic hostility of Pashtun vis-a-
vis Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek in the north and the rest of the country. 
It also won Pashtun sympathizers for the resurgence of the Taliban 
offensive in later years in the south and the east, as well as in 
northern Afghanistan. 
In October 2001, when the Bush administration toppled the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan, all parties of the Northern Alliances entered 
Kabul. However, General Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor, a 
little known Tajik commander of Jamiat party, remained in Balkh to 
vie for power in Mazar-e-Sharif city. After several clashes between 
the two commanders` militiamen, the newly installed president 
Hamid Karzai convinced General Dostum to take part in Kabul’s 
defense administration. Noor, the winner of the battle against his 
rival, was appointed as the governor of Balkh in 2004. Washington 
Post journalist Sudarasan Raghavan noted that it was financial and 
military support from the US and NATO that elevated Noor from an 
unpopular commander to an ‘ultra-rich businessmen’ and ‘King’ 
‘with an iron hand’ in northern Afghanistan  (2015 ). The governor’s 
close diplomatic ties with US and NATO officials also added to his 
fame, with high ranking officials like the US secretary John Kerry 
visiting Noor in his palace in Balkh to discuss the 2009 Afghan 
presidential election (Traub, 2011). Criticism over Noor`s personal 
                                                          
35 A desert in Jawazjan province in northern Afghanistan. Its capital Sheberghan 
and counts as the power-base for General Abdul Rashid Dostum.   
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and political character in Afghanistan gained momentum when he 
resisted president Karzai`s demands to consolidate with the Kabul 
government principles.  
Several Afghan media released a long list of Noor`s property and 
income sources including townships, supermarkets, fuel stations and 
constructions companies which are named after his family members. 
A Hazara ethnic resident and construction engineer in Mazar-e-
Sharif said to the author in an off-the-record interview that if he gets 
a contract then it is second-hand, since Noor holds the monopoly on 
all military and civil aid contracts in Balkh province, through which 
millions of US Dollars are pouring to his and his family members’ 
accounts36.  Many of his Tajik supporters praise Noor for providing 
relative security and reconstruction in Mazar-e-Sharif city, as well 
as for his clear pro-Tajik-nationalist stand in Afghan politics. 
However, the 2015 Human Rights Watch report accused Noor of 
killings, abduction, keeping personal militias, and committing 
systemic crimes against minority Pashtuns in the north (Human 
Rights Watch, 2015).   
Despite holding the governorship post of the Balkh province for the 
last twelve years, Noor has publicly remained a strong opposition 
president Karzai and president Ghani’s government. Noor has 
emerged as a visionary politician who is prone to federalism and has 
taken the lead in the Tajik quest for social and political power in the 
north. Although his main power-base has remained in Balkh, Noor’s 
Tajik support stretches from Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Baghlan in the 
north and Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and Panjshir provinces in 
the north-east. According to Enayat Najafizada, an independent 
Afghan analyst with the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), 
Noor has controlled all media outlets both through banning warlord-
critic printed media and through sponsoring private TV channels for 
his propaganda in Mazar-e-Sharif (2011).  He also backed his Tajik 
                                                          
36. A Hazara ethnic construction engineer talked with the Author in Mazar-e-
Sharif on the condition of anonymity. 
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ally Abdullah Abdulla in the 2014 presidential campaign and 
publicly ‘vowed’ that he would establish ‘parallel government in the 
north’ if the election results favored Ghani (Raghavan, 2015 ).  
Ghani in his turn in a campaign speech in Mazar-e-Sharif promised 
his supporters that he would end the corrupt fiefdom of Balkh if he 
were elected president. The controversy stalled election results for 
months until the US Secretary John Kerry brokered a deal of 
National Unity Government (NUG), in which Ghani become the 
president and Abdullah Abdullah his chief executive, a post not 
backed by the Afghan constitution. After assuming the office, 
president Ghani issued a decree in which he announced all 34 
provincial governors, including Balkh, as ‘acting governors’ and 
promised that new officials would be appointed by the IDLG on a 
merit basis and screened personally by him. However, in an 
interview told the Voice of America (VOA) Dari, Abdullah said, “I 
named my dear brother Ustad37 Atta Mohammad Noor as the 
governor of Balkh and there is no need for farther discussion on this 
issue” (2015). Noor, who is also chief executive of the Tajik Jamjiat-
Islami party, introduced three significant ministers' posts to the unity 
government’s cabinet, including foreign affairs, education, and 
economy  (1TV Kabul, 2016).  The issue of Noor as an acting 
governor in theory, and the only power monopoly in Balkh in 
practice, remained unresolved since chief executive Abdullah, and 
president Ghani did not agree on the matter. 
The failure of chief-executive Abdullah Abdullah to secure the 
promised fifty-fifty government seats for his party and allies led 
Noor to engage in negotiations with president Ghani personally. The 
Ghani team also used this opportunity for their benefit by 
conditioning Noor to step-down from the governorship of Balkh 
province. After a lengthy standoff, Noor finally stepped down from 
the governor post, cutting a political deal with the central 
                                                          
37 Ustad "Teacher" is a nickname used for Atta Mohammad Noor since he was a 
high school teacher before joining the Mujahedeen movement  
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government in March 2018. The deal allowed Noor to pick four 
major political seats for his own men, including the Ministry of 
Education, the Embassy of Kazakhstan, the Balkh police chief and 
the governorship posts (RFE/RL, 2018).  
 
4.2.4.2 The Case of Bamyan: The De-facto Capital and Power-
base of Hazara Elites  
Bamyan, the de-facto capital of Hazaras - the third largest ethnic 
group in the country (Glatzer, Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic 
and Tribal Disintegration?, 1998) - is situated along the Baba and 
Hindukush mountains in central Afghanistan.  Although scattered 
across the country, the Hazaras are primarily settled in the 
Hazarajat38 region, mainly including Bamyan, Daykundi, Maidan-
Wardak and Ghazni provinces.  According to most citied theories, 
the Hazaras are believed to be the descendants of Mongols and 
leftovers of the military garrison of Genghis Khan in the 12th century 
in the areas of modern-day Afghanistan (Hussain, 2003) & (Creasy, 
2009). Hazaras speak the Dari/Farsi-dialect of "Hazaragi" and 
primarily follow the Shia version of Islam in a majority Sunni 
Muslim country (Glatzer, Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and 
Tribal Disintegration?, 1998). The group’s first uprising was 
violently stifled by Pashtun ruler Amir Abdul-Raman Khan at the 
end of 18th century (Ghubar, 1989/2012), and the Hazaras were 
systemically discriminated against and pushed to the lower social 
class until the late 19th century when they managed to raise as a 
competing military and political power in Afghan society.    
The first political inclusion occurred in 1981 when Sultan Ali 
Keshmand, a Hazara ethnic, became the Afghan prime minister 
during the communists' republic regime of the People`s Democratic 
Party (PDPA) in 1981 (Hussain, 2003, p. 53).  The PDPA`s 
imposition of a Marxist-Leninist ideology in a traditionally Islamic-
                                                          
38 Hazarajat is named after the territory inhabited by Hazaras in the 
central region of Afghanistan 
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social context like Afghanistan and their subsequent land-reform 
project resulted in a national revolt against the USSR backed regime 
in rural communities, including the mostly peasant Hazaras in the 
central Hazarajat region (Ibrahimi N. , 2009). Resistance against the 
direct Soviet occupation intensified from all directions with the US, 
Saudi-Arabia, and Pakistan collectively sponsoring the Sunni 
Mujahideen ‘freedom fighters’ and Iran securing its interests through 
funding and arming the Shia-sect of Hazaras in Afghanistan. 
Inspired and backed by the Iranian Islamic Revolution of Khomeini, 
the Hazaras for the first time formed several political parties based 
on Shia-Islamic ideology including Al-Nasr ‘victory’ and Sepah-e-
Pasdaran ‘Revolutionary Guard Corps’ in Iran and Hazarajat region 
in 1979 (Amstutz, 1986, pp. 116-118). In 1989, when the Soviets 
were forced to withdraw, the Khomeini regime mediated an 
agreement among all Hazara parties to consolidate under one armed 
and political movement of Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami ‘Islamic Unity 
Party’ led by Ali Mazari (Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind, The 
Taliban Movement in Afghanistan, 2001, p. 23) & (Razaiat & 
Pearson, 2002).  
The Geneva Accord (GA) in 1992 which created the Afghan Interim 
Government (AIG) failed to align all resistance parties on an all-
inclusive and broad-based political settlement on the ground (Saikal, 
2004, pp. 200-208). The political immaturity of the Mujahideen 
leaders and their division along the ethnolinguistic and Sunni-Shia 
sectarian lines made them pawns of foreign secret intelligence 
services, including those of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, which 
dragged Afghanistan to a bloody civil war. The Mazari-led Wahdat 
forces seized power in central Hazarajat region. It also controlled 
Hazara populated zone of western Kabul city which led to the street 
to street clashes with the Ittihad-e-Islami ‘Islamic Union’ party`s 
armed forces of Abul-Rassoul Sayyaf – a Saudi sponsored party. The 
inter-party clashes of the warlords’ Mujahiddin groups resulted in 
the loss thousands of innocent lives, migrations of millions of others, 
and the destruction of the capital city Kabul. 
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The emergence of the Taliban as a predominantly Pashtun Sunni 
extremist group in 1994 marked another chapter of ethnolinguistic 
and religious sectarianism in the history of Afghanistan. Once again, 
the Hazara ethnic group paid the highest price inflicted by the Sunni 
Taliban regime because of their Shia Islamic belief. The 1998 
Massacre in Mazar-e-Sharif and the Taliban’s cutting off the food 
supply to Bamyan province between 1997-1998 as a pressure 
strategy against the Wahdat party (Fatima, 2014) proved the 
Taliban`s anti-Hazara sentiments. It was the Hazara civilians who 
suffered the most, The historical Buddha statues of the fourth and 
fifth century of Bamyan were also declared un-Islamic and smashed 
down by the Taliban in early 2001.  
Early in 1995 the Taliban mysteriously killed of Ali Mazari, the 
leader of the consolidated Hasara Wahdat party and the virtual father 
of Hazara people (Saikal, 2004), and Karim Khalili stepped up to 
take his place as head of the party. After the occupation of the 
Hazarajat region by the Taliban both Khalili and Mohammad 
Muhaqiq – another senior leader of Wahdat party fled to Iran 
(Ibrahimi N. , 2009).    
The fall of the Taliban regime and the Bonn-agreement that followed 
marked a turning point in social and political developments for the 
Hazaras. Both Khalili and Muhaqiq were given and continue to hold 
high ranking positions in the interim and elected governments. 
Khalili moved from Bamyan to Kabul and twice became second 
vice-president under president Karzai between 2004 and 2014. 
Muhaqiq who was by then deputy leader of the Wahdat party, 
initially become Minister of Planning; however, he soon switched to 
the opposition party against Karzai. According to Ibrahimi (2009), 
this led to contention between Khalili and Muhaqiq and fragmented 
the Wahdat party. Muhaqiq formed his own part of Wahdat party 
under Hizb-eWahdat Isalmi Mardum-e Afghanistan ‘Islamic Unity 
Party of people of Afghanistan’ and ran unsuccessfully in the 2005 
presidential election against Khalili who was in Karzai`s camp.  
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Nevertheless, he won a great deal of popularity among the Hazara 
people (Ibrahimi N. , 2009). In the 2014 presidential elections, 
Muhaqiq entered Abdullah Abdullah`s camp for a second vice-
president post. Khalili, the two term second vice-president during 
Hamid Karzai, introduced his replacement to Ashraf Ghani`s camp, 
Sarwar Danish – a former Justice Minister and deputy leader of the 
Khalili Wahdat party. In the formation of the National Unity 
government, both candidates secured their positions, (Danish  
became the second vice president and Muhaqiq the second vice 
executive. Despite being politically in different camps, however, 
both the Wahdat parties remained united and committed to the 
Hazaras quest for an equal share in the political and socio-economic 
development of Afghanistan. In early summer 2016, when president 
Ghani issued the implementation of a 500kV power transmission 
project, the second vice president Danish and the second vice 
executive Muhaqiq along with Khalili joined the Hazara protesters 
against the government`s decision, demanding a change of line route 
from the northern Salang pass through central Bamyan province. 
President Ghani was forced to compromise with an alternative offer 
that kept the old plan due to its estimated lesser costs, but provided 
an extra line of 220kV to the central Hazarajat region (Khaama 
Press, 2016).      
The Sunni-Shia sectarian divide is now relatively harmonious 
nationally, compared to the neighboring countries of Pakistan and 
Iran, and Iraq. However, locally, the Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict is 
simmering under the surface between the Sunni Tajik and Pashtun 
ethnic minorities versus the Shia Hazara ethnic majority in Hazarajat 
region in general, particularly in Bamyan province. Tajik and 
Pashtun minorities which are mostly settled in Syghan, Kohmard and 
Shebar districts of Bamyan province often claim discrimination by 
their fellow Hazar ethnic citizens. A Tajik representative at the 
Bamyan PC noted:  
we request the central government to consider equality in 
power-sharing in Bamyan local government. If the governor 
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comes from the Shia sect, then the deputy should come from 
the Sunni sect. It does not matter if he is a Pashtun, Tajik or 
Uzbek but he should be from Bamyan. The Nasar39 
organization who rooted its influence in here; it is Khalili 
who installed his people here, and they torture our (Sunni) 
sect and us Tajiks.  (Interview13Bamyan, 2016).  
Because of its relatively homogenious Hazara ethnic composition, 
and because the Hazara are strongly opposed to the Taliban 
ideology, Bamyan is ranked as one of the secure provinces in the last 
fifteen years. It has also attracted foreign aid which has resulted in 
fair development in socio-economic and cultural activities in the 
province. However, both main routes connecting Bamyan with 
Kabul – the Maidan-Wardak road through Hajigak pass to the west 
and the Ghurband road through Parwan province to the north – 
remain highly insecure due to regular attacks and the taking of 
hostages by the Taliban 40.      
 
4.2.4.3 The Case of Herat: The Fiefdom of Ismail Khan    
Herat province is in western Afghanistan and borders with Iran 
(Islam-Qala) and Turkmenistan (Turghundi). The province is known 
as one of the critical centers of Afghan history and civilization (Dietl, 
2004). While Dari is the dominant language in Herat city, the 
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Aimaq comprise the main ethnic 
groups in this province. Despite religious (Sunni-Shia) and ethnic 
                                                          
39 Al Nasr (victory) is a pro-Iranian Shia-Hazara organization in Afghanistan; in-
spired by the Iranian Islamic revolution and established during the Soviet inva-
sion in 1979. Among others, late Ali Mazari was one of the founding fathers of 
the Al-Nasr, see more > (Amstutz, 1986, pp. 107-119).  After the brutal assassi-
nation of Mazari by the Taliban, at the time leader of the Hezb-e-Wahdat (un-
ion party) of central Afghanistan, Karim Khalili took over the charge of the 
party. 
40 In March 2016, the author went to Bamyan province by road through the 
Maidan-Wardak route in order to conduct interviews with the PC members. 
Just a week before his trip, four university students were taken hostage by Tali-
ban on the same route. The author had to hide his recording and questionnaire 
in the car. The contact persons  who accompanied the author on this trip orga-
nized a trustworthy driver. It has been said that sometimes drivers on these 
routes report beforehand to the Taliban when they notice government officials 
will travel with them.        
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heterogeneity, the situation in Herat remains harmonious in 
comparison to Bamyan and Balkh provinces. However, the influence 
of the ex-Jahadi commander Ismail Khan and the drug-mafia is 
strongly visible over both appointed and elected local government 
institutions, as is also the case in many other provinces in 
Afghanistan. 
Mohammad Ismail Khan was an Afghan army officer before the 
Soviet invasion. He turned against the PDPA government in 1979 
and joined the Afghan Mujahedin resistance movement of Jamiat-e-
Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani. During the Afghan civil war, Khan 
controlled Herat province and proclaimed himself the ‘Emir of 
Herat'. When the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, Khan fled to Iran 
where he remobilized his militia and returned to fight them. 
However, in 1997, the Taliban captured and imprisoned Khan, until 
he escaped the jail and fled once again to Iran  (Dietl, 2004, pp. 46-
49).       
After the fall of the Taliban regime, Ismail Khan returned to Herat 
and ran the governor office from 2001 until 2005. Regarding Herat 
as his own fiefdom, Khan refused to transfer the millions of dollars 
in customs revenues raised from the Islam-Qala port, the border with 
Iran. After a battle in which Khan`s private Tajik militias defeated 
Pashtun warlord Amanullah Khan’s forces in the Shindand district 
of Herat (which was soon after seized by the Afghan national army) 
president Karzai offered Ismail Khan a ministerial post in Kabul 
(Synoyitz, 2004). Ismail Khan stayed as water and energy minister 
until 2009 and as acting minister until 2013.  The new unity 
government under president Ghani did not offer Khan any office, but 
he remained, de-facto, the key strongmen in Herat.  
On 17th, April 2016 Ismail Khan commemorated the victory of the 
‘Mujahideen’ against the Soviet invasion in a large gathering in 
Herat province41. In his speech to an audience that included late 
                                                          
41 From the personal notes of the author: co-incidentally,  the author was in He-
rat province on the same date (April 17, 2016) to conduct Interviews with the 
PC members. Some of the PC members canceled their interview appointments 
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Jihadi commanders, government officials including the governor, 
and some PC representatives (only a few PC members boycotted the 
ceremony), Ismail Khan warned the unity government to not ignore 
or sideline ‘Mujahedeen’ in national decision makings. He also 
pledged that, if the government failed to bring security, he and his 
Mujahedeen would act against the rebels without the consent of the 
Kabul government.  The Ghani government took no notice of his 
remarks. In March 2018, Khan called on the Taliban to sit with 
Mujahedeen for negotiations, and “find a solution that will actually 
bring an Islamic system” (TOLOnews, 2018, para.3).  
 
4.2.4.4 The Case of Nangrahar: Divided between Pashtun and 
Pashayie Ethnic Warlords 
Nangrahar is a Pashtun dominant province in eastern Afghanistan. 
As in other parts of the country, here too, the collapse of the Taliban 
regime paved the way for the return of a warlord Mujahedin. With a 
long history of internal rivalry among each other, Haji Abdul 
Qadeer, Haji Zaman, and Hazrat Ali were among the key players, 
financed and armed by the CIA to go after Al-Qaida and Taliban 
remnants in the Tora Bora caves (Jackson A. , 2014, p. 14). Because 
he and his brothers had wielded influential power during the 
resistance against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s and during the 
civil war in the 1990s in eastern Afghanistan, Abdul Qadeer of  ‘the 
Arasala42’ family was able to maintain the upper hand over Zaman 
and Ali. Thus, the interim government assigned him to the position 
of vice-chairman to president Hamid Karzai and also the position of 
minister of Public Works. Nonetheless, shortly after his 
                                                          
because they were invited to attend the Herat-Mujahedeen`s victory against 
the Soviet invasion, a memorial ceremony said to be celebrated every year in 
Herat. Only a few PC members, who seemed to refuse the invitation, were at 
the provincial council. The author also attended the ceremony and took notes 
of Ismail Khan's speech.        
42 The other two brothers of Arsala  are Abdul Haq and Haji Din Mohammad. 
Abdul Haq was captured and killed by  the Taliban in early 2001 whereas Haji 
Din Mohammad is a member at the High Peace Council (HCP).  The Arsala  
name stems from Arsala Khel a sub-tribe of Pashtun Ghelzai tribe (Jackson A. , 
2014).   
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appointment, Qadir was gunned down by unknown persons in his 
own car in Kabul in summer 2002  (Refworld, 2005).  
After Haji Abdul Qadeer is gone, his brother Haji Din Mohammad 
became the governor of Nangarhar, though the real power there was 
retained by his son Haji Zahir Qadeer (Human Rights Watch , 2004). 
Taking advantage of his father's fame, Zahir Qadeer not only 
extended his power through thousands of armed militias, the drug-
trade, and cash from the CIA, but he also won a seat in the 2010 
parliamentary elections at the Wolsey Jirga (lower house) of 
National Assembly. By paying cash to the more obscure legislators, 
the second Qadeer soon formed the first parliamentary groups of De 
Sole Karwan (the Caravan of peace) at the Wolsey Jirga. Soon after, 
he managed to earn the first deputy speaker position43.  The 2004 
human rights report accused Zahir Qadir of being engaged "in 
numerous human rights abuses, including the seizure of land and 
other property, kidnapping civilians for ransom, and extorting 
money” (Human Rights Watch , 2004, p. 16).    
As mentioned earlier, Hazrat Ali (a Pashaie ethnic) and Haji Zaman 
Ghamsharik (a Pashtun) were two other prominent warlord 
commanders in Nangarhar province, yet rivals to each other. After 
being accused of masterminding Abdul Qadir's assassination, Haji 
Zaman fled to France and returned in 2010, when he was killed in a 
suicide attack near Jalalabad city (Nordland, 2010). Hazrat Ali 
served as police chief of Nangarhar until 2005 and moved to Kabul 
after winning a seat at the Wolsey Jirga of the Afghan parliament.  
Like Qadir, Ali is accused of numerous human rights crimes 
including killings, kidnapping, rapes, and land grabbing   (Human 
Rights Watch , 2004, p. 16). In the 2014 elections, both Ali and 
Zaman's sons – Ahmad Ali and Javed Zaman –  made their way to 
the Nangarhar provincial council. 
                                                          
43 At the time (between January 2008 and March 2011) the author worked as a 
legislative translator and legislative program officer with the USAID Afghan par-
liamentary assistant project (APAP).     
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In 2005, Gul Agha Shirzai – the Popalzai Pashtun of Kandahar (for 
more, please see the Kandahar case) –  replaced Haji Din 
Mohammad as the governor of Nangarhar. Because of his lack of 
local support, Shirzai opted to consolidate with Hazrat Ali to weaken 
the Arsala family power base in Nangarhar while he built up his 
patronage network by paying money and positions to local tribal 
elites  (Jackson A. , 2014, p. 21). To win the U.S. and Afghan 
government support, Shirzai not only implemented some 
development projects but also minimized poppy cultivation in the 
province. According to Dipali Mukhopadhyay (2009), the governor 
was providing the tribal elders with “discretionary funds, foodstuffs, 
and construction assistance for schools and mosques. In exchange, 
elders publicly pledged to assist the governor’s administration in 
ensuring that farmers would not cultivate poppy” (p. 15).  
Meanwhile, Shirzai added millions of US dollars to his own pocket 
from the Thorkham44 custom revenues and as the critical contractor 
to the US and other international military and development projects 
in Nangarhar (Jackson A. , 2014, pp. 23-24).  
Shirzai's growing power worried the local elite warlords. Thus, the 
Arsala family, headed by Zahir Qadeer, united with Hazrat Ali  to 
conduct an extensive campaign against the governor, organizing a 
serious of mass protests in which the protesters accused Shirzai of 
growing insecurity and fraud (Foschini, 2013). Sherzai left the 
governor’s office in October 2013, nominating himself for the 2014 
presidential election (Jackson A. , 2014, p. 26). Following, the 
resignation of the Sherzai, President Ghani's administration changed 
several governors in the province, but because of Qadeer and Ali's 
strong influence and control over local politics, none of these 
governors have had an open hand to bring fundamental reform in 
local governance. 
 
                                                          
44 Thorkham is one of the key transit routes with neighboring Pakistan in east-
ern Afghanistan.   
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4.2.4.5 The Case of Kandahar: Divided between Tribal War-
lords and Elites 
Located in southwestern Afghanistan, Kandahar served as the de-
facto homeland for the Pashtun tribal rulers who have governed the 
country since its existence in the early 18th century. The power-base 
and de-facto capital for the Taliban, Kandahar also counts as one of 
the strategic provinces for US military forces after Kabul.   
Since the ouster of the Taliban from power in late 2001, the de-facto 
power has been divided between three major Pashtun tribes and their 
influential affiliated warlords: (1) Gul Agha Sherzai of the Barakzai 
tribe; (2) Ahmad Wali Karzai of the Popalzai tribe and half-brother 
of ex-president Hamid Karzai   and (3) Abdul Raziq of the Achakzai 
tribe. 
After being ousted from power by the Taliban in 1994, Gul Agha 
Sherzai returned to Kandahar with C.I.A military and financial 
support in December 2001 (Coll, 2018). Sherzai remained the 
governor and de-facto power-holder of Kandahar until September 
2003  (The Liason Office , 2011). During his governorship, Sherzai 
cashed millions of funds from the US and Canadian military forces, 
rented government properties to the US forces and pocketed customs 
revenues from Spin Buldak– the country’s main southern trading 
route with Pakistan (Jackson A. , Politics and governance in 
Afghanistan: the case of Kandahar, 2015). According to Steve Cole 
2018, “by one estimate” Sherzai’s “take was about $1.5 million a 
month” (Part-Two, Taliban for Karzai, para.6). His growing tensions 
with Ahmad Wali Karzai and his refusal to hand over the customs 
revenues to the national treasury made president Karzai appoint 
Sherzai to the national cabinet as urban minister  (Jackson A. , 
Politics and governance in Afghanistan: the case of Kandahar, 2015, 
p. 14).   
While Asadullah Khalid – the former governor to Ghazni province 
–  replaced Shirzai as the new governor for Kandahar, nevertheless 
Ahmad Wali Karzai became the subsequent de-facto  power 
179 
 
monopole in Kandahar. Wali consolidated different tribal groups for 
his support through informal councils (Shuras) which were later 
replaced by the PCs. Wali made his way to become PC chairman 
with the highest vote by manipulating the 2005 election (Wilder, 
2005). Although having a seat on the PC was not considered 
influential at that time, it equipped Ahmad Wali with the legitimacy 
to extend his power not only in Kandahar’s local administration but 
also in central government affairs. Deceptively, Ahmad Wali was 
controlling central line ministries through his oversight power for 
Kandahar`s development projects. Together with Qayum Karzai 
(another brother of President Karzai), he owned several private 
security companies, which he rented to the US military forces to 
escort hundreds of trucks of goods and military supplies daily from 
the Chaman-Spin Buldak border to Kandahar and Helmand 
provinces. It is also believed that he secured his drug-trade between 
Helmand and the Spin Buldak border  with the help of these security 
companies (Jackson A. , Politics and governance in Afghanistan: the 
case of Kandahar, 2015).  
Since the new governor, Asadullah Khalid had no tribal roots in 
Kandahar, he ought to build an alliance with Ahmad Wali Karzai. 
Having the support of Ahmad Wali, give Khalid a free hand in his 
lawless governorship. According to Qais Azimy, a senior 
correspondent with Aljazeera in Kabul, Canadian deputy 
ambassador to Afghanistan Richard Colvin worked closely with 
Khalid in Kandahar. Colvin confirmed Khalid`s random 
assassinations, kidnapping gangs, and prisons, as well as his 
narcotics business in a briefing to Canadian parliament (2012).  
Ahmad Wali was gunned down by his own very close bodyguard, 
Sardar Mohammad. The motive for the assassination is still not clear, 
however, according to former Sunday Times correspondent Miles 
Amoore  (2011), among several theories, one says that it was the 
CIA that hired Mohammad to finish him off. Amoore`s (2011) 
personal communication with Sardar Mohammad`s family members 
confirmed his employment with the CIA. It is believed that the US 
180 
 
officials were fed up with Ahmad Wali`s corruption and drug-trade 
(Risen, 2008).  
With Ahmad Wali gone, the only remaining option who president 
Karzai  could trust to manage the de-facto power gap was Abdul 
Raziq (from the Achakzai tribe). As Spin Buldak police chief, Raziq 
was already known for his brutality and hatred towards the Taliban. 
The Norzai Taliban brutally killed his father and uncle (both former 
Mujahideen) in 1994 (Aikins, The Master of Spin Boldak , 2009 ).  
Raziq accepted Karzai`s offer as Kandahar police chief with the 
condition that he remain as the police chief of the Spin Buldak border 
too, the birth-town which secured his Adozai-Achakzai tribal 
support and drug-trade business  (Aikins, 2011). Human Right 
Watch reportedly documented Raziq`s criminal behaviors of torture 
and executions in private prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2015 ). 
However, the U.S.’s heavy dependence on Raziq`s paramilitary 
forces for cracking down on the Taliban made Americans hesitant to 
remove him from his posts (Partlow, 2010) (Aikins, 2011) & 
(Bowman, 2015).  
Similarly, soon after the inauguration of the Unity Government in 
2014, president Ghani planned to sweep Raziq out from Kandahar, 
but advisors at the presidential palace convinced Ghani that it would 
cost him Kandahar`s proportional stability if he did so (Walsh, 
2014). At the time of conducting this research, many informants in 
Kandahar province shared a similar view as that of president Ghani`s 
advisers. In response to a question regarding Kandahar`s security 
situation, a lawyer who runs a private attorney office in Kandahar 
commented: "If the Taliban or anyone having links with them is 
being found, he would be immediately executed and buried in the 
desert, in the outskirts of Kandahar. That is why people praise Raziq" 
(Kandahar35Interview, 2016). He added that being police chief, 
Raziq determined all local politics not only in Kandahar but in the 
whole south (Kandahar35Interview, 2016). Raziq’s outspoken 
hatred for the Taliban and neighboring Pakistan  made him the most 
wanted target for the Taliban. As a result, on October 2018 – a day 
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before the Afghan parliamentary elections – Raziq was shot dead 
after a high-profile meeting in the Kandahar governor compound 
(Shah & Mashal, 2018).  Two days later the Taliban confirmed the 
responsibility for the attack. Soon after, the Afghan government also 
confirmed that shooter was a Taliban infiltrator who was hired as a 
security guard for the governor office a month before the incident 
(TOLOnews, 2018).   (2016) (Khalilzad, 2016) (Rashid A. , 2010, p. 
222) 
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CHAPTER 5: 
State Governmental Design and the Afghan 
Discourse 
 
 
5.1 The 2004 Afghan Constitution: An Unresolved 
Controversial Document 
The official state institutional building process started with the 
formation of the Afghan constitution in 2003/2004. Following the 
appointment of the transitional government, the next step of the 
Bonn agreement was to write a new constitution for Afghanistan. In 
late 2002, the interim president Hamid Karzai assigned a committee 
of nine members to draft a new constitution to define the state 
institutional design and its government and governance structure for 
Afghanistan. The draft was then to be sent for approval to the 
Constitutional Loja Jirga (CLJ) (Goodson L. , 2003, p. 89). Another 
‘35-member commission' supplemented the drafting committee that 
brought amendments to the 1964 Afghan constitution of King Zahir 
(see please chapter III) 'for reviewing the text' including ‘a few 
international experts'  (Rubin B. R., 2004, p. 10).  According to 
Rubin (2004) and Goodson (2003), who both were among the few 
international observers and reviewers, the draft was not opened to 
the public before it reached a final version for discussion at the CLJ. 
As in the previous two meetings (the Bonn and the ELJ) the leading 
participants at the CLJ were split into two main groups: the 
Mujahideen groups and the Karzai team of western émigrés, who 
were mainly western educated elites. However, this time, the wider 
participants were also distinctly divided along the ethnolinguistic 
lines (Pashtun, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbek, and Turkmen) for preserving 
more rights for their ethnic groups. By keeping the constitutional 
drafting process secret, the Karzai team managed to reduce the 
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influence of the Islamist Mujahideen at the CLJ. After nearly a three-
week discussion over contested issues in the drafted text, including 
the role of ‘Islam' in a democratic system, the new state institutional 
design, and national and ethnic identities, the Afghan constitution 
officially was agreed upon by CLJ  (Rubin B. R., 2004, p. 10). The 
new constitution declared Afghanistan a unitary centralized state 
system (Chapter One, Article One) along with a ‘two-house –  House 
of People' or Wolsey Jirga ‘and House of Elders' of Meshrano Jirga 
– National Assembly (Chapter Two, Article Eighty-Two). This 
decision was one of the most contentious issues at the time between 
the Pashtuns and the majority of the non-Pashtun ethnic minorities, 
and remains so today, with the former in favor of the present 
centralized unitary state system or an even stricter one, and the latter 
arguing for an alternative parliamentary or semi-presidential 
decentralized system, or even, in some cases, for federalism. The 
2014 Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) – which goes 
against the principles of the enacted constitution – is also a vivid sign 
of pressure by the non-Pashtun ethnic minority elites for semi-
Presidentialism. 
In comparison to previous Afghan constitutions, the 2004 
constitution turned out to be far more democratic and more sensitive 
to gender, ethnic, religious, and international Human Rights. 
However, there remained unresolved controversial issues on the 
ground, including the state institutional design, the role of Islam and 
women rights, the electoral system, and ethnic identity (Rubin B. R., 
2004).  The 2004 constitution marked the first time in its history that 
Afghanistan adopted a fully democratic system in the country, in 
which the president, members of the Wolesi Jirga, two-thirds of the 
Meshrano Jirga, provincial, district, village councils, and cities' 
municipal officials could be elected through popular vote. Since 
2004, despite colossal fraud allegations, Afghanistan has managed 
to conduct three presidential elections (2004, 2009 and 2014), two 
parliamentary elections (2005 and 2010), and three provincial 
council elections (2005, 2010 and 2014). 
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In his closing address to the 2004 CLJ participants – who were 
indirect representatives of the various Afghan ethnic minorities – 
Hamid Karzai, by then interim president of Afghanistan, felt the 
intensity of the issue that imposing a strong presidential centralized 
system, in theory, only had support from the Pashtun ethnic groups. 
To calm the concerns of the non-Pashtun ethnic delegation at the 
2004 CLJ, Karzai noted the possibility of constitutional amendments 
and a governmental system change in the near future.  Although the 
prerequisites of ‘stability and the emergence of proper political 
parties' mentioned by Karzai in 2004 are still not in place, the 
establishment in September 2014 of the National Unity Government 
(NUG) based on a power-sharing agreement was a clear signal for 
the arrival of such a change. The NUG agreement, which formed a 
unique style of semi-Presidentialism – Ashraf Ghani (a Pashtun) as 
president and Abdullah Abdullah (a Tajik) as chief executive officer 
– called for the ‘convening of a Loya Jirga to amend the (2004) 
constitution and considering the proposal to create the post of 
executive prime minister’ within two years of the deal (Afghanistan 
Analysts Network, 2014). Although four years have passed at the 
time of writing this dissertation, there are no visible signs of the 
inauguration of Loya Jirga. However, if one is ever convened, the 
decision on an alternative system that might better suit Afghanistan 
would not be an easy one. 
The discourse around democracy and the democratic government 
model in particular among the Afghan populations is shaped by 
significant interlinked factors, including the low rate of literacy, the 
dominance of traditional and extreme religious sentiments, the 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation and the tribal patronage system, the 
history-long attempt at centralized state authority, and the foreign 
interventions. Much of the above-listed aspects have already been 
discussed in the context of the nation- and state-building process in 
the earlier section.  
Hence, the present chapter attempts to highlight some of the 
significant themes regarding Afghanistan’s state-institutional design 
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and its alternatives.  However, before addressing these questions, i 
will briefly illustrate the few major, yet controversial, achievements 
of the Afghan 2004 constitution. 
 
5.1.1 The Rights of Women: 
In 2004, according to Rubin (2004) at the CLJ meeting, the 
international community, led by U.S.  and UN officials, along with 
some ‘westernized Afghans,' made revolutionary deals with 
participating Islamists (Mujahideen/warlords) and Ulama 
(traditional religious elites) in terms of the role of the women and the 
state of Sharia law in the new constitution. The result was a 
guarantee of equal rights for Afghan women and a loose sharia law 
that met international human rights principles. 
The establishment of equal socio-political rights for the women is 
one of the significant achievements of the 2004 constitution. For 
instance, in chapter two, Article Twenty-Two of the 2004 
constitution stresses gender equivalence by calling for ‘equal rights 
and duties' for Afghan ‘man and women' ‘before the law'  (The 
Constitution of Afghanistan (English Translation), 2004). It provides 
Afghan women with the right to hold or run for a similar political 
position as that of the men in a still highly traditional conservative 
society. According to Rubin  (2004), the Islamists and Ulama at the 
CLJ, pushed for disqualifying Afghan women for the presidential 
post in the constitution, but the international community resisted.  
In October 2004, when the Afghans went to polling centers for the 
first time to elect their president, Massouda Jalal – a pediatrician by 
profession and a UN employee in the Kabul-based World Food 
Program (WFP) agency –  was the first Afghan female to stand 
alongside a dozen male candidates in the presidential election 
(Majidyar, 2009). Though Dr. Jalal won only 1.1% (Joint Electoral 
Management Body (JEMB), 2004) of the total votes in the run-off, 
her candidacy demonstrated a significant achievement for other 
Afghan women, who had suffered more than a decade of Mujahideen 
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and Taliban oppression. Later Dr. Jalal (2004-2006) served as the 
minister for women affairs in Karzai's administration.  
Likewise, Articles Eighty-Three and Eighty-Four of the 2004 
constitution reserve ‘in average at least two' seats for ‘female' ‘from 
each province' who ‘shall' find their way through free and fair 
election to ‘the House of People' or Wolsey Jirga. Likewise, 50% of 
the president's appointees (one-third of the total members) to the 
‘House of Elders' or Meshrano Jirga of the Afghan National 
Assembly must be women  (The Constitution of Afghanistan 
(English Translation), 2004). According to the United States 
Institute of Peace special report, in the 2005 parliamentary election, 
the number of females reached nearly 12% of the total candidates. In 
2010, this figure significantly increased to 16%, in an election in 
which a woman from Nimroz province found her way above the 
constitutionally reserved quota (Worden & Sudhakar, 2012). 
Subsequent election law also guaranteed at least 25%45 of the total 
provincial council seats for women (Electoral Law, 2016).  
The findings of the present study reveal that a majority of the Islamic 
traditionalists and Jihadi groups who make up a significant part of 
the post-Taliban government are not happy with the social and 
political rights for the Afghan women placed in the constitution and 
achieved in the last one and half decade. In interviews across six 
Afghan provinces, several PCs members shared their concerns that 
the so-called ‘western democracy' (for more, please read democracy 
section below) violated Islamic principles and the Afghan cultural 
values  (Interview26Kabul, 2016), (Interview27Kabul, 2016), 
(Interview29Kabul, 2016) and (Interveiw31Kabul, 2016) 
(Interview4Nangrahar, 2016 ) (Interview5Nangrahar, 2016). On 
several occasions, ex-Mujahedeen leaders including Ustad Sayaf and 
Ismail Khan publicly criticized the appearance of females on private 
TV channels' entertainment shows – calling it un-Islamic.  It is the 
                                                          
45 The 25% quota was decreased to 20% in 2013; however, president Ashraf 
Ghani amended the law to its initial status in 2016. 
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presence of the international community and the U.S. that has kept 
the criticism of both the traditionalist and the Jihadist limited to 
public condemnation. 
The Taliban on their part have their reservations on the Afghan 
constitution in general and the rights of women in particular. If it 
ever happens that they reach a deal with the Afghan government, it 
is expected that there would be some critical changes regarding 
women’s social and political rights in Afghanistan. 
 
5.1.2 The Role of Islam: 
Likewise, while preserving Islam as the religion of the state (Chapter 
One, Article One) and the ‘ban on laws’ that ‘contravene the tenets 
and provisions of the holy religion of Islam’ (Chapter One, Article 
Two), the new constitution holds a nondiscriminattion position 
toward the religious sects of Sunni or Shia. In the Juduicial section, 
the constitution simply refers to the distinctive jurisprudence of the 
‘religion of Islam as the religion of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan' 
and not to the distinctive jurisprudence of Shia or Sunni (Article 
Chapter One, Three), and makes no specific preference as did the 
previous Afghan constitutions  (Rubin B. R., 2004, p. 14). 
Nevertheless, Article 2 (Chapter One) remains nearly indifferent 
regarding ‘the followers of other faiths’ (which in the present case 
refers to the Afghan Hindus and Sikhs) who according to the present 
constitution have the right to practice their ‘religious rituals’ freely, 
but ‘within the bounds of the law’.  
Hence, the Shia religious minority – who are mainly the Hazara 
ethnic minority and who were not only socially and politically but 
also religiously discriminated in the past – received significant 
recognition in the 2004 Afghan constitution. The Hazara social and 
political struggle started in the1970s with the formation of the pro-
Hazara rights political party (see the case of Bamyan) and gained 
momentum during the Soviet invasion between 1978-89, when they 
formed active militant groups backed by Iran. During the civil war – 
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between 1990s-2001 – the Hazaras were recognized as one of the 
four ethnic groups critical for maintaining political and military 
power in Afghanistan.  
In 2009, the approval of Shia Personal Status Law (SPSL) – which 
was followed by strong national and international criticism due to its 
harsh and abusive approach towards women (Oates, 2009) – was the 
first definite step toward religious independence of the Hazara 
minority group.      
 
5.1.3 The Electoral System:  
Article Thirty-Three of the 2004 constitutions give ‘the right’ to the 
Afghan citizen ‘to elect and be elected’(Chapter One, Article Thirty-
Three). In Chapter Three, Article Sixty-One called for the election 
of the president ‘by receiving more than fifty percent of votes cast 
by voters through free, general, secret and direct elections’ (The 
Constitution of Afghanistan (English Translation), 2004). Likewise, 
Article Eighty-Three (Chapter Four) and One-Hundred-Thirty-Eight 
(Chapter Eight) outline the parliamentary and provincial councils' 
elections respectively. The main disputed topic among the 
academics and Afghan politicians in the elections conducted so far 
has been and remains the Afghan electoral system that was adopted 
by the Afghan Electoral Law  (Ennis, 2006). 
The electoral system adopted in Afghanistan is Single 
Nontransferable Vote (SNTV). While the opponents of the SNTV 
criticizes this system for discouraging the formation of political 
parties and thus not  promoting vibrant democracy (Reynolds & 
John, 2012, p. 2), its advocates support the system due to its 
simplicity, which fits the Afghan sociopolitical context  of being 
entirely new to democratic experiment back 2004. Furthermore, in 
Afghanistan SNTV could also be observed as the preventive strategy 
for the return of Mujahedin parties into the power. Since 2001 all 
Mujahedeen and a few Communist parties have returned to the 
Afghan political arena. Both groups bear a violent image from their 
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past political ruling in the eyes majority Afghans. The dominant 
Mujahedeen parties, all of which follow the one ideology of political 
Islam, were and still are divided only along the ethnolinguistic 
identities. Based on the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(AREU) research, in the 2005 parliamentary election, out of 249 
seats, 156 were captured by the leading Islamic Mujahideen parties, 
and the remaining by the independent candidates. Whereas in the 
2010 parliamentary election, the number of party seats decreased to 
93 and the number of independent candidates increased to 155  
(Reynolds & John, 2012, p. 10).  
Therefore, thanks to the SNTV system, the finding of this study 
shows that there are hundreds of new political faces including 
women and educated elites who found their way to the lower-house 
of the parliament and to the provincial councils. The emergence of 
these new political individuals positively challenged the warlord's 
political parties. In the long run, Afghanistan does need an 
alternative electoral system that encourages a strong legislature and 
the formation of active political parties with alternative 
sociopolitical ideologies. But until warlords no longer hold ruling 
positions in the outdated Islamic parties, and until democracy takes 
firm roots in the Afghan political context, it is too early to propose 
replacing SNTV with any alternative electoral  system.  
 
5.1.4 Ethnic Identity vs. National Identity: 
The issue of national and ethnic identity remains sensitive, even 
fourteen years after ratification of the 2004 constitution. Chapter 
one, Article Four of the 2004 constitution applies the word ‘Afghan' 
as the national identity of all citizens of Afghanistan. In chapter one, 
Article Sixteen declares Pashtu and Dari – the two majority spoken 
languages among the Afghan populations –  as the ‘state official 
languages', and follows this with recognition of all other ethnic 
identities by affirming their spoken languages as officially the ‘third' 
in their areas of dominance. According to Rubin  (2004) at the CLJ, 
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some of the ‘non-Pashtun’ ‘northern-block leaders’ objected to the 
word ‘Afghan’ as the national identity, referring to it as only the 
Pashtun ethnic identity (2004, p. 17). Today this sentiment is shared 
among the wider non-Pashtun political class, in which some 
hardcore anti-Pashtun political groups and figures see the word 
Afghan as synonymous to the term "Awghan" – referring informally 
to the ethnic Pashtun – and therefore claim that Pashtuns want to 
impose their identity on other ethnic groups. This conflict re-
escalated in early 2013 when the Afghan government decided to 
distribute standardized identification cards or ‘E-Tazkera' – a policy 
aimed at preventing excessive fraud and improving regulation of the 
2014 election (van Bijlert & Bjelica, 2016). Presently, the debate 
over the topic includes the wider Afghan population. The E-Tazkera 
had to be regulated through the Law on the Population Registration 
Record. When the draft on the population registration record arrived 
at the legislative house of the National Assembly, the parliament 
members (MPs) agreed to nearly all contents except article 6, which 
contains the personal details of the individuals. The majority of 
Pashtun MPs voted for adding the word Afghan and Islam as the 
national identity whereas the majority of non-Pashtuns demanded 
inclusion of the ethnic identity as well. Some others proposed 
omitting all three terms; Afghan, Islam and individual ethnic name 
in the identification card (van Bijlert & Bjelica, 2016). The dispute 
leaked from the National Assembly to the wider political class in 
which the proponents and opponents of the terms Afghan, Islam and 
ethnic identity poured into streets each chanting for their claims, 
which resulted in the halting of the printing process. Such conflicting 
issues are being utilized by hard-core ethnic opposition parties, each 
underlying the topic as their red-line, a strategy to attract more 
sympathizers for their political goals. For instance, Mohammad 
Ismail Yoon, leader of the Tahreek-e-Afghanistan (Afghanistan's 
movement) – who also owns a private TV channel ‘Jwandoon' –  
advocates for Pashtun majority rights. Whereas, Abdul Latif 
Pedram, a Tajik, leader of the ‘Hezb-e-Kongara Milli Afghanistan’ 
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(Afghanistan’s National Congress Party), member of the Wolesi 
Jirga and a pro-federalism in Afghanistan strongly opposes Pashtun 
dominance.   
The emergence of new political parties among them, some with 
ultra-ethnic political orientations, and the Afghans’ extensive access 
to both traditional and digital social media have added to a heated 
public debate over this and other similar topics.  
Today there are tens of private Afghan Radio and TV stations, most 
of them owned by the political elites, and most more concerned with 
political orientation than with running a media business. In addition 
there are several telecommunication companies, that also provide 
internet services on mobile phones through which Afghans can not 
only access local political discourse, but also learn and compare 
themselves with broader global socio-political conditions through 
the use of social media outlets, including Facebook and Twitter.     
 
As discussed above, ethnic identity, the role of Islam, the single non-
transformable voting system "SNTV" and a strong unitary 
centralized state (discussed in detail below) are the major 
controversial issues in the 2004 constitution that will sooner or later 
require public discourse and revision. 
As Rubin and Gagnon (2016) also put rightly, today, access to the 
above global digital means on the one hand, and the uncertain 
security and political landscape of the country, on the other hand, 
has made Afghans, and particularly the younger generation, among 
the most politicized populations in the world. The Afghans’ political 
awareness can be seen as a significant development towards creating 
a more democratic, responsive and accountable government and 
civil society institutions in the future. The transition toward such 
consistent reforms might not be smooth, and if enough attention is 
not paid to these unresolved issues, there could be dangerous 
consequences – possibly even the country slipping back into a civil 
war. Though ignored by the government, and to some extent also by 
its international allies, the Afghan nation suffers some serious ethnic 
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division on various issues including some discussed above. 
Likewise, after nearly one and half decades of its ratification, the 
2004 Afghan constitution needs a proper review and timely reforms 
through an all-inclusive Afghan social and political consensus. The 
call to convene a Loya Jirga, as all conflicting parties inside the 
country also foresee it –  might be one way to make this happen.  
The following part of this dissertation is dedicated to a discussion 
over one of the above noted controversial themes, namely the state-
institutional design/form of the future Afghan state institutional-
building reform project. 
 
5.2 The Afghan Presidential Vs. Parliamentary State 
Institutional Design Discourse 
The 2004 constitution adopted a heavy unitary centralized state sys-
tem for Afghanistan. According to the new Afghan constitution, the 
president is the head of the state, who is directly elected by popular 
vote for a five-year term. The president has the authority to appoint 
the executive and judiciary branches, in which the nominees for cab-
inet minister positions, for the supreme court, and for a few other 
high-ranking officials are subject to the consent of the legislative 
body or the Wolesi Jirga of the National Assembly. According to the 
president's office website in 2016, the cabinet comprised of 24-line 
ministries and six central independent bodies including the inde-
pendent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), the National En-
vironmental Protection Agency (NEPA), the National Directorate of 
Security (NDS), the Directorate of Da Afghanistan Bank, the attor-
ney general's office, and the supreme court.  Most of the ministries 
and independent directorates have provincial and in some instances 
district level departments, which are under direct control and super-
vision of the central line government authorities instead of under 
sub-national administration. The diagram (1) below illustrates the d-
jure state structure in Afghanistan. 
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Source: The Diagram (1) is created by the author. This diagram shows the de-jure 
state institutional design of the Afghan government based on the 2004 constitution, 
whereas the text on the left shows the de-facto power structure at the central level. 
The centralization of state power has a long history in the Afghani-
stan. Since its creation in the mid-eighteenth century, Afghanistan 
has constantly attempted to remain – at least in theory – a strong 
unitary centralized state. The founding father Ahmad Shah Durrani 
appointed provincial Hakims (governors) to extend his power to the 
sub-national regions – to collect taxes and rents from locals. Follow-
ing the second Afghan-Anglo war in 1879, it was Amir Abdul Rah-
man Khan, who reintegrated the power to the central state, yet this 
time based on the idea of Afghan nationalism, Islam and institutional 
modernization  (Saikal, 2004, pp. 35-39).  
The centralization of power and radical state institutional 
modernization process took its first constitutional shape (for details, 
please read chapter three) during Amir Amanullah Khan's reign 
between 1919-1929. The 1923 fundamental code – known as the first 
Afghan constitution –  for the first time in history not only 
strengthened the state power through building a cabinet of ministers 
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and an Advisory Council at the center, but also extended the state’s 
control to its peripheries by establishing advisory committees at the 
province, district and division levels. The members to the councils 
were appointed half by the King from among the government 
officials and remaining half indirectly elected by the people.  (Saikal, 
2004, pp. 73-79) 
In 1964, Zahir Shah introduced constitutional democracy into his 
monarchy for the first time in Afghan history. However, in practice, 
it proved to be nothing but a power-balance between the King's 
intelligentsia team in the center and tribal elites at the periphery. 
Although, this compromise led to peace and relative stability that 
lasted for nearly four decades, it created grave socio-economic 
disparities between the major cities and rural areas of Afghanistan, 
in which the former enjoyed state-provided basic infrastructure, 
health, and schooling, while the latter remained underdeveloped with 
hardly any access even to literacy (Roy, 1986). The 1978 PDPA 
communist revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion not only 
fragmented the central state authority, but also derailed the nation to 
a decades-long state of ethnolinguistic conflict, resulting in the birth 
of rentier warlordism and Taliban extremism (discussed in detail in 
chapter three).       
The question of which government system would best fit into 
Afghanistan's context, was raised in the Bonn conference in late 
2001. The US and the UN-facilitated Bonn talk laid the foundation 
for the following Afghan government system.  Ostensibly to 
consolidate the warring factions – who possessed militiamen and 
held territorial control of their own ethnolinguistic regions – under 
‘a broad-based political settlement', the US and UN remained 
focused on nation- rather than on state-building.  But nation-building 
is necessarily a long-term, self-esteemed process and requires a 
stable, efficient state as a foundation to build on. In 2001, Shahrani 
rightly warned that the conference should focus on building the 
government system's efficiency, accountability, and durability for 
the Afghan nation as the whole and in the long run, instead of on 
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allocating shares of the power structure among divided fractions  
(2001). Nevertheless, the UN and the US approach for fixing the 
problem was based on the present concerns, conditions, and the time 
limit at the Bonn conference. The UN special representative Lakhdar 
Brahimi and the US diplomats knew that the settlement they were 
brokering had serious flaws, including unfair ethnic representation, 
but they hoped to reconsider and fix them  (Rubin B. R., 2004). But 
the U.S. lost enthusiasm for the project, and the following processes 
were doubled with other errors.   
Hence, the Bonn transitional administration charted the foundation 
for an ethnopolitics elite  collation government in Afghanistan, in 
which the head of the state was reserved for a Pashtun, and the 
cabinet was divided among the ethnic groups based on an estimated 
percentage. Out of twenty-nine ministerial seats, eleven were 
allocated to Pashtuns – the largest ethnic group – eight to Tajiks, five 
to Hazaras, three to Uzbek and the remaining two to other minorities  
(Khalilzad, 2016, p. 127). The majority (sixteen out of twenty-nine) 
and key (e.g., defense, interior, and foreign ministries) positions 
were given to the Northern Alliances warlords. Except for swapping 
few ministerial positions, the 2002 interim government composition 
(Karzai the President versus Northern Alliances key Ministries) 
followed the Bonn transitional structure  (Khalilzad, 2016, p. 127). 
The discussion on a state governmental model took its momentum 
during the constitutional drafting process and Constitutional Loya 
Jirga (CLJ), in late 2003.  Here too, Afghans were ethno-politically 
divided between Pashtuns for a Presidential centralization, Tajiks for 
semi-Presidentialism, and Hazaras and Uzbeks for Parliamentary 
federalism. To assure having one strong interlocutor in Kabul, the 
Bush administration also weighed in, advocating for a strong 
presidential centralized system in which Hamid Karzai was already 
foreseen as a favorite candidate for president  (Rubin B. R., 2004). 
As the well-known scholar on Afghanistan, Barnet R. Rubin –  who 
was actively involved in the post-Taliban Bonn process –  writes 
from his notes at the CLJ in 2003/2004: 
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The issue of governmental systems came into sharp relief at 
the CLJ as calls rang out for an up-or-down vote on presiden-
tialism versus parliamentarism. Nearly all Pushtun delegates, 
joined by some members from other ethnic groups, came out 
for presidentialism. A bloc of non-Pushtun delegates, how-
ever, strongly supported a parliamentary system. Both sides 
made cases that mixed genuine public considerations with 
ethnopolitical ambitions. For Pushtuns and reformers, presi-
dentialism provided a way for one of their own—everyone 
knew that the first incumbent would be Karzai—to emerge 
from the Bonn compromise with non-Pushtun armed factions 
as the popularly elected head of state. There would be no un-
certainty about who held legitimate executive power in Ka-
bul, and Washington would retain the benefit of having an 
identifiable Afghan partner whom it would know well and 
indeed preferred. The mostly non-Pushtun delegates who op-
posed presidentialism saw in it a risk of personal and ethnic 
dictatorship. A parliamentary system, they argued, would 
likely result in coalition governments that would be more 
representative and inclusive, safer from potential abuses of 
executive power, and hence more stable.  (Rubin B. R., 
Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 2004, p. 12) 
In another place, Rubin  (2004) writes that the constitutional drafting 
commission proposed a semi-presidential system with a president 
elected through popular vote and the prime minister appointed by the 
parliament – in which the former post was considered for a Pashtun 
and the later for a Tajik (p. 11).   However, the proposal was replaced 
with Presidentialism by the National Security Council (NSC) whose 
members comprised the interim government’s cabinet ministers and 
other high officials, including leading Northern Alliances warlords. 
The reason why some of the non-Pashtun dominant Northern 
Alliances compromised to accept a presidential system, according to 
Rubin (2004), was the attractive political rewards promised by 
interim president Hamid Karzai, whose win at the October 2004 
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scheduled presidential election was assured by the US 
administration. Karzai in his part, promised the first vice-president 
position to Mohammad Fahim Qasim – the leader of the Tajik Shura-
e-Nezar (United Front) party after the assassination of Ahmad Shah 
Massoud – and the second vice-president seat (an unusual extra post 
added to the 2004 constitution) for Karim Khalili, a leading Hazara 
warlord and head of the Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami or Islamic Unity 
Party. This compromise disappointed several other Northern 
Alliances’ leaders, among them the Shura-e-Nezar prominent leader 
Yunis Qanoni who had hoped to win the prime ministerial seat in a 
semi-presidential system (Rubin B. R., 2004, p. 12).  
The discussion above reveals that the architects of the Bonn 
Agreement and the CLJ process had provided limited time and 
options for the Afghan representatives to opt for a proper and well-
debated state institutional design.  The limited discussion that took 
place was general, on the surface, and in some instances impartial. 
Many among both Afghan and international intellectuals, some of 
whom were also directly involved at the Bonn process, believed that 
a strong unitary presidential system could help in national 
integration and reducing warlordism (Rubin B. R., 2004).  Others 
argued that due to the very ethnolinguistic and religious cleavages, 
and the nature of the post-conflict situation, a parliamentary 
federalism or a sort of consociational democracy –  power-sharing at 
the center and group autonomy at the periphery – would best serve 
Afghanistan  (Goodson L. , 2003, p. 89).  For example, Zalmay 
Khalilzad, the influential US diplomat at Bonn and its subsequent 
processes writes: "In most situations, I would have favored a 
stronger parliament. But after years of war and destruction, I 
believed that a strong executive structure was necessary (for 
Afghanistan) to make decisions decisively and rebuild national 
institutions" (Khalilzad, 2016, p. 195).  
Similarly, in a special issue to the Forum of Federation in October 
2001, Umar Zakhilwal noted:  
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(However), in a country like Afghanistan, where illiteracy is 
abundant, the economy is in shambles, and land and other 
natural resources are not evenly distributed across the 
country, federalism would lead to warlordism, personal 
fiefdoms, no respect for the central government and a 
continuation of internal war – this time over who gets what. 
(Federalism in Afghanistan: A recipe for disintegration,  ph. 
16) 
 
Zakhilwal's concerns later proved to have a solid basis in reality, as 
the de-facto coalition government in Kabul failed to prevent the 
powerbrokers in the regions from building their local fiefdoms. 
Karzai, and later Ashraf Ghani, failed to tame the powerful warlords, 
including Atta Mohammad Noor in Balkh, Ismail Khan in Herat, and 
General Raziq in Kandahar. 
In the same publication (special issue on Afghanistan Forum of 
Federation, October 2001), Mohammad Nazif Shahrani (2001) 
proposed a federal system in Afghanistan:   
Any attempt to re-impose a strong centralized regime 
controlled by a single family, clan, tribe, or ethnic group, 
whether Pasthoon or non-Pashtoon, must be and will be 
strongly resisted. Strong centralized regimes in multi-ethnic 
societies such as Afghanistan tend to breed nepotism, 
cronyism, and internal colonialism by the ruling clique. (Not 
"Who" but "How"?: Governing Afghanistan after the 
conflict, ph. 9)     
The reasons for or against brought forward in the above-quoted 
statements could have legitimate reservations; nevertheless one can 
observe the ethnopolitical elite divide even at the intellectual level, 
in which Zakhilwal, a Pashtun, propagated unitary centralization 
while Shahrani – Uzbek, –  stood for a federal system. Later 
Zakhilwal was to hold prominent positions in Karzai's 
administration including the ministry of finance between 2009-2014, 
while, Shahrani's father Nematullah and brother Wahidullah served 
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in various ministerial positions in post-Bonn government. It is worth 
mentioning here, that a large number of international experts46 on the 
topic had, and still have, proposed a sort of federal system – 
following the standard academic line of argument.  
The ethnopolitical parties' voter-banks and individual strongmen's 
regional influence were the key indicators for the power-sharing 
composition of the past three presidential elections of 2004, 2009 
and 2014. For instance, during the 2004 presidential elections, in 
which Hamid Karzai's win was already expected (Smith S. S., 2012), 
he had to pick an influential Tajik as his first vice-president and the 
leader of the Hazara ethnic party as the second-voice president.  
(Khalilzad, 2016, pp. 213-214). To win the consent of his major ally, 
the Defense Ministry was already promised to Mohammad Qasim 
Fahim –  by then leader of the United Front who was promoted by 
Karzai to a symbolic Marshal rank.  The same ethno-power-sharing 
method was followed at the 2009 elections as well. This time, 
however, due to sour relationships with Hamid Karzai, the United 
States favored Abdullah Abdullah – a prominent Tajik member of 
the United Front (UF) with Pashtun roots, and foreign minister to 
Karzai's administration between 2001-2006. To weaken Abdullah's 
writ among the Tajik voters in the north, Karzai had to sell the first-
voice president post to Marshal Fahim before the election. To ensure 
his win, he also invited Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum from 
exile in Turkey to hold the post of ‘Chief of Staff to the Commander 
in Chief to Afghan National Army'. The Hazara ethinc leader Karim 
Khalili remained as the second vice-president until the end of his 
second term in 2014. When Fahim died of a natural illness in March 
2014, he was replaced by Yunis Qanuni, also a Tajik and member of 
the UF. This tradition was a bit changed in the 2014 election when 
president Ashraf Ghani (a Pashtun president) introduced a Hazara as 
                                                          
46 For examples, please visit special issue on Afghanistan, the Forum of Federa-
tion, October 2001 
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the first vice-president (Mohammad Sarwar Danish) and an Uzbek 
as the second vice-president (Abdul Rashid Dostum). 
Likewise, during the last one and half decades of Afghan 
government, the key cabinet ministries, and other high-ranking posts 
were divided based on ethnic preferences between the president and 
the two vice-presidents at the government central and sub-national 
levels.  To win their support to his central government, Karzai had 
to make individual deals with warlords and powerful elites in 
influential regions and provinces. For example, since late 2001, Atta 
Mohammad Noor – a prominent warlord of the Jamiat-e-Islami party 
– remained the governor of Balkh and one of the influential de-facto 
powerholders of the Northern region. Likewise, Ismail Khan, who 
holds a strong power base in Herat, and General Raziq and Gul Agha 
Shirzai, who are based in Kandahar (for more on this, please visit 
chapter six), all have remained in crucial government positions both 
at central and sub-national levels despite frequent human rights 
violations.  
Following the 2009 presidential election, the non-Pashtun political 
parties and individuals that were either left out or purged from 
governmental positions, re-raised their quest for a sort of 
Parliamentary decentralization, and some even federalism. As 
mentioned earlier, although the United States backed the Northern 
Alliances candidate Abdullah Abdulla in 2009 elections, his 
opponent Hamid Karzai won the election and became president a 
second time. The results frustrated some of Karzai's non-alliances 
warlords and they began to advocate for an alternative state 
governmental system to the present strong unitary Presidentialism.  
The political divide and seasonal rivalries within the Tajik and 
Hazara ethnic-based political parties made it easier for Ex-president 
Karzai and current President Ghani to pick only the heaviest in the 
voting bank for the first and second vice president posts. 
Consequently, those who were left out of the power-sharing alliances 
have come to believe that under the present centralized system, they 
are unlikely to achieve a leading role in the central government. In 
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addition, the US’s anti-Karzai sentiments since 2008 encouraged 
some Northern Alliances members to publicly raise their concern for 
an alternative political system. The Obama administration clearly 
accused Karzai's government of widespread corruption including a 
alleged fraud in the 2009 election, but there were also some U.S. 
Republican congressmen who have supported some elements in 
Northern Alliances since the Soviet invasion (Landay & Srobel, 
2010). After president Karzai initiated peace talks efforts with the 
Taliban, a group of U.S. Republican congressmen headed by Dana 
Rohrabacher – chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub-
committee – met with some of the leading Northern Alliances' 
members in Berlin in July 2010, including Ahmad Zia Massoud of 
Tajik Jamit-e-Islami party; Mohammad Mohaqqiq, leader of the 
Hazara Hezb-e-Wahadat-Mardom; and General Abdul Rashid 
Dostum of the Uzbek Junbish-e-Mili. The NA members feared that 
bringing the Taliban to the political process and Kabul would farther 
marginalize their share in the government. Hence, the Berlin 
participants dubbed Karzai's administration a ‘dictatorship' and 
demanded ‘more authority to the provinces'    (Landay & Srobel, 
2010). The quest to change the government system became more 
evident when these key ethnic leaders (Zai Massoud, Mohaqqiq and 
Dostum) announced their political alliance, the "Afghanistan 
National Front" in late 2011 and at the same time publicly insisted 
on changing the government system to Parliamentarism  (BBC 
Persian, 2011). This was soon followed by another meeting with 
U.S. Republican congressmen/women, again led by Rohrabacher, 
which was facilitated by the German Aspen Institute in Berlin in 
January 2012. This time, Amrullah Saleh – former director of 
Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (ANDS) and present 
chairman of Rawand-e-Sabz or the green movement – joined the 
Afghan delegation from Kabul (Ruttig, 2012). The participants at the 
Berlin meeting issued an official statement, calling "for a national 
dialogue on a revised Constitution to correct the inherent flaws in the 
present power structure by decentralizing the political system" and 
202 
 
asserting that Afghanistan "need a parliamentary form of democracy 
instead of a personality-centered presidential system”(Rep. 
Rohrabacher Leads Bipartisan Delegation's Afghanistan Strategy 
Session With National Front Leaders in Berlin, 2012,  para. 5). The 
assertion created anger and tension among the Pashtun political 
circle in general and the Karzai administration in particular, accusing 
Americans and the Germans of disrespecting the Afghan constitution 
and damaging ‘national unity'  (Ruttig, 2012).  
The turbulent 2014 presidential election results not only formalized 
the de-facto ethno-power-sharing government through a political 
deal signed between the contestants –Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah 
Abdullah –  but it also brought the proponents for Parliamentary 
decentralization a step closer to their long wished aim. 
On September 29th, 2014, John Kerry – the US secretary of state to 
the Obama administration – brokered the National Unity 
Government (NUG) deal, in which Ashraf Ghani was declared the 
president, and Abdullah Abdullah, the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) for the five-year term (The 'government of national unity' 
deal (full text), 2014). The NUG partnership agreement came about 
because the fraudulent and contested second-round election 
outcomes on June 14, 2014, created tensions between the two camps 
(The Ghani Pashtun vs. the Abdullah Tajik supporters) that brought 
Afghanistan to the edge of national turmoil. Part one of the NUG 
agreement called for the inauguration of the Loya Jirga (LG) to 
amend the 2004 constitution within two years from the time deal was 
made. The proposed amendments to the constitution, according to 
the NUG deal, include the promotion of the CEO post to a ‘chief 
executive prime minister'. Since the CEO position along with two 
deputies had no constitutional support, a special presidential decree 
was required to initiate these posts  (The 'government of national 
unity' deal (full text), 2014).  
Furthermore, the NUG deal was created on the bases of a half-half 
partnership between the President Ghani and CEO Abdullah.  That 
means, fifty percent of the government posts, including cabinet 
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ministers and their deputies, independent directorates, provincial and 
district governors, diplomats to foreign embassies, and other high-
ranking officials were to be chosen by the president, and the 
remaining half by the CEO Abdullah (Rubin & Gagnon, 2016).  
 
Although the two-year deadline for calling the Loya Jurga has long 
passed, at the time of writing this dissertation, the NUG has still not 
managed to inaugurate the CLJ for the amendments to the 
constitution.  Nor have the government partners (Ghani and 
Abdullah) succeeded in assigning a full ministerial cabinet. The 
constant political deadlock and tensions arising from troublesome 
postings in the government are considered by critics to be a 
significant failing of the domestically and internationally improvised 
unity government project.          
It is worth mentioning here, that the power-sharing government 
strongly contradicts the 2004 constitutional presidential unitary 
system. It was this violation of the rule of law from the very 
beginning that made the Afghan road toward democratic state-
building bumpier than it already was. It created a mistrust of the idea 
of the state and the supreme law not only among the Afghan 
population in general, but also among the powerbrokers and political 
elites, who then could justify their violation of subsequent laws 
about the implementation of the constitution. Several provincial 
council members interviewed in this study shared their concerns that 
violations of the constitution – for example, the emergence of the 
NUG government – discouraged their efforts toward democratic 
state institutionalization. As one PC representative from Kabul in an 
interview to the author said: 
In my opinion, the Taliban government was much better than 
the present one. Though economically Afghanistan suffered, 
however, the laws were implemented. Whenever Mullah 
Omer issued a decree, it was implemented from the south to 
the north of Afghanistan. Today, we have two government in 
Afghanistan. One (referring to president Ghani) issues a 
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decree, the other one (refereeing to Chief Executive 
Abdullah) abolishes it. Each one appoints their affiliates to 
one official posts. People are fed up with this sort of 
governance.  (Interveiw31Kabul, 2016) 
Besides, the creation of the NUG vividly challenged the emergence 
of an active opposition party to the state and discouraged the 
formation of political parties. All major parties have their share in 
the NUG in one way or another. There remain only individuals like 
Abdul Latif Pedram – a parliament member and head of Kangra-e-
Mili or national congress party –  who except for his constituency 
from his home province Badakhshan – has hardly any support or 
recognition among the wider Afghan population. Just recently, a new 
council, Shura-e-Herasat Wa Subat Afghanistan, or the Council for 
Protection and Stability in Afghanistan (CPSA) has emerged whose 
members are ex-Mujahedeen who served during Karzai's 
administration and who were purged from power by the NUG 
government. The Jamiat-e-Islami - in which chief executive 
Abdullah is a leading member -  is a key coalition member of the 
CPSA. 
Finally, the initial goal of adopting a centralized Presidential system 
was to curb warlordism and to build strong national institutions. But 
the de-facto power-sharing practice encouraged warlords to 
strengthen their influence at the sub-national government through 
their patronage relations, in order to achieve more leverage with the 
central government. These warlords have become so strong that in 
several instances they have challenged the central government 
authority.  (Sahak, 2017) 
 
5.3 The Afghan Perception of Democracy  
For the first time in its modern history, the October 2004 
presidential, and September 2005 parliamentary and provincial 
councils' elections marked Afghanistan's full shift to a democratic 
system. Despite its turbulent processes and fraudulent outcomes, it 
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was followed by another two rounds of presidential and provincial 
councils in 2009 and 2014 and parliamentary elections in 2010. 
Despite death threats from the insurgent Taliban, the turnout and 
popular enthusiasm in all past elections were impressive. 
Nevertheless, one should make a clear distinction between 
democracy as a method of electing the head of state and local 
representatives, and as a value perceived by a traditional, religious, 
yet in many aspects evolving, Afghan society. 
As highlighted earlier, the low literacy rate, the continued domi-
nance of traditional and extreme religious sentiments, the ethnolin-
guistic fragmentation, the tribal and kinship patronage system, the 
repeated historic attempts at centralized state authority, and the way 
the new regime was installed all are interlinked factors that shape the 
discourse around the term democracy among the Afghan popula-
tions. Moreover, when talking about democracy and state, one 
should distinguish between Afghans who are educated and have ac-
cess to digital media and information and those who live in scattered 
rural areas, where they hardly have access to basic human needs, in-
cluding health and education. 
Both the concept of ‘democracy' and the system (democratic 
governance) are struggling to find their place in Afghan complex 
socio-political context. Most Afghan political elites interviewed in 
this study understand democracy as an imposed concept based on 
western liberal values brought by the United States and its European 
allies. Secular, educated Afghans elites, who either live in large 
cities or have returned from abroad (neighboring or western 
countries) often welcome democracy in Afghanistan. But the 
religious traditionalists, who make up the majority of the Afghan 
population, are more likely to see democracy as an 'evil' and against 
Islamic principles and Afghan cultural values.  
The results of this study show that with regard to conceptual 
understanding and believing in the values of democracy, Afghan 
political elites are divided between the traditionalist – these comprise 
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warlords, traditional tribal and religious leaders – and newly 
emerging modernists – these include young educated elites. The 
modernists ideologically differentiate themselves from 
traditionalists, identifying themselves as moderate Muslims, 
supporting democratic values such as women rights and freedom of 
speech. Whereas, the traditional elites strongly believe in both 
Afghan and Islamic traditionalism and the ideology of the political 
Islam of the Mujahideen (Discussed in chapter three). A PC member 
in Balk province says: 
The democratic system is one of the best and practical 
systems known in the world. It is the democracy which 
grantees the rights of individuals, regardless of their ethnic or 
other affiliations in a nation. Unfortunately, due to the heavy 
influence of warlords and strongmen, who uses the political 
power for personal gains, democracy did not find its place in 
Afghanistan.  (Interview9Balkh, 2016) 
A few PC members in Bamyan province noted that democracy as a 
social value and as a political system is not well-defined in Afghan 
society. According to these representatives, it is the lack of social 
and political awareness of the people in Afghanistan which has led 
to criticisms of democracy as a whole (Interview12Bamyan, 2016) 
& (Interview13Bamyan, 2016).    
The traditionalist believes that if democracy is a method of electing 
governments then it already exists within their cultural (referring to 
the Jirga system and the election of head of the state through indirect 
election since mid-18th century) and religious values (referring to the 
Baiat, the pledge in Khalifate system in the 7th and 8th centuries). In 
an interview with the author, a PC representative in Kabul asserted:   
Afghanistan is an Islamic country. If we implement Islam, 
democracy (elected government) will prevail. The essence of 
Islam is the democracy. (however) If we limit democracy to 
gender, freedom of women, it creates (cultural) sensitivities. 
There is no-law above as the law of God which is the holy 
Quran; the rest are laws made by the human. If we implement 
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Islam (Islamic Sharia) then the best rights for women, human 
and even for animals are ensured. Since some people in 
Afghanistan take western values as a norm (for democracy), 
they think it means to walk half naked and don't respect your 
parents.  (Interview25Kabul, 2016)  
Several PC representatives made similar comments regarding 
democracy and its perception and implication in the context of 
Afghanistan. The right and freedom to choose, and freedom of 
expression are the controversial concepts within the understanding 
of liberal democracy in the Afghan context. The rights and freedoms 
of individuals are very much  bound by and subject to the Afghan 
socio-cultural and religious norms. For instance, it would be against 
the Afghan cultural values, if a woman chose to marry whom she 
wants to. Likewise, Muslim men and women are not allowed to 
choose another religion once he/she has entered Islam, and 
expressing any critique towards the religious principles of Islam is 
considered blasphemy.  A large number of PC members perceive 
‘western democracy' as a lifestyle, some called it ‘naked', referring 
to western clothing  as evil and against the Afghan and Islamic 
culture (Interview26Kabul, 2016), (Interview27Kabul, 2016), 
(Interview29Kabul, 2016) and (Interveiw31Kabul, 2016) 
(Interview4Nangrahar, 2016 ) (Interview5Nangrahar, 2016). Thus, 
the term democracy has a different perception with different people 
in Afghanistan.  However, when it comes to elections, even the 
traditional Islamists support democratic principles. 
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5.4 The Afghan Perception of State Governmental 
Form  
 In comparison to the national identity problem (ethnolinguistic 
supremacy and the controversial ‘Afghan' term, discussed in the 
earlier section), the discourse over state governmental system largely 
remained within political circles and limited to educated elites in the 
general population. However, whenever discussion on the state 
governmental system arises among politicians, it makes considerable 
news headlines in the local TV channels and the social media. The 
reasons the topic has not penetrated among the wider Afghan 
population encountered in this study are two-fold. First, Afghans 
were always ruled under a unitary centralized system, whether it be 
monarchy, a republic, or an Islamic regime. Second, the low rate of 
literacy and education limited the majority of Afghans, particularly 
in rural areas, from understanding the new and complex concepts 
including democracy and democratic regimes. Quite often, the 
author heard members at the village or community development 
councils (CDC), who perceive and call the state president with its 
traditional term of Pacha or the King. 
Besides, the focus of discourse within political elites (who are 
mainly warlord mujahedeen but also the ethnopolitical parties) is 
primarily, who gets what, instead of what system or model might 
function better, or bring good governance and economic 
development. 
It has been observed during the fieldwork of this study, that even 
most of the local politicians (members of the provincial councils), to 
whom the topic is very much relevant and significant, do not 
comprehend the distinctions between a presidential versus a 
parliamentary system, or between a centralized versus a 
decentralized state system. The author quite often encountered the 
term ‘Nezam-e-Parlemani’ (parliamentary system) being perceived 
as equivalent to ‘Nezam-e-Federali’ (federal system) not only by 
ordinary citizens, but also by politicians, including majority PC 
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members.  Without several follow-up questions and clarification, the 
term Ghir-e-Motamarkis is understood to mean the Federal system. 
Federalism is a very sensitive term which directly invokes partition 
and disintegration in the Afghan context, and thus, only the so-called 
"hard-core" non-Pashtuns would talk about it publicly. The very fact 
of widespread misunderstanding of the topic in general, and of 
Federalism as a recipe for Afghanistan in particular, led many 
respondents in this study to merely answer that a centralized 
presidential system is appropriate for Afghanistan, even when the 
follow-up questions clearly revealed that they preferred the opposite.      
In August 2016, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) 
published its field research results in a paper ‘Afghanistan`s 
Constitution and the Society in Transition’, in which, besides 
addressing other significant constitutional issues, it attempted to 
reveal Afghans’ preferences for state institutional design. The 
quantitative polls of AISS show that  49% of the respondents agree 
with the current presidential system, whereas 29% favors 
parliamentary and 22% semi-presidential system  (p. 59). Likewise, 
the qualitative interview results show that half (17 out of 34)47 of the 
experts are for the parliamentary system (Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & 
Erfani, 2016, p. 75). Similarly, according to this study 39.8% of the 
respondents opted for the present heavily centralized system, 
whereas 40.9% preferred decentralization in which “provinces 
should be given the decision- making power and local officials 
should be elected by the people”, and the remaining 19.4% preferred 
federalism with a division of power between center and periphery 
(Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & Erfani, 2016, p. 67). Nevertheless ‘one-
third’ of the respondents perceive the ‘non-implementation of the 
constitution” as the main issue rather the present state-institutional 
design (Ahmadi, Mohammadi, & Erfani, 2016, p. 44 & 52).   
                                                          
47 At the part, the researcher misinterpreted 17 out 34 as the majority which is 
incorrect.  34 minus 17 is equal to 17. That means only half of the respondents 
were against Presidentialism. 
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The AISS study is the first field research which assesses the Afghan 
perception of the implementation of the Afghan constitution post-
2004. Nevertheless, it has serious technical, methodical and ethical 
short-comings and imbalances, which has been discussed in detail in 
the literature review (Chapter One). Thus, the author made extensive 
efforts to overcome the above shortcomings in the present study.  
One of the significant parts of the field-work of this study focuses on 
the discourse over the state institutional design or system in 
Afghanistan. Since the method undertaken in this study was ‘expert 
interviews', the prime aim was not to find what percentage Afghans 
want what, but instead to explore where the level of discourse stands. 
Furthermore, what is the rationale behind the discourse; what is the 
public perception about the topic as a whole, and whether it is 
divided along the ethnopolitical line as underlined in the hypotheses 
of this dissertation. 
The PC members are the direct representatives of the people at the 
provincial level, hold de-facto two-thirds 48 of the upper house or 
Meshrano Jirga of the National Assembly, and are among the critical 
quorum of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, through which a 
constitutional amendment could take place. Therefore, the PC 
members’ opinions are very much significant to the future decision 
making. The PC is one of the critical democratic parts of the Afghan 
state system at the sub-national level. Any future decentralization 
attempt would directly affect the role and responsibility of these 
elected bodies. Likewise, according to the findings of this study, 
despite having minimal power, it was the PCs that have challenged 
the central authorities of the Afghan government since its 
establishment in 2005. Furthermore, based on the findings of this 
study, the PCs are on their way toward finding legitimacy in the local 
Afghan communities, and once they get professionally and 
                                                          
48 In de-jure it is one-third, but since the election of the district councils did not 
take place yet, a compromise was made to choose two representatives, instead of 
one, from each provincial council to complete the quorum of the Meshrano Jirga 
or Upper House.   
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politically ripe, these bodies will play a central role in sub-national 
government. Therefore, the following discourse is seen from the 
perspective of PC members in six large provinces (Kabul, Kandahar, 
Herat, Nangarhar, Balkh, and Bamyan) in Afghanistan. 
The findings of this study reveal that the PC members are primarily 
divided along three main stances regarding which political system 
might fit the Afghan socio-political context: (1) A majority of the 
Pashtun PC members advocate for the present de-jure presidential 
centralized system and disapprove a parliamentary or federalism in 
Afghanistan. (2) The majority of non-Pashtun PC members – these 
include primarily Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks – promote 
Parliamentary federalism in the country and criticize current 
presidential centralization. (3) The third group includes both Pashtun 
and non-Pashtuns PC members who neither support a "strong" 
centralization nor federalism. Instead, they propose a sort of 
decentralization in which the PCs would have more power and 
authority in some provincial matters. 
 
5.4.1 The Proponents of Presidential Centralization 
 The pro-centralization PC members follow the mainstream 
argument, that a federal parliamentary system would lead to national 
disintegration and eventually end up with succession.  In general, an 
absolute majority of Pashtun PC members from the Nangarhar, 
Kandahar and Kabul provinces in this study are supporters for a 
‘stronger' centralized presidential system. They argue that due to the 
past decades of civil war and warlordism, which created a grave 
ethnic cleansing and harmed the national integration, a semi-
presidential or parliamentary federal system would lead the county 
to a farther ethnic fragmentation and destabilization.  According to 
these PC members, a strong centralized presidential system not only 
fits the socio-geographic, economic, and cultural context of the 
country, but it is the only means to a breakthrough from the ongoing 
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de-facto sub-national warlordism. A PC member from Nangarhar 
province explains: 
Presently Dostum rules in Jawuzjan (province); Atta rules in 
Balkh; Ismail Khan rules in Herat and Abdul Raziq rules in 
Kandahar. If (the government) system changes to federal, we 
would never be freed from their tyranny. Therefore, it 
(federalism) leads Afghanistan to (farther) destruction.  
(Interview2Nangrahar, 2016) 
Some PC members seemed so desperate about the influence and 
atrocities of the warlords that they prefer ‘dictatorship' over a 
democratic system. One PC representative believed that strong 
central government leadership, in the form of what he called a 
‘healthy dictatorship', could remove warlords from power with 
support from the international community. According to this 
representative, the present ‘democracy' facilitated warlords and the 
drug-mafia to buy votes and get access to more government leverage 
and resources  (Interview2Nangrahar, 2016). Similar examples from 
this study confirmed that the existence of warlords and their 
patronage system profoundly influenced the democratic election not 
only at the national (central), but also at the local level. The election 
campaign in the Afghan context included cash payments to 
prominent Maliks or community leaders and regular huge meals to 
the villagers by the wealthy local warlords or their affiliates. Such 
expenditures in the political campaign are derived from the 
traditional Khan or Malik positions, which is a sign of social 
supremacy over other candidates. A Malik or Khan, besides other 
traits, should have enough financial means or land to cover costs of 
local matters including the feeding of villagers at conflict resolution 
gatherings.  
Likewise, a majority of the local power-holders and elites are linked 
and loyal to wealthy and influential big-bosses – the warlords and 
drug-mafia at the provincial and national level. The prominent elites 
at the provincial and central levels also assure their local interests 
through the elections of the Khans or Maliks. These local elites and 
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their sponsors have a direct influence on the local government 
bureaucracies, including on the judiciary, on the police, on taxes and 
tolls, and on the electoral process. They often play the middleman 
and release criminals and accused persons before they go through a 
legal court process. They also hire their own loyal followers to work 
at the local poll centers during elections, who then manipulate the 
process for their sponsor’s benefit49. Hence, many PC members 
believe that a decentralized power or a Federal system would give 
these local corrupt elites full and official access of the local 
bureaucracies and power so that they could run their local fiefdoms 
without any accountability to central government.  These PC 
members believe that the cause of the system failure lies not with the 
‘present system' (unitary centralization) but with the failure to 
implement constitutional centralization properly, which allowed the 
warlords and Mafia-networks to build strong footholds in the 
government at both the national and sub-national levels. A PC 
member from Nangrahar asserts that until the ‘rule of law' replaces 
the rule of ‘patronage relationships', ‘none of the systems' would 
prove effective for Afghanistan (Interview4Nangrahar, 2016 ).        
Furthermore, some believe that the low literacy rate and low level of 
political awareness in the rural areas of the country has hindered the 
current democratic system and that a change to an alternative model 
would just make the situation more confusing. A PC member noted 
that since the majority of the Afghan population are illiterate, it is 
difficult for ordinary citizens to know about the state, law and its role 
at all. Therefore, according to this PC member, the present poor 
socio-educational conditions make the current centralized state 
system appropriate for Afghanistan  (Interview3Nangrahar, 2016). 
In a group discussion among PC members in Kandahar province, a 
female PC stated that "the literacy and education status in this 
country is not on the level where people understand or accept change 
                                                          
49The author himself observed the 2010 parliamentary elections and inter-
viewed those who worked at polling stations in 2014 presidential and provincial 
councils' elections.  
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easily. If one pays a visit to the rural areas of Kandahar, people even 
don't accept the present government system" 
(Interview32KandaharGroupDiscussion, 2016). The PC member 
from Kandahar refers to the scattered rural areas of the country, 
where people have only access to traditional religious teachings, in 
which they learn the Sharia system in the Taliban style. The 
misperception of democracy, which is known as the ‘western evil' 
that mislead Afghans from their ‘holy religion of Islam' and Farhang 
Afghani or ‘Afghan culture' is the main factor that hinders a 
democratic regime.      
Surprisingly enough there are considerable numbers of non-Pashtun 
PC members, especially among Tajiks and Hazaras from Bamyan, 
Herat and Kabul provinces, who also support the current presidential 
centralization and denounce system change in general and 
federalism in particular. However, unlike the majority Pashtuns 
mentioned above, this group's rejection of federalism is based on the 
present security, socio-political, and economic circumstances of the 
country. A semi-presidential or parliamentary Federalism is far more 
suitable than the centralized Presidentialism, but not adaptable for 
present day Afghanistan, according to this group. For example, a PC 
member in Bamyan province noted: 
 
Taking Afghanistan's present circumstances into account, we 
have not reached the time to go for a federal system. A federal 
system would very easily lead to succession. We will not 
have one Afghanistan, but there would be several one of 
them, with different names. However, if the current 
centralized government also continues as it is now, despite 
democratically elected, it would gradually lead to autocracy 
- a modern autocracy. (Interview15Bamyan, 2016) 
Another PC member from Bamyan province states:  
In my opinion, a parliamentary system or federalism is not an 
appropriate system for Afghanistan for now because there are 
well-off provinces that have either natural resources or are 
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bordered with a neighboring country, but there are others that 
have nothing. They are not self-dependent and requires the 
center (government) for reconstruction and people needs.  
(Interview13Bamyan, 2016).  
A PC representative in Herat believes that a federal system would 
deliver the present central government power-sharing conflict to the 
provincial level, that it might act as ‘poison' and fuel more 
destabilization (Interview16Herat, 2016).  Another PC member in 
Herat shared his concerns that, at present, ‘Afghanistan is in a state 
of war' and that a federal initiative would encourage the already 
provincial ‘fiefdom governments'. Instead, he recommends a ‘strong 
centralized government' that practices the rule of law on its all 
citizens. According to him, Afghans have experienced the arbitrary 
rule of individuals, and now it is time for them to get used to the rule 
in a democratic state before testing an alternative system 
(Interview17Herat, 2016).  
 
5.4.2 The Advocates for a Sort of Parliamentary Decentrali-
zation:  
The findings of this study show that it is the majority of the non-
Pashtun PC members who promote either semi-presidential with a 
sort of decentralization or federal parliamentary system in 
Afghanistan. Although there has not been a common rationale 
behind advocacy for an alternative state system, a few of the 
respondents from Herat, Balkh, Bamyan and Kabul provinces stated 
that Nezam-e-Sadarati, or a Prime Ministership, which could be a 
parliamentary or semi-presidential system, is a more democratic and 
just system for a heterogeneous society like Afghanistan.  
In addition, these representatives believe that a decentralized 
government system in which the provinces have the authority to elect 
their own governors, allocate their own budgets, and choose which 
infrastructure and development project has priority for its people. 
For example, a PC member from Balkh province asserts: 
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In my opinion, the federal system would be better for 
administrating Afghanistan. For example, if the income and 
resources of a province are spent within its own jurisdiction, 
and the governor is elected from among its own people, it is 
far better than if someone else comes from another place 
(province). A good example is governor Atta Mohammad 
Noor of Balkh, who is from among the people and a son of 
the people (from this province). He served Balkh and its 
neighboring areas well. We were witnessing when a governor 
came from other places; they did not provide good services. 
If the system changed to Federal, everyone would have the 
right to candidate himself in his own province and serve 
better.  (Interview6Bakh, 2016)  
In Balkh province in particular the PC representatives are divided 
among those who support the de-facto power control of governor 
Atta Mohammad Noor and those who are against him. The PC 
member just quoted above was among the supporters of Noor, for 
example. The supporters of Noor were among the representatives 
who gained both political and financial backing during both 
provincial elections. Since governor Atta Mohammad Noor – the 
executive chairperson of the Jamiat-e-Islami party – is, for his own 
sake, among the strong Tajik advocates for a parliamentary 
decentralization or federalism (for more on Mr. Noor, please read 
chapter four), those who are his men in the PC must follow their 
boss. 
Nevertheless, both Hazara and Uzbek members at the Balkh PC also 
favored decentralized power, however with a sharp criticism to 
Noor's monopoly. For instance, a Hazara PC member from Balkh 
noted that for a ‘multiethnic' country like Afghanistan which has 
‘serious issues' (referring to ethnic conflicts), a federal parliamentary 
system is appropriate. According to this PC member, a federal 
parliamentary system would not only solve these ‘serious issues' but 
also end warlord ‘dictatorships' (referring to governor Noor). 
According to this Uzbek representative, Noor is serving as a 
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provincial dictator, who controls the ‘administrative, military and 
financial matters of Balk' (Interview9Balkh, 2016).  
Similarly, in Bamyan, which is primarily a Hazara ethnic dominant 
province, some representatives advocate for a decentralized system 
and a few propose a federal system.  For instance, a Hazara PC 
member in this province said to the author, "around 25 years before 
Shahid (Martyred) Mazari proposed a federal system for 
Afghanistan. If one wants a real democracy to take place in 
Afghanistan, then the federal system is an appropriate one. We need 
to work for it and program it" (Interview14Bamyan, 2016). As 
mentioned earlier, in comparison to Balkh province, a majority of 
the Hazara PC members in Bamyan advocated for a gradual 
decentralization of power and were reluctant to consider a federal 
system for the time being. As a PC representative from this province 
noted: 
‘Semi-presidential or Federal systems are better than the 
unitary centralized one; however, its implementation would 
be challenging, due to current circumstances in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, for the time being, our proposal for the central 
government is to transfer certain power and authority to 
provincial levels". (Interview12Bamyan, 2016)         
 
In the significant Tajik dominant province of Herat, some PC 
members are proponents of  a semi-presidential decentralized 
system. Here a majority of the PC members agree, that a federal 
system, for the time being, is a dangerous option that would be 
challenging to implement. A Herati PC member said that although a 
non-centralized, non-unitary system is most workable in the world 
today, it is Afghanistan's geographically mingled ethnic distribution 
on one hand, and its recent decades of varying sociopolitical 
orientation on the other hand, that make it very difficult to choose a 
proper system for the country. According to him, for the time being, 
the present government (unitary centralized) needs to implement the 
‘rule of law', so that the people can get used to the relations between 
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the state and society before going to any alternative system  
(Interview19Herat, 2016). Another PC member from Herat pointed 
to the applicability of a parliamentary system, favored by a majority 
of the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan. According to this PC member, 
there is no doubt that a parliamentary system is more accountable 
than a unitary one.  However, for Afghanistan to adopt a strong 
parliamentary system, he said, we need to encounter the ground 
reality, which requires a considerable capacity for adopting such a 
system (Interview20Herat, 2016). Taking the non-party system in 
the country and the present parliament into account, a majority of its 
representations are ill-educated, warlords, and mafia affiliates.  
Some PC members demand that more power and authority be given 
to provincial councils. For instance, they want to have the right to 
advise and consent on the appointed governors' posts and the 
oversight authority over the provincial government with checks and 
balances. Moreover, some PC members, including a few non-
Pashtuns, believe that, in a federal system, only those provinces 
benefit that have a border with neighboring countries or else have 
rich mineral reserves. For example, a non-Pashtun PC member from 
Bamyan shares his concerns as follow: "Federalism is not 
appropriate for Afghanistan. It is centralization through which we 
(Bamyan province) get funds from Kabul for reconstruction and 
development. All provinces are not bordered with neighboring 
countries, neither do they have natural resources" 
(Interview13Bamyan, 2016). 
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CHAPTER 6: The Afghan Elected Provincial 
Councils and Their Role in Sub-National Gov-
ernance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The ‘new' institutionalism put weight on the significance of the 
institution not only in organizing but also in shaping and changing 
the behaviors of political actors and elites, and vice versa. As 
discussed in detail in the theoretical chapter, according to March and 
Oslo (2008), ‘institutions' "have an ordering effect on how authority 
and power is constituted, exercised, legitimated, controlled and 
redistributed" (6). Contextualizing March and Oslo's theory, this 
chapter illustrates the functions and power of Afghanistan’s elected 
provincial councils (PCs) established in 2005. The Afghan PCs are 
crystallized from such conflicting informal institutions as what 
Khalilzad (2016) would call ‘governance-spoilers' (warlords, drag-
mafia and powerful elites) and ‘governance-builders' (educated 
young technocrats and some tribal elites), who both struggle to get 
power through undermining each other's legitimacy. However, to a 
more considerable extent, the new democratic institutions, the PCs, 
are replacing the traditional power of the gun with the power of the 
vote. Although constitutionally very weak, in practice they have 
created some vibrant dynamics at the Afghan sub-national 
governance. 
Based on the field research findings, this chapter looks at the role 
and impact of these quite new institutions (PCs) on the sub-national 
formal and informal governance and government structures. In other 
words, what impact have these new institutions (PCs) had on the 
political behavior of the Afghan tribal and warlord political elites? 
Moreover, how much have these new institutions (PCs) made and 
changed the ‘political character' and ‘vision' of Afghan political 
elites both nationally and locally. Finally, what impact have the new 
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constitutionally defined formal institutions (PCs) had over the old 
traditional informal institutions (namely Shuras/Jirgas)? What new 
orders have they produced so far? 
If the successful execution of decentralization is dependent on the 
ability and accountability of sub-national democratic institutions, 
then the answers to the above questions would lead us to an 
estimation of whether the current Afghan elected PCs are institutions 
capable of taking on the load and responsibility for a possible 
decentralization.  In other words, the study of new elected provincial 
councils is significant in understanding whether the Afghan PCs 
would play a central role in accommodating a bottom-up 
(decentralization) governance in Afghanistan, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven.  
To understand the functions and role of the PCs, it is imperative to 
have a brief review here of the Afghan formal and informal 
governance structure. 
 
6.2. Part-I: Sub-national Formal and Informal Govern-
ment Institutions 
In official terms, Afghanistan has no autonomous ‘local govern-
ment’ which would be Mahali-e-Hukomat-, but instead it has Ma-
hali-e-Edara or local administration which is basically the aggrega-
tion of some key service delivery (e.g., security, education, health, 
financial and primary courts) departments of the central line sectoral 
ministries along with independent organs in provincial and some dis-
trict levels. Article 136 of the Afghan constitution, designates the 
‘province’ as the ‘local administrative unit’.  While ‘preserving the 
principle of centralism’, Article 137 calls for the ‘transfer’ of ‘nec-
essary powers, in accordance with the law’, to local administration 
(The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, Article One Hundred 
Thirty-Six & Thirty-Seven). However, until now, following the old 
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principles of centralism, all powers and authorities have been regu-
lated from the center. The diagram (1) in chapter five, depicts the de-
jure central and sub-national state structure in Afghanistan. 
The province is farther deconstructed into the district and village lev-
els, of which the latter has no official state bureaucratic structure 
(Local Governance Policy, 2010). Instead, based on informal gov-
ernance mechanisms, every village indirectly elects one representa-
tive, locally known as Malik or Arbab or Qariadar, who then works 
as a middleman between the village and the district state administra-
tion. ‘To administer city affairs’, in theory, provincial and district 
levels ‘shall’ create independent municipalities ‘through free, gen-
eral, secret and direct elections’ (The Constitution of Afghanistan, 
2004, Article One Hundred Forty-One). However, in practice the 
mayors or Sharwals have been appointed by the central government 
up until the time of writing of this dissertation. The July 2007 World 
Bank report outlined altogether 34 provinces, 399 districts, nearly 
217 city municipalities, and approximately 40,020 villages in Af-
ghanistan (World Bank, 2007, p. vi). That means 182 districts have 
no municipalities. In addition, according to the constitution, advisory 
councils should be elected at the provincial, district, and village lev-
els. Here too, until now, only elected provincial councils (PCs) have 
been established. These are discussed in detail in the following sec-
tion.   
All of the sub-national institutions mentioned above (formal and in-
formal, appointed and elected) are de-facto primarily occupied and 
controlled by interlinked powerful non-state actors, including ex-
Mujahedeen warlords, drug mafia, tribal leaders, and religious elites. 
In addition to the government's official institutions, a parallel 
shadow structure of the Taliban emirate exists in each province. De-
pending on the area, some of these institutions either cooperate or 
compete for power in each locality (in a province, a district, or a 
village). Balkh province could be a good example to explore here 
briefly. Atta Mohammed Noor – a warlord, alleged drug-mafia, and 
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executive head of the ex-Mujahedeen party – is the governor and 
solo power-holder in Balkh province. Through having extensive 
control of all central line authorities and resources to the province, 
he has not only managed to curb the Taliban to a considerable extent 
in the area of his influence, but also gained tremendous political and 
financial power. only a few members in the PC and local informal 
Shuras remain who would pose a challenge to Noor's power locally, 
whereas the rest are his own men (Interview9Balkh, 2016).  
As stated earlier, the Taliban has their own shadow government in 
each province. Since both the Uzbek Junbish party of Dostum and 
the Tajik Jamiat party of Noor in Balkh province discriminate 
against Pashtun minorities,  the Taliban gained significant sympa-
thizers in these areas.  A female PC member, who is representing 
Pashtun minorities in Balkh province, told the author that the Taliban 
control most of the district she represents. Since she cannot visit her 
district due to security risks, she says that her constituencies are ei-
ther come to Masar-e-Sharif city or reach her via phone to share their 
problems   (Interview8Balkh, 2016). The Diagram (2) below depicts 
the de-facto state institutional structure and power-sharing both at 
national and sub-national level.  
     
               Source: The above diagram (2) is created by the author.  
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In short, there is not only a constant contradiction between de-jure 
and de-facto institutional design at the sub-national level, but also 
enormous conflicts of interest between local formal and informal ac-
tors in Afghanistan. Introducing a democratic institution like Af-
ghanistan's provincial councils into the center of this discussion in 
the following sections will draw out these contradictory aspects in 
more detail.  However, before going on to the PCs, we must briefly 
discuss the formal sub-national administration (provincial and dis-
trict government) and informal governance structures or Shura/Jirga 
(councils) that have crosscutting relations and influences with the 
PCs.   
6.2.1 Provincial Governor & Administration: 
The provincial administration is the largest sub-national government 
institution in Afghanistan. Headed by the office of the governor, or 
Wali, the provincial administration is the aggregation of key sectoral 
departments of the central line ministries and of the offices of some 
independent organs including security, health, education, and the 
primary courts. In theory, the Wali, who is directly appointed and 
supervised by the president, is the coordinating chairperson of the 
sub-national administration. In other words, while sectoral depart-
ments are under direct control and supervision of the central line 
ministries, the Wali is to make sure the programs and projects are 
implemented accordingly (Local Governance Policy, 2010, p. 157). 
For example, the education ministry’s directorate Reyasat-e-Maaref 
has an office in every province that is responsible for administering 
educational matters at the provincial level. While Reyasat-e-Maaref 
is under the direct planning, budgeting, and implementation author-
ity of the education ministry, the Wali oversees and coordinates its 
programs.  
224 
 
Being a direct representative to the president on the one hand, and 
having the all-inclusive influence on the formal and informal insti-
tutions and actors in the province, on the other, Wali is the second 
most attractive political post after ministerial one. Although, in the-
ory, they are assigned only a coordinating role, in practice, their 
functions and authorities vary according to their political back-
ground and who they are. During the past sixteen years, very often 
Walis have been strong warlords or their close affiliates, who run 
provincial affairs according to how it best serves their personal and 
group interests. A detailed discussion on de-facto provincial govern-
ance of the six visited provinces is provided elsewhere in this chap-
ter. 
The sub-national government administrations were under the direct 
organizational structure of the Ministry of Interior, until they were 
transferred to a newly established the Independent Directorate of Lo-
cal Governance (IDLG) in August 2007. The creation of the IDLG 
by President Hamid Karzai aimed not only at strengthening sub-na-
tional government institutions through good governance mecha-
nisms  (Independent Directorate of Local Governance , 2018), but 
also at bringing the Walis, Wuleswals (district governors) and 
Sharwals (mayors) under his direct control and supervision. The es-
tablishment of the IDLG was part of Afghanistan's National Devel-
opment Strategy (ANDS), also known as the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), drafted in 2006 as a pilot project until it was 
officially applied as a state national strategy in 2008. ANDS is 
aligned with the United Nation's Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG), aimed at bringing ‘security, governance, the rule of law, 
Human Rights, economic and social development' to the sub-na-
tional regions of the country (Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS), 2008-2013, p. i & 63). While sub-national service 
delivery programs are planned, supervised, and paid from the central 
government sectoral ministries, the IDLG manages the appointments 
procedure for provincial and district governors and city mayors –  
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also known as the first-grade officers –  for the president (Saltmarshe 
& Medhi, Local Governance in Afghanistan, A View from the 
Ground, June 2011, pp. 19-20).  The IDLG also pays the remunera-
tion and covers the costs of the office and the stuff of the first-grade 
officers.  In return, the first-grade officers are required to report to 
the office of the president through the IDLG  (Local Governance 
Policy, 2010). In short, besides being responsible for drafting local 
governance relevant policies and strategies, the IDLG acts as the li-
aison office for sub-national governance administration to the presi-
dent.   
Until the time of writing of this dissertation, the sub-national gov-
ernance administration has been regulated by a local governance law 
issued by the Taliban emirate in August 2000 (Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2018). A new draft on local 
governance is under process, and expected to be sent to the National 
Assembly for discussion in the near future50.   In 2010, the Afghan 
government, through the IDLG, drafted a ‘local governance policy’ 
aiming to define the sub-national governance’s institutions’ author-
ity and job descriptions (Local Governance Policy, 2010), which was 
copied from the Taliban emirate law on local administration govern-
ance. It outlines an extensive list of vague and overlapping duties 
and responsibilities.    
When it comes to public service delivery, the Afghan government is 
neither technically nor budgetarily capable of affording and imple-
menting programs and projects at the sub-national level. Therefore, 
international donor organizations have funded the majority of the 
central line ministries' projects and programs. In other cases, donor 
organizations directly implemented some programs and projects. 
 
                                                          
50 This information is provided based on a telephone conversation with Abdul 
Hamid Sahak, director at the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Im-
plementation of Constitution (ICOIC), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, date: 
February 6, 2018.  
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In November 2005, the Afghan government issued the establishment 
of the Provincial Development Councils (PDCs) (The Asia 
Foundation, April 2007, p. 18) in order to coordinate the Interna-
tional donor organizations' development programs with the govern-
ment sectoral departments.  The PDC's are supposed to hold monthly 
meetings. Chaired by the Wali, the PDCs' members include heads of 
the sectoral departments, chairmen of the provincial council, 
mayors, district governors, donor community members, and repre-
sentatives of civil society  (Local Governance Policy, 2010). Since 
the withdrawal of the international combat troops from Afganistan 
in 2014, a majority of the international donors' funds have dried up. 
Hence, the PDCs as ad-hoc committees have lost their significance 
for the local government structure.  
 
6.2.2 District Government: 
Presently, the district administration is the lowest official state insti-
tution in Afghanistan. Its administration encompasses a few third-
grade sectoral offices of the central line ministries including, a police 
department, population registration, and prosecutor offices and an 
elementary court. Like the Wali at the province level, the Woleswal 
(the district governor) chairs the district administration. Neverthe-
less, a Woleswal is more a political representative of the Wali and 
the president for directly engaging with local people through infor-
mal community councils. Although the Woleswal’s signature is re-
quired in all the local bureaucratic documentation, he/she has limited 
authority over sectoral departments. Unlike Wali, the Woleswal is a 
civil servant post, appointed by the IDLG with the consent of the 
provincial governor (Local Governance Policy, 2010, pp. 84-85). 
Nevertheless, in practice, like at the provincial level, the functions 
and authority of district level governance also depend on who is 
holding the post. In this case, if a provincial governor is a prominent 
strongman, then he makes sure to appoint his own men to the pro-
vincial seat. In southern and eastern Afghanistan, a majority of the 
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districts are controlled by the Taliban, who rule the area, either in 
cooperation or competition with the Afghan government 51.   
The district offices are under direct administrative structure and con-
trol of the provincial departments of the central line ministries 
(Saltmarshe & Medhi, Local Governance in Afghanistan, 2011). 
Like at the province level, the Afghan constitution calls for the es-
tablishment of elected councils at the district and village level too. 
However, due to undetermined boundaries at the district level and 
technical issues at voting registration centers, elections for the 2010 
district councils were postponed to an unspecified date in the future 
(Katzman, 2013). Instead since 2003, the Ministry of Rural Rehabil-
itation and Development (MRRD) through its National Solidarity 
Program (NSP) created informal Community Development Councils 
(CDCs) (Nixon, 2008, p. 16). Since CDCs are interlinked with infor-
mal Shuras, they will be briefly discussed in the following section.  
6.2.3 Informal Governance of Jirgas and Shuras  
Jirga in Pashtu, Shura52 in Dari, literally means community council, 
and provides the basis for local informal governance institutions at 
the village, district and provincial levels in Afghanistan. Histori-
cally, the Jirga is as old as the Pashtun tribal system. It is a gathering 
of well-respected males aiming at finding a consensus on significant 
family, clan, community and sub-tribal, and tribal disputes. Pashtuns 
Jirgas are managed through their own codes of values knowns as 
Pashtunwali, whereas the non-Pashtun Shuras run according to their 
local community norms. However, both comprise the traditional Is-
lamic law ‘Sharia’ that is then mixed with local tribal and non-tribal 
                                                          
51 During his visits and encounter with people and the officials (both Afghan 
government and the Taliban), the author witnessed districts in Kabul, 
Nangarhar, Herat and Kandahar provinces that were either under Taliban or 
government control or contested between the two. 
52 Shura, which is derived from Arabic, means council and has its base in Islamic 
principles. During the anti-Soviet Jihad, this term entered into Afghan sociopo-
litical context (Glatzer, Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal 
Disintegration?, 1998, p. 176). Today, its use is widespread in the Dari language 
in Afghanistan. 
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ethnic customary norms (Management Systems International (MSI), 
2005, pp. 3-4).  
There is no permanent chairmanship nor membership to informal 
Jirga/Shura, and its members are constantly changing. In some part, 
there exists a sort of permanent institution, while in others, it works 
as an ad-hoc committee, that comes and goes based on need and the 
type of issue.  Bernt Glatzer   (1998) notes that ‘every free and ex-
perienced male person of the tribe has the right to attend, to speak 
and to decided’ in Jirga, and that the ‘Jirgas traditionally have nei-
ther leaders nor chairmen’ (p. 176). Glatzer's observation is correct 
to a considerable extent, and in a sense that there are no permanent 
leaders of a Jirga. However, in practice, usually one or few well-
respected elders chair the sessions, and the rest of participants listen, 
and occasionally share their concerns and ideas. Furthermore, there 
have always been influential men, as Khans, Maliks or Bigs who play 
a leading role in arranging such Jirgas. The Russian invasion and its 
subsequent civil war produced yet another figure, the Jihadi com-
mander, into the lists of local influential men and significantly 
changed the structure, role and functions of Afghan Jirgas and 
Shuras53. Unlike its traditional structure –  in which mostly religious 
or well-respected senior men chaired the decision-making at the 
Jirga/Shuras –  today, a young warlord, due to his militia and eco-
nomic power, decides the outcomes of an issue. 
As stated earlier, in its small and local scale, the Jirga and Shuras 
are primarily practiced for community disputes purposes. Even 
though they are not always just, because the local Jirgas/Shuras are 
quick and have stable results, people often prefer to bring their prob-
lems to them instead to the state judicial system. It is also the case 
                                                          
53 The author attended several local Jirgas and witnessed how powerful war-
lords influenced the sitting and even the decisions of these councils. In some ar-
eas, the warlords used Jirgas to legitimize their illicit activities during the civil 
war. For example, people had to pay Osher (tax) to the so-called Mujahideen 
during the civil war. 
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that the state judicial system does not exist in each locality, and when 
it does, it is often corrupt. Besides, conflict parties abide by the de-
cisions of a Jirga/Shura as much as they would by the verdicts of the 
state courts. Furthermore, culturally, it is humiliatingfor a family or 
clan if their conflict reaches the governmental court. 
In its higher and more representative mode, the Jirga/Shura is used 
as a political link between the state and a tribe or ethnic group. It is, 
in this political context, that the role of Khans, Maliks or Begs be-
come significant to the state. At the sub-national level, both the Wa-
lis and Wuliswals are critical state representatives, who are in direct 
contact with the local Jirga/Shura. Both ex-President Hamid Karzai 
and the current President Ghani regularly accept large groups of rep-
resentatives of these informal institutions in Arg (presidential place) 
not only listening to their issues, but also hoping to win their support 
and legitimacy locally54. During the field research of this study, the 
author observed that after Woleswals and Walies, the elected Provin-
cial Councils (PCs) are becoming a second important institution for 
interaction for the Jirgas/Shuras. That means, when an issue is be-
yond the scope and capacity of the local Jirga/Shura, it is often re-
ferred to the PC. Through its tools of influence, the PC first attempts 
to solve the issue internally. However, if it is beyond their capacity 
or power, then, on behalf of the informal Jirga/Shura, they contact 
the relevant local and central government institutions (for more on 
this, please visit the PC service delivery title). The main reasons this 
works are the easy accessibility of the PC and the cross-cutting mem-
bership and interactions with the Jirgas/Shuras. 
The 2004 constitution also calls on the establishment of elected 
councils in villages and districts. However, as noted above, these in-
stitutions are not yet established. (On page 206, District government) 
                                                          
54. The author also attended a local Jirga in Kandahar province, where due to 
their land disputes with the government, the members decided to bring their is-
sue directly to the president in Kabul (for more on this, please visit the Provin-
cial Councils section). 
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It is a question for future research to find out how these institutions 
would interact and evolve.  
Nevertheless, since early 2002, the Afghan government together 
with its international partners constantly put forth efforts to modern-
ize both formal and informal institutions, by introducing interna-
tional standard good governance mechanisms through their recon-
struction and development programs and projects. Using these pro-
grams and projects as an incentive, efforts have been put in place to 
reform local informal Jirgas/Shuras.  In mid-2003, the World Bank, 
together with the Afghan government, initiated the Community De-
velopment Councils (CDCs) in order to mobilize local communities 
to participate actively in a rural reconstruction and poverty reduction 
program, thereby establishing state legitimacy (Calder & Hakimi, 
2009, p. 13). Under its National Solidarity Program (NSP) the CDCs 
were embedded at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation (MRRD) of 
Afghanistan (Saltmarshe & Medhi, Local Governance in 
Afghanistan, 2011). According to a CDC member in Nangarhar 
province, the CDCs were primarily built upon the already existing 
Afghan informal traditional village and community councils of 
Jirgas/Shuras. That means the traditional community councils were 
reformed through introducing new structures and democratic and 
somewhat inclusive mechanisms. The CDCs are to create a decision-
making board of members directly elected by the local community, 
and made more revolutionary by including females. The board is 
then divided into different committees, comprising of the budget, 
procurement and administrative (Interview33Nangrahar, 2016). 
Through block grants, the CDCs can conduct small-scale projects 
including providing drinking water, sanitation, bridges and roads 
(Interview34Bamyan, Author`s interview with a Community 
Development Councils member in Bamyan province, Afghanistan, 
2016).  
Based on Future Generation Graduate School’s research, the CDCs 
had significant positive outcomes between 2003-2006. According to 
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this paper, the CDCs have ‘undoubtedly contributed to local stabil-
ity, community reconstruction, inclusive governance, and participa-
tory development’ (Calder & Hakimi, 2009, p. 25). However, the 
increasing insecurity limited the work of CDCs. Among others, the 
expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) accorss the 
country resulted in delegtimazing the CDCs’ performance. The 
PRTs were civil-miliatry units of the U.S. and Coaliation troops that 
conducted reconstruction projects in rural Afghan communites – a 
stratigy to win local support after minilitary operations. Since the 
CDCs worked closly with the PRTs, they were targeted by the insur-
gents, who accused them of being propaganda programs of the Af-
ghan state and its coalition partners (Calder & Hakimi, 2009, p. 26).  
Moreover, based on the present research, the CDCs functions were 
significantly dependent on donor funds. Following the withdrawal 
of the international cambats troops in 2014 which also resulted in 
reduced development aid,  caused the unpopularity of the CDCs. 
Several CDCs members interviewed in this study reported that when 
there is no project there is no CDC. Local people returned to their 
traditional structures of local Jirgas and Shuras to solve their issues  
(Interview33Nangrahar, 2016).   
There is no doubt that the Afghan informal governance institutions 
of Jirgas/Shuras require substantial reforms due to their outdated 
mechanisms, the female discriminative structures, and in some in-
stances their taking actions that violate human-rights. Nevertheless, 
any reform or substitution needs local legitimacy in order to be sus-
tainable. Because of their dependence on foreign aid, and a lack of 
state constitutional support, neither the CDCs nor the PRTs proved 
able to gain local legitimacy and so were unsustainable. Therefore, 
taking the successful PCs example into account, instead of investing 
in temporary councils and ad-hoc committees, the Afghan govern-
ment, and the international community could facilitate the formation 
of the district (DC) and village councils (VC). The 2004 constitution 
already assures the establishment of democratic DCs and VCs across 
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the country. Like PCs, the women participation could be maintained 
through reserved quotas set up by subsequent laws. Regulated by 
consistent rules and mechanisms, the roles and duties of CDCs and 
Jirga/Shuras could also be transformed to DCs. This way, the Afghan 
government, and the international community would not only plant 
sustainable democracy, but it would also improve security, govern-
ance, the rule of law, and eventually win local legitimacy and stabil-
ity. 
 
PART II: Sub-National Democratic Institutions 
in Afghanistan 
 
 
6.3 The Afghan Elected Provincial Councils  
The Walayti-Shura "provincial council" in Pashtu or Shura-e-
Walayti "council of the province" in Dari language is the first sub-
national representative body at the province level – embedded in the 
provincial government structure – which has a long history in the 
sociopolitical context of Afghanistan. In a modern state-building 
attempt in 1923, King Amanullah formed provincial (PCs) and 
district councils (DCs) for the first time as part of local government 
administrations in Afghanistan  ( Constitution of Afghansitan, 1923). 
However, articles 40 and 41 of the first Afghan constitution (1923) 
designated that half of the members be elected and the other half 
appointed, and so did not create those PCs as fully democratic 
institutions. It was the 1964 Monarch constitution which for the first 
time allowed provincial councils and municipalities to be elected 
through ‘free, universal, direct and secret election’. Nevertheless, 
they were strongly dependent on local government administrations, 
and  only played an advisory role to the provincial administration 
(Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964, Articles. 109 &111). Since the 
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2004 constitution is simply a copy (with slight amendments) of the 
1964 constitution, it did not present anything new to these elected 
bodies, except that they were extended to the district and village 
levels. However, it does slightly loosen central government control 
over local administration as Article 137 states: 
The government, in preserving the principles of centralism, 
shall transfer necessary powers, in accordance to the law, to 
local administrations in order to accelerate and improve 
economic, social as well as cultural matters, and foster 
peoples' participation in developing national life.  (The 
Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, Article. 137) 
That means, if power and authority is transferred through subsequent 
laws, it should be to the provincial and district administrations rather 
than to the elected PCs and DCs, which are politically appointed 
positions (the Wali and the Wuleswals) from the center. 
Articles 138 and 140 of the 2004 Afghan constitution call for the 
formation of councils in the province, district and village levels 
"through free, general, secret as well as direct elections" (The 
Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, Article 138 & 140).  
Article 139 of the 2004 constitution describes PCs` functions as 
following:  
The provincial council shall participate in the attainment of 
the development objectives of the state and improvements of 
the affairs of the province in the manner prescribe(d) by the 
laws, and shall advise the provincial administration on 
related issues. The provincial assembly council shall perform 
its duties with the cooperation of the provincial 
administration.  (The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, 
Article. 139)  
  
The first Afghan PCs were formed in September 2005 (Wilder, 
2005). Two years later came the law on the provincial council, which 
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provided nothing but a long list55 of vague functions which could be 
summed up as representation, conflict resolution, consultation, and 
oversight duties   (Law on Provincial Councils, 2007). The law on 
PC tasks its members to form several sectoral working-committees 
through which they could oversee and advise respective local 
government institutions on key service delivery and development 
activities. Ad-hoc committees could be formed based on needs (Law 
on Provincial Councils, 2007). The number of working committees 
depends on the density of the local government institutions in a 
province. For example, the PC in Kabul with 3356 members, is the 
largest in the country and has a total of nine working committees. 
Bamyan among the smallest provinces in this study has nine 
members and four working committees which are adjusted according 
to the central government line ministries or public service sectoral 
departments. Themes allocated in these committees include security, 
health, education, culture, finance, good governance, reconstruction, 
women affairs, and dispute settlement. Despite their daily 
attendance, the PC members meet twice a month for a grand session 
to report, discuss and decide on the most significant policy issues at 
the province level.  
However, both the constitution and its later assigned law failed to 
deliver clear decision-making authorities to PCs so that they could 
effectively assure good governance by the government institutions 
at the provincial level. The controversial overseeing/monitoring 
authority (see also oversight authority section) is not accompanied 
by legal checks and balances, nor does it have a clear implementing 
mechanism. 
According to the 2007 assessment by The Asia Foundation, the 
central government together with its National Assembly believes 
that the delivery of more power to the PCs is in contradiction to the 
very idea of a unitary centralized state system. The study also quoted 
                                                          
55 For the Law on Provincial Councils please see Box 1  
56 From the author`s notes from field interviews with the PC members 
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civil society concerns that empowering PCs would lead to 
supporting elitism and warlordism as many councils are strongly 
dominated by these groups (The Asia Foundation, 2007). Taking the 
present de-facto Afghan sub-national governance into consideration 
this argument has weight to a large extent. However, it could also be 
seen as a way to justify the central government’s avoidance of its 
responsibility to mobilize sub-national institutions.           
In the early days of its establishment, the PCs were very unpopular 
as most of the members knew little about their new jobs (Hamish, 
2008). The existence of parallel development councils by the 
international aid organizations and the ISAF`s PRTs also 
overshadowed the PCs role in their communities. Until late 2014, the 
PCs were under the budgetary structure of their provincial 
governments. The provincial administrations, which are sub-
national institutions appointed by the central government, are often 
reluctant to cooperate with PCs. Nevertheless, despite their very 
little de-jure power and financial resources, the PCs have gradually 
managed to find their place within their constituencies and, in recent 
years, to challenge the central and provincial governments.       
The PC members also gained momentum when they came to realize 
that they could deliver more than just dispute resolution in their 
communities. The third round elected PC representatives 
collectively demanded their oversight authority which had been 
withdrawn by the legislative house (Wolesi-Jirga) (for more detail 
please read The Oversight Authority of the Afghan PCs) in late 2013.  
In following pages, the author will discuss the provincial councils – 
the de-facto and de-jure power, and their role and responsibilities. 
Primarily based on the field research interviews and observations, 
the author will also summarize the key achievements and challenges 
of this emerging elected institution in Afghanistan. 
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Box 1. The Law on Provincial Councils  
Article 2: The Provincial Councils shall function as an elective assem-
bly with the objective of creating a structure for partnership and par-
ticipation of people and Civil Society institutions with State Administra-
tion at the provincial level, and counselling and overseeing the provin-
cial offices on related affairs.  
Article 4: The Provincial Council shall have the following duties and 
authorities:  
1. Participate in determining the development objectives of government 
such as economic, social, health, education, environment, reconstruc-
tion, and contribute to improve other affairs of the related province.   
2. Provide consultation on effective usage of financial resourses of the 
province and oversee them.   
3. Participate in settlement of ethnic and local disputes through holding 
of amendatory assemblies (Jirgas).  
4. Provide consultation to design the development plan of province and 
anticipated plan and approve them before proposing to government.  
5. Participate actively and in possible ways in elimination of the cus-
toms and traditions contrary to the law and Islamic Sharia such as 
forced marriages, exchange of females for settlement of disputes etc., 
and efforts to ensure Human Rights.  
6. Visit the areas lacking freedom after reporting to the related author-
ities, analyze and evaluate the actions of law enforcement bodies, and 
provide related report to provincial administration.  
7. Participate actively and effectively to ban the poppy cultivation, drug 
and narcotic production and addiction to them by providing awareness 
regarding the danger of using these substances, attracting the cooper-
ation of people and institutions involved in campaign against drugs and 
its addition.   
8. Acquire information on the proceedings and work plan of the provin-
cial administration and related branches and provide written report to 
the National Council. 
9. Appraise the development plan and annual expenditure process of 
provincial administration, and provide information to the respective in-
habitants of the province through media. 
10. Participate effectively in protection of environmental damages like 
trees from being cut and protect wildlife and birds from being killed.  
11. Promote the participation of Provincial Councils in establishing 
better coordination with district and local villages’ councils.  
12. Participate actively in protecting the general public’s property from 
illegal occupation by the support of the related authorities  
Source: Hamish, N. (2008). Subnational  Statebuilding in Afghanistan. 
Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.   
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6.3.1 The Oversight Authority of the Afghan PCs 
In 2005, when the elected PC members sat for the first time after 
more than two and half decades of war and displacement, they had 
very little knowledge of their new role and responsibilities (Hamish, 
2008). Since there was no law on established PCs, the president had 
to issue a decree to regulate these elected bodies (Ruttig, 2014). Af-
ter two years of its establishment, the first PC law was endorsed in 
March 2007. Article two of the PC law give elected representatives 
the right to ‘consult and oversee the provincial administrations on 
related affairs,' and again article four says the PCs ‘shall consult and 
oversee the province on effective use of financial resourses'  (The 
Law on Provincial Council, 2007, pp. 1-3). Although, the wording 
Mashwara ‘consultation' and Nezarat ‘Oversight' were mentioned in 
the PC law, the Afghan legislators and government officials were 
reluctant to take the PC members seriously in their oversight author-
ity. Likewise, the functions endorsed by the PC law that are key to 
good governance in subnational government institutions have re-
mained controversial and undefined until today. There is neither a 
clear mechanism under which the PCs could practice their oversight 
power, nor does the law say which sectors or services of the local 
government shall be monitored, or how and when the advice should 
be given. The PC members also lack the know-how of any over-all 
oversight mechanism; therefore, they simply apply a self-style pro-
cedure. 
In early 2014, to highlight their oversight authority in the PC law, 
the Afghan PC members lobbied for a new bill in the Wolesi Jirga 
"legislative house of the national assembly" with the support of the 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). The new bill 
was composed of two major proposals: (1) PCs shall have the au-
thority to oversee local government`s service delivery, budget 
spending and the implementation of the development projects and, 
(2) bringing the PCs under IDLG which is an executive organ itself, 
directly supervised by the president. Some representatives believed 
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that since the PCs are financially dependent on provincial governors, 
moving to IDLG would give them more freedom  (Jawed, 2015), and 
the ability to use their oversight authority strictly. Not surprisingly, 
the opposite happened. The Wolesi Jirga amended the law and with-
drew the oversight authority by omitting the Nezarat ‘oversight' 
wording altogether. Some legislators feared to lose the monopoly of 
power in their provinces if they would hand over this key accounta-
bility tool to the PCs  (Ruttig, The Butter on the Bread: The 
Provincial Councils` fight for extended authority, 2014).  In Septem-
ber 2014, when the new PCs took over the office, they raised the 
oversight issue once again. The PCs chairmen of the 34 provinces 
met in Kabul and organized large street protests in the capital and 
other major provinces, demanding that the central government return 
their oversight authority (Interview4Nangrahar, Author`s Interview 
with the PC member in Jalalabad, Nangrahar Afghanistan, 2016).  
Despite their strikes and lobbying efforts, the demand has been 
rejected once again by the Wolesi Jirga (Ruttig, The Butter on the 
Bread: The Provincial Councils` fight for extended authority, 2014).  
Since two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga is composed of the PCs 
members, it gave them the chance to return the amended law to the 
Wolesi Jirga for reconsideration. According to the 2004 constitution, 
each PC shall send one of its members to the Meshrano Jirga (upper-
house of the national assembly) for four years from all 34 provinces 
(see also National Assembly section). Since the district councils DCs 
are not yet established; therefore each PC sends two of its members 
based on internal consensus to the Meshrano Jirga  (The Constitution 
of Afghanistan, 2004). It gives PCs the chance to communicate their 
problems quickly with the central government and the Wolesi Jirga 
through Meshrano Jirga of the Afghan parliament. 
Through many joint sessions of both houses` committees, finally, the 
Wolesi Jirga was convinced to approve the new bill on October 2014 
(Qaane, 2015).  The legislative procedure required the bill to be sent 
to the president for signing - to turn it into law. By then Ashraf Ghani 
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was freshly seated as the president of the unity government. 
Surprisingly enough, Ghani too, rejected the bill, claiming that 
delivering more power to the PCs would increase corruption at the 
local government level. The Wolesi Jirga also took advantage of the 
dilemma and approved the old version of the bill which did not 
include the oversight wording at all (Jawid, 2015) (Qaane, 2015). 
Not only ordinary Afghans, but government officials too, believe 
that empowering PCs would lead to decentralization of power which 
goes against the very idea of a centralized state system (The Asia 
Foundation, 2007). 
The president’s rejection of the bill united the PCs even more than 
before. Pouring into the streets in Kabul and other big cities, the PC 
members across the country called their strike once again. As one 
PC member in Balkh noted, they closed the PCs` doors as a sign of 
protest and marched on the streets of Kabul for several days until 
they made president Ghani reconsider his decision 
(Interview7Balkh, 2016). In March 2015, president Ghani issued an 
‘administrative decree’ 57, in which he endorsed the 2007 PC law 
back to power. In his very detailed article on Afghan PC to 
Afghanistan Annalists Network, Qanne noted that issuing an 
administrative degree instead of a legislative one is less powerful and 
didn’t solve the issue in the long run. According to Qanne, the 
Wolesi Jirga must vote to pass the decree in order to turn it into a 
proper law. Such a vote looks like a no-go situation for the legislators 
in the near future (2015). 
                                                          
57 Box 2 is a copy and translation of the president Ashraf Ghani decree. 
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President Ghani also tasked the IDLG to draft a rule of the procedure 
through which the oversight authority could be implemented. 
According to Hasht-e Subh ‘8 AM’ – a Kabul-based daily 
newspaper, on August 2015 the IDLG came up with a draft in which 
it illustrated the do and don'ts for the PCs regarding their oversight 
authority. The draft says that PCs could oversee the provincial 
government activities and provide necessary recommendations. 
Likewise, the PCs are required to submit their oversight report to the 
IDLG and share it with the people. It also notes that in case the 
recommendations submitted by the PCs are not taken seriously by 
the local government, the IDLG and other relevant organs would act 
accordingly. This tactic of the president Ghani ostensibly returned 
their power to the PCs and cut the WJ hands off the issue. Since 
Box 2. Presidential Decree on Provincial Councils  
No: 867 
Date: 13/12/1393 (4 March 2015) 
Decree  
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
About the Oversight Authorities of the Provincial Councils  
Article 0ne: The Provincial Councils shall implement oversight author-
ity according to the previously published Provincial Law in the official 
Gessate issue number (920), date 30 Hamal 1386 (19 April 2007).  
Article Two: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance shall 
facilitate the implementation of the authorities mentioned in the first 
article of this decree in the relevant provinces.  
Article Three: This decree shall be implemented from the date of its 
issue.  
 
Signed by 
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani  
The President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
  
 
Source: Translated by the author, for the original copy, please refer to the An-
nex 2.  
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provincial governor posts are political ones, and the IDLG is only 
processing administrative work, the PCs oversight results and 
recommendations would most probably end up in the IDLGs 
dustbin. This leaves media outlets as the only effective pressure 
mechanism left with the PCs. The PC regularly uses the local Radio 
and TV stations, as well as Social Media, particularly Facebook, for 
making their concerns and appeals public.  In the meantime, the draft 
also warns the PC members to abstain from interfering and 
influencing the local government civil servants' appointments, 
contracting, and judicial affairs (Roye, 2015).  
After all these restless efforts, the PCs failed to achieve what they 
expected at the beginning. Oversight authority through 
administrative decree with no proper legal checks and balances still 
lacks teeth. The procedure in the IDLG’s draft, authorized by 
President Ghani, looks more like the president monitoring the PCs 
than the PCs monitoring local government institutions. The IDLG`s 
draft clearly exposes President Ghani`s mistrust of the PCs. 
President Ghani`s reluctance to issue a free hand to the PC is due to 
the high dominance of local corrupt warlords and militiamen, who 
by gaining more power would advocate for their personal interests 
rather than acting as a watchdog on the local government system. At 
the time of conducting this research, many PC members shared their 
belief that the president and the Wolesi Jirga had betrayed them and 
that their oversight role is mor symbolic than a real decision-making 
authority. The strong centralization of power also demoralized 
visionary democrats who have local popular support and are 
committed to fighting corruption in local government institutions. A 
female PC member from Bamyan shared her concerns as follows: 
I am representative of the provincial council, but not able to 
meet the needs of my people. In comparison to the needs and 
pain of my people, the power and authority of the provincial 
councils are nothing. Based on the present authority, I cannot 
work for my people at any level, and it is a moral pain for 
me. Because of this, I am continuously at a moral fight with 
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myself. Exactly, for this reason, I am not willing to candidate 
myself for the next term.  (Interview15Bamyan, 2016)  
Nevertheless, the struggle for more power seems to continue - as the 
PC members are getting more confident in their duties and aware of 
their de-facto power through local popular support. Local people 
have started trusting PC members more than other politicians as they 
are the only easily accessible authorities who could mediate their 
problems with local and in some cases even central government 
bureaucrats and officials (see also PC`s de-facto duties section). 
It is worth mentioning that the IDLG is playing a significant role in 
educating the PC members by providing regular capacity building 
programs on their duties and responsibilities. Many representatives 
interviewed during this research responded that the PC is a 
provincial parliament at the local level and that it should be 
empowered and respected equally as that of the national assembly. 
A very influential elected representative from Nangrahar province 
said that the given oversight authority is useless unless sound check 
and balances accompany it. He went further and claimed that the 
central government imposes both the governor and municipal leaders 
on Nangrahar province which is undemocratic. According to him, 
the PCs should have the power to approve or disapprove the central 
government appointees to prevent corruption at the local government 
level (Interview5Nangrahar, 2016). Similarly, a PC member from 
Balkh province emphasized that in order to end the "fiefdom" of 
governor Atha Mohammad Noor they require the central 
government to deliver them the authority to advise and consent on 
provincial high-ranking appointments (Interview9Balkh, 2016). 
Another PC member from Balkh province argued: "the advisory 
role, in my opinion, is not an authority because if there is a will, it 
could be accepted otherwise not… if we prefer democracy, then 
governor and municipal should be elected" (Interview10Balkh, 
2016).  The Lower-house of the National Assembly seems to be the 
inspiring institution for most of the PC members when it comes to 
how things should function. The phrases like “the PC is a parliament 
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at the provincial level", and "we want similar power and rights as 
that of the lower house of the national assembly" repeatedly 
mentioned by the member of the PCs in all six provinces. The PC 
members repeatedly demanded the power to approve or disapprove 
the governor and other high provincial bureaucrats in the same way 
that the lower house members advise and consent power on state 
ministers and other high-ranking officials. Moreover, they demand 
similar rights and incentives as that of the Wolsey Jirga members 
(Interview10Balkh, 2016), (Interview5Nangrahar, 2016) & 
(InterviewGroupDiscussion32Kandahar, 2016). It clearly indicates 
that PCs in Afghanistan are finding their place in the local social and 
political sphere. 
 
6.3.2 Conflict Resolution Role    
Historically subnational government institutions in Afghanistan 
have relied heavily on local informal councils for resolving local 
community issues such as disputes on the property, water, 
family/clan, etc. (see also informal councils section). Today too, due 
to pervasive corruption and insufficient government institutions, 
disputes are most often settled through local informal Jirga/Shura 
(councils) before going to the local courts. On the one hand, PCs are 
gradually taking over this role from the informal councils at the 
provincial level, as is supported by the law. However limited, the 
PC`s monitoring authority puts them in a better position than the 
informal councils, since they are legally empowered bodies who can 
pressure the local government if it avoids cooperating. On the other 
hand, since formal district and village councils are not yet formed, 
the informal Jirgas/Shuras still predominantly function as before. 
Usually, collective issues/conflicts are first discussed in village or 
district Jirga/Shura before being referred to the PCs (See an example 
in Box 3 below).  In southern Kandahar province hundreds of people 
in the form of groups – which usually represents informal tribal 
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Jirgas/Shuras from rural districts - pass their issues on to the PC58. 
The PC sessions function somewhat like a typical court hearing but 
are less organized.  The internal rule of procedure is somewhat based 
on the Pashtunwali code of conduct in Pashtun dominant districts 
and on a mixture of Sharia and local traditions in the non-Pashtun 
areas (see informal governance section). The PC members sit in the 
corner of a large room, the chairmen in the middle with the vice-
chairmen at both sides, at the other corners individuals and groups 
report their problems, one after another. A large queue of individuals 
and groups wait outside in the provincial council building or in 
waiting rooms. The appeals usually include land arrogation by the 
local strongmen, murder cases between families/clans, petitions 
against district government officials, and so on. After listening to the 
involved parties in the conflict (unless only one side is present), the 
chairman asks the respective committee to take charge of the case. If 
there is no relevant committee in which the issue could be handled, 
they form an ad-hoc one on the spot. If the petition is against or with 
the government, the committee follows up the case with the relevant 
government institutions through both personal and official 
interactions. Depending on the level of power, sometimes local 
government officials are summoned to the grand meetings, a practice 
copied from the upper and lower houses of the National Assembly. 
Usually smaller conflicts such as family/clan ones are resolved on 
the spot by charging a fine if one of the parties should violate the 
decision made by the PC session. 
With a slightly less structured setting than Kandahar, the conflict 
resolution procedure works somewhat similar in Kabul, Balkh, 
Nangrahar, Bamyan and Herat provinces. However, as mentioned in 
the informal governance section, its application and setting vary, 
based on local tribal and non-tribal ethnic customary codes and rules 
of procedure. 
                                                          
58 Author`s notes from attending one of the general sessions of the PC in Kanda-
har. 
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 Box-3: Kandahar PC settle a conflict: 
During a general session, An elderly man, on behalf of a group of tribal 
elders from  Jeray district of Kandahar province said: "Haji Rais Sahib 
(Mr. Chairman) we are a group of elders from Jeray district of Kanda-
har. It is around 20 to 25 years ago that we seized a piece of government 
land - each 15 to 20 acres per family - on a hillside where we built houses 
and harvest the rest for our needs every year. Recently the district gov-
ernment is warning us that we should either lease these properties from 
the government or leave. Mr.  Chairman, we: male, female, and children 
under terrible circumstances spent millions of AFs at our own expense 
to build these houses, harvest gardens, and dig wells for irrigation. We 
told the officials that they could charge us taxes, and we will pay, but we 
will never lease these properties from the government or leave even if 
they threaten us with death. We do not have a place to go. This is our 
land, and we lived here all these years.   
After listening to the comments of a few PC members, the Chairman 
asked: "But you know that these properties belong to the government. 
Did you share this matter with the (provincial) governor?” 
The elderly man replied: "Yes, we did share this matter with the gover-
nor, but he said that this is the central government order that all the 
government properties should be returned back to the government. Our 
argument is, when the government applies this rule to all 18 districts in 
Kandahar, then we will also obey the order, but now this is happening 
only with us. Mr. Chairman, we voted for you, and you are our repre-
sentative, and we want you to help us in this matter; otherwise, we intend 
to prepare a group of 200 to 500 elders and go to Kabul to meet the 
president."   
The Chairman: "We heard your problem, we will assign a committee to 
talk to the governor first, and if he makes trouble then we will meet with 
the president and talk about the issue. For the time being you return to 
your district and we will make sure that nobody makes trouble for you 
until there is a lasting solution found to the problem." 
Source:  author`s notes during a PC general session: The above note is a 
summary of a case discussed in a PC general session in Kandahar prov-
ince. 
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6.3.3 De-Facto Service Delivery: (The Catalytic Role at Local 
Bureaucracy)  
As stated earlier, by law the PCs have no executive power, and their 
oversight authority lacks implementing mechanisms, including 
corresponding checks and balances. However, through their 
patronage relations/influence, the PC members built a catalytic 
reputation at local bureaucracies among its local constituencies. 
Administrative corruption and complicated bureaucracies make it 
nearly impossible for local citizens to have their work done on time 
– or done at all. Therefore, hundreds of people are waiting in lines 
daily to meet their PC representatives for whom they voted in the 
elections. After hearing the matter, the PC member then contacts 
relevant local administration.59 Applications referred to the PC range 
from obtaining a passport - which is the right of every citizen by law 
to have – to the negotiation and release of a murder-case suspect 
from the local jail.60 One PC member in the Nangrahar provincial 
council expressed the following:  
 We have constituents coming every day. Our office starts in 
the morning at 9:00 am. There are different issues, someone 
needs a passport, someone`s relative is in prison, someone 
needs a visa, someone has a problem in public health, 
someone needs a job from us. Many people you see in 
Nangrahar have defiantly visited us at least once. 
(Interview5Nangrahar, 2016)  
In response to the question of how they approach these applications, 
the PC members said, "we make telephone contact with the relevant 
bureaucracies, and if not then we send them an official letter"  
(Interview5Nangrahar, 2016).  
                                                          
59 From the author`s notes during the PC sessions. 
60 Please see box 3 for example on how a PC member handles a murder case. 
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A representative from Bamyan PC said that during his last ten years 
of membership, he received nearly thousands of applications each 
year from his constituencies, of which he managed to settle around 
95 to 97 percent locally and didn’t let the case reach the courts 
(Interview14Bamyan, 2016). This indicates that the PCs indirectly 
operate as the de-facto executive branch of the local government. 
Although very exhausting, these sessions are one of the principal 
instruments through which the PC members win the hearts and 
minds of the local constituencies and gain support and popularity for 
saving their seats in  future elections. As one PC member noted: 
We have two types of clients who approach the PC for help. 
First, those who are educated and their requests are also legal, 
and we try our best to solve their problem. However, then we 
have also people who would ask me to help them financially. 
I may help one or two, but my budget does not afford to help 
everyone… or they asked me to issue them visas. Issuing a 
visa is not my job it is the job of an embassy. 
(Interview19Herat, 2016).  
Herat province has a border with neighboring Iran, and it is quite a 
challenge for the people to get visas. Similar concerns have been 
shared by many PC members across six interviewed provinces. 
There are some significant reasons why the constituents rely on their 
local representative instead of the government bureaucracies. First, 
government institutions are highly corrupt which makes the people 
approach the PC members to get their work done. Second, people`s 
awareness regarding what the PC’s job is, is very low in rural areas, 
Third, to win local support, some rich PC members or those affiliated 
with the rich, occasionally pay their constituents voluntarily, or use 
their patronage relations to accelerate paperwork through the local 
bureaucracies. 
It was the constant pressure of the local government officials, 
particularly the Walis, which led President Ghani to issue a warning 
through the IDLG in late 2015, instructing the PCs to refrain from 
such interferences. According to the new rule of procedure, the PCs 
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are strictly forbidden from interfering in local bureaucratic affairs, 
including influencing the local civil servants’ appointments, 
contracting, and judicial affairs (Roye, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
6.3.4 The Bridge between the People and Government:  Build-
ing on State Legitimacy 
Local trust and legitimacy building are among the crucial tasks of 
any government for sustainable stability. For the Afghan 
government, which has continually suffered from the Taliban 
Box-4: Kabul PC member settles a murder case: 
After introducing himself, a plaintiff explains his problem to the PC 
member as following: "Wakil Sahib (Mr. Representative-a common 
way of calling the PC member) my brother X had an accident with 
his car and killed a young man. He is now in prison in Kabul. We 
talked to the decedent’s family, and they agreed that it was not in-
tended murder and they would like to give my brother impunity. 
However, the prosecutor claimed that it was intended murder and 
must go through the court. We were told that the prosecutor asked 
for a bribe and it is a huge amount. We have already covered the 
funeral expenses of the decedent (A norm practiced, through which 
the murderer family pays an amount as compensation)" 
The PC member made a phone call (most probably to the general 
prosecutor office or a court) and said, “This is PC member Y talk-
ing.” After a personal chat for a while, he comes to the main point 
“I am sending someone to you. Only you can solve his problem. He 
will tell you about the matter himself. I need your close coopera-
tion.” He assured his constituent that he will follow up the case and 
that he does not need to worry.     
Source: From the author`s notes while waiting to interview a PC 
member in Kabul 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  From the author`s notes: The above note is a summary of a 
case discussed in a PC general session in Kandahar province. 
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insurgency since shortly after its establishment, this is a survival 
concern. In addition, the heavy centralized state is also very short of 
providing basic public services (e.g., security, shelter, drinking 
water, health, or schools) to its citizen in a majority of its rural areas, 
which is also a key to building legitimacy. However, it is noticed in 
this study, that despite its limitations, the PCs, as democratically 
elected institutions, play a vital role in building legitimacy for the 
Afghan government.  As one of the Balk PC members asserted: 
We are among the people, and we encourage local people to 
cooperate with the government. There is a distance between 
the people and the government due to increasing insecurity. 
We play a significant role in convincing local people and 
aligning them to back the government. It prevents the Taliban 
from penetrating among the local people. This job neither the 
police nor the army could do  (Interview7Balkh, 2016). 
The PC members acknowledge that government legitimacy and 
existence is directly linked to and conditional on their own. Besides, 
a majority of the PC members live in their villages, among their 
people, which is already an extended hand of the government in the 
locality. Through the conflict resolution and indirect bureaucratic 
services that they provide, they firmly build their place and 
legitimacy among the people. 
Almost all the PC members interviewed define provincial council as 
"a bridge between the people and the government". After officially 
taking their seats, members of PCs are recquired to attend regular 
capacity-building training programs which are conducted by the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governments (IDLG) through 
international donor support.  The seminars and workshops cover 
themes including the PC's roles and responsibilities in their 
localities. Although "a bridge between the people and the 
government" is a phrase memorized from such capacity-building 
training programs, it does accurately describe a significant role of 
the PC as it has been in practice in the past few years. 
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Although the central government fears it will lose more control of 
the locality by empowering PCs, if the PCs ever gain more power 
and resources through which they could not only hold the local 
government accountable, but also provide substantial legal services 
to their locality. It would significantly encourage not only PC 
members but also the local people to support the whole state 
apparatus. A female PC member notes: 
If the central government, following the law, issued more 
power to us, it is inevitable that we would also deliver more 
to the people. In a house, if one (a family member) works 
more and puts forth efforts, then the rest (of the family 
members) would respect him more and he would be loved by 
the others. (Interview1Nangrahar, 2016)    
The PC representative compares the role of the PC to that of the 
Afghan collective family system. That means local acceptance and 
legitimacy of the PCs are dependent on how much they deliver to the 
people. Thus, empowering the PC is a precondition for the local trust 
and legitimacy. The subnational government, as the representative 
of the central government and the PC as the local representative of 
the people, could complement each other in service delivery, 
accountability, and trust building. 
 
6.3.5 The Increasing Role of Afghan Female PC Representa-
tives 
The Afghan Electoral Law ensures at least 25% of the total 
provincial council seats for women (Electoral Law, 2016). So far the 
female representatives have not managed to win more than the 
reserved quota. However, in the 2005 elections, 105 from a total of 
285 female candidates found their way to provincial councils, these 
numbers respectively increased to 117  out of 328 in 2009. Due to 
2013 electoral law amendments, in which the percentage of the quota 
was decreased from 25 to 20, the total number of female candidates 
decreased to 308 and the winners of the provincial councils' seats to 
251 
 
97 in the 2014 elections (Sharan, Wimpelmann, & Torunn, 2014). In 
late 2016 the Afghan government endorsed a new Electoral Law in 
which the women representation was reversed back to its initial 
status of 25% (Adili, 2017, p. 8). Presently, based on the field 
research of this study, in Kabul (the largest PC) from out of total 
thirty-three PC members, seven are female, and in Bamyan (the 
smallest PC in this study) from a total of nine representatives, two 
are female. 
This study also reveals that nearly all female representatives are 
elected in provincial capitals, where life is an urbanized by Afghan 
standards. It also indicates that women representation in Afghan 
rural localities remain, to a more considerable extent, taboo. 
The PC is not the only institution with female representation in 
Afghanistan. The 2004 constitution reserves ‘in average at least two’ 
seats ‘from each province’ for ‘female’ who ‘shall’ find their way 
through free and fair election to ‘the House of People’ or Wolsey-
Jirga of the Shura-e-Mili or National Assembly.  It also assures a 
quota of 50% from among the one-third of president’s appointees to 
the ‘House of Elders’ or Meshrano-Jirga of the Afghan parliament 
(The Constitution of Afghanistan (English Translation), 2004, 
Articles Eighty-Three and Eighty-Four). That means a large number 
of women from all over Afghanistan have representation in the 
National Assembly. However, upon their elections, a majority of the 
representatives move with their families to the capital in Kabul and 
rarely visit the provinces, from where they were elected  
(InterviewGroupDiscussion32Kandahar, 2016). It could be argued 
that their daily attendance at parliament in Kabul and a high threat 
from the insurgents in their home provinces might be the reasons for 
abstaining these MPs for meeting their constituencies in a regular 
basis. However, some female PC members in Kandahar province 
claimed that the MPs go for vacations abroad during Parliament 
recess instead of visiting their home provinces and constituencies. 
They noted that for issues at the central level, the MPs are their main 
contact source, but ‘some cooperate while others do not answer our 
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phones'   (InterviewGroupDiscussion32Kandahar, 2016). A 
representative in Balkh province also noted: "usually it is the 
constituents who go to Kabul to meet their representatives for their 
concerns and matters" since the MPs come very rarely to their 
provinces (Interview10Balkh, 2016). Thus, the PC remains the only 
state democratic institution where women are encouraged to work 
for their people in their province. Afghanistan remains a highly 
male-dominated society where women are not welcomed in public 
alongside men. 
In the past, the Afghan local state bureaucracies in rural provinces 
were exclusively male-dominated. It was during the time from King 
Zahir Shah to the late communist regime, when one could see female 
civil servants in Kabul and a few urban cities like Mazar-e-Sharif or 
Herat. Therefore, usually, men would represent their female family 
members outside the home. The Taliban regime completely locked 
up women at home, including preventing them from going to school. 
With the arrival of the US-backed Afghan government in late 2001, 
and ratification of the new constitution in 2004, women not only got 
freedom in social life but were strongly encouraged to participate in 
political and economic spheres. In the early years of the new Afghan 
government, it was mainly repatriated refugees from the neighboring 
countries of Pakistan and Iran – who had had the chance there to 
pursue their studies or work in humanitarian assistance NGOs – that 
got the opportunity to fill the female vacancies. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, Afghanistan's public and private 
universities have graduated significant numbers of female students, 
who have quickly found their way to governmental and non-
governmental institutions in the county. Based on present research 
results, unlike men PC councilors, of whom a majority are ex-
Mujahedeen, the female representatives are repatriated refugees with 
a professional career or study background from neighboring Pakistan 
and Iran. The younger female representatives include public and 
private Afghan university graduates or students. 
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Despite grave challenges, the present study finds a revolutionary 
change in women's socio-political life in Afghanistan61. Female 
representative have not only become a vibrant voice for local 
women, who suffered history-long suppression, but also a 
challenging political competitor for their male counterparts. Local 
women now share their problems including family violence and 
abuses with their female representatives. They also ask for meddling 
in their court cases which are usually divorce related issues. As a 
female PC representative from Bamyan province noted: 
Since I am a woman, most of my constituencies are also 
female. Men come too when they need help. More women 
come for sharing family disputes. Others come because they 
had abusive experiences at the (local) police, prosecution and 
courts. Some others are in severe economic conditions and 
expect financial assistance.  (Interview15Bamyan, 2016) 
As stated in the earlier section, due to widespread corruption at local 
bureaucracies, often people approach their representatives for 
solving their issues with local administrations. The PC 
representatives copied the middlemen duty from the Afghan national 
parliamentarians. However, constitutionally the PC is not as 
persuasive an authority as that of parliamentarians, whose consent 
and oversight authorities have significant influence on central line 
ministries and relevant departments.  
 
As to how the PC representatives respond to the demands and 
expectation of their constituencies, a female member replied:   
 
In family issues, we try to use our mediator role. We have 
been given this authority by law to intervene as mediator. 
Sometimes we give advice, other times we give warnings (to 
the conflict parties that they would report to the police if they 
                                                          
61 Besides interviews with female representatives across six visited provinces, 
the author also attended and observed PCs’ members meetings as well as their 
interactions with their constituencies.   
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do not cooperate). It is very constructive; we have solved 
many disputes this way. However, when an issue is already 
registered (with the police) and has reached the prosecutor 
and the court, it is out of our authority. We cannot do more, 
other than just advise (share their insight of the conflict) to 
the prosecutor and court. However, usually, the court does 
not accept our interference and works independently.  
(Interview15Bamyan, 2016)     
Female PC members understand that their potential support lies with 
the Afghan women population, which needs to be mobilized. 
Therefore, although some of the duties (e.g., meddling in local 
bureaucracies) are neither in their authority not part of their job 
description by law, they still do so in order to increase their 
credibility among their constituencies. They are actively engaged in 
building public awareness about women’s roles and rights in local 
communities.  As the representative of the people, they often attend 
official local government ceremonies, give speeches, and travel for 
training programs to Kabul and abroad. Some of the representatives 
have several thousand followers on Facebook and Twitter, and are 
often invited to public debates on local radio and TV channels 
(Interview19Herat, 2016). Others go to schools and universities to 
discuss their issues and concerns with them – a political campaign 
strategy for attracting more female supporters and voters. It is 
interesting to observe that women PC members have become 
inspiring role models for many young Afghan females. Due to their 
easy accessibility, female representatives are more often approached 
by school and university students for help with their problems, 
including lack of shelter, hygiene, water, chairs, and desks.  In other 
instances, they may report discrimination and abuses by teachers and 
other officials62. One female PC member in Bamyan said, “students 
                                                          
62 The author witnessed students' representatives of both male and female in 
Bamyan, Kandahar and Herat provinces who were standing in a queue to meet 
their representative for sharing their problems. During interviewing a female PC 
member in Herat in her office, outside a large group of female University stu-
dents were waiting to meet their representative. 
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share their problems with us, and we accompany them to the local 
relevant authorities”  (Interview15Bamyan, 2016). However, due to 
lack of political power and financial incentives, like many males, the 
female representatives, too, use this position as a ladder to a higher 
political career in the central government63.    
  
It is worth mentioning here that besides the achievements mentioned 
above, the female representative holds one of the most dangerous 
and challenging jobs in the Afghan localities. According to the 
findings of this study, female PC members are often discriminated 
against by their male colleagues or threatened by warlords and 
strongmen if they dare to speak out about their corruption or drug-
deals64. Speaking with anonymity, a female representative from 
Herat said to the author: 
Female representatives are often discriminated against at the 
provincial level. The governor (of Herat) discriminates 
against women (in the meetings). The head of the provincial 
councils very openly tells me that I have no rights to talk 
against narcotics issues. Well, I am a representative, and this 
is my right and job to speak about corruption with the media. 
I have been frequently threatened by phone. On one occasion, 
they attacked my home and dropped a hand-grenade in my 
house. Lately, I have learned that there was a plan to abduct 
me. The reason for all this is that I am sharing the corruption 
                                                          
63  A female representative from Kandahar and another from Bamyan province 
told the author off the record that they are planning to candidate themselves 
to the Wolesi-Jirga or House of People of the National Assembly in the next 
term.  
64. During the Kandahar group discussion, a female PC representative com-
plained about Kandahar MPs due to their non-cooperation. A male representa-
tive at the group discussion who seemed to disagree with her disrespectfully in-
tervened and asked the author to stop the recording. After a short verbal ex-
change, two of the female participants at the group discussion left the room, a 
sign of objection. In another instance, during an internal meeting of the PC, in 
which the author was present, a female representative angrily requested the 
chairmen to assign her to another working committee because in her present 
committee, one of the male representatives was abusive toward women. This 
same male representative also rejected an interview with the author due to the 
author's interview with female members. 
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of the representatives and the government with the media. 
(Interview19Herat, 2016) 
As discussed in their earlier section, many representatives who are 
either warlords and drug-traffickers or their affiliates used their PC 
authority and influences and cut deals with local bureaucracies, 
including the police, to protect illegal businesses. Through their 
networks and power, they often pressure noncorrupt representatives 
to either cooperate or shut their mouth. As the PC member said: 
Unfortunately, as a woman, it is very challenging (to fight 
against corruption). If you cooperate and remain silent, they 
reward you. However, I am not someone who would 
cooperate. I put my hand on the Quran (the holy book of the 
Muslims) and made a commitment that I will fight against 
corruption.  (Interview19Herat, 2016) 
While female representatives continue the tireless struggle against 
corruption and the fight for their rights both at the PC and local 
government institutions, they are also higher on the target list for 
insurgents.  A very talented young female councilor, Angiza 
Shenwari65 died due to serious injuries from a targeted explosion in 
Jalalabad city in eastern Nangrahar province. Another prominent 
female representative –  Sitara Achekzai –  was shot-dead in 2009 in 
Kandahar city (The Long War Journal, 2009). Although it might take 
decades for Afghan women to have the chance to enjoy equal civil 
and political rights in rural part of the country, the inclusion of a 
female quota in the new constitution and in subsequent election laws 
creates promising hopes for the future. The extensive female 
participation in the last elections, both as candidate and voters 
marked a historic step towards gender equality in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 A road near the provincial council complex in Jalalabad city is named after 
this councilor.   
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6.3.6 The Changing Face of Local Power: The Power of the 
Gun Leaves its Place to the Power of the Vote 
Despite all their limitations, the elected PCs are the first ever sub-
national democratic institutions in Afghanistan. Although powerless 
by law, they have fundamentally changed the sociopolitical sphere 
and interaction in Afghan localities.  The power of the gun is 
gradually leaving its place to the power of the vote. The traditional 
power-brokers and elites who once ruled their areas of influence 
have come to realize that their old power strategy may not last long. 
The people's vote matters the most now. To win more votes and stay 
in political power, they need to be loyal and provide better services 
than their competitors. A warlord who presently is an elected 
member of the PC, and is still an influential power-broker in his 
region, said in an interview to the author: 
We keep good relations with local people. Every day, until 
very late we have meetings with our people, or we go to the 
villages (to meet the constituents for listening to their 
concerns and issues). If I perform well, then they will vote 
for me again.  Otherwise, it is not necessary to candidate 
myself again, (for the next term elections). If I work for the 
people, I am sure they will vote for me.  
(Interview5Nangrahar, 2016) 
It indicates that the elected PCs significantly changed the social and 
political behaviors of the powerful elites.  The PC as a new 
institution redefined the relations between the ruled and the ruling 
actors in Afghan localities. In the past, people would run after these 
strongmen not to ask for services, but to ask for mercy, because these 
warlords would have seized their land, animal, or other properties 
unlawfully and by force. Today, the same warlords and strongmen 
approach local people in Mosques or other social gatherings and ask 
for support at provincial, parliamentary and presidential elections66.  
                                                          
66. The author experienced several occasions during the 2014 presidential and 
provincial councils' elections, where a majority of the PC candidates were invit-
ing local people to large meals or using the Friday prayer gatherings for their 
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It is the democratic election, which created the opportunity for many 
young and educated Afghan men and women to compete with the 
local warlords and illiterate strongmen, reducing their power and 
influence in local social and political affairs. A young PC member 
from Herat told me why people elected him in the 2015 elections: 
If one studies the history of Afghanistan in the last few 
decades, different groups, including the Mujahedeen and 
religious elites were in power. There was hardly a chance for 
the younger generation. The traditional elites in power 
dragged Afghanistan into civil war and severe challenges 
including threatening our national integration. The 
acceptance of ethnic diversity and the commitment to the 
national unity is higher among the younger (Afghan) 
generation than the older generation. That is why people 
understand that if they want peace and national unity, it can 
come through the younger generation. The youths play a 
leading role in building a nation.  (Interview18Herat, 2016)   
It has been observed that the way warlords approach their 
constituencies for votes during elections is also significantly 
different from that of the young and educated elites.  Another young 
and educated representative from Herat PC shared his success in the 
2015 election, as below: 
I joined the election campaign as a young man. I neither had 
power, nor gold. I neither belonged to a party nor did I own 
a Hilux67 (vehicle, usually Toyota pick-up). I did not offer 
people meals or anything. I used the local TV channel and 
told people the truth. I told my audience that if I promise you 
that I will build school, Mosque, road, or dig wells, I will lie 
to you, but I do not lie.  I would do what is in the authority 
and capacity of a provincial council member. It was 
                                                          
political campaign. The author witnessed one of the warlords weeping in a local 
Mosque and asking people's support for the vote. 
67It is usually a custom that warlords and strongmen drive expensive SUVs 
packed with armed men - a sign to demonstrate their wealth and power.  
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surprising that I won more than ten-hundred-thousand votes, 
and among one-hundred-sixty-six candidates, at the 
provincial level, I received the fifth position (the number of 
votes) and in city-zone the second.  (Interview16Herat, 2016)     
To provide large meals, give cash and make all sorts of promises, 
became the standard tool for the Afghan election campaign. The 
candidates (it also applies in presidential, parliamentary elections) or 
their campaigning affiliates would rent houses or go to social 
gatherings, including Mosques, asking local people for votes. The 
wealthy warlords and strongmen provide stipends as large meals or 
cash, whereas the educated elites use media outlets as well as pay 
visits to academic institutions, including high-schools and 
universities. To attract their voters, the warlords used the Jihad 
against the Soviets and the communist's regime as principle 
statements in their campaigning speeches, whereas the non-Jihadis 
speak of their academic achievements, the services they have done, 
and the commitment for democracy and more rights for people. 
Nevertheless, since the Afghan warlords still have the upper hand 
both in numbers and the power, it leads to suppression and often 
discouragement of the unarmed competitors, mainly female and 
young male candidates. A female PC representative from Bamyan 
noted in an interview with the author that local strongmen threatened 
her with abducting her children if she stood for the PC election. This 
PC representative, who was previously a member of the civil society 
explained that it was her public stand against the local strongmen, 
which led the younger generation of both men and women in her 
province to encourage her to go for the elections. She added that 
since her membership in the Bamyan PC, she is in a constant struggle 
with those of her colleagues who are warlords or affiliates of 
strongmen, or who have links with corrupt local officials in the local 
government (Interview15Bamyan, 2016).     
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6.3.7 Lack of Enough Financial Means to the PC Led to Cor-
ruption 
The PC, under the IDLG administration and provincial government 
structure, does not have its own budget. Councilors are paid only 
monthly like any other bureaucrats in the government. Comparably, 
the Lower House representatives receive monthly salaries of up to 
200.000 AFs (approximately 3000USD) plus security and other 
allowances – whereas a PC member receives only 25.000 AFs gross, 
which is equal to less than 400 US dollars a month. In order to 
survive, in practice, the PC representatives are dependent on other 
resources than what is considered a monthly wage by the 
government. Along with their representation duty, many councilors 
run private businesses or are dependent on wealthy local 
businesspeople. The nine PC members in Bamyan share one vehicle 
in order to reach to their constituencies in very remote areas. 
Whereas, depending on their backgrounds, there are some PC 
members, who own at least up to four bodyguards, armored or luxury 
cars, and in many instances are followed by a large caravan of armed 
vehicles. This group comprises local strongmen and warlords who 
are involved in illicit businesses including drug-trafficking and 
kidnapping. They are buying local support through donations and 
self-financed services. Their financial resources also provide them 
with more leverage and a greater say in the internal affairs of the 
PCs. For instance,68 one PC member who belongs to a prominent 
warlord family in Nangrahar province refurbished the PC building 
and the compound at his own financial costs. In return he earned the 
support to be the PC chairman, despite being the youngest69 among 
                                                          
68 A contact person who also facilitated the interview with this PC member 
shared this story with the author. The PC member initially refused to meet with 
the author. However, after consistent approaches and several contacts he fi-
nally agreed to meet the author in his private office, in a huge building with two 
check-points at the entrance.    
69 Traditionally, in Afghanistan the older the person, the higher the position and 
respect he would gain in a social context, and particularly in a council context. 
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his colleagues. Similarly, two representatives from Balkh province, 
speaking on condition of anonymity, commented that their chairman 
is involved in drug-trafficking. The chairman uses his wealth to buy 
the support of the other members in the PC`s internal election.   
Inadequate financial resources to the PCs increased the influence of 
prominent warlords and drug-traffickers over those financially weak 
members who are committed to bringing change. For warlords and 
drug-traders, the PC is not a direct means of income, but a source of 
indirect power and influence over the local government institutions, 
through which they could easily run their illicit businesses. In 
contrast, the scarcity of funds allotted to the PCs not only 
discourages financially strapped representatives from fighting 
against the strongmen, but it also  tempts them to involve themselves 
in corruption and embezzlement for the sake of keeping their social 
and political status. Several interviewed PC members across the six 
visited provinces shared concerns that if they were somehow paid as 
well as the national parliament representatives, they would have 
more influence to fight corruption and bring reforms locally.  A PC 
representative from Balkh province compared the financial and 
social status of PC and WJ representatives: 
A parliament member (after being elected) moves from the 
province to the capital. The constituents cannot meet their 
representative (if they need to) probably once in four or five 
months. In order to meet (his representative) the constituent 
needs to travel to the capital and take an extra gift with him 
as it is a custom in Afghanistan. Now, this is an extra cost for 
the constituent as that for a parliament member. In contrast, 
the PC representatives live in their provinces, and their 
constituents can visit them at their home, office or guesthouse 
anytime. When a constituent comes from a rural village to the 
city, he definitely stays one or two nights at his PC 
representative's home. How can a representative afford these 
costs with only 23,500AFs a month (nearly 400USD wage).  
While a parliamentarian earns over 200,000 (nearly 3500 
262 
 
USD monthly) wage, is given four or five bodyguards, a 
driver, a secretary, and other benefits. The PC member’s 
relative poverty undoubtedly leads to corruption, and there 
have been incidents in which the (PC) representative blindly 
approved a project, despite its poor results. 
(Interview10Balkh, 2016)   
 
PC representatives’ access to sufficient financial resources is also 
crucial for local trust-building in a very traditional and patronage 
society like Afghanistan. The constituents expect tangible services  
from their representatives, which will otherwise be provided by local 
strongmen and elites who hold a share in the informal Shura (council 
of elders) to win the support of local people. In the informal Shura 
culture, the elite who is representing a village or a clan must have, 
besides his virtual influence, enough financial capacity to 
accommodate tens of guests daily when they pay a visit to discuss 
their issues. This characteristic of hospitality is called, in local terms, 
the man of Nan-o-Dasterkhowan in Dari or Dudai-Mar in Pashtu – 
referring to a person who could serve several visitors large meals on 
quite a regular basis. Apparently, this title has also been inherited by 
the PC members, who now play the official representative role in 
their local communities. A PC member from Kabul province shared: 
"It is very challenging to survive with only 23,000 AFs (monthly 
wage). How could we accommodate sometimes up to 40 or 50 
constituents who come to visit? They require tea and a meal. It is 
thanks to the merchants in our region who sometimes support us 
financially."  (Interview25Kabul, 2016) 
Security is another major challenge faced by poorly financed 
councilors.  Being part of the local government, the PC is also a top 
target for the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Several PC 
members have lost their lives in various assaults or suicide bombings 
across the country in the last couple of years. Among them, a female 
member from eastern Nangrahar province, Angiza Shenwari, was 
injured in a targeted explosion and later died in the hospital from 
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severe injuries70. In another incident, a suicide bomber exploded 
himself in the middle of a Jirga (council meeting) at a PC member’s 
home in Jalalabad, the capital of Nangrahar, leaving 13 civilians 
killed. The councilor Obaidullah Shinwari and his father were 
among the wounded  (Fahim, 2016). According to the Long War 
Journal, in 2009, the Taliban put a price of 200,000 Pakistani rupees 
(2,500 USD) on killing a female PC member. In the same year, two 
men on a motorbike gun-downed Sitara Achekzai, a prominent 
female councilor in Kandahar province (2009). In relatively secure 
areas such as in Bamyan, parts of Kabul and Balkh only a few 
members walk without any security guards. However, in most 
insecure areas where PC members are at high risk, they have to be 
escorted by several guards and sometimes armored vehicles. A PC 
member in Balkh province noted that they shared their concern with 
the central government and demanded at least two guards for their 
security. 
 
6.3.8 The Elected Provincial Councils and the Power-Sharing 
Battle between Traditional and Newly Emerging Elites.  
It has been encountered in this study that the PC, as a political 
institution, is gaining gradual significance in the public and political 
domain at the national and sub-national government levels in 
Afghanistan. At the national level, political parties, warlords and 
powerful elites generously spend their resources to place their 
patrons in PC representative positions. At the local level, for 
traditional elites –warlords, traditional tribal and religious leaders – 
the PC position formalizes and legitimizes their local social and 
political influence, and for the newly emerging elites –young and 
educated figures with a family background either from merchants or 
from second generation traditional elites – it is a jump-board for 
higher political careers. The young and educated PC representatives 
                                                          
70 A local citizen and member of the community development council reported 
to the author during an interview.   
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also ideologically differentiate themselves from the traditional ones, 
identifying themselves as moderate Muslims, supporting democratic 
values including the social and political participation of women and 
the right to freedom of speech. However, traditional elites strongly 
believe in both Afghan and Islamic traditionalism and in the political 
Islam of the Mujahideen.  These conflicting interests lead to a power-
battle between the two parties – the traditional and newly emerging 
political elites.  
Demographic information based on the interviews conducted in this 
study shows that more than half of the new PC members have higher 
education (bachelor or masters) or are currently enrolled in private 
or public institutions of higher education. The traditional elites in the 
PC – who had barely finished their secondary schools at the time of 
the first-round provincial councils' election in 2005 – are now 
enrolled in semi-higher and higher educational institutions, parallel 
to their PC office. This indicates that higher education has become 
one of the important parameters indicating a PC member’s ability to 
attract more voters and beat their opponents. The voter's preference 
for educated representatives over non-educated tribal elites and 
warlords is clearly a sign of increased social and political awareness 
in the still highly traditional patronage Afghan society.  
As stated earlier, popular Mujahideen leaders who are either already 
sidelined from political power in the central and local government, 
as well as those who are afraid to lose their official stakes in the 
government, are securing their interests locally through backing their 
affiliates in the PCs. It provides these warlords with a local legal 
power-base, and it is an influential political tool through which they 
can pressure the provincial government and even sometimes the 
central government for their own interests. 
Although the PC oversight authority lacks legal checks and balances, 
it remains a tool they can use to pressure local government officials.  
The PC members report corruption and short-comings of the local 
government officials to the president via the IDLG office, and also 
share the information with the public through social and national 
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broadcasted media outlets.  As one of the PC members in Jalalabad 
noted, the PC house and the local government are ‘always in conflict' 
due to the PC’s oversight of government activities. According to this 
PC representative, the short-comings and corruption of the 
provincial government is either shared with the president through the 
IDLG or with the people through the media  (Interview5Nangrahar, 
2016).  
However, the nature of the relationship of PCs and the local 
government depends on whether or not the governor has enough 
influence on the members of PC, and whether or not he is 
cooperating through sharing the stake with influential 
representatives. For example, the relationship between the governor 
and the PC members in Kabul, Bamiyan, and Kandahar provinces 
seem to be very smooth and friendly. The PC representatives from 
Balkh, Nengrahar, and Herat provinces are divided on their opinions 
of local government officials, and particularly of the governors. In 
both cases, as mentioned above, the PC is divided between the 
traditionalist warlord elites, who support their own sympathizers, 
and the newly emerging elites. Although the educated elites and 
technocrats are often resisting the warlords, they are also often 
forced to compromise due to their limited numbers and a lack of 
political, and in many cases financial support.   The following section 
will present a more detailed overview of the situation in Balkh, 
Herat, Kandahar, Nangrahar and Bamyan provinces. Since the focus 
of this section is more on the sub-national governance, the Kabul PC 
is not included this section. 
 
6.3.8.1 The Case of Balkh 
The Balkh PC is divided between the supporters of two major 
political parties, the Jamiat-e-Islami of ex-governor Atta 
Mohammad Noor and the Junbish-e-Mili of General Abdul Rashid 
Dostum. A few Pashtun representatives are backed by Juma Khan 
Hamdard – an influential warlord of Hezb-e-Islami party of 
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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Noor supporters publicly vowed to back Atta 
Mohammad Noor for the Balkh governorship.   A PC member, who 
himself is also a former warlord, said: 
It is a mercy of God in Balkh province, during the last three 
periods (of PC since its establishment), the provincial council 
has an excellent relationship with the provincial government. 
The head of the PC and all other representatives have a great 
deal of respect for the governor’s office. The administration 
of the local government which is led by ‘Ustad71' Atta 
Mohammad Noor trusts the provincial council…We do not 
have any such (political) issue, and it is because of the good 
relations and respect that we have with the local government 
officials. (Interview6Bakh, 2016).  
To break Noor’s power monopoly in Balkh, the Junbish and Hezb-
e-Islami PC representatives formed a collation against Atta 
Mohamad Noor and frequently organized mass protests demanding 
his removal from the governor’s office72. Although Dostum is out of 
Mazar-e-Sharif city, his party and supporters are manipulating every 
single opportunity to discredit Noor and provide the return of 
Dostum or his party men to the city. In the spring of 2016 thousands 
of his supporters protested in Balkh and Jowzjan – the power-base 
and capital of Dostum - provinces in a reaction to the removal of 
Dostum`s photos from the city billboards in Mazar-e Sharif. The 
protesters alleged Noor and his government were showing Dostum 
disrespect. 
The opposing PC members have publicly criticized the governor for 
social injustices and discrimination. An ethnically Uzbek PC 
member who was also part of the organizing committee for several 
protests against the governor said:  
                                                          
71 Ustad literally means teacher. It is said that Atta Mohammad Noor was a 
school teacher before joining the Mujahedin ranking. Since then Atta is known 
among his supporters with a prefix of Ustad. 
72 On tcondition of anonymity, a PC member shared with the author in an off-
the-record interview. 
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In Balkh province, the chain of power is in the hands of one-
person (Atta Mohammad Noor), military, economic, civil 
and all (other) sectors are in his control. He has been ruling 
here for fourteen years and has installed all his people 
everywhere.  (Interview9Balkh, 2016) 
Although the Balkh PC is and will remain divided in opinions 
towards Noor, he has considerable influence on the bulk of the 
representatives. However, the dissent causes a major headache for 
Noor, making him think twice before taking action in local politics 
at least. This is crucial because if the PCs are mobilized with proper 
constitutional power and authorities one day, they could hold the 
governor, or any other local official accountable, which would make 
the job of bringing in sub-national reform easier for the Kabul 
government. 
 
6.3.8.2 The Case of Bamyan  
The power-relation between elected provincial representatives and 
the local warlord in Bamyan is similar to that of the Balkh province. 
The PC members in central Bamyan and Daikundi provinces have 
frequently challenged the central government authority through 
organizing mass demonstrations. Protesters demanded the removal 
of the appointed governors from their offices (Zareen, 2015). A PC 
member with the condition of anonymity told the author in an 
interview that Karim Khalili, though not in an official position 
anymore, still holds a strong influence over local politics and control 
over central Hazarajat. Khalili's consent is required when appointing 
the governors of Bamyan and Daikundi provinces, said a PC member 
(Interview13Bamyan, 2016). 
Nevertheless, regardless of their political affiliations with different 
parties, the PC representatives in Bamyan remained committed to 
bringing fundamental development improvements to their 
constituencies.  In two unique incidents, Jawad Zahaak, former head 
of the Bamyan PC hung a large lantern on the side of an avenue and 
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paved a large area of the city road with cob as a sign of protest to the 
central government for depriving Bamyan of development projects. 
In another large gathering, Zahaak together with his other fellow PC 
representatives and members of the civil society symbolically 
handed over letters of appreciations to a few donkeys with which 
local residents carried drinking water from a distance of several km. 
A citizen and civil society activist in Bamyan province stated in an 
interview, "Thanks to Zahaak, today, Bamyan city and its 
surrounding districts have drinking water, regular electricity, and 
asphalted roads."  (Interview34Bamyan, 2016).  
 
 
6.3.8.3 The Case of Herat 
The PC in Herat is divided between the supporters and opponents of 
the warlord Ismail Khan. On April 17, 2016, Ismail Khan 
commemorated the victory of  the "Mujahideen" against the Soviet 
invasion in a large gathering in Herat province. This event was 
officially supported by the provincial government of Herat, which 
sent out formal invitations to all governmental and nongovernmental 
institutions announcing an official government holiday and asking 
the authorities to attend the ceremony  73. Several PC members 
boycotted Ismail Khan’s order and kept their office doors open at the 
PC. As one PC member shared with the author,  he rejected the 
invitation because the “feudal system came to an end long ago in 
Herat province” (Interview17Herat, 2016).  
Besides warlords (part of whose resources are maintained through 
drug-dealings), the drug-mafia, form another influential group who, 
directly or indirectly, infiltrate the PC. For the drug-mafia to sustain 
                                                          
73 From the notes of the author: coincidentally, the author was in Herat prov-
ince on the same date (April 17, 2016) to conduct Interviews with the PC mem-
bers. Some of the PC members canceled their interview appointments because 
they are invited to attend the Herat-Mujahedeen`s victory against the Soviet in-
vasion, a memorial ceremony said to be celebrated every year in Herat. Only a 
few PC representatives who seemed to refuse the invitation remained at the 
provincial council.  
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their illicit-business, it is critical to secure seats in the PCs, the only 
democratic monitoring organs on local government administrations 
in Afghanistan. These drug-mafia  can buy their constituencies and 
local election-commission officials through offering financial and 
other means, whereas other candidates cannot. On condition of 
anonymity in a not off-the-record-interview, a PC member said that 
Kamran Alizada, head of the PC in Herat, is directly involved in 
Herat drug-trafficking  (Interview19Herat, 2016). Herat also 
controls one of the key drug-trafficking routes between southern 
Helmand province and Mashhad of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
According to the UNODC 2013 report, Helmand is responsible for 
48% of the total opium production in Afghanistan - the largest in the 
country  (UNODC, 2013). 
In an official visit of the Minister of Counter Narcotics to Heart 
province, the interviewed PC member was warned not to speak about 
the drug-trafficking issue in the meeting. At the time of writing this 
dissertaion, Alizada`s representation at the PC was suspended by the 
national Attorney General, after he entered the Herat provincial 
attorney’s office with twenty armed men and freed a person 
suspected of corruption  (Saber, 2016). The Herat attorney office put 
the suspect back into the prison, and Alizada continued his post after 
two weeks of suspension.  
 
6.3.8.4 The case of Nangrahar:  
The local politics in Nangrahar province remain controlled by the 
Pashtun and Pashayie warlords. With a long history of the tribal 
rivalry, each fraction sent their second and third generations to seize 
power at the PC of Jalalabad, the province capital. Just as their older-
generation had made their way to central government political 
positions including representation in the Lower and Upper houses of 
the National Assembly. A PC representative said:  
justice would come, and people`s expectations would meet 
when they (PC representatives) earned their way to the 
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provincial council by merit and competence. However, 
currently, if a father is in the Wolesy-Jirga (Lower-House), 
his son is in the provincial council. District councils' 
elections would take place soon, and their grandsons would 
represent that councils too"  (Interview2Nangarhar, 2016).  
The author crossed checked the background profiles of some of the 
PC representatives in Nangrahar province,  provided by the Pajhwok 
Afghan news – an independent Afghan news agency. According to 
Pajhwok's online lists of the 2014 provincial council members, 
Ahmad Ali, chairman of the Nangrahar PC is the son of ex-Jahadi 
commander Hazrat Ali (Pajhwok Afghan News, 2014). Hazrat Ali is 
currently a representative at the Lower-House "Wolesi Jirga" at the 
National Assembly. Shams-ur-Rehman Muslimyar another PC 
representatives is the younger brother of Fazal Hadi Muslimyar.  
Fazal Hadi Muslimyar is chairman of the Upper-House "Meshrano 
Jirga" of the National Assembly.  PC member Abdul Qahar Qadir is 
the son of Haji Qadir Arsala (late Jahadi commander of Hezb-e-
Islami of Khales) and the younger brother of Zahir Qadir. Zahir 
Qadir is also a representative of the Lower-House of National 
Assembly. Zahir Qadir is also known to be one of the influential 
warlords in Nangrahar province, who is believed to own thousands 
of armed militias and has reportedly been accused of human rights 
abuses and the drug trade. Finally, Javed Zaman, son of Haji Zaman 
Ghamsharik, is another PC member  (Pajhwok Afghan News, 2014). 
His father Zaman was also one of the influential warlords, who, 
together with Hazrat Ali, committed brutal human crimes. Zaman 
lives in exile in France after being accused of being the mastermind 
behind the assassination of Abdul Haq – another major influential 
commander before and after the Taliban regime  (Jackson A. , 2014).  
The above-listed PC representatives are strong rivals to each other, 
each using the power and resources in their disposal to beat their 
opponents and gain more political power and public support. The 
stronger influence of the various warlords' groups and their power-
grabbing rivalries has resulted in the central government appointed 
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officials having limited control over Nangrahar's security and 
economic development affairs. 
 
6.3.8.5 The Case of Kandahar 
The Kandahar PC is dominated by three dominant Pashtun tribal 
elites, the Popalzai, the Barakzai, and the Achakzai. The dominance 
of a tribal group in PC strongly depends on whose tribal affiliate is 
controlling the political power in Kandahar. As discussed in chapter 
four, since late 2001, among various rival tribes, the Popalzai (with 
the informal representative the Karzai family), Barakzai (the 
informal representative Gul Agha Sherzai), and Achakzai (the 
informal representative Abdul Raziq) remained the main tribes 
controlling the power in Kandahar. 
According to the AREU field research report, during Ahmad Wali's 
– half-brother of ex-president Hamid Karzai – representation, the 
Kandahar PC was the strongest in the country, its influence reaching 
to the central government ministries level in Kabul (Jackson A. , 
2015, p. 21). Following the Ahmad Wali's assassination in 2011 and 
the emergence of Abdul Raziq as the dominant powerholder in 
Kandahar, the local politics also turned in favor of the Achakzai 
tribe. Currently, although the PC chairmanship has remained with 
the Popalzai tribe, Raziq’s position as the provincial police chief and 
an influential figure in Kandahar means that the real power lies in 
the hands of Achakzai representatives. 
The PC members interviewed in this study reported that their 
relations with local government officials were friendly and 
cooperative. Nevertheless, the AREU research report reveals that as 
long as their share is secured, the PC members in Kandahar 
compromise on corruption with local government officials  (Jackson 
A. , 2015, p. 21).   
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and the Prospects for a 
Future Research 
 
7.1 Few Possible Alternatives to the Afghan Unitary 
Centralism  
The 2019 presidential elections will mark the fifteenth anniversary 
of Afghanistan’s unitary centralized state system. Taking this young 
and shaky experiment with democracy, and the country's constant 
state of war into consideration, it is too early and probably unfair to 
conclude whether presidential democracy has failed in Afghanistan. 
However, it is necessary to study alternative models for 
constitutional amendments that are to be expected following the 
NUG government deals in 2014. The Afghan political elites' 
controversial divide over the state institutional design (discussed in 
chapter five) leads us to a significant conclusion that, sooner or later. 
the contemporary constitutional state model (unitary centralism) will 
require revision. 
However, as discussed in the earlier section, the de-facto state model 
practiced during the last nearly one and half decades is a sort of grand 
coalition at the capital, while the central government attempts to 
consolidate its power and resources at the periphery by brokering 
deals with the powerful regional ethnopolitical elites. In official 
terms, both the Karzai and Ghani central governments had some 
successful instances, in which some warlords peacefully handed 
over the sub-national government positions (usually the 
governorship or police chief, both influential positions). In return, 
the warlords received political posts in central government, or 
appointed their affiliates in crucial government bureaucracies, 
including diplomatic positions abroad.   And because of their strong 
patronage networks, political power, financial resources, and in 
some instances armed militiamen, these ethnopolitical elites 
remained, de-facto, the dominant players in their respective regions 
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(For more on this, please visit Chapter Six). As long as there is a 
coalition government of warlords at the center, there will be self-
defined, de-facto, local and regional autonomies, as financial and 
political support flows both ways. The ethnopolitical elite power-
sharing government created in 2001 Bonn seems to have become a 
standardized and accepted norm now, not only among the various 
involved Afghan political parties but also within the international 
community. Implementation of a non-ethnic-party and merit-based 
democratically elected unitary government as envisioned in the 2004 
Afghan constitution would require a reversal of this norm. In 
practice, this would neither be accepted by the various ethnic groups 
and parties, nor would it be backed by those regional and 
international partner countries that have their own interests and 
affiliations with different ethnic groups in the country. Taking these 
facts into consideration, the implementation of a constitutionally 
unitary centralized system is far from reality, at least in the next few 
decades.    
    
7.1.2 Federalism for Afghanistan 
 As noted in a previous discussion, a complete federal option also 
fails to have majority Afghan support, nor is it suitable for a 
geographically and socio-politically complex Afghanistan with a 
weak economy, if peace, political stability, and national integration 
is the optimum goal for system change. Although each ethnic group 
has a dominant region (e.g., majority Pashtuns are populated along 
south-east, Tajiks in the north-west, Uzbek in the north, and Hazaras 
in the central region of the country), scarcely any of the regions are 
inhabited purely by a single ethnic group. In most regions and 
provinces, particularly in big cities (e.g., Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-
Sharif, and Jalalabad), ethnic groups are mingled through inter-
ethnic family and business relationships. A majority of the non-
Pashtun PC representatives interviewed in this study – these 
included Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbek, and Pashaie –  rejected federalism 
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as an inappropriate system for their country, noting it could 
undermine the national integration of Afghanistan and start another 
round of misery and ethnic cleansing in Afghanistan. This finding 
rejects the argument of some non-Pashtun ethnopolitical elites that 
all non-Pashtuns demand  a federal system across the county.   
PC members are directly elected representatives of their local 
communities in rural Afghanistan. Their interview responses show 
that federalism has no grass-roots support among the Afghans. 
Furthermore, as noted also by many PC representatives, because 
Afghanistan is unevenly divided geo-economically, only the natural 
resource rich (Northern) or bordered regions and provinces (e.g., the 
South-east with Pakistan, the West with Iran and the North with 
former Soviets-block countries, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan) would be well-off in a federal system. The central 
regions have limited untapped mineral resources and are 
predominantly dependent on traditional agricultural resources.  
Furthermore, despite ethnic conflicts, the federal system is neither 
demanded by grass-root Afghans nor was it a point of conflict among 
the various ethnic groups during Afghanistan’s modern history, as is 
the case in other ethnically fragmented nations in the world. The 
proposal for federalism is a post-Taliban regime topic, and this only 
with few unpopular ethnic political elites (e.g., Abdul Latif Pedram, 
a Tajik and leader of the Kangar-e-Mili, or the national 
congressional party of Afghanistan. After being purged from power 
in the government, some non-Pashtun political elites have used the 
call for a federal system as a tool for politically pressuring the Karzai 
and Ashraf Ghani governments. As soon as they regain their 
positions with the government, they relinquish that demand. Hence, 
the implementation of a federal system seems non-functional and 
unrealistic, and also has little buy-in within Afghan political 
discourse. 
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7.1.2 Semi-Presidentialism 
 As one can gather both from the literature review and from the 
empirical findings of this study, there is considerable weight behind 
the implementation of a semi-presidential decentralization –  
particularly among majority non-Pashtuns, but also among some 
Pashtuns.  Contextualizing the semi-presidential system theory into 
the present Afghan scenario, the Shura-e-Mili or National Assembly 
and the Chief Executive post (which could be changed to Prime 
Minister) would be added into the executive power paradigm of the 
elected president at the central level. Moreover, if one takes into 
consideration the proposed demands of the PC representatives (more 
on this in Provincial Council section, Chapter Five) – in which they 
ask for more power and resources, this includes the election of 
provincial governors or subjecting the governorship and other 
critical sub-national posts to their advise and consus – then this 
would involve some devolution of power to the sub-national level. 
The power balance between the three key executive bodies: the 
president, the parliament and the prime minister, which is vital for 
the functionality and stability of such a political system, remains the 
critical question.   
The semi-presidential system expert Vitalino Canas (2004) notes 
that the balance of power, which he calls it ‘the backbone of the 
semi-presidential system,' can be only achieved through mutual 
political legitimacy of all three bodies, along with a collaborative 
interaction among them. According to Canas (2004), a ‘mutual 
legitimacy' could be achieved via ‘more or less popular vote' and 
collaborative interaction through somewhat ‘equivalent' power-
sharing of the executive body. That means the president and the 
parliament could be elected via a popular vote, and then the 
parliamentarians as the direct representatives of the people could 
vote for the prime minister – a candidate that could be either chosen 
from among the parliament representatives or an independent figure 
outside the government state structure. The parliament and Prime 
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Minister could have a say in executive power, which would limit the 
president's authority as the sole head of the state. In theory, it might 
seem a somewhat convincing solution to majority groups, however 
not to all Pashtuns. Some considerable pro-Pashtun political parties 
and figures fear the loss of their inherited domination of central 
power in a semi-presidential system, and would challenge this 
reform. 
Moreover, a parliamentary system requires a strong party system, 
which is a severely lacking in Afghanistan. Due to their 1990s civil 
war and ruthless human atrocities, the ordinary Afghans do not trust 
political parties by and large. Besides, the old Mujahideen parties 
and the few post-Mujahedeen parties who often enter to seasonal and 
unstable alliances, lack an all-inclusive political agenda that could 
promise socioeconomic wellbeing for the Afghans as a nation. In 
theory, all most all of these parties follow one poorly defined 
political ideology of Islam, whereas in practice, the majority are 
ethnocentric and aim to win more leverage in the government with 
whatsoever means possible. Therefore, a weak, corrupt and non-
professional parliament (the present Shura-e-Mili, whose members 
includes influential warlords and drug-traffickers could be a precise 
reference to what parliament and its members would look like) 
would not only lack the capacity to run a state, but also, because of 
their constant rivalry for a share in the executive power, would 
plunge the nation into constant political deadlocks.  
Furthermore, in the case of Afghanistan, dividing the state excutive 
powers based on ethnic identies (e.g., the president a Pashtun, the 
prime minister a Tajik, and the head of the parliament Hazra and 
another key post to Uzbick) would farther damage the national 
intergerations by forcing ethnic groups to chose ethnic identities 
over national identity. The ethnopolitical loyelity would also 
promote cliantalisim and corruption. Moreover, ethnic groups and 
parties that gain less influential posts at the central government 
would demonstrate their power by hijacking the sub-national 
government levels. This would lead to frequent political deadlocks 
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and constant conflict between the center and periphery, and 
eventually, the country might slip into another period of national 
turmoil. Thus, a semi-presidential system for Afghanistan would not 
be a better governmental model for the country's political stability 
and national integration than the present unitary centralized system. 
 
7.1.3 Unitary Decentralization 
 For Afghanistan to achieve national integration and political 
stability on the one hand, and bring about constructive state 
institutional reforms on the other, it needs to take gradual and careful 
steps. Arend Lijphart’s (Constitional Design for Divided Soceities, 
1999/2004) consociational democracy might better accommodate 
the complex Afghan context, not in semi-presidential system, but in 
a presidential system at the center with a somewhat loose devolution 
of power to the local level. In other words, at the national level, 
within the principal of Presidentialism, Afghanistan could 
constitutionalize an all-inclusive grand ethnic coalition government 
– a president and three vice-presidents (or executive officers of the 
president) who shall have equal share and authority after the 
president in the executive power. The collaborative spirit among the 
political party/parties representing different ethnic groups in 
alliances standing for elections would provide the backbone of such 
a system. With no pre-specification of ethnicity in the constitution 
for the president post or any of the three officers, each political party 
or alliance of parties could have the right to go for election. The 
constitution could make sure, that each team running for election 
announces their candidates (e.g., president, and the three vice 
officers) beforehand, making it easy for ordinary of Afghans to 
decide on their choice.  
An ethnopolitical collation government at the center would 
encourage broad-based multi-ethnic political parties to form in order 
to win elections. Such a system would also normalize a political 
culture of government (parties or a single multi-ethnic party that win 
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the election) and opposition (parties that lose an election), which is 
necessary for praviling social justice, democracy, accountability, 
competitiveness, and efficient governance.    
At the sub-national level, the central government should deliver 
evident power, resources, and responsibilities to elected institutions 
at the sub-national level, within the principle of the unitary state 
system and based on the present capacity of the PCs to function 
effectively (for more on this, please read the Afghan PC, a potential 
institution for moderate and gradual devolution of power). Taking 
the diverse, divided, and unstable sociopolitical and economic 
conditions of Afghanistan into consideration, a unitary decentralized 
system may prove a less dangerous path forward, if not yet a 
convincing one to all parties. 
 
 
7.2 The Afghan Sub-National Governance Institutions: 
Challenges and Opportunities  
The insecurity posed by the militant Taliban has, to a considerable 
extent, undermined the Afghan state-building achievements to date 
both at the center and locally. However, since late 2001 considerable 
efforts have been put to institutionalize governance, socio-economic 
development, and stability in very remote areas of Afghanistan. The 
local state-building efforts comprised both reforming and 
strengthening the existing formal and informal institutions and 
building new ones. For the first time in its history, the Afghan 
government created elected PCs across the 34 provinces. The PCs, 
though weak, became not only a representative hub between the 
people and the government, but also an instrument through which 
the Afghans learned about political rights and responsibilities at their 
localities. Through its reserved quota, it also ensured female political 
participation – a revolutionary achievement, taking into 
consideration the impact of the Taliban’s suppressive regime, when 
women were banned from schools. The constitution-based 
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democratic elections assured legitimacy and eventually the 
sustainability of the PCs, and if required power and resources were 
transformed, they would fundamentally help in improving local 
governance.  
The lack of apparent power and resources considerably undermined 
from the popularity of the elected Afghan PCs among the local 
population.  However, according to the findings of this study, 
because of the general lack of education, the dominant influence of 
local warlords and strongmen (who then built strong patronage 
relations with corrupt provincial government officials), a powerful 
PC right from the beginning in 2005 might have also been 
counterproductive. As discussed in detail in chapter six, local 
warlords and strongmen use even the present very weak PCs for 
personal gain, securing their share in administrative corruption and 
facilitating illicit businesses. With such circumstances in place, 
empowering PCs means empowering local warlords and strongmen.  
However, as increasing numbers of young and educated 
representatives, including women, have turned the PC into an 
attractive and competitive political institution. By promoting 
democracy and good governance rules, the young and educated elites 
use the PC as a ladder to a higher political career.  Meanwhile, the 
warlords and traditional elites have realized that to remain in 
political power, they must abide by the rules and will of the people. 
Thus, the creation of the PC as an elected institution has not only 
increased the political awareness and participation of the local 
people, but also has significantly changed the discourse and behavior 
of the local warlords and traditional elites. The democratic elections 
of the PC significantly replaced the traditional power of gun and 
violence with the power of the vote in Afghan localities. 
Moreover, the educated representatives, but also the IDLG capacity 
building programs, significantly increased the political awareness of 
the PC representatives regarding their roles and responsibilities.  
According to Hamish, in September 2005, when the Afghan PCs 
were elected for the first time, its representatives did not know their 
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role and responsibilities (Hamish, 2008). After nearly a decade later, 
in September 2014, the elected representatives successfully 
campaigned to regain their oversight authority. In other instances 
(e.g., Bamyan and Balkh) the PC representatives – by mobilizing 
their local constituencies to conduct countrywide protests – pushed 
the central government to replace the governors and implement 
development projects.  
 
Since early 2002, the Afghan government, together with the 
international donor community, also attempted to reform the 
informal governance institutions of community Jirgas/Shuras. The 
creation of Community Development Councils (CDCs) – by the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) using 
technical support (capacity building programs) and financial grants 
from the World Bank and other international aid organization – 
aimed not only at rural rehabilitation but also at building Afghan 
state legitimacy in the local communities. (Saltmarshe & Medhi, 
2011). The CDCs were built on the already existing traditional 
institutions by introducing new administering structures and 
democratic mechanisms, including the participation of women. In an 
attempt to replace the Afghan traditional Jirgas/Shuras, the CDCs 
were given community dispute resolution tasks.  The grant 
development projects also produced tangible services to local 
communities. Nevertheless the CDCs proved to be unsustainable 
because of their strong dependence on foreign aid. According to the 
finding of this study, as the block grants of the foreign aid dried up, 
the CDC also lost its popularity, and, in most areas, the people 
returned to the informal traditional Jirga/Shura for conflict 
resolution. In insecure regions, the informal Jirga/Shura remain 
under the direct influence of the Taliban.  
Not surprisingly, this study also finds that many of the disputes that 
were beyond the capacity of the community Jirga/Shura were 
referred to the PCs, which means that, unlike the CDCs, the PCs are 
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perceived by local Afghans as legitimate institutions for conflict 
resolution. 
Therefore, taking the PCs legitimacy (democratically elected) and 
sustainability (institutions that will stay as long as there is the state) 
into account, it is necessary to establish democratically elected 
district and village councils – as called for in the 2004 constitution –  
instead of investing in informal institutions of Jirgas/Shuras or 
CDCs. That said, the informal Jirgas/Shuras could only be replaced 
and reformed via legitimate and sustainable institutions like the 
constitutionally mandated District Councils (DCs) and Village 
Councils (VCs). 
Although the Afghan sub-national administration is still heavily 
centralized and top-down there have been some significant 
improvements in the provincial government. The Afghan sub-
national administration was under the direct organizational structure 
of the Ministry of Interior Ministry until it was shifted to IDLG in 
mid-August 2007 (Independent Directorate of Local Governance , 
2018). The IDLG has played an essential role in facilitating 
communications and supervising both elected and appointed sub-
national political institutions (except for the public services branch, 
which is under the direct supervision of central line sectorial 
ministries). Providing capacity building programs and drafting 
policy papers, the IDLG facilitates the improvement and 
implementation of good governance in Afghan localities (Local 
Governance Policy, 2010). 
Furthermore, to align central line sectorial departments and donor 
community programs and projects, since 2005, there exist the 
coordinating and planning institutions of the Provincial 
Development Councils (PDCs) (The Asia Foundation, April 2007). 
The PDCs’ (supposedly) monthly meetings include a wide array of 
representatives of the government, the donor community, the PCs, 
and civil society (Local Governance Policy, 2010). Nevertheless, in 
practice, wherever the Afghan government holds power, both 
provincial and local corrupt warlords and strongmen predominantly 
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control district administrations. Central government appointed 
officials must either agree to the local terms of conditions if they 
wish to stay in their positions, or choose to leave. And during in the 
past five years both options have led to constant political tensions 
and instability. Thus, until warlordism and corruption are in place, 
simply transferring more power and resources to provincial 
administration would prove counterproductive and further 
undermine political stability. 
 
 
7.2.1 The Afghan PC, a Potential Institution for a Moderate 
and Gradual Devolution?     
If the current Afghan government ever managed to make peace with 
the Taliban, demobilize warlords, and successfully limit corruption, 
then a loose form of devolution of power to the provinces is one of 
the best possible strategies for improving governance, democracy, 
economic development, and political stability, particularly in the 
rural areas of Afghanistan.  
While keeping the principle of a unitary system (in the form of 
constitutionally unspecified ethnic-grand collation mentioned 
above), Afghanistan could adopt a moderate and gradual devolution, 
by transferring political, administrative and in some instances fiscal 
power to its provincial elected institutions. For implementing 
political decentralization, the Afghan PC is the most feasible 
democratic institution to build on. By clearly defining the political 
structure, the PC could either run the executive government or 
provide oversight over the appointed/elected bureaucrats. Certainly 
the latter option would be valid for a beginning.  As also called for 
by the representatives interviewed in this study, the provincial 
governor could either be elected directly by the people, or indirectly 
by the PC, or appointed by the central government and subject to the 
vote of consent and advise of the PC. To save national integration 
and prevent political crises, the president could have the 
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constitutional right to veto PC dismissals of the sub-national elected 
and appointed authorities.  Any of these suggestions would lead to 
better local governance than the existing system (governor as the 
political representative of the president appointed from the center). 
The sub-nationally (directly or indirectly) elected governor would be 
a more legitimate authority for the local people, but also the official 
responsible to the president and the provincial representatives.  
She/he could have the power to form her/his local administration, 
make budgetary allocations, and have access to resources (both 
central and local) for implementing small-scale projects including 
building infrastructure, health clinics, schools, roads, bridges, parks, 
educational, and cultural programs. This way, the government 
officials at the local level would feel responsible before the local 
population in general and also to the PC representatives for 
conducting better public services to the people. Once bureaucracies 
become accountable to the local population, trust would 
automatically improve and bring the people closer to the 
government.   
 
The 2004 Afghan constitution already approved autonomous and 
democratic provincial and district municipalities, which needs to be 
clearly defined by subsequent laws and implemented. With clearly 
defined accountability mechanisms supported by laws, the PCs 
could provide oversight and control the provincial government 
sectorial departments, including municipalities. Likewise, the 
elected district councils DCs could be handed oversight authority 
over the district relevant departments, programs, and projects. The 
PCs could also be given the provincial legislative power. Since PCs 
are nearer to the local people and issues than the parliamentarians, 
they could regulate local programs and projects by initiating bills and 
policies that could go through the National Assembly and 
presidential approval to become law.   
The electoral system is critical to the successful execution of 
transparent and fair democratic elections. While the Single-Member 
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Constituency (SMC) system is considered more transparent, 
nevertheless, taking the Afghan women and minority vulnerability 
into consideration, Proportional Representation (PR) is the most 
convincing choice for the moment for sub-national elections. 
Likewise, unless new national political parties –  that are based on 
modern political ideologies and people welfare strategies – come 
into existence, a non-party elections system would prove more 
successful than party-based. No doubt a party-based election system 
creates more political competition and accountability, but, as 
witnessed above, the non-Party system also has shown it can create 
significant political contests between the traditional elites/warlords 
and the young/educated technocrats emerging in Afghanistan during 
this last decade. 
Administratively, to promote national integration, and improve 
socioeconomic inequalities, the central government could have 
absolute control over military and foreign diplomacy. Other public 
services institutions (e.g., ministries) could be deconstructed to 
national, with the final approval authority, and the provincial, with 
the planning and implementing authority. In other words, while it is 
essential for Afghanistan to keep its final decision-making authority 
on national policies including, policing, judiciary, health, education 
system, and financial regulations, the provincial governments could 
actively be involved and autonomously authorized in adapting them 
locally. The sub-national public services sectorial 
departments/ministries of central line institutions could be 
autonomously structured under provincial government offices. The 
governor, as the administrative, political and executive director of 
provincial government affairs, could be empowered with precise 
planning and implementing authorities. Likewise, under the direct 
supervision of the governor, the district governors (Wolewals) could 
also have some power and authority in implementing the district 
relevant programs and projects.   
Based on Arend Lijphart’s (1999/2004) consociational democracy’s 
local authority, local religious and cultural groups could be given 
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local autonomy. The Afghan 2004 constitution has already made 
some considerable steps in this regard.  In the 2004 constitution and 
its subsequent laws (for example, the family laws), the Afghan 
Sunnis and Shias are already separated from each other religiously. 
Since local courts decisions are based on the Islamic Fiqh or 
jurisprudence, separate courts of Sunni and Shia could prove more 
fair and practical. Similarly, the Afghan Hindu and Sikh minorities 
should be given equal religious rights.  Linguistically, the Pashtun in 
the south, and east and the Tajiks in the North and central region 
have education curriculum based on their preferred local languages 
of Pashtu or Dari.  Other minorities should be given the same right 
to have at least primary education in their mother tongue or other 
preferred local languages. 
Fiscally, it might take decades, until Afghanistan can become self-
dependent economically. Therefore, in the beginning, the central 
government could transfer some fiscal power and resources to 
provincial levels. For example, the provincial government could 
have the authority to control small-scale income resources including 
taxations, rents, and leasing. The provincial government could also 
allocate its budget and implement small-scale public services and 
development projects including infrastructure, policing, health, 
judiciary, educational, and cultural projects and programs. 
To avoid conflict and assure equal distribution, the central 
government should hold absolute control over large-scale income 
resources including border-transit, mining, foreign aid, and other 
national or interprovincial projects and programs. By adopting 
internationally practiced successful financial mechanism and 
instruments, the central government could distribute the national 
income and uplift the poor provinces. 
However, until sustainable security and political stability between 
various groups is in place, any quick decentralization process might 
result in further destabilization and conflict. Therefore, the transfer 
of political power and fiscal resources to the PCs needs to be gradual 
and based on current conditions. 
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7.3 Future Research Prospects:  
The Afghan constitution marked the first full Afghan democracy, 
assuring its citizen equal rights and opportunities, as well as freedom 
of the press and respect for human rights. Nevertheless, the political 
ideology of Islam, recognized as a legitimate institution and the 
religion of the Afghan state and society, conflicts in many aspects 
with liberal democracy and International human rights, including the 
freedom of speech and religion, equal rights for the women and non-
Muslim, etc.  Similarly, the Taliban considers the 2004 constitution 
un-Islamic and demands its change as one of the conditions for peace 
and reintegration process with the Afghan government.  
A majority of the Afghan PC representatives, although part of the 
current democratic system, were nevertheless reluctant to take a 
stand in favor of the success of the present democracy. Many of the 
interviewed PC representatives from across six provinces, suggested 
an "Islamic democratic regime" as the suitable state system for 
Afghanistan. The Islamic democratic regime might be defined 
differently by different individuals. Nevertheless, what unifies them 
is that Islam and its fundamental Sharia principles should be 
implemented in the state constitutional system. Since the PC 
members are elected directly by Afghans in the rural areas, their 
beliefs and perceptions would be likely to reflect the local Afghans' 
understanding of the terms democracy and Islam and their roles in 
the state and society.  Thus, the PC representatives are best suited to 
the task of finding the right balance when adapting national policies 
to local conditions.  
Today, the Afghan society is politically divided between three main 
groups: (1) The liberal democrats - mostly the young Afghan 
technocrats in the cities who are partly educated abroad – support the 
US intervention and the Afghan government and are against the 
Taliban ideology and the return of the Islamic Sharia. This group is 
currently the smallest. (2) The Afghan nationalists and moderate 
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Muslims, are against the U.S. invasion, but support the Afghan 
government and are willing to include the Taliban in the current 
government structure. (3) The traditional Islamists – mostly 
educated in traditional religious schools of Madrasas in rural areas –  
are against the US invasion, and directly or indirectly support the 
Taliban movement.   
Moving forward from the findings of this dissertation, we must ask, 
if the U.S. and Afghan government ever manage to end the war with 
the Taliban and include them in the current government, what would 
Afghan democracy look like? Is democracy compatible with Islam? 
What is an ‘Islamic democratic' state system altogether? These 
remain crucial questions for future research prospects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1: Expert Interview’s Questionaire  
 
Part One: Demographic Questions: 
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o Name:                                                                                  
o Age:  
o Gender:  
o Occupation:  
o Ethnicity:  
o Province:  
o Place: 
o Date: 
o Time:  
Part Two:  Background Questions:  
2. Where do you come from in Afghanistan? 
3. If you are not from Afghanistan how long you have 
been in Afghanistan? 
4. What kind of (political, job, academic, business or 
other) affiliation do you have or had in the past 15 
years concerning the subnational governments or 
relevant in Afghanistan? 
 
Part Three: Focus group, the provincial government elected and 
appointed members: 
1. How do you define local governments? 
2. What do you think, why did people vote you? 
3. How do you define your role/job as a member of the local, 
provincial council (PC)? 
4. As a member of the PC what were your achievements for 
your locality so far? 
5. For what purposes your constituencies arrange meetings with 
you?   
6. Did you get or help in any development project (building 
schools, clinic, etc...) for your locality so far, or did you ap-
peal to the government or NOGs for this purpose? 
7. How do you see your role in the provincial council?   
8. How do you define your relations with other PC members? 
9. What are your main legal and administrative challenges 
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about the service delivery for your constituencies? 
10. What are the main political and financial hurdles in respect 
to the service delivery for your locality? 
11. How do you define your relations with the provincial/district 
governor? 
12. In your opinion what shall be done differently to make it pos-
sible for you a member of the PC to deliver better services? 
13. How do you attract your constituencies to have their votes 
for the second round? 
 
Part Four: General Questions: 
14. In your opinion how do you define the present government 
system of Afghanistan? 
15. How do you define a democratic system, and how important 
is it for Afghanistan?  
16. What is your suggestion for a strong subnational government 
system for Afghanistan? 
17. How do you see decentralization for Afghanistan? 
18. How do you see a federal system for Afghanistan? 
19. How do you define a parliamentary system for Afghanistan?  
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: The Dari Version of the Presidential 
Decree on PC Overisgt Power   
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